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1 Introduction 
In this dissertation I explore the status of instruments and related con-
cepts at the Syntax-Semantics Interface. I look into these concepts from 
the point of view of Role and Reference Grammar (or: RRG), using a core 
set of languages (primarily languages belonging to the Standard Average 
European group) for illustration. I pursue three main goals: 1) To explore 
the status of instruments in linguistic theory and provide answers to 
problems connected to instruments, 2) to deepen the RRG approach to 
these concepts and 3) to contribute to the further development of RRG as 
a theory. The central question of my investigation is: What is instrumen-
tality and how does instrumentality link to syntax? 
1.1 Instruments, instrumentals 
& comitatives: phenomena and problems 
Instruments are usually treated in terms of thematic relations in the rel-
evant literature. Such treatments are often problematic for several rea-
sons: 1) There are many theoretical problems concerning thematic rela-
tions in general and treatments of instruments usually suffer from the 
same flaws, 2) the instrument relation is usually treated only peripheral-
ly, 3) there is an alternation in many languages where the instrument 
appears as the subject and this is often not captured sufficiently or not at 
all, 4) only the standard, prototypical occurrence of instruments (such as 
in (1a)) is explored whereas there are several other constructions with 
instruments and 5) instrumental marking is cross-linguistically very 
multifunctional.  
The status of instruments is fully dependent on the general concep-
tion of thematic relations in the framework under investigation. As there 
is a wide range of conceptions of them, there is an equally diverse  
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landscape of approaches to the instrument role. For instance, for Dowty 
(1991), instruments are participants that have an equal amount of proto-
agent and proto-patient properties. This captures the fact that instru-
ments are both acted upon by a manipulator and act on another partici-
pant themselves. An example of this is given in (1a): Lumberjack acts on 
the chainsaw and in turn, it acts on the tree with the result that the tree 
is cut down. Instruments, like other thematic relations, are treated as 
primitive notions by many linguists and linguistic traditions (e.g. Lexi-
cal-Functional Grammar). A treatment in terms of primitive, unanalyza-
ble relations is highly problematic in itself, but especially problematic for 
instruments. The example in (1a) reveals that instruments have a dual 
role: they are simultaneously agentive and patientive. Treating them in 
isolation thus seems questionable. 
With respect to 3), there is an important difference between instru-
ments, implements and instrumentals. Based on the morphosyntactic 
behavior of instruments, some linguists distinguish between two differ-
ent classes of instruments. Even though the motivation for positing two 
different classes can vary, it is usually based on roughly the same obser-
vation. I refer to this alternation as the Instrument-Subject Alternation 
(or: ISA). Consider the difference between (1a–1b) and (1c–1d): 
(1) a. The lumberjack cut down the tree with the chainsaw. 
 b. The chainsaw cut down the tree. 
 c. The lumberjack cut down the tree with the axe. 
 d. *The axe cut down the tree. 
The inability of axe to occur as the subject, compared to the ability of 
chainsaw to undergo precisely that alternation has led some linguists to 
assume two distinct classes of instruments. RRG (Van Valin & LaPolla 
1997, Van Valin 2005) labels the former implements and the latter in-
struments. With respect to this alternation, there is a great deal of cross-
linguistic variation. Dutch is less permissive than English, for example. 
German disprefers ISA as well, clearly preferring an ability reading. 
Consider the example in (2). 
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(2) Dieses Messer schneid-et das Brot. 
 DEM.PROX knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF bread 
 ‘This knife cuts the bread.’ 
In (2), the referent in subject position, Messer (knife), is described as hav-
ing the ability to cut another referent (in this case, bread) rather than 
describing a situation as it unfolds. The ability-reading in Dutch is also 
less common and generally requires a modal auxiliary. Slavic, on the 
other hand, strongly disprefers instruments in subject position altogeth-
er. There are further problems with this alternation, which will be ex-
plored in chapter 3. Most theories can handle one of these issues, but not 
all. I will propose an approach that can capture the behavior of this con-
struction in all its facets. 
I reserve the term instrumental for the morphological and syntactic 
marking of the semantic concepts (either implement or instrument). 
Instrumental covers both adpositional marking and case marking. Exam-
ples of this are given in (3). Irish (Celtic) uses a preposition, but Hungar-
ian (Uralic) uses a case marker.  
(3) a. Ghearr Sean an t-arán le scian. 
  Cut.PST John DET bread with knife 
  ‘John cut the bread with a knife.’ (Irish) 
  b. János egy kés-sel felvágta a  
  John.NOM INDEF knife-INS up_cut.3SG DEF  
  kenyer-et.      
  bread-ACC      
  ‘John cut the bread with a knife.’ (Hungarian) 
Apart from differences like those between Irish and Hungarian, many 
languages mark comitatives – roughly the expression of accompaniment 
– and instruments with the same means. Consider the differences be-
tween French (Romance) and Finnish (Uralic) in (4). 
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(4) a. Jean a coupé le pain avec 
  Jean AUX.3SG cut.PTCP DEF bread with 
 
  un couteau. 
  INDEF knife 
  ‘Jean cut the bread with a knife.’ (French) 
 b. Jean travaille ensemble avec Marie. 
  Jean work.PRS.3SG together with Marie. 
  ‘Jean works together with Marie.’ 
 c. Hän kirjoitta kynä-llä.  
  3SG write.PRS.3SG pen-ADE  
  ‘He writes/is writing with a pen.’ 
  (Finnish, Karlsson 2004: 135, glossing mine) 
 d. Läsnä ol-i Veikko Väätäinen  
  Present be-PST.3SG Veikko Väätäinen  
  vaimo-ine-en.     
  wife-COM-POSS     
  ‘Veikko Väätäinen was there with his wife.’ 
  (Karlsson 2004: 145, glossing mine) 
French uses the same marker for accompaniment as for the instrument 
((4a–4b)): Marie and couteau express the former and the latter, respec-
tively, and are both marked by avec. In Finnish, by contrast, accompani-
ment is expressed by the comitative case marker -ine ((4d)), whereas the 
instrument ((4c)) is marked with the adessive case -llä. The prototypical 
use of this case is to express a form of static location, but it also encodes 
instrumentality.  
In addition to the standard occurrence of instruments and ISA, such as 
in (1a), there are also other types of examples that feature instruments 
(examples in (5)). These occurrences cover passives containing an in-
strument ((5a)), passive versions of ISA ((5b)), unaccusative construc-
tions with an instrument ((5c)), middle constructions with an instrument 
((5d)) and the like. Because such occurrences are only sporadically exam-
ined in the literature, I will provide a discussion of them and propose an 
analysis based on the standard treatment of instruments.    
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(5) a. The tree was cut down with the axe. 
 b. The bread was cut by the knife. 
 c. The door opened (with the key). 
 d. This glass breaks easily with a hammer. 
The examples in (4) illustrated that French uses typical instrumental 
marking for more than just instruments. English, Dutch and German, 
too, use this marking for a wide range of functions. The multifunctional 
nature of the preposition with in English and its counterparts in, for 
example, Dutch and German is a particular challenge. Consider (adapted 
from McKercher 2003) the various uses of with in (6). 
(6) a. Kim ate pizza with a fork.          Instrument 
 b. Kim ate pizza with her friend.    Comitative 
 c. Kim ate pizza with enthusiasm.   Manner 
 d. Kim ate pizza with pesto sauce.  Attribute 
 e. Her argues with Sandy about that issue.  Opposition 
 f. Kim needed help with that problem. Reference 
 g. Kim left her keys with her wallet.  Proximity 
 h. Kim was paralyzed with fear.  Cause 
 i. The garden swarms with bees.  Locatum 
Dutch and German would use met and mit, respectively, for all of these, 
except for (6g–6i). In this dissertation, I do not discuss all of these func-
tions as the focus of this dissertation lies on instrumentality. Neverthe-
less, many of the functions of with can be accounted for with the ap-
proach that I develop in this dissertation. 
Apart from instruments and comitatives, there are other, seemingly 
related notions. Causees, for instance, are often implicitly treated as a 
type of instrument. I argue in favor of distinguishing instruments from 
causees, partly over the strength of causation that each is under the 
scope of. In addition to causation, animacy differences between the ref-
erents is central in the distinction between causees and instruments. It is 
to this end that Force Dynamics will be integrated with RRG’s logical 
structures. Force Dynamics (Talmy 2000) is a production model of causa-
tion in that the precise type causation is the sum of the interaction of the 
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components in a configuration. Using the combinatorial possibilities of 
force dynamic configurations, Talmy proposes a wide range of causation 
types. I propose an integration of Force Dynamics with RRG as a theo-
retical contribution and I argue that my account deepens the latter’s 
approach to causation. 
Furthermore, there are other non-canonical, instrument-like notions. 
The arguments marked by with in the examples in (7) superficially look 
like instruments or comitatives but they are, in fact, neither. For exam-
ple, in (7a) hammer is not wielded by the lumberjack to arrive at a certain 
result, nor does it perform the action of running as a companion of the 
aforementioned lumberjack. In (7b), the book is not wielded and it is not 
interpreted as accompanying the running individual. Rather, it conveys 
the meaning of an attribute: The woman seems to be (at least partly) 
defined over her possession of a book. In (7c), the use of an instrument 
in the coming about of a result state is explicitly denied. However, as it 
is present in the morphosyntactic structure, it must somehow be present 
in the semantic representation as well. Finally, in (7d), the accompani-
ment is explicitly denied. From a semantic point of view, it would be 
questionable to simply negate a normal expression of accompaniment 
(i.e. comitative) as comitatives are often defined over the observation 
that two entities perform an action simultaneously. Adopting such an 
approach would be overly simplistic and present problems for the link-
ing to syntax.  
(7) a. The lumberjack ran to the store with the hammer. 
 b. The woman with the book ran to the store. 
 c. John broke the window without a hammer. 
 d. Bill went home without Eric. 
In this dissertation, I present an RRG-based analysis of the concepts su-
perficially related to instruments. In addition to ISA and the phenomena 
in (7), I will explore the occurrence of other inanimate referents in sub-
ject position and how they are related to the more canonical instances of 
instruments.  
1.2   Methodology 
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1.2 Methodology 
This dissertation is primarily an investigation of the syntax-semantics 
interface based on a small sample of languages. It is not a typological 
study in the strictest sense of the word, even though typological data are 
certainly used at times to illustrate a point. This study primarily uses 
English (West-Germanic), Dutch (West-Germanic), German (West-
Germanic) and French (Gallo-Romance) as main data points. The follow-
ing languages are also referenced to or used to varying degrees: Afri-
kaans (West-Germanic), Russian (East-Slavic), Croatian (South-Slavic), 
Serbian (South-Slavic), Bulgarian (South-Slavic), Georgian (Kartvelian), 
Finnish (Balto-Finnic), Estonian (Balto-Finnic), Hungarian (Ugric), Ice-
landic (North-Germanic), Basque (Isolate), Portuguese (Ibero-Romance), 
Spanish (Ibero-Romance), Romanian (Eastern Romance), Lithuanian 
(Baltic), Irish (Celtic), Persian (Indo-Iranian), Greek (Hellenic), Quechua 
(Quechua), Malayalam (Dravidian), Japanese (Isolate) and Jingulu (Jingu-
lu) and several others. All examples that were not drawn from the litera-
ture, including those from my own native language (Dutch), were sup-
plied and validated by native speakers. I employed questionnaires with 
example sentences in a lingua franca that the native speakers were most 
familiar with, i.e. there are 4 base questionnaires (one in Dutch, one in 
German, one in English and one in French). Many of the examples do 
not concern strict grammaticality vs. ungrammaticality. Rather, they are 
a matter of acceptability and degrees thereof. If more consultants accept-
ed an example than not, I included the example as acceptable. Beyond 
the questionnaires, further interviews conducted with consultants con-
stitute the bulk of the data used in this dissertation. Finally, the RRG-
trees were generated with Praat (Boersma & Weenink 2016). 
1.3 Glossing in this thesis 
I loosely follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules (or: LGR, Comrie 2008). There 
are, however, several exceptions. I do not apply the same level of gloss-
ing in every example. The level of detail depends on the purpose the 
example serves and the morphological complexity of the language. For 
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instance, Georgian and Basque are always glossed in extensive detail 
with an extra top line provided for the sake of clarity. Another exception 
to the standard LGR concerns the marking of morphophonological 
changes. In addition to the backslash, the locus of change is marked in 
boldface. As German and Dutch employ such a marking strategy quite 
productively to mark past tense, it will be found throughout this disser-
tation. An example of this is given in (8). 
(8) Lena lief in-s Haus. 
 Lena run\PST.3SG in-DEF house 
 ‘Lena ran into the house.’ 
Another exception to the LGR concerns the marking of personal pro-
nouns. Rather than including long sequences like PERS.PRN.DAT.3SG I 
have opted to simply use 3SG. Case information for German has mostly 
been omitted, unless directly relevant for the matter at hand or if leaving 
it out would create confusion. The relevant preposition marking the 
instrument in German is mit and it always takes dative case. As Dutch 
does not have a case system any more than English does, the fact that 
the preposition met takes oblique marking (in the rare cases where there 
is overt marking) is hardly relevant.  
I have also opted to use several labels that are not in the LGR-
inventory. Both German and Dutch exhibit a phenomenon where a pre-
fixed verb is split into the base verb and a postposed prefix or particle. 
Instances of this are labeled VPR (Verb particle/verb prefix). Dutch also 
has a syntactic element (er) with a wide array of uses, such as that of a 
placeholder pronoun or that of a locative pronoun. This element is an 
ongoing topic in Dutch (and general) linguistics and I do not wish to go 
into its details. As it is very frequent, it will appear throughout the 
Dutch examples. I will label it as Multi-purpose Syntactic Element (MSE). 
Examples of these phenomena are given in (9a) and (9b–9c), respectively.  
(9) a. Jan schlug das Fenster ein. 
  Jan break\PST.3SG DEF window VPR 
  ‘Jan broke the window.’ (German) 
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 b Ik ben er goed aan<ge>komen.  
  1SG AUX.1SG MSE good arrive<PTCP>arrive 
  ‘I arrived there well.’ (Dutch) 
 c. Jan heef-t er drie. 
  Jan have-PRS.3SG MSE three 
  ‘Jan has three.’ 
The glossing of English taken from the literature has been maintained, 
unless explicitly indicated. The glossing of languages other than Dutch, 
English, French and German was validated by the native speakers of the 
respective languages. The Dutch examples are from Standard Belgian 
Dutch. These will be simply indicated as ‘Dutch’.  
1.4 Structure of this thesis 
Chapter 1 has been a brief introduction to several basic phenomena that 
are the central object of study: Instruments, implements, causees and 
others that are either semantically or superficially related to them. I will 
employ the Role and Reference Grammar framework and therefore, 
chapter 2 supplies a detailed introduction to the theory. Chapter 3 pro-
vides an overview of the relevant literature regarding thematic relations, 
the types of semantics they employ and of instruments and related phe-
nomena. Chapter 4 presents the first major pillar of my own approach: A 
proposal to revise the concept of animacy and to merge it with another 
concept which I call autonomy. Chapter 4 also includes a brief excursion 
into a different type of analysis, using a multiple inheritance hierarchy. 
This type of hierarchy can be used as a starting point to translate parts 
of my research into Barsalou’s frame semantic approach as developed in 
the CRC 991 at the Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf (cf. Löbner 
2014, 2015, Petersen 2007/2015, Kallmeyer & Osswald 2013). Chapter 5 
presents the second major theoretical pillar. I provide an analysis of the 
causal relations that instruments occur with using Force Dynamics and I 
argue in favor of merging Force Dynamics with logical structures, a cen-
tral component of RRG’s theory of linking. In doing this, I explore a 
weaker type of causation (helping) that will constitute the core of my 
1   Introduction 
10 
 
 
 
 
analysis of a specific type of instrument-related class, the implement. 
Chapter 6 is an approach to ISA, drawing from RRG’s approach to con-
structional schemas. ISA presents special challenges for handling the 
notion of context and the cross-linguistic validity of theories of instru-
ments. The main problems concerning ISA that are often not addressed 
in the relevant literature will be discussed in detail and a solution for 
each of them will be proposed. The principle topic of chapter 7 is how to 
distinguish instruments from phenomena that are (superficially) related. 
These include comitatives and causees but also phenomena like the ones 
that the examples in (7) illustrated. Chapter 8 concerns the linking of the 
semantics of instruments, causees and comitatives (in various forms) to 
the syntactic representation. As RRG is a non-derivational theory of 
syntax, the semantic analysis of these notions will prove crucial to ac-
count for their marking and surface behavior. I primarily explore mark-
ing and linking in English, Dutch, French and German. Chapter 9 is a 
summary of the most relevant semantic analyses and morphosyntactic 
tests. 
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2 Role and Reference Grammar 
2.1 Introduction 
Role and Reference Grammar (Foley & Valin 1984, Van Valin & LaPolla 
1997, Van Valin 2005) is a functionalist grammatical framework which is 
monostratal in nature. Its ongoing development is driven by two major 
questions (Foley & Van Valin 1984, Van Valin 2005: 1): 1) What would a 
theory of language look like if it were not based on the analysis of Eng-
lish but rather on the analysis of typologically diverse languages such as 
Lakhota, Tagalog and Dyirbal? and 2) How can the interaction of the 
syntax, semantics and pragmatics in different languages with differing 
systems best be captured and explained?  
The main focus of work in RRG lies on syntax-semantics interface and 
pragmatics (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997, Van Valin 2005), although ad-
vances are being made in the area of morphology (e.g. Martín Arista 
2008, 2009, 2011, 2012 and Nolan 2010, 2011). Most RRG work is syn-
chronic in nature (including this dissertation), although there is some 
diachronic work available (e.g. Matasović 2004, Martín Arista 2011). This 
chapter is intended to serve as an overview of RRG in its present-day 
conception. 
2.2 Fundamentals 
Apart from the research questions above, RRG holds a number of fun-
damental insights that make it quite distinct from other theories. Van 
Valin (2005: 3) points out that any theory of clause structure must meet 
two fundamental requirements, as displayed in (1). 
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(1) a. A theory of clause structure should capture all of  
  the universal features of clauses without imposing 
  features on languages in which there is no evidence 
  or them. 
 b. A theory should always represent comparable structures in
  different languages in comparable ways. 
In addition to these requirements, RRG rejects any kind of underlying 
deep structure syntactic representation or transformation commonly 
found in the generative tradition, Relational Grammar and certain varie-
ties of Case Grammar. RRG’s structures can be considered to be flat and 
the syntactic representation of a given clause reflects its actually occur-
ring form very closely (Van Valin 2005: 3–4). 
In general, RRG posits a semantic base which is linked into the syntax 
using a system known as the linking algorithm (Van Valin 2005: 1–2). 
Discourse pragmatics – or information structure - influences the whole 
system and can be described as ‘mediating’ the linking (Van Valin 2005: 
1–2). Information structure operates in all aspects of the grammar. Each 
of the components of RRG has its own representation. These will be 
discussed in more depth in the following sections. The organization of 
RRG is visualized in the figure below (Van Valin 2005: 2): 
 
Figure 1: General organization of RRG. 
Central to RRG’s conception of non-relational clause structure is the 
Layered Structure of the Clause or LSC (Van Valin 2005: 3–4). It is based 
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on two distinctions; one is made between the predicate and elements 
that do not predicate. Another (within the class of non-predicating ele-
ments) is made between arguments and non-arguments. These distinc-
tions result in units that are defined semantically rather than syntactical-
ly (Van Valin 2005: 5). Each of the semantic units has a syntactic equiva-
lent, for which they are the motivating elements: 
Semantic Element(s) Syntactic Unit 
Predicate Nucleus 
Argument in semantic  
representation of predicate 
Core argument 
Non-arguments Periphery 
Predicate + Arguments Core 
Predicate + Arguments + Non-
arguments 
Clause (=Core + Periphery) 
Table 1: Semantic units underlying the syntactic units of the Layered 
 Structure of the Clause (Van Valin 2005: 5). 
It stands out that contrary to other theories, there is no syntactic unit 
called verb phrase. RRG treats VPs in languages that have them as 
grammaticalized focus structure patterns (Van Valin 2005: 8 & 80–81). 
This means that from the RRG perspective, VP is not a universal constit-
uent and thus it is not listed as a syntactic unit. 
Contrary to other theories, Role and Reference Grammar is represent-
ed through three different structures or ‘projections’: a constituent pro-
jection (representing the syntactic structure), an operator projection and 
an information structure projection. Not all of these projections need to be 
construed in every analysis or visualization. Indeed, representing all 
three simultaneously comes with certain difficulties as the result is a 
three-dimensional figure1. As the information structure projection is not 
relevant for the topic of this thesis, it is not discussed in this chapter. 
The operator and constituent projections will be discussed in the  
 
1 See Van Valin (2005: 80) for an example of such a figure. 
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following sections. For more background on information structure and 
its projection, see Van Valin (2005).  
It is important to point out that Van Valin (2008) argued for replacing 
the concept of the noun phrase with the concept of reference phrase or 
RP. Van Valin points out that language is used to refer and predicate 
(Van Valin 2005: 1). Calling an ‘NP’ a reference phrase is a logical conse-
quence of this point of view, as RPs are indeed referring expressions 
(Van Valin 2005: 28) and as such refer to real world participants. They 
are also categorically varied. That is to say, just like predicates need not 
be verbs (although they canonically are), RPs are usually headed by 
nouns but do not need to be (Van Valin 2005: 28). Consider (Van Valin 
2008: 167) the German nominative phrase Der Lange (‘The tall one’) in 
Der Lange ist eingeschlafen (‘The tall one has fallen asleep’). In German, 
it is undeniably headed by an adjective, whereas the English equivalent 
has the nominal ‘one’ as a head. RP has become the standard unit in RRG 
in post 2008-work. Consequently, in this thesis RP is used in all RRG-
analyses. In the discussion of other frameworks, the labels and terminol-
ogy of the respective approach will be respected. 
2.3 Overall organization of Role and 
Reference Grammar 
Role and Reference Grammar can be described as a semantically driven 
syntactic theory. RRG assumes that every verb belongs to a certain ak-
tionsart class. These classes are largely drawn from Vendler’s classes 
(1957, 1967) but there are also several non-Vendlerian aktionsart classes 
in RRG. Each class is paired with a so-called logical structure, which re-
flects the syntactically relevant elements. These logical structures are 
based on Dowty’s (1979) system of lexical decomposition. A logical 
structure (or: LS) is thus a decomposition of certain predicate (including 
argument slots). Such decompositions constitute the basis for the linking 
algorithm. The logical structures are not usually depicted together with 
any of the projections. An exception is when the workings of the linking 
algorithm are graphically illustrated (see section 2.5.3 and chapter 8). 
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The logical structures are stored in the mental lexicon (Van Valin 2005: 
47 & 130ff.). Parallel to the mental lexicon, the syntactic inventory is a 
syntactic equivalent in that it stores the syntactic structures available in 
a given language (Van Valin 2005: 13–15). As the logical structures (and 
aktionsarten) play a vital role in the workings of RRG, they are the prin-
ciple topic of section 2.4. The following sections will focus on the projec-
tions and their respective components, explore the semantic basis of 
RRG (which will play a pivotal role in this dissertation) and finally dis-
cuss the linking algorithm. As RRG is an elaborate theory, not all aspects 
of it will or can be discussed in this chapter. 
2.3.1 Constituent Projection 
The constituent projection is the representation of the syntactic struc-
ture in RRG. The concept of the Layered Structure of the Clause is cru-
cial here. The units posited by Van Valin (2005: 4–5) are directly reflect-
ed in the constituent projection and form the backbone of syntactic rep-
resentation: The nucleus is the syntactic unit that contains the predicate 
(Van Valin 2005: 4–5). The core consists of the nucleus and the argu-
ments of the predicate. Consider the following example from English. 
 
Figure 2: Constituent projection of a simple English sentence. 
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The clause is the core and periphery (which contains non-arguments) 
combined. The highest level in the LSC is the sentence:  
 
 Figure 3: Constituent projection including the periphery. 
In addition to these semantically motivated units, there are also prag-
matically motivated units. Languages can have an extra-core slot (pre- or 
postcore slot) and a detached position (left- or a right-detached position). 
The former contains fronted elements and question words in languages 
where they do not appear in situ (Van Valin 2005: 5). In the Dutch sen-
tence BIER drinkt hij niet graag2 (‘BEER he doesn’t like to drink’), the 
fronted object-RP is located in the precore slot (PrCS).  
 
2  ‘The Dutch adverbial graag roughly translates as gladly or happily. In English, this 
is expressed by the verb like. 
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Figure 4: Dutch sentence with a PrCS. 
The detached positions (LDP and RDP) are often the location of adverbi-
als that are set off from the rest of the sentence by an intonation break 
(Van Valin 2005: 5–6). Consider the following example. 
 
Figure 5: English sentence with an LDP  
(adapted from  Van Valin 2005: 6). 
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Van Valin (2005: 8) points out that the pragmatically motivated units 
(the detached positions and extracore slots) are not universal, whereas 
the other syntactic units are universal. This means that not all languages 
will have an extracore slot, whereas others will have both and still others 
will only have one. Van Valin (2005: 17) stresses that the extracore slots 
cannot contain more than one RP or PP at a time and that there can nev-
er be more than one such slot in the clause. It is possible in some lan-
guages to have a semantic argument of the predicate in a detached posi-
tion. If this is the case, a resumptive pronoun will be present in the core 
(Van Valin 2005: 6). Van Valin offers an example from English, but the 
situation in Dutch is similar: Ik ken hem, je broer (‘I know him, your 
brother’) or Ik zie het, dat onweer (‘I see it, that thunderstorm’). Consider: 
 
Figure 6: Dutch sentence with an RDP and a resumptive  
 pronoun in the core. 
RRG assumes that the syntactic structures are stored as templates in the 
syntactic inventory rather than being derived by any kind of phrase 
structure rule (Van Valin 2005: 13). As different languages show different 
configurations in the constituent projection, the templates in the syntac-
tic inventory are not universal but subject to considerable cross-
linguistic variation. In short, the content of the syntactic inventory is 
language specific. Judging from the Dutch examples in figures 4 and 6, 
2.3   Overall organization of Role and Reference Grammar 
 
  
 19 
 
 
we can theorize that Dutch has (at least!) a right detached position-
template, a precore slot-template and two different core templates. With-
in the process of linking semantics to syntax, the correct templates are 
selected and merged to form the complete structure that is depicted in 
the constituent projection. This non-exhaustive Dutch inventory is given 
in figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: A non-exhaustive list of Dutch syntactic templates  
 in the syntactic inventory. 
It has been previously explained that the periphery contains the non-
arguments, the adjuncts. Van Valin (2005: 19) distinguishes between 
phrasal and non-phrasal adjuncts. PPs are an example of the former, 
adverbs an example of the latter. An element of the periphery, depend-
ing on its precise content, can modify any layer of the LSC. Van Valin 
(2005: 19) posits that temporal or locational PPs (such as in figure 3) 
modify the events encoded by the elements of the core. Consequently, 
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the periphery that contains them modifies the core level. Adverbs may 
modify all three layers of the LSC, depending on their nature. For exam-
ple, a manner adverb like carefully modifies the core, but an aspectual 
adverb like completely modifies the nucleus.  
Generally speaking, the structure of phrases is similar to that of claus-
es (Van Valin 2008, Van Valin 2005: 24): both have a layered structure, 
both have a set of operators modifying this structure and a (potential) 
periphery for each level. The phrase level is equivalent to the clause and 
sentence levels in the LSC. Parallel to the LSC, there is a nucleus and a 
core3. The nucleus in an RP is usually filled by a noun but is not restrict-
ed just to nouns. Similar to the nucleus in the LSC, other categories such 
as verbs and adjectives can function as filler (Van Valin 2008, Van Valin 
2005: 28).  ‘Core arguments’ can occur in certain complex RPs. Adjec-
tives are treated as modifiers in the nuclearR periphery. Similarly to ad-
verbs in the clause, they are constrained by iconicity: Adjectives must 
occur closer to the nucleus than other modifiers and operators (Van Va-
lin 2005: 26).  
Phrases can also have a unit which functions like an extracore slot 
and a detached position (Van Valin 2005: 26). Similar to both units in the 
LSC, this ‘RP-slot’ can be phrase initial or phrase final, depending on the 
language. They are therefore termed the RP-initial position (RPIP) and 
RP-final position (RPFP) respectively. All of these units are also stored as 
templates in the syntactic inventory (Van Valin 2005: 24). An example 
for the structure of an RP is given below. The Dutch example reads ‘big 
bridges’ and is adapted from Van Valin (2005: 25).  
 
 
3 In the projections, a subscript R identifies a given unit as belonging to a reference 
phrase. Thus CORER is the nominal core. 
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Figure 8: The layered structure of a Reference Phrase. 
The account presented above applies to phrase structure in general. 
There is however an important addition to be made concerning the na-
ture of prepositional phrases. Van Valin (2005: 21–23) points out that 
from the RRG-perspective, PPs4 can be predicative or non-predicative. 
Non-predicative PPs are characterized by a flat structure. They are – as 
the name suggests – licensed by the predicate and do not predicate any-
thing themselves. They are, in other words, core arguments and the 
preposition is considered to be a type of case marker, an insight also 
shared by, for example, Fillmore (1968, 1977a). In the sentence John gave 
a book to Mary, the PP to Mary is a non-predicative PP functioning as a 
core argument5.  
A predicative PP is a PP where the adposition itself licenses an argu-
ment, contributing semantic information. Such PPs are usually found in 
the core periphery. A locational PP, such as the one in figure 3, is a good 
example. The location coded by the phrase is licensed by the adposition. 
Figure 9 shows both types of PPs (adapted from Van Valin 2005: 23). 
 
4 It would probably be more precise to use the term AP (adpositional phrase) as this 
distinction also applies to postpositional phrases in language where they occur. 
5 A core argument marked by a preposition is termed Oblique Core Argument in RRG. 
Core arguments not marked thus are Direct Core Arguments (Van Valin 2005: 7). 
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Figure 9: A non-predicative and a predicative PP in English. 
2.3.2 Operator Projection 
RRG treats grammatical categories such as tense and aspect as operators 
modifying different layers of the clause (Van Valin 2005: 8). Some opera-
tors can only modify one layer (e.g. aspect), whereas negation is the only 
operator that can occur on all three levels6 (Van Valin 2005: 9). Van Valin 
crucially points out that operators are largely language-specific; only 
negation and illocutionary force are universal. Even though operators 
modify the different layers of the LSC they are separate from them (Van 
Valin 2005: 11). Therefore, they warrant a separate projection; the opera-
tor projection. A list of operators is given in the table below (Van Valin 
2005: 9). 
  
 
6  It is to be remarked, however, that there are still important differences between 
negation on the different levels. This is a complex matter, which I will not go into 
here. 
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Operators in the LSC 
Nuclear  Core Clausal 
Aspect Directionals7 Status8 
Negation Event quantification Tense 
Directionals9  Modality10 Evidentials 
Internal (narrow 
scope) negation 
Illocutionary Force 
Table 2: Summary of operators in the LSC. 
The operator projection is treated as the mirror image of the constituent 
projection. The morphological expression of an operator is connected 
with a dashed line to the respective layer it modifies. It is crucial to point 
out that an iconic Universal Scope Constraint applies in RRG in various 
ways (Van Valin 2005: 11, 12 and 21). This principle dictates that the 
morphemes expressing nuclear operators occur closer to the verb (stem) 
than morphemes expressing core operators. In turn, morphemes express-
ing clausal operators must occur outside of those expressing core opera-
tors. According to Van Valin (2005: 11), no counter-examples to this or-
dering principle have been found to date. The sentence from figure 3 is 
repeated in figure 10, this time with the matching operator projection. 
Adverbs interact quite intensely with operators and they are iconical-
ly constrained by the operator projection and the scope of different op-
erators. That is to say, adverbs related to inner operators must be closer 
to the predicate than adverbs related to (more) outer operators (Van 
Valin 2005: 20). ‘Outer’ operators are to be understood as operators op-
erating on a higher level of the LSC. Ergo, nuclear adverbs must occur 
closer to the predicate than core adverbs. In turn, core adverbs must 
occur closer to the predicate than clausal adverbs (Van Valin 2005: 21). 
 
7  Only those expressing the orientation or motion of one participant with reference 
to another participant or to the speaker. 
8  Epistemic modals, external negation. 
9  Only those modifying orientation of action or event without reference to partici-
pants. 
10  Root modals, e.g. ability, permission, obligation. 
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Figure 10: Constituent and operator projections of an English sentence. 
Similar to the LSC, phrases have their proper set of operators and an 
operator projection. These operators have scope over different levels, as 
is the case with the LSC. For example, definiteness is an RP-level opera-
tor whereas quantification is a core level operator. A list of RP-operators 
is provided below (Van Valin 2005: 24). 
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Operators in the layered structure of the RP 
NuclearR CoreR RP 
Nominal aspect11 Number Definiteness 
Quantification (quanti-
fiers) 
Deixis 
Negation 
Table 3: Operators in the layered structure of the RP. 
The example of the RP in the previous section only had a constituent 
projection. Expanding the phrase from figure 8 to de drie grote bruggen 
(‘the three big bridges’) involves including operators. The expanded 
phrase is given below, this time with the operator projection included. 
 
Figure 11: Constituent and operator projections of a Dutch RP. 
 
11 Count-mass distinction, classifiers in classifier languages. 
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It is crucial to point out that the operator projection is just that, a projec-
tion. Operators can be included in the logical structure of a sentence (or 
can be omitted for the sake of clarity) to represent the scope of each 
within this structure. 
2.4 The Semantic Architecture of Role and 
Reference Grammar 
2.4.1 Aktionsarten 
RRG is a semantically driven syntactic theory. The semantic representa-
tion of sentences is directly based on the semantic representation of the 
predicating element (usually the verb). It is crucial to describe and cap-
ture the semantic relationships that hold between a predicate and its 
arguments. As the most typical predicate is a verb, a systematic theory 
of verb classes is at the heart of Role and Reference Grammar. RRG as-
sumes that verbs can be classified according to their aktionsarten 
(Vendler 1957, 1967). It recognizes the Vendlerian aktionsart classes but 
also includes non-Vendlerian classes. Each class can be defined over a set 
of features, summarized in a feature matrix. Van Valin (2005: 32) points 
out that there is great cross-linguistic validity to the proposed verb clas-
ses. Hence, it is not unreasonable to assume that these distinctions are 
universal to human language.  
Four features characterize the aktionsart classes: [±static], 
[±dynamic], [±telic] and [±punctual]. I provide a short description of 
each of them, followed by an overview of tests that help determine the 
precise aktionsart class. 
Van Valin points out that [+static] verbs code a ‘non-happening’, 
whereas [-static] refers to a ‘happening’ (Van Valin 2005: 33). A fairly 
rudimentary way to test this is to ask the question ‘what is happening?’. 
If the sentence that is to be tested could be a possible answer, then the 
verb is [-static]. For example, John is running could be an answer to that 
question but John knows Mary is not. Hence, run is [-static] and know is 
[+static]. 
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The feature [±dynamic] is related to whether or not the situation coded 
by the verb involves action. [+dynamic] verbs can be modified by so-
called dynamic adverbs such as violently amongst others. This also con-
stitutes the test for this feature (see below).  
The feature [±telic] refers to whether or not the situation coded by the 
verb has an endpoint. [+telic] verbs do, [-telic] verbs do not have an  
inherent endpoint. In a sentence like John knows Mary the verb (a state) 
does not have an inherent endpoint, making it [-telic]. This can be con-
trasted with the ice melted where the point in time where the ice has 
completely turned to water is the inherent endpoint. 
The feature [±punctual] refers to whether or not the situation coded 
by the verb has internal duration. In a sentence like the window shat-
tered, the event coded by the verb is a punctual change-of-state. The 
change-of-state occurs instantaneously. As such, it is considered 
[+punctual]. The feature matrix for all classes is given in table 4 (Van 
Valin 2005: 33). 
Class Features 
State [+static] [-dynamic] [-telic] [-punctual] 
Activity [-static] [+dynamic] [-telic] [-punctual] 
Achievement [-static] [-dynamic] [+telic] [+punctual] 
Semelfactive [-static] [±dynamic] [-telic] [+punctual] 
Accomplishment [-static] [-dynamic] [+telic] [-punctual] 
Active  
accomplishment 
[-static] [+dynamic] [+telic] [-punctual] 
Table 4: Feature matrix for the base aktionsart classes as recognized  
 by RRG. 
Two of these classes, however, warrant a closer look: semelfactives and 
active accomplishments. Semelfactives are pure, punctual events without 
a change of state. Examples include sentences like the light flashed (Van 
Valin 2005: 32), where the state of the light after the event is identical to 
the state of the light before the flashing took place. In other words, there 
is no result state. There is one further important point to make with 
respect to semelfactives. In the feature matrix they are listed as either 
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[+dynamic] or [-dynamic]. This simply reflects the fact that some sem-
elfactives are indeed dynamic in nature, a fact which is represented by a 
do´ in the logical structure (see below). Consider (adapted from Van 
Valin 2005: 31ff.): 
(2) a. The light flashed (*violently). 
 b. John coughed (violently). 
The acceptability of the adverb in (2b) and the unacceptability of that 
adverb in (2a) show that semelfactives do come in two flavors. This has 
to be borne in mind when applying the aktionsart tests. 
The most important non-Vendlerian aktionsart is the active accom-
plishment. Active accomplishments can be considered as telically used 
activity predicates (Van Valin 2005: 32). They are derived from activity 
predicates, a fact that becomes very clear in the logical structure of both 
classes: the LS of an active accomplishment is a subset of the LS of an 
activity predicate (see below for further details). Consider the following 
examples (adapted from Van Valin 2005: 33): 
(3) a. I ran.   = activity 
 b. I ran to the park.  = active accomplishment 
 c. Dana ate fish.  = activity 
 d. Dana ate the fish.   = active accomplishment 
All of these aktionsart classes have causative counterparts. These classes 
will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
Drawing from the work of different linguists, RRG provides a set of 
tests with which the precise patterning of a given verb in a given lan-
guage can be determined. It is, however, crucial to realize that these tests 
come with numerous caveats. First, the tests have to be adapted to fit the 
language under investigation (Van Valin 2005: 35). For example, tests 4 
and 5 use the format [Prep + unit of time]. In Van Valin (2005) and in 
this chapter, the tests appear in an English-specific format (in an hour vs. 
for an hour). In the case of the for/in-alternation, it has to be determined 
how the language in question expresses for and in in their temporal 
senses (Van Valin 205: 37). Second, these tests have their limitations with 
respect to individual verbs. For example, the verb bleed is an activity but 
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is not compatible with dynamic adverbs and thus fails test 2 (Jens 
Fleischhauer, p.c.). Despite these limitations, the tests are a powerful tool 
to determine the aktionart class of a given predicate. The account pre-
sented below is the one presented in Van Valin (2005) and represents the 
standard RRG-account.  
Test 1 involves the use of the progressive and identifies a verb as an 
actvity, an accomplishment or an active accomplishment if it is  
compatible with the progressive. With the other classes, the progressive 
is less (or not at all) compatible. Consider for example the questionable 
grammaticality of sentences like *The glass was shattering or *I was see-
ing the painting. Most states disallow the progressive altogether, whereas 
achievements seem to allow it with plural subjects only. Semelfactives 
can occur with the progressive, but only in an iterative reading (Van 
Valin 2005: 35–36). In both cases, the verb patterns like an activity verb 
and no longer like an achievement or a semelfactive, respectively (Van 
Valin 2005: 36). Causative states are particularly interesting in this re-
gard.  Causative states allow the progressive more easily when the state 
of affairs described by the sentence is more actional in nature. Consider 
(Van Valin 2005: 39) the sentence your attitude upsets/?is upsetting me as 
compared to your boorish behavior upsets/is upsetting me. There are two 
important caveats with this test: 1) it is only useful if the language in 
question has progressive aspect and 2) it does not isolate a singular 
property. Rather, it sets three classes apart from the others (Van Valin 
2005: 35). I have therefore listed the property tested by test 1 as ‘multi-
ple*’ in table 6. 
Test 2 involves the use of dynamic adverbs and isolates [±dynamic]. 
The compatibility of the verb under investigation with an adverb encod-
ing a dynamic action reveals a positive value for dynamicity. An im-
portant restriction for this test is that no dynamic adverb be used that 
requires a controlling subject (Van Valin 2005: 36). Doing so would mean 
mixing the properties [±dynamic] and [±controlling] which could yield 
wrong or distorted results. Incompatibility might then be due to the 
agentive reading of the adverb conflicting with semantic properties of 
the verb. Consider (Van Valin 2005: 36) the examples in (4). 
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(4) a. The dog shivered.    Activity ([+dynamic]) 
 b. The dog shivered violently.  Activity ([+dynamic]) 
 c. *The dog shivered deliberately. Activity ([+dynamic]) 
With test 2, causative states again present an interesting, additional 
complication: The more actional the state of affairs described by the 
sentence is, the more acceptable dynamic adverbs will be, e.g. (Van Valin 
2005: 40) The clown actively amused the children. 
Test 3 isolates [±punctual] and involves using pace adverbs (e.g.: 
quickly, rapidly, slowly etc.). In other words, test 3 tests whether or not a 
verb has temporal duration. If the pace adverb and the verb are compati-
ble, the verb has temporal duration and thus is [-punctual]. For example: 
The ice melted slowly (melt = accomplishment, [-punctual]) as opposed to 
*The window shattered slowly (shatter= achievement, [+punctual]). This 
test is not linked through any kind of redundancy with test 2. These pace 
adverbs are compatible with [-punctual] irrespective of the dynamicity 
of the verb. For example (after Van Valin 2005: 36): The ice melted slowly 
as opposed to *The ice melted violently. The main caveat with test 3 is 
that adverbs denoting very short units of time distort the test results. 
Using such adverbs could lead the user to wrongly rate [+punctual] 
predicates, such as achievements and semelfactives, as [-punctual]. Con-
sider for example (Van Valin 2005: 36–37) the sentence the bomb explod-
ed instantly/*gradually (achievement, [+punctual]). Semelfactives, again, 
seem to allow for an iterative reading12, making them pattern like activi-
ties (see above).  It is thus important to use adverbs denoting an ade-
quately long temporal interval. 
Test 4 involves adding (in English) a for-PP with a temporal meaning. 
As such, this test focusses on whether a verb has temporal duration or 
not. Consider the sentence (Van Valin 2005: 37) he read the book for an 
hour. The PP specifies that the event denoted by the verb went on for a 
certain amount of time. No reference to any endpoint is given. All clas-
ses except achievements and semelfactives are compatible with for-PPs 
and thus have duration in time. Semelfactives are only compatible with 
 
12 To counteract any iterative reading, once (or a similar adverb) can be added (Van 
Valin 2005: 36–37). 
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for-PPs denoting very short time spans. An important caveat with this 
test is that states denoting inherent properties do not take for-PPs (Van 
Valin 2005: 37) as in for example ?John was intelligent for an hour. One 
last remark needs to be made. Accomplishments and active accomplish-
ments can co-occur with for-PPs. Van Valin (2005: 37–38) points out that 
this follows from their [-punctual] nature (as determined by test 3). Van 
Valin (2005: 37–38) considers the occurrence of for-PPs with these clas-
ses irrelevant and they are therefore marked as such in table 5. 
Test 5 is often used in conjunction with test 4 and uses an in-PP with 
a temporal meaning. This test focuses on terminal points (Van Valin 
2005: 37). In the sentence he read the book in an hour, the act of reading 
is complete. The reading took one hour and the book has been finished. 
A caveat with test 5 is that even though achievements have an endpoint 
(i.e. [+telic]) they are incompatible with most in-PPs due to their 
[+punctual] nature. Only PPs denoting very short time segments are 
possible (e.g. in a fraction of a second). Practically speaking, accomplish-
ments, active accomplishments and their causative counterparts take in-
PPs. Tests 4 and 5 are often collectively known as the for/in-alternation 
and are used to distinguish the [+telic] classes from the [-telic] classes. 
Van Valin points out that both tests should be used with ‘temporal ex-
pressions of substantial duration’ (Van Valin 2005: 37). 
Both semelfactives and achievements are [+punctual] and test 6 is 
used to distinguish them. The verb is used as a stative modifier. Consider 
(after Van Valin 2005: 38): 
(5) a. The window shattered à The shattered window. 
 b. The light flashed. à *The flashed light. 
As semelfactives are pure events without a result state, they cannot be 
used as a stative modifier. 
Test 7 makes use of a paraphrase to ascertain whether the verb is 
causative or not. It is however crucial that the number of arguments 
remain constant: All the arguments of the original sentence have to fea-
ture in the paraphrase. Consider the examples (Van Valin 2005: 38) in (6). 
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(6) a. The cat popped the balloon.  
  The cat caused the balloon to pop. 
 b. The hot water melted the ice.  
  The hot water caused the ice to melt. 
 c. Leslie runs.  
  *Leslie causes to run./*Leslie causes herself to run. 
It is important to stress that this test cannot be applied to single-
argument verbs as using a cause-paraphrase with only one argument is 
not possible (6c). Causativity always includes (at least) two participants. 
Values with caveats are marked with an asterisk in the table. Table 5 is a 
summary of the aktionsart tests and their result when applied to the 
individual classes including the causative versions of each (Van Valin 
2005: 39). Table 6 is a summary of the aktionsart tests, the properties that 
they test and possible caveats. Note that the question-answer pairing has 
been included as test 1’. It is not featured in Van Valin (2005) as a test in 
its own right, but due to its usefulness it should be included here. The 
causative classes are derived from the non-causatives ones, a fact which 
is represented in the table. The tests were applied to all example sen-
tences in this book.  
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Class T1 
 
T2 T3 
 
T4 T5 T6 T7 
State No* No No Yes* No Yes No 
Achievement No* No No* No* No* Yes No 
Semelfactive No* No* No* Yes* No* No No 
Accomplishment Yes No Yes Irrelevant* Yes Yes No 
Activity Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Active  
accomplishment 
Yes Yes Yes Irrelevant* Yes Yes No 
Causative state Yes* Yes* No Yes No Yes Yes 
Causautive 
achievement 
No Yes* No* No No* Yes Yes 
Causative  
semelfactive 
No* Yes* No* No* No* No Yes 
Causative 
accomplishment 
Yes Yes* Yes Irrelevant* Yes Yes Yes 
Causative  
activity 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Caus. active 
accomplishment 
Yes Yes Yes Irrelevant* Yes Yes Yes 
Table 5: Aktionsart tests and the values for the respective  
 aktionsart classes. 
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Test Format Property tested Caveat 
1 Progressive Multiple* Only in  
languages with 
progressive  
aspect 
2 Dynamic adverb [±dynamic] Avoid adverbs 
with controlling 
subject 
3 Pace adverb [±punctual] Avoid time units 
that are very 
short 
4 For-PP Temporal duration (1) Semelfactives 
only with PPs 
denoting very 
short intervals 
(2) Not with state 
predicates  
denoting inher-
ent properties  
5 In-PP Terminal point Achievements 
only possible 
with PPs denot-
ing very short 
intervals 
6 Stative modifier Result state with 
[+punctual] verb 
 
7 Causative para-
phrase 
Causativity Maintain number 
of arguments! 
 
1’ Question-answer [±static]  
Table 6: Summary of aktionsart tests with tested properties  
 and caveats. 
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2.4.2 Logical structures 
Each aktionsart class is represented by a certain logical structure. In 
RRG, the system of lexical decomposition proposed by Dowty (1979) in a 
modified form is used as the basis for the logical structures. RRG as-
sumes that the LSs of the aktionsart classes are all derived from either an 
activity or a state predicate. States are represented as bare predicates 
whereas activities are characterized by the predicate do´ in their logical 
structure. In other words, activities and states are basic and all others are 
derived from them (Van Valin 2005: 42). Achievements are characterized 
by the presence of the operator INGR (ingressive), accomplishments by 
the presence of BECOME. Semelfactives are characterized by the pres-
ence of the SEML-operator and causatives are characterized by the 
CAUSE-operator. It is to be borne in mind that causative predicates have 
a more complex logical structure following the pattern α CAUSE β, 
where α and β are logical structures of any type (Van Valin 2005: 45). 
In the LS, each of the aktionsart classes is represented as an operator 
or combination of operators. Bold face indicates a predicate and the vari-
ables x, y and z represent the argument slots. A list of sentences with 
their corresponding logical structures (adapted from Van Valin 2005: 
42ff.) is given in (7). 
(7) a. John knows Pat.   State 
  know´ (John, Pat) 
 b. Carl ate pizza.   Activity 
  do´ (Carl, [eat´ (Carl, pizza)]) 
 c. The window shattered.  Achievement 
  INGR shattered´ (window) 
 d. The ice melted.   Accomplishment 
  BECOME melted´ (ice) 
 e. Dana glimpsed the picture.  Semelfactive (stative) 
  SEML glimpse´ (Dana, picture) 
 f.  Mary coughed.    Semelfactive (dynamic) 
  SEML do´ (Mary, [cough´ (Mary)]) 
 g. Chris ran to the park.   Active accomplishment 
  do´ (Chris, [run´ (Chris)]) & INGR be-at´ (park, Chris)  
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 h. The dog scared the boy.   Causative state 
  [do´ (dog, Ø)] CAUSE [feel´ (boy, [afraid´])] 
 i. The girl walked the dog.   Causative activity 
  [do´ (girl, Ø)] CAUSE [do´ (dog, [walk´ (dog)])] 
 j. The cat popped the balloon.  Causative achievement 
  [do´ (cat, Ø)] CAUSE [INGR popped´ (balloon)] 
 k. The hot water melted the ice.  Causative 
        accomplishment 
  [do´ (hot water, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME melted´ (ice) 
 l. The soldier flashed the light. Causative  
        semelfactive  
  [do´ (soldier, Ø)] CAUSE [SEML do´ (light, [flash´  
  (light)])] 
 m. The Praetor marched the soldiers to the fort. 
        Causative active 
        accomplishment 
  [do´ (Praetor, Ø)] CAUSE [do´ (soldiers, [march´  
  (soldier)]) & INGR be-at´ (fort, soldiers)] 
A small note on causation has to be made at this point. Van Valin (2005: 
42) distinguishes between three kinds of causation: direct, indirect and 
permissive causation. The former two are represented by CAUSE in the 
logical structure, the latter is represented by LET. However, in the logi-
cal structures the (potential) distinctions are generalized over for practi-
cal reasons (Van Valin, p.c.). This means that the three types of causation 
are amalgamated – as far as the LS is concerned – into CAUSE. Table 7 is 
a summary of possible LS-configurations. 
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Aktionsart Class Logical Structure 
STATE predicate´ (x) or (x, y) 
ACTIVITY do´ (x, [predicate´ (x) or (x, y)]) 
ACHIEVEMENT INGR predicate´ (x) or (x, y) or 
INGR do´ (x, [predicate´ (x) or (x, y)]) 
SEMELFACTIVE SEML predicate´ (x) or (x, y) or 
SEML do´ (x, [predicate´ (x) or (x, y)]) 
ACCOMPLISHMENT BECOME predicate´ (x), (x, y) or 
BECOME do´ (x, [predicate´ (x) or (x, y)]) 
ACTIVE  
ACCOMPLISHMENT 
do´ (x, [predicate1´ (x, (y))]) & INGR pred-
icate2´ (z, x) or (y)  
CAUSATIVE α CAUSE β, where α, β are logical structure 
of any type 
Table 7: Lexical representations for aktionsart classes  
 (Van Valin 2005: 45). 
2.5 Linking semantics to syntax 
In the previous sections, I have introduced the basics of the syntactic 
representation and the semantics of the theory. In the following sections, 
the mechanisms relating semantics to syntax will be discussed. 
2.5.1 The Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy and the Macroroles 
In the linking of the semantic base into the syntax, RRG employs two 
crucial tools: the macroroles (actor and undergoer) and the actor-
undergoer hierarchy (AUH). Macroroles (Van Valin 2005: 60, Van Valin & 
LaPolla 1997, Van Valin 1977, 1999 and 2004, Foley & Van Valin 1984) 
are generalized semantic roles or GSRs.  
GSRs have been proposed by various scholars in recent decades, in 
various incarnations (see Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 51ff.). Dowty, 
for example, posits semantic proto-roles as cluster concepts rather than 
as discrete semantic roles. Van Valin (1999: 373) points out that GSRs 
have important functions in monostratal theories of syntax as they are 
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employed to capture important generalizations that are handled in terms 
of deep subjects and objects (and similar devices) in the various versions 
of transformational grammar. The main motivation behind GSRs is that 
there is a fundamental opposition between the two cardinal arguments 
of a transitive predication (Van Valin 1999: 373, 2005: 60-61). Van Valin 
points out that many syntactic phenomena are tied to these two cardinal 
arguments. RRG’s macroroles are similar to Dowty’s proto-roles in that 
both are derived concepts with no invariant semantic entailments (Levin 
& Rappaport Hovav 2005: 68), but they differ with respect to their im-
portance for linking mechanisms (Ibid.) In RRG, they occupy a promi-
nent position in many aspects of the system. It is crucial to stress that 
GSRs are not thematic relations. Rather, Van Valin distinguishes (1999: 
373) between three levels of semantic relationships: verb-specific seman-
tic roles, thematic relations as generalizations across verb-specific roles 
and, finally, GSRs as generalizations across thematic relations. The first 
type does not really play any role in RRG, the second can play a role in 
interpretation and differences therein. For linking, the GSRs are by far 
the most important ones. GSRs are partly motivated by similar consider-
ations that inspired the concept of thematic relations (e.g. active vs. pas-
sive sentences). GSRs are, however, an attempt to address the inherent 
shortcomings of standard thematic relations (Dowty 1991). Due to their 
generalized nature, they are much more robust and adequate to capture 
the behavior of a grammatical system. Most approaches using GSRs have 
two such roles, although some linguists posit three roles (e.g. Primus 
1999). Van Valin (1999) provides arguments against three macroroles, 
defending the dual nature of RRG’s GSR-conception. First, some lan-
guages disprefer or even completely prohibit three arguments in a single 
core (Van Valin 2004: 74ff). Therefore, a hypothetical third macrorole 
can never be universal. As such, it would not be adequate to use as a 
cornerstone of syntactic theory. Second, morphosyntactic coding of ac-
tor and undergoer is fairly consistent cross-linguistically, contrary to the 
coding of the third argument in a ditransitive predication (Ibid.), which 
is typologically not consistent at all. 
RRG’s macroroles are semantic notions that play a crucial role in the 
syntax (Van Valin 2004: 64). As was explained above, actor and  
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undergoer are distinct from both thematic relations and syntactic rela-
tions such as subject and direct object. RRG does not use these latter two 
concepts because they are deemed to be non-universal (Van Valin 2005: 
89ff.). Rather, actor and undergoer are the pivotal linking concepts in 
RRG. Put simply, the actor is the most agent-like argument and the un-
dergoer is (usually) the most patient-like argument. Altough the notions 
have no place in RRG, actor and undergoer can be (more or less) equated 
to ‘logical subject’ and ‘logical object’. The third argument of ditransitive 
verbs is treated as a non-macrorole argument (NMR). This means that the 
argument in question simply does not receive a macrorole.  Single-
argument verbs have either the actor or the undergoer macrorole, corre-
lating with the respective presence or absence of do´ in the logical struc-
ture (Van Valin 2005: 63). Throughout the linking process, reference is 
made to the macroroles and, to a lesser extent, the NMR (for example in 
the domain of case assignment – Van Valin 2009a and Van Valin 2005: 
108–110).  
Because the base semantics in RRG are dealt with in terms of logical 
structures, the assignment of macroroles to arguments of the predicate 
can be described in terms of the argument positions relative to each oth-
er. The more ‘agent’-like arguments will be to the left (in the LS) of the 
more ‘patient’-like arguments. It is therefore possible to capture the rela-
tion between macroroles and the arguments in the LS in terms of a hier-
archy, the Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy (Van Valin 2005: 61 & 126): 
 
Figure 12: The Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy (AUH). 
The argument in the LS that ranks highest on the AUH is selected as 
actor, the argument that ranks lowest is selected as undergoer. If there is 
a third argument, it is neither the highest nor the lowest and therefore 
becomes the non-macrorole argument (NMR). Actor assignment is not 
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variable. Undergoer assignment is variable, although there is a default. 
Variable undergoer selection is possible in certain languages, such as 
English and Dutch. RRG analyzes the ‘dative shift’ phenomenon in the 
languages (and verbs) that allow it in terms of variable undergoer selec-
tion (Van Valin 2005: 61ff, Foley & Van Valin 1985). Consider the follow-
ing examples of macrorole assignment (adapted from Van Valin 2005: 
46ff. & 61). Example (8d) is the dative-shifted version of (8c): 
(8) a. The ice melted. 
  BECOME melted´ (ice) 
      U 
 b. Sara melted the ice. 
  [do´ (Sara, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME melted´ (ice)] 
        A        U 
 c. Pat gave the book to Chris. 
  [do´ (Pat, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME have´ (Chris, book)] 
       A              NMR    U 
 d. Pat gave Chris the book. 
  [do´ (Pat, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME have´ (Chris, book)] 
        A                U     NMR 
Macrorolehood and NMR-hood have important implications for the 
workings of the theory. The selection of the Privileged Syntactic Argu-
ment (PSA) – the closest RRG-equivalent to the notion of the traditional 
subject – is selected on the basis of the macrorole-status of the argu-
ments in the logical structure. The macrorole assignment principles are 
summarized below (Van Valin 2005: 63). 
(9) Default Macrorole Assignment Principles 
 a. Number: the number of macroroles a verb takes is less 
  than or equal to the number of arguments in its logical 
  structure.   
  1. If a verb has two or more arguments in its logical 
    structure, it will take two macroroles;  
  2. If a verb has one argument in its logical structure, 
   it will take one macrorole. 
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 b. Nature: for verbs which take one macrorole, 
  1. If the verb has an activity predicate in its logical  
   structure, the macrorole is actor. 
  2. If the verb has no activity predicate in its logical  
   structure, the macrorole is undergoer. 
RRG distinguishes between syntactic transitivity (S-transitivity) and 
macrorole transitivity (M-transitivity). As macroroles have such a pivot-
al position within the theory, the concept of M-transitivity is the more 
important of the two. S-transitivity is an indication of the number of 
direct core arguments, whereas M-transitivity is an indication of the 
number of macroroles a verb takes (Van Valin 2005: 63–64). The im-
portance of macroroles for the workings of RRG cannot be underesti-
mated. Case marking and preposition assignment (Van Valin 2005: 
107ff.), for instance, are tied to the macrorole-status of the argument in 
question.  Dative case (in languages with a case system) is treated as the 
default case for NMRs, for example. Atypical case assignment is dealt 
with in terms of exceptional M-transitivity (Dahm-Draksic 1997, Van 
Valin 1991, Van Valin 2005). Semantic valence refers to the number of 
arguments in the logical structure. A table (adapted from Van Valin 
2005: 64) comparing M-transitivity and semantic valence is given in table 
8. Transitivity is always understood as M-transitivity in this book, unless 
otherwise specified. 
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Semantic 
valence 
Macrorole 
number 
M-
transitivity 
Example verb 
0 0 Atransitive rain, snow 
1 1 Intransitive die 
1 or 2 1 Intransitive drink (activity)13 
2 2 Transitive drink (active  
accomplishment) 
2 2 Transitive kill 
3 2 Transitive set 
3 2 Transitive send 
Table 8: Transitivity in Role and Reference Grammar. 
2.5.2 Privileged Syntactic Argument 
Partly as a reaction to the problematic handling of ergative languages in 
terms of grammatical relations, RRG posits the so-called privileged syn-
tactic argument of a construction (or: PSA). Van Valin points out that in 
all languages there are restrictions on the RPs and PPs that can feature 
in syntactic constructions. These restrictions are said to define a privi-
leged syntagmatic function with respect to the construction (Van Valin 
2005: 94). It is crucial to make clear that one cannot speak of ‘the PSA in 
Dutch’ or ‘the PSA in English’. PSAs are constructionally defined (Van 
Valin 2005: 99). Therefore, there is no single PSA for a given language. 
Rather, English or Dutch have many PSAs, one per construction. All 
PSAs in one and the same language can be quite similar, however. It 
would be erroneous to treat the PSA as a notational variant of the term 
subject. ‘Subject’ is treated as a non-universal concept in RRG. The so-
called S-function is considered to be a (restricted) neutralization of the 
actor and the undergoer of an intransitive verb. Simply put, if a language 
treats the actor-argument and the undergoer-argument of an intransitive 
verb the same way, then the language has an S-function. To illustrate: If 
a language treats John in John ran and in John died the same way, it has 
 
13  If the second argument of activity verbs is non-referential, it does not take a macro-
role. If it is referential, a second macrorole is assigned (Van Valin 2005: 64, also see 
Van Valin & LaPolla 1997). 
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an S-function. Languages like English, German and Dutch have such an 
S-function, but others, such as Acehnese, do not (Van Valin 2005: 96). In 
languages like Dutch and English the S, the actor of the transitive verb 
(AT) and the ‘derived subject’14 (d-S) are treated alike as PSA; they are 
‘restrictively neutralized’. In Acehnese, there is no such neutralization: 
Actor-PSAs are treated differently from undergoer-PSAs. Van Valin 
points out that besides the aforementioned S-function, languages are 
often very consistent in their treatment of PSAs across constructions. 
This high level of consistency in a given language can allow for positing 
a ‘subject’ as a kind of generalized PSA if most (or even all) of the major 
constructions in a language have the same pattern of restricted neutrali-
zation (Van Valin 2005: 99). 
After the macroroles have been assigned to arguments in the logical 
structure by the application of the AUH, the PSA has to be assigned. The 
assignment of the PSA can be captured in terms of an accessibility hier-
archy, which, in essence, is the actor half of the AUH (Van Valin 2005: 
100): 
(10) Arg. of DO > 1st arg. of do´ > 1st arg. of pred´ (x, y) > 2nd 
 arg. of pred´ (x, y) > arg. of pred´ (x) 
In accusatively-aligned languages, the highest-ranking direct core argu-
ment (in terms of (10)) becomes PSA. In ergatively-aligned languages, 
the lowest-ranking direct core argument becomes PSA. The hierarchy – 
and the markedness of the choices – is thus inverse for ergatively-
aligned languages. Principles for the default and marked assignment of 
the PSA can be now drawn up (Van Valin 2005: 100). These are given in 
table 9. 
  
 
14 Crudely speaking, the subject of a passive. 
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Syntactic system Default choice for 
PSA 
Choice for PSA  
requiring special 
construction 
Accusative Actor Undergoer [Passive] 
Ergative Undergoer Actor [Antipassive] 
Table 9: PSA-assignment overview. 
There is considerable cross-linguistic variation with respect to the PSA 
along three dimensions. First, there are languages that have variable 
PSAs. This means that not only the default choice for PSA is allowed, but 
also a marked choice (e.g. English and Dutch). Other languages (e.g. 
Lakhota) have fixed or invariable PSAs: they only have the default 
choice available to them. Roughly speaking, such languages do not have 
a passive (or antipassive in the case of ergative systems). Second, lan-
guages vary with respect to the required macrorole status for the PSA. 
Some languages only allow macrorole arguments as PSAs, whereas oth-
ers also allow non-macrorole direct core arguments to function as PSA. 
German is an example of the former, Icelandic of the latter (Van Valin 
2005: 100). However, oblique core arguments becoming PSA seem to be 
crosslinguistically strongly dispreferred (Van Valin 2005: 136, Van Valin 
2009b). Third, some languages have case-sensitive PSAs (e.g. English and 
German). Others have case-insensitive PSAs (e.g. Belhare). Examples of 
PSA-assignment are given in (11). 
(11) a. Pat gave the book to Chris. Default assignment 
  [do´ (Pat, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME have´ (Chris, book)] 
 A+PSA            NMR     U 
 b. The book was given to Chris by Pat. Marked assignment 
  [do´ (Pat, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME have´ (Chris, book)] 
  A+ Peripheral PP             NMR  U+PSA 
2.5.3 The Linking Algorithm 
All of the aforementioned systemic devices come together in the linking 
algorithm, the centerpiece of RRG. The linking algorithm can be consid-
ered as a set of ordered rules that relate the semantics to the syntax, with 
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discourse pragmatics playing an influential role (figure 1). The linking 
algorithm is considered bidirectional. It not only links semantics to syn-
tax, but also maps a syntactic structure onto a semantic base through use 
of a parser. This ‘reversed’ linking occurs when language material is 
processed by the hearer. In other words, one direction captures language 
production, the other captures language comprehension (Van Valin 2005: 
129). The RRG linking system is regulated by a general, overarching 
constraint, called the completeness constraint. It is given in (12). 
(12) Completeness constraint (Van Valin 2005: 129–130)  
All of the arguments explicitly specified in the semantic represen-
tation of a sentence must be realized syntactically in the sentence, 
and all of the referring expressions in the syntactic representation 
of a sentence must be linked to an argument position in a logical 
structure in the semantic representation of the sentence. 
One can summarize the linking system as follows: The predicate comes 
with a certain logical structure. The semantic representation is built up 
out of these components in the lexicon. The semantic representation and 
the information therein determine the choice of syntactic templates 
(stored in the syntactic inventory). The syntactic template selection prin-
ciple states that the number of arguments a verb takes must be equal to 
the number of positions that arguments can appear in (in the core). This 
can be considered a logical consequence of the completeness constraint. 
The syntactic template selection principle can be complemented by lan-
guage-specific requirements, however. The syntactic template selection 
principle and language-specific qualifications (Van Valin 2005: 130) are 
given in (13). 
(13) Syntactic template selection principle 
The number of syntactic slots for arguments and argument-
adjuncts within the core is equal to the number of distinct speci-
fied argument positions in the semantic representation of the 
core. 
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 Language-specific qualifications 
 1. All cores in the language have a minimum syntactic 
  valence of 1. 
 2. Argument-modulation voice constructions reduce the  
  number of core slots by 1. 
 3. The occurrence of a syntactic argument in the pre/post-  
  core slot reduces the number of core slots by 1 (may override 
  1. above). 
Now that the main components of RRG’s linking system have been in-
troduced, the tenets of the theory presented in this chapter can be sum-
marized as in figure 13. 
Because the linking algorithm is bidirectional, two possible linking 
procedures can be spelled out. For my purposes, the semantics-to-syntax 
linking is by far the most important aspect. Therefore, only this direction 
of the algorithm is represented in (14) (adapted from Van Valin  
2005: 123). It is important to stress that all the steps in the algorithm 
show cross-linguistic variation (for instance, variable undergoer selec-
tion or pragmatically influenced PSAs). 
(14) Linking algorithm: semantics-to-syntax 
  1. Construct the semantic representation of the   
     sentence, based on the logical structure of the   
     predicator. 
  2. Determine the actor and undergoer assignments,  
    following the actor-undergoer hierarchy in figure 12. 
  3. Determine the morphosyntactic coding of the  
    arguments 
a. Select the privileged syntactic argument, based on the
  privileged syntactic argument selection hierarchy and
  respective principles. 
b. Assign the arguments the appropriate case markers 
 and/or adpositions. 
c. Assign the agreement marking to the main or 
 auxiliary verb, as appropriate. 
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  4. Select the syntactic template(s) for the sentence  
   following the appropriate principles. 
  5. Assign arguments to positions in the syntactic  
    representation of the sentence. 
    a. Assign the [-WH] argument(s) to the appropriate 
      positions in the clause. 
 b. If there is a [+WH] argument of a logical structure, 
   1. assign it to the normal position of a 
   non-WH-argument with the samefunction, or 
  2. assign it to the precore or postcore slot, or 
  3. assign it to a position within the potential 
 focus domain of the clause (default = the  
 unmarked focus position). 
   c. A non-WH argument may be assigned to the 
  precore or postcore slot, subject to focus structure  
  restrictions (optional). 
   d. Assign the [-WH] argument(s) of logical  
  structure(s) other than that of the predicator in the  
  nucleus to 
 1. a periphery (default), or 
 2. the precore or postcore slot, or 
 3. the left- or right-detached position. 
It is crucial to bear in mind that everything discussed so far applies to 
simple sentences. Even though matters are obviously more complicated 
in complex sentences, the same basic principles apply. It is possible to 
graphically represent the linking in its various stages. The representa-
tion of figure 2 is given in figure 14, including the logical structure and 
the various stages of linking from semantics to syntax.  
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Figure 13: General overview and summary of the RRG linking system 
 (Van Valin 2005: 129). 
Figure 14 is a visualization of the linking algorithm using the sentence 
from figure 2 as an example (adapted from Van Valin 2005: 140). The 
steps in the linking are indicated in the circles and correspond to the 
phases of linking described in (14). 
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Figure 14: Semantics-to-syntax linking in its successive steps. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have introduced the basic tenets and principles of Role 
and Reference Grammar. I have discussed the fundamentals of the theo-
ry, its general organization and single components. We have seen that 
the Layered Structure of the Clause and its phrase-level equivalent are 
versatile concepts capable of capturing a wide range of language phe-
nomena without resorting to transformations, movement or similar de-
vices. RRG makes extensive use of its GSRs actor and undergoer. PSA-
assignment and case assignment (Van Valin 2009b and 2005: 107ff.) are 
tied to them, for example. This brief exploration of RRG applies primari-
ly to simple sentences. With the information presented in this chapter, it 
is possible to refine the organizational figure in 1 into the one in 15 (Van 
Valin 2005: 134) by adding several important mechanisms that were dis-
cussed in this chapter.  
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Figure 15: General organization of Role and Reference Grammar (final). 
Case and preposition assignment in RRG were not discussed in this 
chapter. They are, however, very relevant for the topic of this disserta-
tion. They will be introduced in chapter 8 where the linking of instru-
ments to the morphosyntax is explored.  
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3 Instruments at the syntax-
semantics interface 
In most approaches and formal frameworks thematic relations are the 
usual way to handle instruments and related concepts. Theories that use 
them usually have the instrument as one of the more prominent mem-
bers in their inventory. Yet, despite the instrument’s ubiquitous presence 
in frameworks and loose approaches alike, they are often not coherently 
defined, nor are they in the center of attention when it comes to devel-
oping a view of thematic relations. They are ‘peripherally present’ if you 
will. It does, however, seem to be the case that the instrument is general-
ly treated as a dependent relation that plays some causal, intermediate 
role. It is often dependent on the presence or existence of other relations, 
such as the agent. This chapter aims to provide an overview of thematic 
relations in a number of topic-relevant theories, placing them in the 
broader field of lexical semantics, while focusing specifically on instru-
ments and related concepts. Some of these approaches are looked at in 
more detail in following sections: Case Grammar, Lexical-Functional 
Grammar, Jackendoff’s Conceptual Semantics and Role and Reference 
Grammar. They will become relevant for the discussion of instrument-
related alternations explored in later sections and chapters.  Therefore, a 
general introduction to thematic relations and to each of the aforemen-
tioned frameworks is warranted. The overviews are, however, limited to 
only those mechanisms which are required to gain a deeper understand-
ing of instruments. 
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3.1 Thematic relations as an interface 
component 
Language describes events, canonically expressed by a predicate and its 
arguments (and its adjuncts).  A thematic relation R can be defined as the 
relation of a participant x in an event e relative to the event as a whole 
(after Davis 2011: 400). Put somewhat informally, a thematic relation is 
the relation between an event and a participant. Semantically, they can 
be defined as partial functions (Dowty 1989: 80, Chierchia 1984: 326-327, 
Carlson 1984 and Davis 2011: 401): 
(1) A θ-role θ is a partial function from the set of events into the set 
 of individuals such that for any event k, if θ(k) is defined, then 
 θ(k) ∈ k. 
In linguistics, thematic relations are a central explanatory tool in ac-
counting for the linking from semantics to syntax (Davis 2011: 399ff.). 
They are essentially theoretical constructs to account for empirical facts 
concerning syntactic behavior and they are often argued to be an inter-
mediary in the mapping from semantics to syntax (Bierwisch 2006: 89-90 
& Carlson 1984: 259, 270). This is often referred to as the interface char-
acter. Thematic relations are usually nested inside a more general theory 
of event conceptualization, in the broader endeavour of argument reali-
zation (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 2). 
Bierwisch (2006: 89) points out that approaches to thematic relations 
are essentially driven by two principles: 1) parsimony, which requires 
the stipulations to be as minimal as possible and 2) adequacy, which 
requires that all relevant empirical facts be covered. With respect to in-
struments, adequacy is hardly ever reached and parsimony is often not 
satisfied due to the attempts to attain adequacy (e.g. Alexiadou & Schäfer 
2006, Schlesinger 1989). There are several possibilities to classify theories 
of thematic relations. One very general classification involves dividing 
such approaches into instrinsic and extrinsic ones (Bierwisch 2006: 98ff.). 
Intrinsic approaches assume that thematic relations and relevant ordering 
and mapping mechanisms arise from the semantic representation of the 
event. Typically, but not exclusively (Bierwisch 2006: 120), such  
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approaches are decompositional in nature. Wunderlich’s Lexical Decom-
position Grammar, for example, assumes that thematic roles can simply 
be extracted from SF (semantic form) by virtue of argument positions 
relative to the predicate they are arguments of (1997: 43). On the extrin-
isic view, thematic relations are defined independently from any kind of 
semantic representation, as are mapping mechanisms, well-formedness 
constraints and the like. Thematic relations are, under this view, self-
contained organizing elements that are separate from the semantic base 
they function in (Bierwisch 2006: 105 & 109). Even though Bierwisch 
(Ibid.) assumes many theories have problems meeting the two condi-
tions, he points out that especially the extrinsic approaches have prob-
lems in this respect.  
Ideally, thematic relations1 serve to capture linguistic generalizations 
across and within languages. Therein lies the appeal of such a type of 
relations: The syntax can vary, the thematic relations between predicate 
and argument will remain the same. This enables linguists to build sali-
ent grammatical descriptions around these concepts and to use them as 
the corner stones for a descriptive framework. Yet, despite their appeal, 
they are faced with a myriad of problems of both a practical and a theo-
retical nature. Carlson (1984: 259-260) argues that despite their weak-
nesses, thematic relations prove so useful that we should work with 
them nonetheless. It is important to stress that thematic relations in their 
traditional, primitive form are only one of several forms they can take. 
As thematic relations are usually seen in connection to a governing verb, 
theories intending to be complete should also propose a more general 
theory of event conceptualization as a backdrop against which thematic 
relations function (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 4ff.). Understanding 
what thematic relations really are in a given theory depends on under-
standing how the theory conceptualizes events. Event conceptualization 
 
1 In modern linguistics, thematic relations are known under a plethora of names: 
semantic roles, semantic relations, thematic roles, deep cases, thematic relations, θ-
roles, thematic role types etc. In this dissertation the more general term thematic re-
lations is employed. The terminology used by the original author may vary. In addi-
tion, the same label may be used with a different content depending on the author. 
This is a general problem with respect to the thematic relations literature (Levin & 
Rappaport Hovav 2005: 48). 
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often takes the form of a variety of lexical decomposition, but this need 
not be the case.  Several approaches include lexical decompositions with 
variables embedded in hierarchal structures to account for ‘thematic 
structure’ and linking preferences (e.g. Dowty, RRG) whereas others 
combine a more conceptual approach with the decompositional ap-
proach (e.g. Jackendoff) and even others analyze thematic structure with 
causality as a central driving component (e.g. Croft). As these approach-
es can be vastly different, the nature, number and properties of thematic 
relations will vary dramatically. For instance, J. Anderson’s Case Gram-
mar recognizes only four roles, whereas Ostler (1979) recogonizes 48 
roles. A non-exhaustive overview of several important schools of 
thought is given in figure 16.  
 
Figure 16: Overview of thematic relation approaches discussed 
  in this dissertation.2 
Generally, theories of thematic relations share five theoretical pillars 
(Croft 2015: 104-105 & Davis 2011): 1) a conception of event structure, 2) 
‘participant’ roles, 3) a ranking for thematic relations (or: thematic hier-
archy), 4) a special status role designation (e.g. RRG’s macroroles) and 5) 
mapping rules relating thematic roles to grammatical roles and con-
cepts.3 In addition to these five features, most theories on thematic rela-
tions come with some version of thematic relation uniqueness (Carlson 
1984: 271, Davis 2011: 403-404), stipulating that there may only be one 
 
2  A straight line indicates a subtype of the superordinate. An arrow denotes an influ-
ence from one on the other. 
3  This includes stipulations of well-formedness or completeness and the like (Levin & 
Rappaport Hovav 2005: 7). These are intended to make sure that there is close map-
ping from the semantic base to the syntax. 
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thematic relation of a kind in each sentence. Especially extrinsic ap-
proaches to thematic relations are in need of such an independent 
stipulation, as the structure itself does not provide any meaningful in-
formation of this kind (Bierwisch 2006: 107). Despite extrinsic approach-
es’ necessity to have some form of this stipulation, the idea has been 
subject to criticism for not being compatible with certain linguistic ob-
servations.  As the instrument is usually present in proposed role inven-
tories and the status of the role varies across proposals, the status of the 
instrument role likewise varies.  
It is possible to carve up the theoretical space concerning in thematic 
relations in several ways. For instance, the graph in figure 16 shows the 
development of theories, roughly ordered along the type of semantics 
they employ. It is also possible to divide them on the basis of the nature 
of their thematic relations (primitive vs. derived, Davis 2011). These no-
tions will be discussed further in this chapter. For the purposes of this 
overview, I have grouped together relevant theories based on their most 
salient characteristics: 1) finite-primitive theories, 2) decompositional 
theories and 3) causality-driven theories. Many linguists acknowledge 
explicitly or implicitly that thematic relations are, in fact, not primitive. 
However, apart from briefly stating this fact, no attention is devoted to 
the subject (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 9). In such cases, I treat such 
approaches as assuming primitive thematic relations. 
3.1.1 Finite-primitive approaches 
The modern notion of thematic relations developed out of Fillmore’s 
early proposal and is largely conceptual in nature. Levin & Rappaport 
Hovav (2005: 4, 35) term these semantic role lists. Essentially, in their 
simplest forms, that is exactly what they are: Lists of thematic relations 
with an unanalyzed semantic grounding. They contain labels identifying 
the role that each participant plays in the event as denoted by the verb. 
This type of approach is the most widely adopted one, but is wrought 
with enormous problems (Ibid.: 4). As a solution to these problems, some 
linguists have argued in favor of a highly diversified set of relations, 
whereas others have rejected thematic relations in their traditional form 
altogether (e.g. Dowty). Some linguists, such as DeLancey (1991), have 
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also criticized the objectivist nature of thematic relation-approaches: 
Rather than grounding them in objective truth about an event, they 
should rather be modeled on the mental conceptualization of the event 
(e.g. Jackendoff). 
It is important to distinguish the verb-specific relations from the more 
general thematic relations. The thematic structure of an expression is a 
partial representation of its meaning which consists minimally of a se-
mantic relation and its arguments (Wechsler 2006: 645–646): The verb 
bake thus expresses a bake-relation between two participants, the baking 
entity (the ‘baker’) and the baked entity (the ‘bakee’). Such relations are 
verb-specific and thus only apply to a specific event or predicate type 
(Davis 2011: 401). Verb-specific relations (thematic roles in Dowty’s ter-
minology; Dowty 1989 & 1991) are relations such as ‘see-er’, ‘seen’, 
‘runner’, ‘giver’, ‘given’ etc. (Van Valin 2001: 28–29, Van Valin 2005: 53–
55); they are specific to the semantics of the individual verb. Although 
one might contend this gives such roles a high degree of specificity, it 
also makes generalizing across different verbs very difficult, if not im-
possible. It is indeed pointless (and somewhat absurd) to refer both to 
the doer of ‘run’ and to the doer of ‘give’ with ‘giver’. Furthermore, us-
ing verb-specific roles would nullify the positive, practical effects of se-
mantic generalizations (Dowty 1991: 551), which leads many linguists to 
reject them (e.g. Dowty, Van Valin). The verb-specific roles can be se-
mantically neutralized to thematic relations (Van Valin 2001: 30), which 
implies a neutralization of semantic contrasts between them so as to 
arrive at relations that are generalized across individual verbs. It is this, 
neutralized, level of semantics that finite-primitive approaches place 
their semantic roles on. Contrary to thematic relations and verb-specific 
roles, participant roles are not linguistic entities and are thus not part of 
natural-language semantics (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 113).  
Finite-primitive theories assume that thematic relations are semanti-
cally unanalyzable units that 1) are finite in number (Croft 1991: 156, 
Engelberg 2011a: 368), 2) are defined independently of the verb’s mean-
ing (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 35) and 3) are independent from 
each other (Davis 2011: 407). In other words, finite-primitive approaches 
all assume a simple, atomic predicate, with equally atomic relations. The 
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logical representations (adapted from Davis 2011: 401 and Bierwisch 
2006: 106) for kill and break are given in (2a–2e) and in (2f–2j), respec-
tively. The governing predicate is the most basic primitive element 
available. In other words, predicates do not conceal a more complex 
structure made up of smaller semantic components. 
(2) a. kill´ (x, y) 
 b. Agent(kill´) = x 
 c. x(kill´) = agent 
 d. Patient(kill´) = y 
 e. y(kill´) = patient 
 f. break´ (x, y) 
 g. Agent(break´) = x 
 h. x(break´) = agent 
 i. Patient(break´) = y 
 j. y(break´) = patient 
Theories operating under such assumptions rely quite heavily on inde-
pendently motivated thematic hierarchies to provide some form of rank-
ing as the structures themselves provide no hierarchical information 
relevant for linking (Bierwisch 2006: 107) nor is any causal or aspectual 
information entailed, contrary to the lexical decomposition approaches. 
There are several important problems with finite-primitive approach-
es. These problems can be clustered as follows: 1) The exact number of 
semantic roles is a hotly debated topic and little consensus has been 
reached (Van Valin 2001: 23, Dowty 1991: 548, Bierwisch 2006: 110), 2) it 
is difficult to delineate roles from one another with respect to their con-
tent (Dowty 1991: 553–554, Carlson 1984: 259, Bierwisch 2006: 110), 3) 
there are very often lacking or wrongful motivations for positing  cer-
tain semantic roles (Dowty 1991: 556–557), 4) further analyzability (Croft 
1991: 163), 5) the proposals lack the power to adequately capture the 
complexity of the linguistic expression of human experience (Croft 1991: 
163), 6) there is a lack of reliable diagnostics (Wechsler 2006: 648, Levin 
& Rappaport Hovav 2005: 38), 7) there are no rigorous definitions availa-
ble (Davis 2011: 404), 8) there are often no limits on the number of roles 
per verb even though linguistic evidence suggests those are required 
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(Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 43) and 9) as a consequence of the 
above, there is an inflationary fragmentation of thematic relations (Levin 
& Rappaport Hovav 2005: 40).  
The shortcomings of finite-primitive approaches have inspired many 
different alternative solutions: Augmenting them with two generalized 
roles (RRG, Dowty), considering them to be readings of structural con-
figurations (Jackendoff, RRG), treating them as the result of the interac-
tion of semantic features (Dowty, Rozwadowska 1988), or combinations 
thereof. Primitive-finite approaches represent the simpler systems of 
thematic relations and they are standard components of several frame-
works (such as LFG). The nature and the properties of these relations are 
commonly left unexplored by those who do not explicitly deal with 
them; they are simply ‘there’. If thematic relations are not primitive, 
then they are derived. There are two subtypes of derived thematic rela-
tions (Davis 2011: 411): structural (configurational) and featural. 
3.1.2 Lexical decomposition 
Theories of lexical decomposition started out with Generative Semantics 
challenging certain widely held views within generative grammar (En-
gelberg 2011a: 359). To cope with the shortcomings of Generative Se-
mantics, linguists like Jackendoff and Dowty proposed new, but still 
decompositionally grounded approaches. For Dowty, state predicates are 
the smallest component and there will be no decomposition beyond 
that.4 These will combine with a set of operators to build complete de-
compositional structures. Dowty’s system has since inspired many dif-
ferent linguists and frameworks such as LDG (Wunderlich 1997) and 
RRG (Foley & Van Valin 1984, Van Valin & LaPolla 1997, Van Valin 
2005). RRG, for instance, assumes that verb meaning is decomposable 
into state predicates with several constant logical operators (such as DO, 
 
4 From a Montague-perspective, if one assumes such a system, thematic relations 
become superfluous entities (Carlson 1984: 260). They would become epiphenome-
na without theoretical implications (Ibid.). 
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CAUSE, BECOME etc.) and a set of connectives.5 All decompositional 
theories share the same central assumption: Word meaning is complex 
and can be broken up (or: decomposed) into smaller, more basic compo-
nents (Engelberg 2011b: 124, Wechsler 2006: 648). However, any such 
system requires a means of preventing infinite regression into smaller 
and smaller components. Jackendoff (2002: 336f.) and Van Valin & Wil-
kins (1993: 503–504), amongst others, acknowledge this issue.  
Consider the thematic structure analysis of the sentence John sold the 
book to Mary in a finite-primitive approach (3a, early Fillmorean case) 
and two decompositional approaches (Wechsler 2006: 648, after Jackend-
off 1991: 191) and RRG, respectively: 
(3) a. [___O + D + A] 
 
 c. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME have´ (Mary, book)] 
The representation of thematic structure in (3a) simply lists the semantic 
roles that have to be realized in the surface syntax. There is no further 
analysis of verb meaning, which is taken to be atomic (to be inserted on 
the line). In (3b)6 and (3c), verb meaning is broken up into several small-
er components, which allows for the inclusion of more specific infor-
mation. For instance, in (3b), the direction of the transaction is explicitly 
represented with ‘GO’. The same is true in the RRG-representation: 
There, the entire section CAUSE [BECOME have´ (Mary, book)] repre-
sents the direction of transaction. (3b) and (3c) nicely illustrate derived 
thematic relations. The position an argument occupies relative to the 
 
5 It is crucial to point out that theories that use decomposition do not necessarily 
accord it the same place and importance within the wider theory (Engelberg 2011b: 
125, 132ff.). 
6 The variable δ stands for the price of the transaction. For the clarity of the example, 
it has been left unspecified. 
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whole structure makes up the thematic relation. Mary is considered the 
recipient in (3c) because the Mary-argument is the first argument of 
BECOME have´ (x, y). This structurally derived notion of thematic  
relations was originally proposed by Gruber (1965) and further devel-
oped by Jackendoff (1972, 1987). Jackendoff (1987: 379–380 & 1990: 48) 
points out that a configurational approach to thematic roles transcends 
primitive-finite approaches in that the roles can be precisely and – most 
importantly – independently defined by constraints that are generated 
by the units in the decomposed structure itself. Under a featural view, 
the coalescence or the interaction of features (whatever they might be) 
makes up for the thematic relation. Even though Dowty’s (1991: 572) 
proto-agent and proto-patient and their properties are located on a high-
er level of neutralization (generalized semantic roles), they are nonethe-
less a prime example of the featural, derived approach. Despite the theo-
retical nature of lexical decomposition, there is psycholinguistic (Pi-
ñango 2006) evidence in favor of thematic relations derived from such 
decompositional structures. 
3.1.3 Causality-driven approaches 
Theories of the third type start out from causality-inspired representa-
tions of event structure. Rather than introducing causality as an operator 
the way the decompositional theories do, the causality-driven theories 
posit a chain of events. Croft (1991), for instance, posits causal chains 
which not only represent verb meaning, but rather the complete event as 
it occurs in the outside world. This means it does not succumb to the 
problem of ‘objectivism’ as DeLancey put it. Subsections of the larger 
chain are usually selected as the representation of verb meaning. The-
matic relations are entities in relation to their position in the chain. Con-
sider an example from Croft (1991: 173) in figure 17. 
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Figure 17: Causal chain representation of Fred ate the banana. 
In figure 17, Fred is an agent and banana is a patient due to their position 
in the causal chain. Causality-driven approaches are quite diverse 
amongst themselves and each must be discussed individually. 
3.1.4 Generalized Semantic Roles 
It was established above that one can consider thematic relations as a 
type of relations holding between a predicate and its arguments (Van 
Valin 2001: 23). Such relations can be considered neutralizations of verb-
specific roles. Neutralization of semantic contrasts always occurs with 
increasing generalization (Van Valin 2001: 30–31).  It is possible to gen-
eralize even further, to Generalized Semantic Roles (GSRs).  RRG’s 
macroroles actor and undergoer introduced in chapter 2 are the original 
GSRs and they have no exact equivalent in other theories (Van Valin 
2005: 60ff.).  GSRs were introduced by some linguists as a means of rem-
edying certain problems of the finite-primitive approaches (Levin & 
Rappaport Hovav 2005: 51), especially the problem of associating the-
matic relations with certain grammatical functions (Ibid.: 52). Influential 
in the development of GSR-theories was the observation that languages 
tend to cluster grammar around two diametrically opposed semantic 
prototypes (Bossong 2006: 237). GSR-proposals can differ widely, how-
ever. Some have proposed them as stand-alone solutions, whereas others 
combine them with an extensive system of lexical decomposition. Dowty 
considers his proto-agent and proto-patient not to be discrete roles, con-
trary to RRG, where the macroroles are entities that grammatical rules 
can refer to. Rather, Dowty (1991) posits semantic proto-roles as cluster 
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concepts or prototypes rather than as discrete semantic roles. They are 
given in (4–5) (adapted from Dowty 1991: 572). 
(4) Contributing properties of proto-agent: 
  a. Volitional involvement in the event or state. 
  b. Sentience (and/or perception). 
  c. Causing an event or change of state in another participant. 
  d. Movement (relative to the position of another participant). 
  (e. Exists independently of the event named by the verb.) 
(5) Contributing properties of proto-patient: 
  a. Undergoes a change of state. 
  b. Incremental theme. 
  c. Causally affected by another participant. 
  d. Stationary relative to movement of another participant. 
  (e. Does not exist independently of the event, or not at all.) 
These features are to be understood as lexical entailments recurring clus-
ter-wise (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 53).  For Dowty (1991: 576), 
subject selection follows from the simple principle that the participant 
with the largest number of proto-agent properties becomes the subject. 
Conversely, the participant with the largest number of proto-patient 
properties will become the direct object. This shows that GSRs have im-
portant functions in monostratal theories of syntax as they are employed 
to capture important generalizations that – in the various incarnations 
of transformational grammar – are handled in terms of deep subjects, 
objects and similar devices (Van Valin 1999: 373). Even though Dowty’s 
approach may be very appealing, there are some problems with it. For 
instance, Wechsler (2006: 650) points out that there is no unifying se-
mantic dimension behind these lists, nor is there any attempt to come up 
with one. It is also not clear how linking to obliques would be handled 
(Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 60). Partly because of these issues, Pri-
mus proposes a third proto-role (Ibid.). Van Valin (1999: 386) also criti-
cizes Dowty for simply stating generalizations about the properties of a 
verb’s subject and object. Dowty’s proto-roles were not proposed in the 
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context of a linking algorithm and due to their cluster-like nature, it is 
unclear how he sees them in practical linking.  
It is crucial to stress that GSRs are not thematic relations. Rather, Van 
Valin distinguishes (1999: 373) between three levels of semantic relation-
ships: verb-specific roles, thematic relations as generalizations across 
verb-specific roles and, finally, GSRs as generalizations across thematic 
relations. The first type does not play any meaningful role in RRG, the 
second can play a role in interpretation. The neutralization patterns are 
given in figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: Neutralization of semantic contrasts (Van Valin 2005: 54). 
The main motivation behind macroroles (and GSRs in general) is that 
there is a fundamental opposition between the two cardinal arguments 
of a transitive predication (Van Valin 1999: 373, 2005: 60–61). Van Valin 
points out that many syntactic phenomena are tied to these two cardinal 
arguments. Due to their generalized nature, they are much more robust 
and adequate to capture grammatical behavior. Most approaches using 
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GSRs have two roles, although some linguists posit three (also see sec-
tion 2.5.1).  
3.1.5 Instrument as a thematic relation 
Instruments appear in many grammatical frameworks and different ap-
proaches to language. However, of all the traditional thematic relations, 
the instrument is only studied peripherally. Agents and patients (or 
equivalents) are in the focus of research, as their relevance for linking is  
obvious. Instruments, on the other hand, are often assumed to be simply 
‘there’. Sometimes, they are employed as concepts without even having 
been introduced in the theory at all. Generally speaking, the thematic 
relation of the instrument has several fundamental characteristics 
(Jackendoff 1990: 142) that shine through in most approaches, explicitly 
or implicitly: 1) the instrument plays a role in the means by which the 
agent/actor carries out a certain action, 2) the agent/actor acts on the 
instrument and as a consequence, 3) the instrument acts on the pa-
tient/undergoer and 4) agents and instruments have some semantic simi-
larities (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 45). The instrument role has 
been faced with the same problems that generally thematic relations 
have been faced with. For instance, Nilsen (1973) assumes that the in-
strument is actually a grouping of four more specific roles. As instru-
ments are an integral part of the array of thematic relations, the status of 
‘the’ instrument cannot simply be generalized over in one section. With 
respect to instruments, many frameworks fail to achieve what Bierwisch 
(2006: 89) labels adequacy. Several commonplace phenomena are not 
accounted for in the theories, such as the instrument functioning as a 
subject or the nature and the corresponding syntactic behavior of more 
complex ‘tools’ (e.g. computer programs). In the following sections, I will 
discuss the instrument relation after having introduced the necessary 
information on the respective frameworks or approaches. I will then 
illustrate that many theories and approaches to instruments do not 
achieve adequacy, for various differing reasons.  
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3.2 Role and Reference Grammar 
In chapter 2, RRG was extensively introduced. Yet, the theoretical com-
ponent that is so commonplace in other frameworks – thematic relations 
– was not introduced as the macroroles are the primary tools for linking. 
In this section, I will discuss thematic relations as they exist in RRG. 
3.2.1 Thematic relations 
The Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy captures the relationships between the 
thematic relations themselves in relation to the macroroles. This was  
introduced in figure 12. RRG has an intrinsic conception of thematic 
relations, that is, they arise from the decompositional structure itself. 
RRG assumes that thematic relations are functions of argument positions 
in the logical structure (Foley & Van Valin 1984: 34, 47ff., Van Valin 
2005: 53, 59 & 126, Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 114). In other words, they 
are – similar to Jackendoff’s proposals – structural configurations and 
belong to the derived class. They can thus be considered readings of ar-
gument positions in relation to the governing predicate: A participant is 
read as an experiencer because it is the 1st argument of the pred´ (x, y) 
where pred´ is a predicate of internal experience. This means that the-
matic relations are entirely dependent on the logical structures and do 
not have a meaningful existence independent of them. Logical struc-
tures, in turn, can be motivated with independent criteria (i.e. aktionsart-
tests). This ensures that thematic relations are not arbitrarily assigned to 
a predicate (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 116). It is therefore adequate to 
posit thematic relations as labels or shorthand for expressions of the 
type ‘1st argument of a two-place predicate of internal experience’. An 
overview of thematic relations, defined over argument positions, is given 
below (Van Valin 2005: 55) in table 10.   
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I STATE VERBS  
 A. Single argument 
  1. State or condition broken´ (x)  x = patient 
  2. Existence  exist´ (x)  x = entity 
 
 B. Two arguments 
  1. Pure location be-LOC´ (x, y)  x = location 
        y = theme 
  2. Perception  hear´ (x, y)  x = perceiver 
        y = stimulus  
  3. Cognition  know´ (x, y)  x = cognizer 
        y = content 
  4. Desire  want´ (x, y)  x = wanter 
        y = desire 
  5. Propositional attitude consider´ (x, y) x = judger 
        y = judgment 
  6. Possession  have´ (x, y)  x = possessor 
        y = possessed 
  7. Internal experience feel´ (x, y)  x = experience 
        y = sensation 
  8. Emotion  love´ (x, y)  x = emoter 
        y = target 
  9. Attributive  be´ (x, [pred´])  x = attributant 
        y = attribute 
  10. Identificational be´ (x, [pred´])  x = identified 
        y = identity 
  11. specificational be´ (x, y)  x = variable 
        y = value 
  12. Equational  equate´ ( x, y)  x, y = referent   
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II ACTIVITY VERBS 
 A. Single argument 
  1. Unspecified action do´ (x, Ø)  x = effector 
  2. Motion  do´ (x, [walk´ (x)]) x = mover 
  3. Static motion do´ (x, [spin´ (x)]) x = ST-mover 
  4. Light emission do´ (x, [shine´ (x)]) x = L-emitter 
  5. Sound emission do´ (x, [gurgle´ (x)]) x = S-emitter 
 
 B. One or two arguments 
  1. Performance  do´ (x, [sing´ (x, (y))]) x = performer 
        y = performance 
  2. Consumption do´ (x, [eat´ (x, (y))]) x = consumer 
        y = consumed 
  3. Creation  do´ (x, [write´ (x, (y))]) x = creator 
        y = creation 
  4. Directed perception do´ (x, [hear´ (x, (y))]) x = observer 
        y = stimulus 
  5. Use   do´ (x [use´ (x, y)]) x = user 
        y = implement 
Table 10: Definition of thematic relations in terms of argument positions 
in the logical structure. 
Examples of logical structures and their thematic relations are given 
below: 
(6) a. John killed Barry. (adapted from Van Valin 2005: 56) 
  [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME dead´ (Barry)] 
  (Agent-)Effector              Patient 
 b. The snow melted. (Van Valin 2005: 47) 
  BECOME melted´ (snow) 
                 Patient 
 c. Dana saw the picture. (Van Valin 2005: 46) 
  see´ (Dana, picture) 
      Perceiver   Stimulus 
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Table 10 might imply that RRG posits a vast number of thematic rela-
tions, but Van Valin (2005: 57) points out that there are only five rele-
vant distinctions, namely those distinctions that directly correspond to 
the five possible argument positions in the logical structures. Thematic 
relations can thus be lumped into five groups on a continuum with the 
strongly affected participants on the right end of the scale and the 
strongly affecting, controlling and willful participants on the left end. 
RRG’s conception of derived thematic relations comes from merging the 
Gruber-Jackendoff notion of structurally determined relations with a 
Dowty-inspired semantically decompositional structure (Van Valin & 
Wilkins 1993: 503). Each of the five groups of thematic relations illus-
trated below thus corresponds to one of the five distinctions on the ac-
tor-undergoer hierarchy.  
Figure 19: Thematic relations in terms of argument positions on the  
    Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy (Van Valin 2005: 58). 
Certain thematic relations that are present in most other theories, like 
recipient or goal are absent from the list above. There are three ways to 
expand a base logical structure: 1) Adding an implement (see section 
3.7.2.2), 2) to specify a source, goal or path with the respective predicates 
or 3) to specify a full causal chain (Van Valin 2005: 59). With transfer 
predications, for example, a logical structure of the form INGR/BECOME 
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have´ (x, y) is expanded into a more complex logical structure of the 
form [do´ (x, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME have´ (x, y)]. The thematic relation 
of recipient can be defined as the x-argument of this predicate expansion 
and a notion like source can be defined as the possessor or location ar-
gument in INGR/BECOME NOT have´ (x, y) or in INGR/BECOME NOT 
be-at´ (x, y), respectively. In contrast to other theories, no list of themat-
ic relations is stored in the mental lexicon, only the logical structures.  
RRG also has a quite distinct conception of agency (Van Valin & Wil-
kins 1996), where instrument, with several others, is treated as a reading 
of a more basic thematic relation called ‘effector’. This is the topic of the 
following sections. 
3.2.2 The effector role: agents 
RRG posits a basic thematic relation called effector (Foley & Van Valin 
1984: 51ff., Van Valin & Wilkins 1996, Van Valin & LaPolla 1997 & Van 
Valin 2005) which underlies the agent, instrument and force thematic 
relations. Explicit agentivity is less basic than non-agentivity, an insight 
also shared by Talmy (2000: 421). RRG’s view of agency is thus that of an 
implicature, contrary to (for example) Jackendoff (1990: 129) for whom 
agency corresponds to a set of different action tier configurations. Be-
cause instrument is only one reading of effector, it is crucial to discuss 
agents and forces as well. 
An effector is considered to be the dynamic participant in an event 
(Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 289). In terms of the logical structures (Van 
Valin & LaPolla 1997: 118), the effector can be defined as the 1st argu-
ment of do´ (x, Ø). However, there is no implication of it performing the 
action in question intentionally or willfully (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 
118). By contrast, an agent is defined as an effector performing an action 
willfully, rationally and intentionally (Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 313 & 
316). Intentional is treated as distinct from volitional: volitional7 acts are 
defined as non-conscious, basic acts of will. Rational means that the  
 
7 Some authors use volitional as a synonym to intentional or as a component or pre-
requisite of intention. Dowty, for example, uses volitional in his work where RRG 
would employ intentional. If this is the case, I will point it out at the relevant mo-
ment. 
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entity is aware of the consequence of their actions, whereas intentional is 
considered to be the ability to plan an action and that one is conscious of 
one’s will to perform the action. Van Valin (2005: 57) adds instigating as 
a prerequisite for agenthood. However, not all instigators have to be 
agents. An instigator can be defined as the effector of the first CAUSE 
(Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 318). Forces are by definition also instigators. 
An instigator is thus the initial effector in the LS.  
Several factors influence and determine whether an effector is read as 
an agent or as a force. These factors include pragmatics, properties of 
the predicate, grammatical constructions and the referent’s properties. A 
human instigator is read as an agent, unless if there is evidence to the 
contrary. This is the core of Holisky’s pragmatic principle which states 
that agency arises from pragmatics rather than being lexically inherent 
to the predicate (Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 309).  Consider (Holisky 
1987: 119, Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 309): 
(7) Pragmatic Principle: You may interpret effectors and effector-
 themes which are human as agents (in the absence of information 
 to the contrary). 
This raises the question of what can serve as information or evidence to 
the contrary. Certain adverbs cancel agency, such as accidentally (after 
Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 309): 
(8) a. Larry killed the deer. 
 b. Larry killed the deer accidentally. 
 c. Larry killed the deer intentionally. 
Holisky’s principle predicts that Larry in (8a) is read as an agent. The 
sentence in (8b) contains an agency-canceling adverb and thus blocks 
the agent reading. The agency-signaling adverb in (8c) simply confirms 
an interpretation that is predicted by Holisky’s principle. Intention is a 
central component: An agent is a human effector that intentionally does 
something. This observation in itself is not new. Talmy (2000: 521), for 
instance, also considers agent to be a composite of the author of a certain 
event and the intender of that event. The addition of these two concepts 
yields an agentive reading. This approach, however, is of a more  
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conceptual nature and it is unclear how it can deal with agency-
ambiguous sentences such as Larry killed the deer. 
Inanimate effectors cannot be agents (Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 319): 
The unacceptability of (9b) results from the presence of an agency-
signaling adverb (adapted from Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 309–310). 
(9) a. The explosion killed the deer. 
 b. *The explosion intentionally killed the deer. 
From an RRG-perspective, intention is a property that can only belong to 
humans. There are cases where agency is lexicalized into the verb’s se-
mantics, thereby obligatorily requiring an agent. Adding an agency-
cancelling adverb ((10c)) yields a contradiction, illustrating the lexicali-
zation of agency with murder (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 120). The oc-
currence of inanimate instigators with such verbs is not possible as the 
ungrammaticality of (10b) proves (adapted from Van Valin & Wilkins 
1996: 310).  
(10) a. Larry murdered the lumberjack. 
 b. *The explosion murdered the lumberjack. 
 c.  *Larry murdered the lumberjack accidentally. 
Lexicalized agency is expressed with the operator DO (‘big’ DO) in the 
logical structure (Van Valin 2005: 56, Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 119). Big 
DO can be considered a semantic property of the verb. Big DO always 
co-occurs with little do´ in the logical structure because both of them 
have arguments that do something (Van Valin 2005: 57). 
(11) a. Larry killed the lumberjack. 
  [do´ (Larry, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME dead´ (lumberjack)] 
 b. Larry murdered the lumberjack. 
  DO (Larry, [[do´ (Larry, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME dead´  
  (lumberjack)]]) 
Lexicalized agency varies across languages: English has very few such 
verbs, while Japanese kill and break encode agency (Van Valin & Wilkins 
1996: 310, Hasagawa 1996: 60). As the sentence (10b) illustrates, the  
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x-argument for the verb in question cannot be inanimate. This re-
striction can be annotated in terms of qualia with the relevant argument 
position in the logical structure of the verb (Van Valin 2005: 50–51 & 52).  
Agency can also be coerced by a construction; grammatical construc-
tions can impose a certain reading or interpretation on an argument. In 
the case of, for instance, purposive constructions, the subject-argument 
intends for something to happen or come about, which forces an agency 
reading on the initial effector argument (Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 311): 
(12) a. John rolled down the hill. 
 b. John rolled down the hill in order to get to the road before  
  the bikers got there. 
 c. Mary slid from her chair. (own data) 
 d. Mary slid from her chair in order to dodge flying debris.  
  (own data) 
In (12a) and (12c), the argument in question (John and Mary, respective-
ly) is ambiguous with respect to agency. In both cases, the referents 
could have performed the action described accidentally or on purpose. 
When a purposive clause is added, only the agentive reading remains a 
possibility as adding an agency-canceling adverb proves: 
(13) a. *John accidentally rolled down the hill in order to get to the  
  road before the bikers got there. 
 b. *Mary accidentally slid from her chair in order to dodge  
   flying debris. 
Van Valin and Wilkins (1996: 312–313) posit that purposive clauses can 
be strong enough to even overrule normal implications of the lexical 
meanings of verbs: 
(14) Jesus died to save us from our sins. 
The single argument of die is a patient but the purposive clause forces an 
agent-reading on this typically patient-taking verb. The authors note 
that this is cross-linguistically not uncommon in the context of religious 
3.2   Role and Reference Grammar 
 
  
 73 
 
 
martyrdom (Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 312). Outside of religious con-
texts or contexts of great personal sacrifice, this is not admissible: 
(15) a. John died to save his sister. 
 b. *John died to make us clean up the room. 
 c. *John died to save Sarah’s bike. 
Even though certain constructions force an agentive reading, certain RPs 
cannot have an agentive reading due to their inherent properties 
(adapted from Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 311ff.): 
(16) a. The ball rolled down the hill. 
 b. *The ball rolled down the hill in order to bounce into the  
   lake. 
 c. *The ball intentionally rolled down the hill. 
 d.  The baby broke the window. 
 e. */?The baby intentionally broke the window. 
 f.  The looter broke the window. 
The ungrammaticality of (16b) and (16c) shows that the referent’s prop-
erties also determine grammaticality: The examples in (16a–16e) show 
that an agency-signaling adverb is compatible with a human referent but 
is incompatible with an inanimate referent as these cannot intentionally 
or willfully do something. Another argument against positing [±human] 
as a property that automatically correlates with agency is illustrated in 
(16d–16e). The semantic properties of looter in (16f) make an agentive 
interpretation plausible, if not, likely.  By contrast, baby is considered as 
an entity too young and dependent on others to intentionally perform an 
act. This again shows that the referent’s properties have a tangible im-
pact on the grammaticality of certain sentences. In next chapter 4, I will 
propose an expansion of this principle and its incorporation into RRG. 
Van Valin and Wilkins (1996: 314–315) propose to capture the relation 
between agency and the referent’s properties with two interrelated, yet 
distinct hierarchies (Van Valin and Wilkins 1996: 313 & 316): 1) a salien-
cy hierarchy which ranks entities according to the likelihood of them 
being interpreted as agent when placed in an actional event and 2) an 
animacy hierarchy with various degrees of animate entities (with  
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prototypical animates near one end of the scale). Due to the large size of 
the graph, figure 20 has been included in the appendix. 
The operational range of Holisky’s principle can be mapped onto the 
graph: it is active in the right top (everything branching to the right of 
[+human]). There are, however, some issues with this scale: 1) Certain 
types of referents are not included, such as AI-driven referents and 2) 
the ranking is only relevant for capturing agentive readings. In chapter 
4, I will propose a different scale that not only captures the occurrence of 
agentivity, but also accurately captures the morphosyntactic behavior of 
instruments, forces and those referents that occupy the grey area be-
tween them.  
Apart from the referent’s properties and constructions, the logical 
structures themselves also play a role in agentive readings: The LS corre-
lates with the likelihood of the occurrence of an agentive interpretation. 
If a verb has the activity predicate do´ (x, Ø) in its LS, it is (quite obvi-
ously) more likely to have an agent argument. As logical structures are 
the manifestation of aktionsarten, it is possible to posit a hierarchy of 
aktionsart-classes in terms of their agent-admitting probability (Van 
Valin & Wilkins 1996: 313): 
(17) activity/accomplishment  > achievement > state8 
Summarizing, the origins of agent-readings can be summarized in two 
groups: 1) coerced agency and 2) non-coerced agency. Coerced agency is 
either forced by a construction or lexicalized agency. In these cases, an 
agent-reading is imposed on the relevant argument, irrespective of other 
considerations. Non-coerced agency is more complicated. The combina-
tion and interaction of several factors determines whether agency is 
present or not:  the referent’s properties (figure 20), the predicate’s prop-
erties (the ranking in (17)) and, finally, pragmatic considerations as cap-
tured by Holisky’s principle.  
 
8 The hierarchy in (17) is based on the pre-1997 decomposition system. 
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3.2.3 The effector role: forces vs. instruments 
Contrary to many other accounts, instruments are not treated as a the-
matic relation in their own right. They are considered as an allorole of 
effector (Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 289ff. & 319). Both instruments and 
forces are distinguished from agents by animacy: instruments and forces 
are [-animate].  
These two readings are both inanimate, but are essentially distin-
guished over argument positions: Instruments are always under control 
of another effector. They are manipulated entities in a causal chain. In 
the structure in (18), an effector x performs an action which causes an-
other effector (y) to cause another action in turn (adapted from Van Va-
lin & Wilkins 1996: 317). The y-argument is thus manipulated by x to 
arrive at some result which is specified after the second causal operator.  
(18) [[do´ (x, Ø)] CAUSE [do´ (y, […])] CAUSE [BECOME pred´ 
 (z)]] 
The y-argument in this schema is the canonical slot for the (manipulat-
ed) instrumental entity in RRG. Forces cannot, by their very nature, oc-
cupy this argument slot as they are always at the top of a causal chain. 
In other words, forces are instigators and instruments are always under 
the scope of an instigator. Consider the inanimate effectors in the fol-
lowing examples from English, German, Dutch and French (own data 
and after Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 318): 
(19) a. John broke the window with a rock. 
      [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (rock, Ø)] CAUSE [INGR  
  broken´ (window)]] 
 b. Mary cut the sausage with a knife. 
      [do´ (Mary, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (knife, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
  cut´ (sausage)]] 
 c. The terrorists destroyed the car with a bomb. 
  [do´ (terrorists, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (bomb, Ø)] CAUSE [INGR 
  destroyed´ (car)]] 
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 d. Maria hat den Baum mit der Axt 
  Maria AUX.3SG DEF tree with DEF axe 
 
  ge-fäll-t. 
  PTCP-cut down-PTCP 
 
  [do´ (Maria, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Axt, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
  cut down´ (Baum)]] 
  ‘Maria cut down the tree with an axe.’ 
 e. Jan heeft de winkel met sten-en verniel-d. 
  Jan AUX.3SG DEF store with rock-PL destroy- PTCP 
 
  [do´ (Jan, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (stenen, Ø)] CAUSE [INGR 
  destroyed´ (winkel)]] 
  ‘Jan destroyed the store with rocks.’ 
 f. Sophie a coupé le pain avec le couteau. 
  Sophie AUX.PST cut.PTCP DEF bread with DEF knife 
 
[do´ (Sophie, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (couteau, Ø)] CAUSE  
[BECOME cut´ (pain)]] 
  Sophie cut the bread with the knife.’ 
In each of these examples, an entity expressed by the x-argument per-
forms some manipulation of another entity (expressed by the y-
argument), which leads to a specific change of state of third entity (ex-
pressed by the z-argument). In all of these, the instigator is human. Forc-
es, however, can also take instruments due to the fact that they occupy 
the same position (see below). 
Following the proposal in Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 121), the full 
logical structure for instruments should be represented with a use´ in-
cluded into it as the second argument of the first do´ and the main pred-
icate repeated as the second argument of the intermediate do´: 
(20) [do´ (Mary, [use´ (Mary, knife)])] CAUSE [[do´ (knife, [cut´ 
 (knife, sausage)])] CAUSE [BECOME cut´ (sausage)]] 
This logical structure is thus more specific in that it includes use´ (x, y). 
The rationale for including use´ (apart from attaining a higher degree of 
specificity) is that in wielding the knife to perform the cutting action, 
Mary manipulates the knife throughout the macro-event to arrive at a 
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state of affairs where the sausage is cut. This manipulation is represented 
by use´. As such manipulation is logically implied by the rest of the 
structure, it can be left out. Likewise, the intermediate cut´ predicate can 
be left out. This can be treated the same way: It is more accurate to in-
clude it, as what the knife is caused to do is indeed a cutting action. 
Therefore, the LS in (21a) can be represented in a reduced form (21b) 
(adapted from Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 318). I use the reduced logical 
structures by default, unless it is relevant to use the full structure. I am, 
of course, aware that the full structure is the complete one. 
(21) a. [do´ (John, [use´ (John, rock)])] CAUSE [do´ (rock, [hit´  
  (rock, window)])] CAUSE [INGR broken´ (window)]] 
 b. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (rock, Ø)] CAUSE [INGR  
  broken´ (window)]] 
Contrary to instruments, forces are capable of independent motion 
([+motive]) and action and are never under control of another effector. 
Typical forces are meteorological or astronomical phenomena. Consider 
the following examples: 
(22) a. The hail storm destroyed the barn. 
[do´ (hail storm, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE 
[BECOME  destroyed´ (barn)]] 
 b. The meteorite shattered the window. 
[do´ (meteorite, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE  
[BECOME  shattered´ (window)]] 
 c. The typhoon destroyed the village. 
  [do´ (typhoon, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
  destroyed´ (village)]] 
In the logical structures above, a second do´ sequence is included and its 
two argument positions are left open because 1) forces can take instru-
ments (like agents) and one wants to indicate this ability explicitly in the 
logical structure, 2) to indicate that forces are at the top of causal chains 
(like agents) and 3) to differentiate such logical structures from those 
where metonymic clipping has occurred, which will be discussed in sec-
tion 3.7.2.2. With human effectors the second do´ sequence is not  
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included, because those are expected to be at the top of the causal chain 
anyway due to their semantic properties. 
Forces are thus not under control of other effectors and can instigate a 
causal chain (Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 317–319). In a sentence like The 
typhoon destroyed the village with its storm surge, the structure in (22c) 
would include the phrase its storm surge as the x-argument of the second 
do´ in the chain. This is given in (23a), together with a second example. 
(23) a. [do´ (typhoon, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (its storm surge, Ø)]  
  CAUSE [BECOME destroyed´ (village)]] 
 b. The storm destroyed the house with the storm surge. 
  [do´ (storm, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (storm surge, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME destroyed´ (house)]] 
This observation also immediately provides a test to distinguish forces 
from instruments. If the referent occupies the instigator position, then it 
must be able to take an instrument. If the referent is an instrument, then 
it cannot take an instrument itself. Ergo, by adding an instrument one 
can be distinguished from the other. The unacceptability of (24b) identi-
fies knife as an instrument. Conversely, the acceptability of (24a) identi-
fies storm as a force. 
(24) a. The storm destroyed house with the storm surge. 
 b. *The knife cut the bread with the blade. 
This may seem to provide a clear-cut distinction between forces and 
instruments. However, there are referents that pass both sides of the 
test. They can function as an instrument, yet take instruments them-
selves as well. Consider the following examples from Dutch and English: 
(25) a. Mara vernietig-de de mainframe met 
  Mara destroy-PST.3SG DEF mainframe with 
 
  het computer programma. 
  DEF computer program 
  ‘Mara destroyed the mainframe with the computer program.’ 
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 b. Het computer programma vernietig-de de 
  DEF computer program destroy-PST.3SG DEF 
 
  mainframe met het stuk code. 
  mainframe with DEF piece of code 
  ‘The computer program destroyed the mainframe with the 
   piece of code.’ 
 c.  John destroyed the barn with the crane. 
 d.  The crane destroyed the barn with the large boulder. 
It is unclear how standard RRG would account for the referents in (25a–
25d). It is conceivable that there is a semantic grey area, where referents 
can be conceptualized as an instigator and a non-instigator. This will be 
explored in chapter 4. 
A force argument can be defined as the [-animate], [+motive] effector 
of the first CAUSE in the causal sequence (Van Valin and Wilkins 1996: 
318–319). The authors point out that the logical consequence of this def-
inition is that, in their analysis, effectors that meet force-criteria are only 
forces in causal sequences (Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 319). Thus, in the 
examples in (22), the effectors are forces, contrary to (26), where it is a 
plain effector (after Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 319). 
(26) The wind is blowing briskly.  
 [briskly´ (do´ (wind, [blow´ (wind)]))] 
Irrespective of whether the instigator is a force or an agent, the instru-
ment (if present) is always an intermediate effector manipulated by a 
higher-ranking effector. To sum up, formal definitions (adapted from 
Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 319 and Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 122) of 
agent, force and instrument are given in (27). 
(27) a. Agent: animate (usually human) x-argument of initial do´. 
 b. Force: inanimate x-argument of initial do´. 
 c. Instrument (Full LS): Implement y-argument in LS   
  configuration [do´ (x, […])] CAUSE [[… do´ (y, […])] 
  CAUSE [BECOME/INGR pred´ (…)]] 
 d. Instrument (reduced LS): x-argument of intermediate do´. 
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The definition of instrument in (27c) is a definition in relation to the full 
logical structure. Because usually reduced logical structures are used, the 
definition must be rewritten. It is given in (27d). The definition in (27c) 
also highlights another important point: Implement is the basic class of 
‘tools’ in RRG. They are defined as the y-argument of a use´ predicate. 
Only if this predicate is incorporated into the causal chain, does an im-
plement become an instrument. To avoid confusion I will always refer to 
causally embedded ‘tools’ as instruments and to those that are not as 
implements. This latter class will be discussed in section 3.7.2.2. 
3.3 Case Grammar 
3.3.1 Overview 
Case grammar refers to an array of approaches to grammatical theory 
originally inspired by Fillmore’s influential 1968 paper The Case for Case 
and subsequent work (1971a, 1971b, 1971c, 1972, 1977a, 1977b). All of 
these varieties of case grammar share the same assumption that seman-
tic functions are basic and that many aspects of the syntax are derivative 
of them or driven by them (J. Anderson 2006: 220). Fillmore’s original 
proposal has greatly influenced the way linguists think about semantic 
functions and traces of Fillmore’s case grammar can be found in many 
other grammatical frameworks. 
Fillmore (1968) posits semantic functions that are linked to language-
specific surface encoding. These functions are called case relations (Fill-
more 1965 [1969], 1968) or simply cases (J. Anderson 2006: 220). This is 
the first modern formulation of thematic relations and their interface 
character.  From a contemporary perspective, the use of case seems in 
need of an explanation. Anderson points out that the term was used 
because of the frequent observation that in many languages – like Old 
English, Russian or Latin – nominal inflection marks semantic relations. 
However, two remarks must be made: 1) in many instances nominal 
cases mark grammatical relations rather than pure semantic functions 
and 2) many languages mark grammatical or semantic relations with 
other strategies such as word order (J. Anderson 2006: 220). It is crucial 
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to point that, usually, case relations do not have a one-to-one relation 
with a certain marking strategy (J. Anderson 2006: 221). This is a funda-
mental principle that can be found in all approaches using thematic rela-
tions. Somewhat similar to RRG, grammatical relations are considered 
neutralizations of case relations (Ibid.)  
Fillmore assumes that cases “comprise a set of universal, presumably 
innate, concepts, which identify certain types of judgments human be-
ings are capable of making about the events that are going on around 
them, judgments about such matters as who did it, who it happened to, 
and what got changed” (Fillmore 1968: 45–46). This is often an intuitive 
way of defining thematic relations (Chierchia 1984: 323, Jackendoff 2002: 
260). It is possible to treat case relations in Fillmore’s earliest conception 
as linguistically relevant translations of cognitively salient concepts. Put 
differently, case relations are a speaker’s conceptualized intuitions which 
are employed in the grammar. Cases are seen as basic in grammar, con-
trary to grammatical relations like subject and direct object (J. Anderson 
2006: 223). In his 1968 paper, Fillmore proposes a non-exhaustive list of 
case relations but he often revised it and added more cases in later work. 
For instance, in his (1971b: 376) paper, he proposes the so-called counter-
agent and proposes to split the dative into several others (also see J. An-
derson 2006: 228). In Fillmore’s other work, the counter-agent is not (or 
no longer) present. For the purpose of this dissertation, Fillmore’s (1968: 
46) original list suffices: 
(28) Agentive (A): The case of the typically animate perceived 
 instigator of the action identified by the verb. 
 Instrumental (I): The case of the inanimate force or object 
 causally involved in the action or state identified by the verb. 
 Dative (D): The case of the animate being affected by the state or 
 action identified by the verb. 
 Factitive (F): The case of the object or being resulting from the 
 action or state identified by the verb, or understood as a part of 
 the meaning of the verb. 
 Locative (L): The case which identifies the location or spatial 
 orientation of the state or action identified by the verb. 
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 Objective (O):9 The semantically most neutral case, the case of 
 anything representable by a noun whose role in the action or 
 state identified by the verb is identified by the semantic interpret
 tation of the verb itself; conceivably the concept should be limited 
 to things which are affected by the action or state identified by 
 the verb. The term is not to be confused with the notion of direct 
 object, nor with the name of the surface case synonymous with 
 accusative. 
One major problem with Fillmore’s characterization of instrumental is 
the conflation of force and instrument: Forces can take instruments 
themselves, but instruments cannot take other instruments. Fillmore’s 
characterization does not capture this. Each predicate comes with a cer-
tain set of cases, summarized in the case frame. Consider the sentences 
below and their respective case frames: 
(29) a. John ran.    [___A] 
 b. John gave Mary a book.  [___O + D + A] 
 c. John murdered Pat.   [___D + A] 
For example, the verb run has +[___A] as a case frame. The verbs give 
and murder have the case frames +[___O  D  A] and +[___D  A], respec-
tively. Optional case roles are indicated with round brackets. The over-
lapping brackets in (30) mean that either of the two must be present (or 
both). 
(30) +[___D (I ()A)] 
The sentence in (29b) determines that and O, D and A are involved in the 
action, producing this case frame. The verb that is to be inserted must 
have a case frame with matching cases. However, this mechanism needs 
to be complemented by restrictions on the lexical material bearing cases. 
Without such restrictions, any noun is eligible for any case role. For 
example, inanimates cannot bear agentive case (Fillmore 1968: 48).  
 
9 This case is termed neutral by Anderson and others (J. Anderson 2006: 220ff). 
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As far as the mapping to syntax is concerned, Fillmore introduced a sim-
ple principle: a subject selection hierarchy (cf. Wechsler 2006: 647), 
thereby fulfilling three out of five of Croft’s (2015: 104–105) theoretical 
pillars: The hierarchy is a ranking of roles (3), it simultaneously consti-
tutes a method for designating a certain case as preferable in the linking 
(4) and generally provides mapping rules from thematic roles to syntac-
tic units (5). Fillmore distinguishes between an unmarked subject choice 
and a marked subject choice. Consider Fillmore’s unmarked subject selec-
tion rule (Fillmore 1968: 55), which is essentially a hierarchy (J. Anderson 
2006: 222) in (31). 
(31) If there is an A, it becomes the subject; otherwise, if there is an I, 
 it becomes the subject; otherwise, the subject is the O.  
In later work, Fillmore (1977a: 75) made the syntactic level more promi-
nent again – following Stephen Anderson’s criticism (1971) – leading to 
the concept of nuclear elements (subject and direct object) directly inter-
acting with subject selection. Fillmore (1977a: 79–80) also introduces 
foregrounding: Of all the participants one can identify only a few are 
brought into perspective (or ‘foregrounded’). A saliency hierarchy de-
termines which elements are foregrounded, after which the foreground-
ed elements are subjected to the hierarchy in (31).  
3.3.2 Instruments 
In Fillmore’s earlier variety of case grammar, the instrument is treated as 
a distinct case role (1968: 46 & 1971b: 376). He characterizes the instru-
ment as an inanimate force or object causally involved in the action or 
state identified by the verb (Fillmore 1968: 46). A different wording, but 
with the same underlying idea, is found in Fillmore 1971b where the 
instrument is considered as the stimulus or immediate physical cause of 
an event (Fillmore 1971b: 376). Consider (J. Anderson 2006: 229):   
(32) Emma killed Albert with the poison. 
In his 1968 and 1971b work, he treats the instrument as a discrete, finite-
primitve case relation. In his 1977a paper however, Fillmore entertains 
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the possibility of treating instrument as a derived notion, which is de-
pendent on a very specific causal relationship of the instrument to its 
wielder. Consider (Fillmore 1977a: 77): 
(33) a. I broke the vase with the hammer. 
 b. I broke the hammer on the vase. 
In (33a), the hammer is a manipulated entity causing a change of state in 
a third entity as the result of being wielded by the instigator. In (33b), 
hammer undergoes the change of state. Now consider a paraphrase like 
(34). 
(34)  I used the hammer to break the vase. 
In (33a), the with-PP is the canonical expression of the instrument. 
Drawing on paraphrases like (34) for justification, Fillmore (1977a: 77–
78) posits that an instrument is any patient that is not included in the 
sentence nucleus due to the higher salience of a competing patient. As 
the entity undergoing the change of state is included in the perspective, 
the manipulated entity is removed from the set of nuclear grammatical 
relations (Fillmore 1977a: 77). The less salient of the two competing pa-
tients is realized with (in English) a preposition outside the nucleus. The 
more salient patient is realized as the direct object. Thus, contrary to his 
1968 (and 1971b) opinion, Fillmore assumes that instrument is not a case 
relation in its own right, rather a syntactic operation driven by the pa-
tient’s lower salience. Contrary to many other approaches, Fillmore’s 
derived instrument hints at multiple linking strategies for that concept, 
the oblique being the preferred one. One problem with Fillmore’s de-
rived instrument is that he considers it to be a patient. It is not clear 
what implications this would have for his subject selection hierarchy. 
Does that mean the instrument is removed from the hierarchy and sub-
sumed under patient? If so, the intermediate position of the instrument 
disappears and the natural way of dealing with instruments in subject 
position is lost. Similar to Fillmore (1977a), John Anderson assumes that 
the instrument is derivative of another case relation, the absolutive. An 
instrument-PP is the result of displacement from object position (J. An-
derson 1977: 124).  
3.4   Causality-driven approaches 
 
  
 85 
 
 
Whereas in John Anderson’s approach the combination of two features 
in a feature matrix makes up a semantic role (instruments are handled 
differently), Fillmore uses primitive thematic relations. Anderson treats 
the instrument as the result of a displaced absolutive case, similar to 
later Fillmore’s displaced patient. I shall refer to this treatment of in-
struments as displacement. A summary is given in table 11 below. 
 Role Type Instrument type 
Fillmore 1968 Primitive Primitive 
Fillmore 1977a Primitive Displacement 
J. Anderson Featural Displacement 
Table 11: Comparison of thematic relation properties between varieties  
of Case Grammar. 
3.4 Causality-driven approaches 
Croft rejects the primitive, reductionist notion of thematic relations. 
Instead, Croft (1991: 159) argues in favor of defining thematic relations 
on the basis of verb semantics, which he primarily analyzes in terms of 
causal structure. From Croft’s point of view, causality and thematic rela-
tions cannot be viewed separately. Therefore, I will begin by introducing 
Croft’s approach to causality. 
Croft rejects the independence of thematic relations from their gov-
erning predicate. Rather, he (1991: 159) assumes that regularities in ver-
bal semantics correlate with regularities in thematic relations. Croft 
(1991: 161–162) proposes an approach to causation that is distinct from 
both the Davidsonian and the proposition-argument approach. He ar-
gues for a third approach, which is supposedly better suited to capture 
linguistic generalizations.  He argues that his proposal has two ad-
vantages over the others: 1) causally related events share participants 
(e.g. the participant at the endpoint of an event is the initiator of the 
next) and 2) the causal chain approach will impose an ordering of partic-
ipants and thus constitutes a thematic hierarchy without having to 
stipulate one independently. Croft’s claim that the second advantage is 
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absent from the other approaches is a tenuous one. Where this may be 
true for the Davidsonian approach, RRG’s logical structures or LDG’s 
Semantic Form clearly impose an ordering on participants. As was point-
ed before, RRG recognizes different ways to expand a base logical struc-
ture, one of which is the expansion into a full causal chain. It is this or-
dering that provides the basis for actor and undergoer assignment and it 
is also central for instruments by virtue of being a causally embedded 
effector. Croft’s first advantage is also false with respect to RRG. Certain 
participants can occur several times in the logical structure, thereby 
allowing different segments of the structure to share participants.  
Croft (1991) proposes to analyze causation as individuals acting on in-
dividuals, rather than events acting on events, as is the case with Da-
vidsonian-style treatments. In later work, he identifies this as a major 
flaw (2015: 105). In his 1991 work, Croft proposes an analysis of event  
structure in terms of causal chains. A basic causal chain is given in fig-
ure 21 (Croft 1991: 163). 
Figure 21: Basic causal chain. 
The nodes in the chain represent the participants and the arrows in be-
tween mark the transmission of force. Croft (1991: 172) points out that 
full causal structure is incredibly complex and must therefore be simpli-
fied to a predicate-argument structure, which will include thematic rela-
tions. For Croft, the link between event structure (the causal chain) and 
the clause expressing it is characterized by a verb denoting a segment of 
the causal chain (the verbal segment). Each verbal segment is delimited 
by ###. For example (Croft 1991: 173) in (35).10 
 
10  Croft (2015: 106–109) points out that the earlier representations (1991) suffer from 
serious flaws: 1) the arrow notation is too coarse (as it cannot capture a non-causal 
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(35) Fred ate the banana. 
Figure 22: Chain representation of Fred ate the banana. 
3.4.1 Thematic relations 
Croft (1991: 176ff., 2015: 105) defines the points in the causal chain as 
thematic relations. The causally prior end of the chain is the initiator and 
the causally posterior end is the endpoint. Croft distinguishes between 
oblique thematic relations and direct thematic relations. The direct the-
matic relations can be considered as different subtypes or readings of 
initiator and endpoint, depending on the type of causation they are in-
volved in. Croft considers these relations primary (or: direct) because 
they have a priority in subject and object choice. It is typically initiator 
and endpoint (regardless of their thematic role) that are selected as sub-
ject and object. As a rule, the participant in the chain that becomes sub-
ject must be antecedent to the object (Croft 2015: 108). Croft’s emphasis 
on initiator and endpoint can be placed in the tradition of logical subject 
and logical object. The direct thematic roles are given in (36) (adapted 
from Croft 1991: 176): 
(36) Agent: Initiator of an act of volitional causation. 
 Stimulus: Initiator of an act of affective causation. 
 Experiencer: Endpoint of an act of affective causation. 
 Patient: Endpoint of an act of physical causation. 
 
relation), 2) only states and processes are distinguished and 3) it only shows partic-
ipants acting on participants. 
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3.4.2 Instruments 
Oblique thematic relations are defined in terms of the ordering of partic-
ipants in the causal chain, relative to the choice of object and subject 
(Croft 1991: 176). In other words, they are only secondary to the direct 
thematic relations. A selection of oblique thematic relations (Croft 1991: 
178–179) is given in (37). 
(37) Comitative: An entity that participates in a causal chain at the 
 same point and in the same role as the subject of the main verb. 
 Instrument: An entity that is intermediate in a causal chain 
 between the subject (initiator) and the direct object (final affected 
 entity). 
 Manner: A property holding of some or all of the verbal causal 
 segment. 
Consider the following example (adapted from Croft 1991: 177). The RRG 
equivalent is given in (39):  
(38) John broke the window with the hammer.11 
Figure 23: Causal chain representation of John broke the window  
  with the hammer. 
(39) [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (hammer, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
 broken´ (window)]] 
 
11  ‘VOL’ stands for volitional causation. It is one of four types of causation recognized 
by Croft. 
3.4   Causality-driven approaches 
 
  
 89 
 
 
The chain approach to event structure certainly has advantages as far as 
the ordering of events is concerned. However, the lexical decomposition 
approach is also capable of imposing order on events, which the logical 
structure in (39) clearly shows. 
Croft’s approach fails to capture three instrument-related phenomena: 
1) instrument-subject alternation, 2) instruments that cannot undergo 
ISA and 3) the fact that ISA varies across languages. 
As far as 1) is concerned, the approach falls short: It cannot account 
for sentences such as The knife cut the bread, because instruments are 
defined as oblique roles. Because oblique roles depend on subject and 
object selection, instruments (amongst others) cannot become subject 
themselves. This is problematic as this would amount to defining a the-
matic role relative to itself. One might of course posit that the ‘instru-
ment’ is an agent in such cases. This is prohibited by Croft’s definition of 
agent, however. Croft points out that instruments cannot be the initiator 
of an arc of volitional causation. Therefore, they cannot be agents, ei-
ther.  
Secondly, certain instruments cannot undergo ISA. For example, The 
spoon ate the soup is not grammatical, whereas The knife cut the bread is. 
This distinction leads some approaches to distinguish between two types 
of instruments (see section 3.7). For Croft (1991), there is only one type 
of instrument and thus this point remains unaddressed.  
Thirdly, causal chains are reflections of conceptual structure and as-
pire to be universal in nature. Yet, there are unmistakably language-
specific concerns with respect to ISA. The knife cut the bread is perfectly 
acceptable in English, but is highly ungrammatical in Russian. It is hard 
to explain any kind of language-specific status of the instrument-role in 
Croft’s framework, as it would contravene the very idea of universal 
causal structures. 
I have illustrated that Croft characterizes thematic relations as partic-
ipants in a causal chains. Furthermore, he subdivides them in two sepa-
rates classes, making one class dependent on the other. The instrument 
is dependent on the primary class of relations and thus on subject and 
object selection. 
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3.5 Lexical-Functional Grammar 
Lexical-Functional Grammar (Bresnan 2001, Falk 2001, Dalrymple 2001 & 
2006, Asudeh & Toivonen 2012) is a theory of syntax that places heavy 
emphasis on the lexicon (Dalrymple 2006: 82) rather than on the syntax 
proper (Van Valin & Wilkins 1993: 500–501).  In this regard, LFG is on 
one end of a spectrum, with frameworks such as Relational Grammar or 
Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG) occupying the other end 
(Van Valin & Wilkins 1993: 500–501). Similar to RRG, LGF rejects the 
idea of abstract underlying syntactic representations and transfor-
mations of any kind (Asudeh & Toivonen 2012: 2ff.). Rather, it makes 
extensive use of constraints and is thus considered a constraint-
satisfaction theory (Asudeh & Toivonen 2012: 10f.). Grammatical func-
tions like subject and object are considered primitives of the theory ra-
ther than being defined by phrase structure or syntactic configurations 
(Dalrymple 2006: 82). LFG’s emphasis on the lexicon entails the risk of 
turning that lexicon into a list of ad-hoc list rules and facts that would 
otherwise be treated systematically, thereby losing the power to general-
ize (Van Valin & Wilkins 1993: 501). 
3.5.1 A-structure and mapping to grammatical functions 
Bresnan (2001: 302–303) argues that the argument structures (a-
structures) project skeletal functional-structures (f-structures). A-
structure is conceptualized as an interface (see interface character in sec-
tion 3.1) between the semantics and syntax of predicators and ‘houses’ 
the thematic relations themselves. The LFG-view of this interface can be 
summarized as in figure 24 (adapted from Bresnan 2001: 306). 
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Figure 24:  The relation between lexical semantics, a- and f-structure. 
Classical LFG (Bresnan & Zaenen 1990) posits a linking theory based on 
a hierarchy of thematic relations (Bresnan & Kanerva 1989, Butt et al. 
1997: 3) as illustrated in (40). 
(40) AGENT > BEN12> EXP/GOAL > INST > PATIENT/THEME  
> LOCATIVE 
The linking hierarchy essentially assists in mapping the thematic role-
bearing arguments to grammatical functions. The highest thematic rela-
tion will be given priority in mapping to functions. The semantic roles 
play a crucial role in determining the grammatical function that the ar-
gument is linked to (Bresnan 2001: 309). The principle is simple: Each 
thematic relation in an argument structure intrinsically has a specific [± 
restricted] or [±objective] value that is relevant for the mapping to the 
grammatical functions (which are decomposed in terms of these features, 
see Lexical Mapping Theory). Agents, for example, are intrinsically [-
objective] (Dalrymple 2006: 90). In addition, there are so-called ‘default 
values’, determined by the relative position of the arguments in the hier-
archy (Dalrymple 2006: 90). The highest argument is, in addition to its 
intrinsic value, assigned [-restricted].13 In the example below (Dalrymple 
 
12  Beneficiary 
13 There is some theory-internal variation with respect to this aspect of mapping. Butt 
(1997: 6ff.) proposes to work with numbers assigned to the thematic relations rela-
tive to the thematic hierarchy. A similar approach underlies Webb’s characteriza-
tion of instruments in standard LFG (see section 3.5.2). 
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2006: 90), the agent-argument’s combined features yield a linking to 
subject. 
(41)   kick  <AGENT  PATIENT> 
 
 
 
 Instrinsic:       [-O]             [-R] 
 Default:             [-R] 
               SUBJ    SUBJ/OBJ 
 Final Classification:      SUBJ                 OBJ 
This does not, however, answer the question what thematic relations 
are. Bresnan (2001: 304) points out that a-structure captures the core 
participants of events designated by a predicate. The main problem here 
is that of grounding: Where are these roles located in theoretical space 
(cf. Engelberg 2011a, 2011b)? The early definitions (2001: 11) point in the 
direction of conceptually-grounded roles, but the presence of an elabo-
rate semantic structure (s-structure) could point to a more formal se-
mantic grounding. In short, this is unclear and thus quite problematic. 
Bresnan does present brief definitions of selected thematic relations that 
indeed point to a more conceptual grounding (2001: 11). For example, 
agent is defined as the participant in an event that essentially controls or 
causes the action, whereas the patient is the participant that undergoes 
the effect of the action (after Bresnan 2001: 11). Such an approach is not 
unlike Fillmore’s early formulations where he assumes that speakers are 
able to conceptually identify “who does what to whom”. Assuming the 
LFG-roles are conceptually grounded, the definitions suffer from the 
same theoretical flaws pointed out in section 3.1: Roles are poorly de-
fined, there is no fixed amount of roles, diagnostics for testing are ab-
sent, delineating one from the other seems problematic etc. Bresnan, 
however, acknowledges that there are several different conceptions of a-
structure in the LFG-community, including using Dowty’s proto-roles 
(Bresnan 2001: 304 & 320). Mainstream LFG, however, still uses the se-
mantically primitive thematic roles as described by Bresnan (2001).  
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3.5.2 Instruments 
Instruments in LFG are considered to be primitives like all other themat-
ic relations. Instruments occupy an intermediate position on the themat-
ic hierarchy given in (40), a commonly held idea in the linguistic com-
munity. Consider a standard LFG-analysis of a sentence containing an 
instrument. The example is taken and adapted from Webb (2008: 24): 
(42)     Jack opened     the door with the key. 
 Thematic relation: Agent  Theme     Instrument 
 Feature:    [-o]    [-r]          [-o] 
 Thematic  
 Hierarchy rank:       1     5            4 
 Mapped to:  SUBJ   OBJ         OBLθ 
This example illustrates the purpose of the thematic hierarchy nicely. 
The features of Agent and Instrument are the same, creating a potential 
conflict. Due to the higher rank of the agent in terms of the hierarchy, it 
and not the instrument is mapped to the SUBJ-function. The theme-
argument is mapped to object because of its [-r] feature. The instrument 
is mapped to OBL due to the fact that the other function it is eligible for 
(SUBJ) is already filled (Webb 2008: 24). This is somewhat reminiscent of 
RRG’s assignment of the non-macrorole argument. 
Standard LFG has problems handling the instrument in subject posi-
tion phenomenon (Webb 2008: 25). The sentences in (1.1) would be han-
dled the same way in LFG. Yet, due to the different syntactic behavior of 
the instruments, this is untenable. This leads Webb to redesign LFG’s a-
structure to a two-tier system with proto-roles in the tradition of Dowty. 
Webb (2008: 25) also argues that 1) the causal relation between the agent 
and the instrument is not captured by standard LFG and 2) that there is 
no principle difference between instrument and other roles (say, experi-
encer). To remedy these issues, Webb proposes several innovations: 1) a 
second tier in a-structure, 2) the use of Dowty’s proto-roles in a-
structure and 3) Croft’s causal chains that feed conceptual event infor-
mation into a-structure (Webb 2008: 38). Webb justifies a second tier in 
a-structure with what he calls the optionality of the instrument-NP. He 
argues that instruments are argument-adjuncts because they are  
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optional (like adjuncts) but cannot be increased in number (like argu-
ments). To account for this, he considers instruments proto-agents on 
the second tier. A skeletal reformed a-structure is given in (43) (Webb 
2008: 26): 
(43) VERB  1st tier     <α  β> 
   2nd tier    <γ> 
Webb recognizes the similarity between instruments and agents in that 
they both share two proto-agent properties: 1) causing an event or a 
change of state in another participant and 2) movement (relative to the 
position of another participant). The similarities would justify according 
the role of proto-agent to the instrument and the agent. Webb does, con-
trary to Dowty’s original proposal, use the proto-roles in a more discrete 
way that makes them linking-concepts, a widely acknowledged problem 
with Dowty’s proposal (see section 3.1). In a single-tier system, the very 
essence of having only two, opposed proto-roles would be violated. In 
Webb’s system, it is possible as the two proto-agents will be on different 
tiers (Webb 2008: 28ff.). Due to the alleged optionality of the instrument, 
it is placed in the 2nd tier. Arguments on the 1st tier take precedence in 
the mapping process (Webb 2008: 40). Consider Webb’s analysis of Jack 
opened the door with the key in (44). 
(44) 
In other words, a more principled linking pattern emerges (Webb 2008: 
41): 
(45) 1st tier proto-agent > SUBJ 
 1st tier proto-patient > OBJ 
 2nd tier proto-agent > OBLINS 
Webb’s system remedies some of the issues faced by classical LFG: The-
matic relations are largely dispensed with and replaced with a  
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non-primitive system. A solution to analyzing ISA follows naturally. 
This will be discussed in section 3.7. The major problem with Webb’s 
system is that it is not clear how the third argument in ditransitives can 
be handled. In a traditional Dowty-based approach, recipients would be 
poor candidates for either proto-agent or proto-patient. By virtue of not 
being either, they can be ‘linked’ into an oblique. Standard LFG can deal 
with ditransitives by virtue of a recipient thematic relation, even though 
there is no adequate definition. Webb’s approach seems to hinge on the 
fact that there can only be two elements on 1st tier. A recipient argument 
would have to be placed on the 2nd tier, but that would mean it is option-
al. This is clearly not the case: 
(46) a. John gave Mary a book. 
 b. *John gave Mary. 
To conclude; LFG is a theory that is primarily concerned with providing 
a computationally plausible system of grammar. Thematic relations  
generally are not in the focus of LFG-research, and that includes the 
instrument. Webb’s proposal is the most extensive LFG-based analysis of 
the instrument role in its various occurrences to date. Webb’s views will 
feature prominently in section 3.7. 
3.6 Conceptual Semantics 
Jackendoff’s conceptual semantics (1983, 1987, 1990, 1991, 2002, 2011) 
can be seen as an elaboration of Gruber’s (1965) original proposal (Van 
Valin & Wilkins 1993: 503, Jackendoff 2014: 2). The essence of Conceptu-
al Semantics is that meanings are considered to be conceptual entities 
(Engelberg 2011a: 368), located in the minds of the speakers and in the 
speaker’s conceptualization of the world (Jackendoff 2011: 688). Seman-
tics, therefore, is considered to be the organization of those thoughts 
that can be expressed by language (Jackendoff 2002: 123). Jackendoff 
uses abstract motion and location predicates in his decompositions, mak-
ing his theory localist in nature (Engelberg 2011a: 370): Local and spatial 
relations are taken to be basic.  
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3.6.1 Overview 
The centerpiece of Jackendoff’s system is an autonomous level called 
conceptual structure where meanings are represented. He considers this 
level to be the universal model of the human mind’s construal of the 
world (Jackendoff 1983: 57ff., 1991: 10 & 12, Engelberg 2011a: 396) and as 
such universal to all languages. The strict division that some theories 
make between semantic meaning and world knowledge is not present in 
Conceptual Semantics (Jackendoff 2002: 267ff., Engelberg 2011a: 369, 
Jackendoff 2011: 689). Therefore, it does not suffer from what DeLancey 
calls ‘objectivism’. Jackendoff’s (2011: 688) theory is decompositional in 
nature, although these decompositions are very different from those 
employed by Dowty or RRG. The basic building blocks need not be 
words in themselves, for instance (Engelberg 2011a: 370). Conceptual 
primitives belong to several major conceptual categories such as Event, 
Thing, Path, Place etc. (Jackendoff 1991: 13). These are the arguments of 
functions, such as CAUSE, TO or GO. The sentence in (47a) corresponds 
to the structure in (47b) (Jackendoff 1991: 13). The RRG representation of 
(47a) is given in (47c): 
(47) a. Bill went into the house. 
 b. [Event GO ([Thing BILL], [Path TO ([Place IN ([Thing HOUSE])])])] 
 c. [do´ (Bill, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME be-in´ (house, Bill)] 
Square brackets mark a conceptual constituent (Jackendoff 1991: 13). 
Lexical entries are construed according to the same logic (figure 25, En-
gelberg 2011a: 369). Similar to RRG, lexical entries contain a skeletal 
decomposed structure with open argument slots. 
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Figure 25: Lexical entry for go into (conceptual semantics). 
The top line in the lexical entry in figure 25 represents phonological 
structure, the second and third lines represent syntactic structure and 
the bottom line is conceptual structure.  
3.6.2 Thematic relations 
Thematic relations are a crucial tool in Conceptual Semantics for the 
mapping to syntax (Jackendoff 1987: 372, Engelberg 2011a: 371). Essen-
tially, thematic relations are simply structural configurations in the con-
ceptual structure (Jackendoff 1972, 1987: 378, 1990: 47). Jackendoff (1987: 
372 & 1990: 46), unlike other generative linguists, places them in the 
semantics and not in the syntax. For instance, in (47b) the first argument 
of GO is the theme. This places Conceptual Semantics’ thematic relations 
clearly in the ‘derived’ class.  This line of reasoning was the inspiration 
for RRG’s conception of thematic relations, which are structurally  
determined readings as well (Van Valin, p.c.). For Jackendoff, conceptual 
structure consists of a thematic tier (hosting relations related to motion 
and location) and an action tier. The latter was introduced as a proposed 
solution to some of the shortcomings having only one tier (Levin & Rap-
paport 2005: 47f.). The action tier bears some similarity to the general-
ized semantic roles found in RRG or in Dowty’s work. Even though 
Jackendoff’s actor and patient/undergoer14 cannot be directly equated to 
RRG’s actor and undergoer, Jackendoff’s motivation for them follows 
 
14  Patient and Beneficiary are considered to be subtypes of undergoer (Nikanne 1995: 
2). Yet, in the literature on conceptual semantics, patient and undergoer are often 
used interchangeably. 
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similar lines: The action tier and its components are intended to capture 
how (and which) participants are ‘affected’. For Jackendoff, the action 
tier is the primary level involved in the linking to morphosyntax while 
the thematic tier plays a secondary role at best.15 Arguments bearing 
action tier-roles are prioritized in linking; arguments bearing thematic 
tier-roles follow the action-tier roles in linking (Nikanne 1995: 2). Con-
sider the following example (The car hit the tree) (adapted from 
Jackendoff 1990: 126–127): 
Figure 26: Thematic tier and action tier. 
The top level in figure 26 is the thematic tier and the lower level is the 
action tier. The structural configuration means that car is a theme on the 
thematic tier and an actor on the action tier, whereas tree is a goal on the 
thematic tier and a patient on the action tier. An ordering of thematic 
relations is provided by a thematic hierarchy. This hierarchy is mapped 
onto a syntactic hierarchy to account for linking (Jackendoff 1990: 258ff, 
Engelberg 2011a: 372). Consider Jackendoff’s Thematic Hierarchy and its 
structural ‘translation’ (Jackendoff 1990: 258) in (48). Asterisks indicate 
the relevant constituents: 
(48) a. Order the A-marked arguments in the action tier from left to 
  right, followed by the A-marked arguments in the main  
  conceptual clause of the thematic tier, from least embedded
   to most deeply embedded. 
  
 
15  This is very reminiscent of RRG’s extensive use the GSRs actor and undergoer. The 
more basic-level thematic relations sometimes play a role, but similar to Jackend-
off’s thematic tier, only secondarily so. 
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 b.  [AFF (X*, <Y>)]  (Actor) 
  [AFF (<X>, Y*)]   (Patient (AFF-) or   
      Beneficiary (AFF+)) 
  [Event/State F (X*, <Y>)]  (Theme) 
  [Path/Place F (X*)]  (Location, Source, Goal) 
In later work, Jackendoff (2011: 695) revises the tier-system and subdi-
vides conceptual structure into propositional structure on the one hand 
and information structure on the other. Despite the revisions, the basic 
idea remains the same. 
3.6.3 Instruments 
As the thematic hierarchy in (48) shows, there is no instrument role. 
Rather, instrument is an interaction of actor and patient. To capture this, 
Jackendoff (1987: 398ff.) proposes to augment the thematic and action 
tiers with a temporal tier. The temporal tier operates with two primi-
tives: P (point in time) and R (region in time). Jackendoff describes, for 
example, an achievement as the combination R P. A region in time is 
bounded by a point in time (these annotations are always to be read 
from left to right). Individual Ps and Rs can be expanded into sequences 
of smaller Ps and Rs: P can be decomposed into R P R and R can be de-
composed into P R P.  
Instruments are nothing more than entities that are acted on and that 
act on another entity themselves. This double role can be simultaneous 
or it can be sequential. The former implies a continuous manipulation on 
the part of the instigator, whereas the latter does not. Each of these op-
tions is associated with a different temporal tier configuration, (P P) and 
(P R P) respectively. Associations are indicated with association lines, 
dashed lines indicate potential associations. The system of association 
lines permits the conceptualization of the event as one where there is 
constant manipulation on the part of the instigator or where there is 
only initial contact manipulation. In terms of the decomposition, an ‘in-
strument’ is a theme argument of a predication (in the example below of 
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GO) that is demoted16 in the sense that it does not feature in the action 
tier (Jackendoff 1987: 400–401), contrary to – for example – the car in 
the car hit the tree. Rather, it appears on the temporal tier twice, as a 
goal in the first section of the tier and as a theme in the second section 
of the tier. An overview of this for Sue hit Fred with the stick is given in 
the decomposition in figure 27:17  
Figure 27: Jackendoff’s analysis of an instrument construction (pre-1990). 
Jackendoff (1990: 142–145) revises his analysis of instruments in his later 
work, although the basic assumption remains the same: Instrument is an 
entity that is acted upon and in turn acts on another. However, Jackend-
off (1990) no longer resorts to a temporal tier. Rather, he treats the in-
strument as an entity embedded in a means expression (expressed with by 
in the decomposition). The BY-function turns events into means modifi-
ers (Jackendoff 1990: 142). Here, too, the instrument can be defined struc-
turally (Jackendoff 1990: 142–143): It is a conceptual entity embedded in 
an event which acts as a modifier of a superordinate event. Consider 
(Jackendoff 1990: 143) the 1990 analysis of Sue hit Fred with a stick in 
figure 28.  
 
 
16 The analysis in Foley & Valin (1984: 54) is similar: Instruments are considered to be 
effector-themes. 
17  This graph was taken from Jackendoff (1987: 401). The notation used there on the 
thematic and action tiers is the pre-1990 notation. 
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Figure 28: Jackendoff’s reformulated analysis of an instrument  
construction (1990). 
The structures proposed by Jackendoff for instruments are quite com-
plex. When compared to RRG or to the finite-primitive approaches, it is 
doubtful whether parsimony is met. Jackendoff assumes that instrumen-
tal subjects are instances of inanimate instigators rather than instru-
ments (Jackendoff 1990: 295), but he does not explore this matter any 
further. Positing key in (49a) as an instigator is implausible as (49b) illus-
trates. Because the key cannot take an instrument itself, it cannot be an 
inanimate instigator. This means that is fundamentally different from 
storm in (49c). There is a further issue with Jackendoff’s system: Some 
instruments cannot undergo ISA, yet this point remains unadressed. 
(49) a. The key opened the door. 
 b. *The key opened the door with the stick. 
 c. The storm destroyed the village with its strong winds. 
There does not seem to be any straightforward way in Jackendoff’s sys-
tem to account for ISA itself and the fact that some instruments cannot 
undergo it whereas others can. Instruments depend on the presence of 
agent and patient and seem too circumstantial here to account for ISA. 
Second, in the 1990 representation, the more extensive temporal-causal 
information from the pre-1990 representation is gone. Yet, it is im-
portant in order to account for ISA, as will become clear in section 3.7. 
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3.7 Instruments as subjects 
Many, if not most, linguists who acknowledge the category of instru-
ment do not distinguish within this class any further. However, there are 
good empirical reasons to assume that there are subtypes of instruments, 
motivated by diverging morphosyntactic behavior of some instruments 
when compared to others. In the introduction, the instrument-subject 
alternation (ISA) was briefly introduced. It has been observed that some 
instruments can occur as subjects, whereas others cannot (e.g. Marantz 
1981: 285–286, Wojcik 1976: 165). I denote instruments that can undergo 
ISA as intermediary instruments and those that cannot as facilitating 
instruments. The use of this terminology is borrowed from Marantz 
(1981). I use these terms for the sake of theoretical neutrality. The for-
mer’s conceptual ability to act ‘independently’ is often cited as an expla-
nation for ISA (see Kamp & Rossdeutscher and Alexiadou & Schäfer 
below). Fillmore acknowledged the existence of ISA as a natural conse-
quence of the subject selection hierarchy A > I > O (Schlesinger 1989: 
189–190). Fillmore can account for the alternations in (50a–50b) by posit-
ing that they refer to the same scene. The second sentence’s case frame 
simply lacks an A and thus, the I becomes the subject. Yet, difficulties 
emerge for this kind of approach when confronted with (50c–50d), 
which should, following the same logic, be possible. It is difficult in 
many approaches to account for this alternation because all instruments 
are treated as one monolithic class. Croft’s account has difficulties cap-
turing this alternation because instruments always occupy an intermedi-
ate position in the causal chain (Webb 2008: 32). Although numerous 
explanations to capture ISA have been suggested (Kamp & Ros-
sdeutscher 1994, Alexiadou & Schäfer 2006, Webb 2008, Grimm 2013, 
RRG), most theories, however, are silent on the subject. Generally speak-
ing, ISA is a phenomenon where participants of an event that are con-
ceptualized as instruments are ‘moved’ to subject position. Consider: 
(50) a. John picked up the container with the crane. 
 b. The crane picked up the container. 
 c. Larry picked up the potato with the fork. 
 d. *The fork picked up the potato. 
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 e. Jan sneed het brood door met het mes. 
  Jan cut\PST.3SG DEF bread through with DEF knife 
  ‘Jan cut the bread with a knife.’ (Dutch) 
 f. *Het mes sneed het brood door. 
  DEF knife cut\PST.3SG DEF bread through 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ 
 g. Jean a coupé le pain avec le couteau. 
  Jean AUX.3SG cut.PTCP DEF bread with DEF knife 
  ‘Jean cut the bread with the knife.’ (French) 
 h. *Le couteau a coupé le pain. 
  DEF knife AUX.3SG cut.PTCP DEF bread 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ 
 i. Jan schnitt das Brot mit dem Messer. 
  Jan cut\PST.3SG DEF bread with DEF knife 
  ‘Jan cut the bread with the knife.’ (German) 
 j. ?/*Das Messer schnitt das Brot. 
  DEF knife cut\PST.3SG DEF bread 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ 
 k. Jovan je sekao hleb nožem. 
  Jovan AUX.3SG cut.PTCP bread(ACC) knife.INS 
  ‘John cut the bread with a knife.’ (Serbian) 
 l. *Nož je sekao hleb. 
  knife AUX.3SG cut.PTCP bread(ACC) 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ 
 m. John killed the man with a silver bullet. 
 n. A bullet to the heart killed the man. 
 o. John murdered the man with a silver bullet. 
 p. *A bullet to the heart murdered the man. 
These examples reveal that there are three main issues that need to be 
addressed: 1) There are different classes of instruments (50a–50d), 2) 
predicates vary (50m–50p) and 3) languages vary (50a–50l). Not every 
approach has an answer to each of these issues. In fact, many do not 
even recognize 3) at all, focusing exclusively on English. Even though 
examples (50e–50l) illustrate that this phenomenon is language-specific. 
For instance, Dutch, French and Serbian do not allow for this alternation 
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at all here, whereas in German the sentence in (50j) comes with an abil-
ity reading only: The knife was capable, at one point in the past, of  
cutting bread. The past tense indicates that it has since lost the ability to 
do so.  
Variation with respect to ISA generally comes in two flavors: (a) vari-
ation within languages and (b) variation across languages. Even though 
(b) is hardly ever investigated, it is sometimes acknowledged (e.g. Webb 
(2008) and Schlesinger (1989)).  
Generally, two approaches can be discerned: 1) Approaches that as-
sume that instruments in subject position are nothing more than agents, 
albeit less prototypical ones; 2) approaches that use ISA to justify a di-
versification of the instrument participant into several subtypes.  The 
former usually uses features or traits to capture the similarities between 
instruments and more prototypical agents (i.e. humans). For instance, 
some linguists assume that agent and instrument crucially share a fea-
ture like causal change or the like (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 46). 
Due to the crucial presence of a certain feature, instruments can occur as 
subjects. The latter assumes that ISA is a type of construction. The sec-
ond class of approaches does not treat all inanimates in subject position 
as instruments, whereas the first class of approaches does (at least tacit-
ly). The former runs the risk of diluting the notion of the ‘instrument’ 
into a non-relation because the boundary between instigator and inter-
mediate is blurred (or even lost). The latter has a clear definition of what 
an instrument is, yet it must find a principled way to distinguish cases of 
ISA from mere inanimate subjects.  
3.7.1 The general approach 
For Schlesinger and DeLancey (1984), instruments in subject position are 
best analyzed as inanimate agents, rather than instruments that are con-
structionally highlighted. DeLancey (1991: 348) assumes that key in the 
key opened the lock must be an agent because as it is a perfectly normal 
transitive clause, there is no reason to assume another agent. Being iden-
tified as a causally involved argument is sufficient to be agent (DeLancey 
1991: 349). He claims that even though there might be an ultimate cause 
(i.e. agent), it is not necessary to include it in the event representation. In 
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other words, only the proximate cause is included in the semantics and it 
is a normal agent. If they were normal agents then there is no reason 
why they could not take instruments. This is, however, impossible, call-
ing their agent status into question.  
Schlesinger (1989: 193) proposes that the agent-category is not a dis-
crete but a graded category, with different degrees of membership.  
Inanimate tools are usually instruments, but can be read as agents if the 
referent’s membership in the agent-category is high enough. This ap-
proach not only accounts for typical instruments (e.g. fork lift) but for all 
inanimates in subject position. Schlesinger (1989: 193 & 197) also points 
out that mechanisms are ‘better agents’ than simple inanimate objects 
and more complex mechanisms are better agents than less complex ones. 
Alexiadou & Schäfer (2006: 43) and Grimm make similar observations. 
However, Schlesinger does not explore this further. Schlesinger proposes 
two naturalness conditions and a set of constraints to account for ISA. 
Only if certain conditions are met, can an inanimate become the subject 
of a sentence. For example, Schlesinger (1989: 189–190) argues that the 
sentence (51b) is unusual because the stick’s membership in the agent-
category is not high enough for it to be considered agent and, conse-
quently, to be accepted as the subject of the sentence. 
(51) a. Carol hit the horse with the stick. 
 b. ?The stick hit the horse. 
3.7.1.1 Naturalness conditions 
Schlesinger (1989) proposes two naturalness conditions. Consider natu-
ralness condition 1 (Schlesinger 1989: 190): 
(52) Naturalness condition 1: When the event is not instigated by a 
 human agent, or when the agent is unknown or no longer on the 
 scene, the instrument by means of which the action is performed 
 or which is involved in the event may be naturally expressed as 
 the subject. 
This condition, in combination with Schlesinger’s examples, implies that 
there is always a manipulating entity with every inanimate in subject 
position. Consider the very conceivable interpretation for (51b) that a 
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falling stick impacts a horse (say, when the stick falls from the tree by 
natural-physical causes such as the wind or, even more basic, gravity). In 
such a reading, a speaker would not readily conceptualize the wind or 
gravity as an instigator or as a manipulating entity, even though it 
would certainly be one in the realm of physics. A similar concern is valid 
for (53a–53b), given by Schlesinger (1989: 190) as illustrations of natu-
ralness condition 1. 
(53) a. The rust has eaten away at the lock. 
 b. The clock was ticking so loudly that it woke the baby. 
 c. The rust has eaten away at the lock by means of its oxidizing 
  processes. 
 d. *John broke the metal box with the rust. 
 e. *The knife cut the box with the blade. 
It is problematic to consider rust as instrument, as there is no realistic 
instigator. Furthermore, rust cannot be instrument, because it can take 
instruments (53c) and, more importantly, it cannot be under manipula-
tion of an instigator (53d). Natural forces cannot conceivably have an 
agent governing them, as DeLancey points out (1991: 347). I thus follow 
DeLancey (1991: 347) and Grimm (2013: 2–3) when they argue that they 
are simply not instruments. Schlesinger, however, claims that forces and 
instruments are essentially the same and that naturalness condition 1 
applies to both. This is doubtful because forces and instruments CAN be 
distinguished quite easily. Forces can take instruments themselves and 
cannot be instruments of another instigator ((53c) and (53d)), whereas 
instruments can never take other instruments ((53e)). Schlesinger’s ex-
amples given in (54) are even more problematic: 
(54) a. A fence barred his access. 
 b. A pile of rubble barred his access. 
In (54), there is not even a change of state, as bar tests as a state. There is 
no activity predicate, and consequently, there is no instigator. Therefore, 
assigning forcehood to fence and pile of rubble is highly doubtful. 
Another problem is the example (Schlesinger 1989: 190) the letter of in-
troduction opened all doors to him. The letter of introduction does not  
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literally open doors. It is an idiomatic expression and should be disquali-
fied as an example. A similar concern applies to Schlesinger’s (1989: 192) 
use of Shakespeare to illustrate his point, which uses poetic language. A 
fourth problem is ‘no longer on the scene’. Although one can claim that 
the instigator is no longer present or unknown in e.g. The computer virus 
crippled John’s computer, this is not true for the knife cut the bread, as the 
knife requires continuous manipulation. An additional problem is Schle-
singer’s (1989: 190) illustration in (55a). 
(55) a. The World War II mine wounded him when he stepped on it. 
 b. The World War II mine wounded him with shrapnel when  
  he stepped on it. 
However, the mine is not an instrument in (55a): It takes other instru-
ments ((55b)), but more importantly, there is no event link between the 
stricken individual18 and the instigator of the mine’s planting. Consider: 
(56) a. ???The WW II-soldier killed the civilian in 2015 with a  
  landmine. 
 b. The soldier killed the civilian with the landmine. 
 c. The landmine killed the civilian. 
There are two events involved in (56a): The planting of the mine in 
World War II and the mine killing a civilian in 2015.  It is strange to 
claim that a soldier planting a mine some 70 years ago is directly respon-
sible for a civilian in 2015 dying, as (56a) illustrates. The mine-examples 
do reveal two interesting facts, though: 1) some referents can be concep-
tualized as both instrument and a type of force (55b) and 2) for ISA to be 
acceptable, there has to be some kind of event link between the ‘stand-
ard’ sentence (e.g. (56b)) and the shifted sentence ((56c)). Schlesinger 
(1989: 191) also proposes a second naturalness condition, shown in (57). 
  
 
18 I assume that him refers to a person in the here and now. If it referred to a person 
in the World War II-era, the use of the RP ‘The World War II mine’ would be very 
strange. 
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(57) Naturalness Condition 2: To the extent that attention is drawn 
to the instrument by means of which an action is performed and 
away from the instigator of the action, the former will be natural-
ly expressed as the sentence subject. 
Criticism is in order here as well. Consider (adapted from Schlesinger 
1989: 191) the examples in (58). 
(58) a.  The pencil draws lines. 
 b. John draws lines with the pencil. 
 c. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (pencil, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME  drawn´ (lines)]] 
 d. John draws lines with the pencil today. 
 e. ?The pencil draws lines today. 
 f.  John cut the bread with a knife today. 
 g.  The knife cut the bread today. 
The sentence in (58b) corresponds with the LS in (58c). One can para-
phrase (58b) as The pencil is a/the cause of the lines being drawn. This 
stands to reason: Without the pencil, John would have been unable to 
draw lines. However, I reject the idea that (58a) is the ISA-version of 
(58b). Rather, I believe it has an ability reading. Contrary to (58f–58g), 
adding a temporal adverbial makes (58e) less acceptable.  
3.7.1.2 Deliberation constraint & mediation constraint 
Apart from the naturalness conditions, Schlesinger proposes two con-
straints. These can be used as tests to determine how similar the instru-
ment in question is to the prototypical agent. The first constraint Schle-
singer (1989: 195) proposes is the deliberation constraint. Essentially, the 
more the task requires deliberation, the less likely the inanimate will be 
realized in subject position. Consider (59) (Schlesinger 1989: 195): 
(59) a. The baton is jerking nervously above the conductor’s head. 
 b. *The baton is conducting Tchaikovsky’s fifth Symphony. 
The sentence in (59a) is said to be fine because little or no deliberation is 
needed on the part of the instrument. This is problematic, because there 
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is no instrument in (59a): Baton is not causally involved in any way. It 
does not cause anything in turn. Rather, baton in (59a) is an inanimate x-
argument of the LS: SEML do´ (baton, [jerk´ (baton)]). However, if the 
deliberation constraint is stripped of its instrument-related aspects, then 
it can be useful to account for the appearance of at least some inani-
mates in initial x-argument position. Consider (Schlesinger 1989: 195): 
(60) a. The black king moves to H4. 
 b. *The chess pieces play a short game. 
Schlesinger posits that if too much deliberation is entailed in the verb’s 
meaning, agentivization is ‘blocked’. I believe one should turn this per-
spective around: Verbs with higher deliberation in their meaning will 
require a more prototypically agentive subject-referent. Verbs like mur-
der and beat are said to have a great deal of deliberation in their mean-
ing, only allowing humans as subjects (Schlesinger 1989: 196). There are 
two problems with this: 1) The concept of deliberation is ill-defined and 
2) due to Schlesinger’s refusal to posit deliberation as an annotation in 
the mental lexicon, it is unclear how it would function technically. 
Schlesinger (1989: 196–197) states that the deliberation constraint can be 
overridden if one of the naturalness conditions is satisfied, thereby ex-
plaining (61). 
(61) The musical box played the madrigal. 
Positing overrides to constraints considerably complicates matters and 
fails to achieve parsimony. The second constraint that Schlesinger (1989: 
197) proposes is the mediation constraint: An inanimate object can only 
be an agent if it cannot take instruments, contrary to prototypical 
agents. Schlesinger claims that the mediation constraint explains why 
(62a) is ungrammatical. Yet, this sentence is grammatical. 
(62) a. The wind broke the window with a twig. 
 b. The storm destroyed the village with huge tidal wives. 
 c. The computer virus crippled Mary’s computer with a batch  
  of junk files. 
 d. The assembly robot cut the steel in half with a saw. 
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The mediation constraint does predict the unacceptability of instruments 
taking instruments: As soon as an instrument is added to an ISA-
sentence, it becomes ungrammatical ((53e)). However, the mediation 
constraint overgeneralizes: It would correctly filter out the ungrammati-
cal sentence in (53e) but it would wrongly rate the examples in (62a–62d) 
as ungrammatical. Schlesinger (1989: 199–200) proposes an override here 
as well. If the instrument is a proper part of or ‘otherwise intimately 
associated with the agent’, then the inanimate agent can take instru-
ments. Consider (Schlesinger 1989: 200) the examples in (63). 
(63) a. The new apparatus bores holes with a laser beam. 
 b. The piper plane exterminated the insects with a special  
  spray. 
Even though this override seemingly captures (63a–63b), it does not 
explain cases where the instrument is not necessarily closely associated 
with the agent (e.g. saw in (62d)). Needless to say, the subject referents 
above are mechanisms and thus rank high on the Van Valin-Wilkins 
scale (1996). An additional problem with the mediation constraint is that 
Schlesinger cannot adequately draw a line between those instruments 
where it holds and those where it does not hold (Schlesinger 1989: 200). 
For instance, he claims that it does not hold in (64) and therefore these 
sentences are grammatical. Why the constraint does not apply here is 
not explained. 
(64) a. The cruiser bombarded the coast with heavy shells. 
 b. The locomotive cleared the track with a snow plow. 
3.7.1.3 Conjunction test & do-test 
Fillmore (1968) sought evidence for his cases in the fact that it appears 
that entities bearing different cases cannot be conjoined (1968: 43). Con-
sider (Schlesinger 1989: 201, after Quirk et al. 1972): 
(65) a. *Carol and the stick hit the horse. 
 b. *John and the key opened the door. 
3.7   Instruments as subjects 
 
  
 111 
 
 
For Fillmore, Carol and John are agents (A) and stick and key are instru-
ments (I). Schlesinger concedes that this might pose problems for his 
analysis, because stick and key can be read as agents. If they are agents, 
then (65a–65b) should be grammatical. Schlesinger believes that even if 
two referents have the same case, they still require a degree of agentivity 
that is similar. Because Carol and stick are too dissimilar, they cannot be 
conjoined. In RRG, John and the key would occupy the same argument 
position in the logical structure as a conjoined RP of the form (John ∧ 
key). As the two referents are not co-agents, the sentence is ungrammat-
ical. I will revisit this in chapter 7. 
Schlesinger argues that the permissibility of highly agentive instru-
ments as the subject of do affirms their agent-like status. From an RRG-
perspective, a do-test only detects that the referent is under the scope of 
a do´, nothing more. Furthermore, such a test is not cross-linguistically 
valid for two reasons: 1) Not all languages have a general do verb and 2) 
even languages that have such a verb often do not allow for such a test. 
Consider Schlesinger’s (1989: 202) illustrations with their Dutch equiva-
lents: 
(66) a. What did the bullet do? 
 b. *Wat deed de kogel? 
  What do\PST.3SG DEF bullet 
 c.  Bob showed Dick what the new type of chisel can do. 
 d. *Bob toon-de Dick wat het nieuwe type 
  Bob show-PST.3SG Dick REL DEF new type 
 
  beitel kan doen. 
  chisel can do.INF 
3.7.1.4 Instruments as members of the agent class 
Schlesinger (1989) and Grimm (2013) assume that the more agentive an 
inanimate is, the more likely it can be a subject. Schlesinger and Grimm 
argue that the agentivity of referents is largely (but not exclusively) de-
termined by properties inherent to the referents. Schlesinger proposes a 
set of features to capture this, whereas Grimm proposes a network. 
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Schlesinger’s features 
Schlesinger considers agentivity as a graded concept: There are more 
prototypical agents (e.g. John) and less prototypical ones (e.g. knife). The 
ability to appear in subject position depends (amongst others) on the 
degree of membership in the agent class. Schlesinger (1989: 207) posits 
that instruments that can become subject crucially share features like 
[+cause] or [+control] with prototypical agents. Schlesinger emphasizes 
that the constraints and conditions he stipulates cannot be transformed 
into features and must therefore remain a separate part of the apparatus. 
This is mainly due to the fact that the constraints depend on context or 
on the interaction between agent and instrument, rather than on a refer-
ent’s inherent properties. Constraints are thus context-sensitive and fea-
tures are context-insensitive. The main problems with this account is that 
the features are not defined properly and that they are used in a fairly ad 
hoc-fashion.  There are no independent criteria for assigning [+cause] to 
a referent. Yet, the idea that ‘agency’ is a cluster concept is very intri-
guing. This idea is also present in the Van Valin-Wilkins hierarchy: 
Traits and features are ranked hierarchically and interact with other 
factors such as constructions. 
Grimm’s lattice(s) 
Grimm (2013) proposes to capture the limits of subjecthood with the in-
terplay of two hierarchically structured lattices. Referents are placed on 
the lattice according to the features that make up the lattice’s architec-
ture. Rather than positing constraints and conditions, Grimm assumes 
that argument slots can access certain sections of the lattice, whereas 
they cannot access other portions of it. In a nutshell, inanimates must be 
in a portion of the lattice that the argument slot can access for them to 
become subject. Canonical subjects such as humans are near the top of 
the lattice. The main difference between Schlesinger’s and Grimm’s ap-
proaches lies in the consistency with which the lattice is built: A set of 
well-defined features is chosen and made subject to entailment relations. 
This puts Grimm in the ‘general approach’: A system is set up to deal 
with inanimates in subject position (including ISA). Grimm argues that 
there is no equivalence between normal instrument constructions and 
ISA (Grimm 2013: 1–2) as not all instruments can appear in subject  
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position, an observation that leads others to assume subtypes of instru-
ments (RRG, Alexiadou & Schäfer). Grimm concludes that instruments in 
subject position are simply inanimate referents in subject position and 
are governed by general linking principles. Contrary to Schlesinger, 
Grimm distinguishes forces from instruments, stating that the former do 
not appear in a with-PP or, generally, exhibit the syntactic behavior of 
instruments (Grimm 2013: 2). This is only partly true, as instruments 
exist that are ‘agentive’ enough to be realized as an instrument or an 
instigator (e.g. assembly robot).  
Grimm (2005 & 2013) proposes two related lattices: A more basic 
agency lattice and an agency-animacy lattice, the latter being a combina-
tion of the former with a typical animacy hierarchy. The agency lattice is 
compiled from the features instigation, motion, sentience, volition and 
persistence, some of which are inspired by Dowty’s proto-role properties 
(Grimm 2005: 20). Grimm considers his features to be event-based prop-
erties. Hence, the agency lattice is intended to capture event structure. 
Some of these features are problematic however. For example, the fea-
ture persistence supposedly tracks how a participant is affected over time 
(Grimm 2005: 21–22). The apple in John ate the apple would be ranked as 
existential persistence (end) as the referent ceases to exist. Grimm subdi-
vides persistence by introducing the distinction between existential and 
qualitative persistence and including beginning/end as values. The main 
problem is that the features are not adequately defined or delineated. For 
instance, in the sentence he was thinking about his dream last night the 
referent dream no longer exists; it ended the moment the person woke 
up. Yet, it is possible to speak of the dream as if it still existed. The 
vagueness and overcomplexity of persistence makes it a very confusing 
feature.  
Grimm (2005: 21) follows Rozwadowska (1988) in defining sentience as 
“conscious involvement in the action or state”, making it an event-based 
property. I strongly disagree with their use of the term sentience. In this 
thesis, I define sentience as “the ability to judge intentions in others 
and/or the ability to make independent decisions. I consider sentience as 
an inherent feature, that is, a feature inherent to the referent. 
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Motion is defined (Grimm 2005: 21) as a requirement of being in motion 
during the event, which is evident with predicates like throw. For in-
stance, in the stick hit the horse the subject position imposes the re-
quirement on its filler that it moves. Therefore, whatever fills this slot 
must be capable of moving or being moved, which is captured with the 
NP-related feature [±mobile]. As stick can be moved, it possesses the 
feature [+mobile] and is thus compatible with throw’s requirements 
(Grimm 2013: 8). Volition is defined as a feature characterizing an entity 
that consciously plans to bring about a specific result. In RRG, volition is 
defined as a basic act of will. What Grimm calls volition is termed inten-
tion(al) in RRG. Despite the differences between the two concepts, they 
are not necessarily discrete categories. Determining whether something 
is intention or volition is tricky and it may be advantageous to leave it 
underspecified. In this dissertation, volition is used as a label for such an 
underspecification. Sentience and motion illustrate that there are good 
reasons to assume a distinction between inherent properties and induced 
properties. Grimm’s agency lattice is given in figure 29 (see appendix). 
Grimm’s treatment of agentivity and patientivity as two different axes 
is contradictory. This theoretically allows for referents to be simultane-
ously highly patientive and agentive. In RRG, the deeper a referent is 
embedded in an LS, the more ‘patientive’ it will be and vice versa. The 
event-related features that Grimm introduces are captured naturally 
with the Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy. Interesting, however, are the no-
tions of upward-closed and downward-closed. Grimm states that if a refer-
ent with a position x on the hierarchy is treated as a patient relative to 
its verbal predicate, then every referent that ranks lower would also also 
treated as such (e.g. downward-closed). The same applies to agents and 
upward-closed. This gives rise to the idea (Grimm 2013: 5) that potential 
agents and patients form regions in structured semantic space. I agree 
with this reasoning and it will feature prominently in my own approach 
(see chapter 4). 
Grimm combines the agency lattice with an animacy hierarchy, yield-
ing the combined agency-animacy lattice. For the construction of the 
animacy hierarchy, Grimm again proposes a combination of features, 
compiled into a lattice-like structure (Grimm 2013: 5–6). He proposes 
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four features that are subject to entailment relations: human, sentient, 
mobile and potent. Human is self-explanatory, but sentience is not. Grimm 
treats sentience as a feature referring to a referent’s ability to perceive 
stimuli. For him, [-sentient] equals inanimate and [+sentient] equals 
animate. This crucially assumes that there is a binary opposition be-
tween them. Such oppositions make it difficult to characterize referents 
like Artificial Intelligence. Mobile are those referents that can be moved; 
non-mobile are those that cannot be moved, such as houses or trees. This 
feature is distinct from the event-related motion that was described 
above. The event-related motion feature refers to whether something is 
in motion in the event, the NP-mobile describes an inherent quality of 
the referent. Mobile is less straightforward than it would appear, howev-
er. Consider: 
(67) a. Mara saw the house. 
 b. Mara saw the parked car. 
 c. Mara saw the car. 
In (67a), house is inherently unable to move, whereas the car in (67b) is 
only induced immobile. It has the inherent ability to move, but context 
(here in the form of an adnominal modifier) dictates that it is immobile. 
In other words, in (67b) the immobility of car is owed to context, where-
as in (67a) it is an essential feature of the referent. Whereas Grimm’s 
approach can capture the immobility of referents like house, it is unclear 
how he would capture the induced immobility of (67b). Barring the fact 
that Grimm’s labeling is unfortunate and confusing, I believe the mobili-
ty of referents can be captured in a more natural way. If movement is 
relevant in the event described by the predicate, it will be encoded as 
such in the logical structure. Nevertheless, the inherent (in)ability to 
move or be moved is an important distinction that will appear in my 
own approach in chapter 4. Last, potent is considered to be true of inan-
imates that have their own internal power or are considered to have it, a 
concept often found in the literature. Here, Grimm (2013: 7) follows 
Chafe (1970: 109). This feature is used to distinguish inanimates capable 
of semi-autonomous activity ([+potent]) from those that are not ([-
potent]). 
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These features are related to each other through entailment relations, 
similar to the event-related features. Sentient entails potent and mobile. 
Human entails sentient, thereby also entailing potent and mobile (Grimm 
2013: 7): 
(68) inanimate < mobile inanimate, potent inanimate < mobile and  
 potent inanimate (e.g. natural force, autonomous machine)  
< animate < human 
Grimm believes that this approach can also account for autonomously 
acting machines and natural forces: They possess potent and mobile. 
There are two problems with this assumption: 1) Natural forces and au-
tonomous machines behave differently syntactically and 2) there is gra-
dation within the class of ‘autonomous machines’ illustrated by diverg-
ing syntactic behavior.  
Grimm’s combined lattice is given in figure 30 (see appendix). The 
combined lattice raises important questions: How is this combination 
accounted for? What principles are followed in connecting nodes with 
each other? Grimm points out (2013: 7) that ‘one is inserted into the oth-
er’, thus taking their Cartesian product. However, this is not made ex-
plicit any further. 
Grimm wants to use this combined lattice for the broader purpose of 
argument linking. As much of these event-based properties are handled 
in the logical structures in RRG, I see no need for Grimm’s agency lat-
tice. Rather, the combination of this lattice with an animacy hierarchy 
complicates his account considerably. Despite the philosophical merit 
such a combined lattice might have, it is highly impractical for linking 
purposes. Grimm also states (2013: 7) that the higher in the lattice, the 
fewer entities there are to meet the requirements. As can be seen quite 
clearly in the Van Valin-Wilkins hierarchy, the amount of potential ref-
erents for a given ‘lattice-position’ does not become smaller with an 
ascending position, rather, the referents become more specific. For in-
stance, the referent expressed by the personal pronoun I is higher than 
the referent John.  
The key to Grimm’s account for instrumental subject follows natural-
ly from his general approach to argument linking: A predicate imposes 
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certain semantic restrictions on its argument slots. These can be ex-
pressed as regions in the lattice. A referent filling the argument slot 
must occupy a position within the lattice-region imposed on the slot by 
the predicate. If a referent that would typically be realized as an instru-
ment (e.g. in a with-PP) is inside the semantic region imposed by the 
predicate, then they, too, can become subject. For example (Grimm 2013: 
8): 
(69) a.  The worker moved the dirt with the shovel/crane. 
 b. The crane/*shovel moved the dirt. 
Shovel possesses, similar to stick, only the feature [+mobile] and there-
fore does not meet the predicate’s requirements for that slot. Crane, on 
the other hand, also possesses potent, which places the referent within 
the correct portion of semantic space. Therefore, it is eligible as subject 
whereas shovel is not. Grimm (2013: 10–11) explains the ungrammaticali-
ty of (70a–70b) with the same principle. 
(70) a. Carl ate the spaghetti with a fork. 
 b. *The fork ate the spaghetti. 
Grimm claims that the position of fork in the lattice is essentially the 
same as that of shovel. Eat requires its subject slot to possess sentience, a 
property fork cannot possible have. Grimm ignores the causal distinction 
that exists between the fork- and the crane-example. Crane is directly 
causally involved. Without the crane, there is no moving of the dirt, 
whereas without the fork, there is an eating event. I share RRG’s as-
sumption that the causal difference is more important than the micro-
semantics of individual verbs. The strengths of Grimm’s approach are 
clear: Predicate variation and, more importantly, language variation can 
be accounted for. Even though Grimm does not even mention this him-
self, it can be theorized that languages (even with similar predicates) will 
impose different requirements on their slots. Predicate variation is 
solved in according stronger requirements to the subject slot filler of 
murder than to that of kill. While kill requires the referent to be potent19, 
 
19 Bullet is considered potent because it is conceptualized as having a form of kinetic 
energy (Grimm 2013: 9 & Kearns 2000: 241). Alexiadou & Schäfer (2006: 43),  
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murder requires its filler to be sentient in addition. This is a requirement 
that the referent bullet cannot possibly meet. I believe it is possible to 
treat ‘lexicalized agency’ as a form of shorthand for predicates that only 
allow actors from an extremely small section of semantic space, usually 
coinciding with humans. Consider, for example, the sentences in (71): 
(71) a. The lumberjack murdered the engineer. 
 b. *The robot murdered the engineer. 
The sentence in (71a) is grammatical; meaning that its referent possesses 
some form of sentience that allows it to act intentionally. The example in 
(71b), on the other hand, is ungrammatical, as the referent does not meet 
the correct criteria (i.e. is not in the correct portion of semantic space). 
3.7.2 The subtype approach 
The observation that some instruments can undergo ISA whereas others 
cannot leads many linguists to assume two subtypes of instruments. 
Intermediary instruments seem to be more intimately associated with 
the event, whereas facilitating instruments appear to be only auxiliary to 
the event (Webb 2008: 5ff.). The motivation for the distinction between 
intermediary and facilitating instruments varies, however. RRG posits 
causal embedding as the defining criterion, whereas Alexiadou & Schäfer 
assume a combination of causality and referent properties. Webb intro-
duces a single feature which he terms causal force. Even though these 
approaches are all different, causality is component common to all of 
them (to some extent).  
3.7.2.1 Intermediary instruments & facilitating instruments 
Kamp & Rossdeutscher (1994) assume that intermediary instruments 
possess a form of causal independence (or near-independence). That is to 
say, the referent needs only to be initiated by an instigator. The rest of 
the action is a separate causal process that is carried out autonomously; 
 
following DeLancey (1984), also entertain the possibility of referents acquiring 
some form of kinetic energy that allows them to be in subject position. Cruse (1973: 
16, 19) makes a similar claim. This is an assumption I also share, be it in a slightly 
different way. This is explored in chapter 4. 
3.7   Instruments as subjects 
 
  
 119 
 
 
the referent is conceived to be acting on its own (Kamp & Rossdeutscher 
1994: 144–145). In (72), the drug is administered by an instigator (the 
doctor), but continues to do the healing autonomously. 
(72) a. Der Arzt heil-te den Patienten mit der  
  DEF doctor cure-PST.3SG DEF patient with DEF  
  Kamille.        
  camomile        
  ‘The doctor cured the patient with the camomile.’ (German) 
 b. Die Kamille heil-te den Patienten. 
  DEF chamomile cure-PST.3SG DEF patient 
  ‘The camomile cured the patient.’ 
This type of instrument is considered to have some form of causal power 
in bringing about the result state. Kamp & Rossdeutscher (1994) call this 
subtype Instrument-causers. The sentences in (73) illustrate the other 
subtype: 
(73) a. Der Arzt heil-te den Patienten mit dem  
  DEF doctor cure-PST.3SG DEF patient with DEF  
  Skalpell.        
  scalpel        
  ‘The doctor cured the patient with the scalpel.’ (German) 
 b. *Das Skalpell heil-te den Patienten. 
  DEF scalpel cure-PST.3SG DEF patient 
  ‘The scalpel cured the patient.’ 
The authors theorize that ISA is impossible because of the fact that the 
referent needs to be manipulated throughout the event. Kamp & Ross-
deutscher (1994: 145) therefore assume that such instruments are strictly 
auxiliary to the event and do not have causal power. This subtype is 
termed instruments, later rebranded as pure instruments by Alexiadou & 
Schäfer (2006). This approach seems intuitive enough, but is faced with a 
rather stringent issue: There are pure instruments that can nevertheless 
undergo ISA (see also Alexiadou & Schäfer 2006: 44) as ((74)) illustrates. 
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(74) a. John cut the bread with the knife. 
 b. The knife cut the bread. 
Such observations lead Alexiadou & Schäfer (2006) to make a further 
distinction in the class of intermediary instruments (or, to use Kamp & 
Rossdeutscher’s terminology, instrument-causers). Alexiadou & Schäfer 
argue that intermediary instruments can undergo ISA for either of two 
reasons: (a) They are causally (quasi-)independent (following Kamp & 
Rossdeutscher 1994) or (b) the referent in question has a so-called 
grounding property. In effect, this categorization gives rise to a further 
subclassification. I have summarized this in figure 31: 
Figure 31: Overview of Alexiadou & Schäfer’s (2006) instrument  
 classification. 
The further distinction that Alexiadou & Schäfer make is in line with the 
observation made by Gruber (amongst others) that there is a fundamen-
tal distinction between causers and agents (Alexiadou & Schäfer 2006: 
40–41). They transport this dichotomy into the class of instruments. 
Alexiadou & Schäfer (2006: 42–43) posit that causer-instruments are 
causers by virtue of their involvement in an event and due to the fact 
that they do not need to be controlled (permanently) by a human agent. 
Thus, the motivation behind causer-instruments seems to be one of 
causal independence. They believe Schlesinger’s crane/fork-example can 
be accounted for with causal independence: Because crane has a higher 
degree of causal independence than fork, it is the better subject for the 
event.  In this respect they follow Kamp & Rossdeutscher’s (1994) line of 
thought. This is then also the motivation behind acceptability of (72b) 
and the unacceptability of (73b).  
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Alexiadou & Schäfer (2006: 42–43) argue that this level of causal inde-
pendence is similar to that of natural forces. It might be tempting to 
equate forces with this kind of instruments, motivated by a superficial 
similarity in causal independence, but this is problematic: I wish to stress 
that forces behave differently from instruments in that the former can 
take instruments whereas the latter cannot.  
The other class of instruments, the agent-instruments, can undergo 
ISA by virtue of having a grounded property. Rather than possessing 
causal independence or eventivity  like the causer-instruments, these 
instruments have an internal property that is crucial in the coming about 
of the event (Alexiadou & Schäfer 2006: 45–46). For instance, a knife has 
a blade which has the property that it is sharp. It can therefore perform a 
cutting action on the object. For Alexiadou & Schäfer it therefore consti-
tutes a non-trivial relation with the event as a whole. Consider (Alexi-
adou & Schäfer 2006: 44): 
(74) a. Ashley cut the melon with a knife. 
 b. Casey opened the door with the key. 
Both key and knife are crucial for the result: The melon being cut and the 
door being opened. Therefore, ISA is possible. In standard RRG, howev-
er, one explanation covers both such cases and the causer-instruments. 
Both are analyzed as being embedded in a causal chain, i.e. under the 
scope of the CAUSE-operator, contrary to implements. Despite the fact 
that native speakers judgments have confirmed that (74a–74b) can un-
dergo ISA, Alexiadou & Schäfer’s (2006: 44) proposed ISA-variants in 
(75) are problematic: 
(75) a. This knife cuts the melon easily. 
 b. This key opened that door. 
In addition to the ability adverbial in (75a), the use of the demonstrative 
actually weakens the argument for ISA. The use of the demonstrative is 
rather indicative of an ability reading. In German, (76a) is ungrammatical 
and the sentence in (76b) can only have an ability reading, as was con-
firmed by informants. 
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(76) a. *Das Messer schneid-et die Melone leicht. 
  DEF knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF melon easily 
  ‘The knife cuts the melon easily.’ 
 b. Dieses Messer schneid-et die Melone leicht. 
  DEM knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF melon easily 
  ‘This knife cuts the melon easily.’ 
In Dutch, the ability reading must always be expressed by a form of the 
verb can: 
(77) a. *Dit mes snijd-t het brood makkelijk. 
  DEM knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF bread easily 
  ‘This knife cuts the melon easily.’ 
 b. Dit mes kan het brood makkelijk snijd-en. 
  DEM knife can DEF bread easily cut-INF 
  ‘This knife can cut the bread.’ 
Alexiadou & Schäfer claim, following DeLancey (1984), that the use of 
demonstratives puts contrastive focus on the instrument in subject posi-
tion, thereby making it more acceptable. My informants have confirmed 
that there is nothing unacceptable about the key opened the door, contra-
ry to DeLancey’s and Alexiadou & Schäfer’s claim. Be that as it may, I 
believe the use of the demonstrative illustrates the ability reading: The 
use of the proximate demonstrative contrasts it with other knives that 
do not have this ability. Therefore, the acceptability of such construc-
tions is higher when a present tense is used. In English, the acceptability 
of (75a) changes drastically when other tenses are used (78a–78b): 
(78) a. ???This knife had been cutting the melon easily. 
 b. ???This knife was cutting the melon easily. 
 c. The knife had been cutting the melon (easily). 
 d. The knife was cutting the melon (easily). 
By contrast, using a definite article is perfectly acceptable in tenses other 
than the present (78c–78d). This shows that an ability reading is more 
natural with proximate demonstratives and present tenses, whereas ISA 
is not constrained in this fashion. Alexiadou & Schäfer (2006: 45) assume 
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that focusing on the instrument (e.g. with demonstratives) highlights the 
non-trivial relation that some instruments have with their VPs (i.e. the 
grounded property). However, the authors do not consider the existence 
of an ability reading. Second, there is no precise definition of grounded 
property, as Webb (2008: 14) points out. One could claim that spoon is a 
grounded property in John ate the scolding-hot soup with the spoon be-
cause without the spoon the eating event could not have taken place due 
the high temperature of the soup. Yet, ISA is impossible: 
(79) *The spoon ate the scolding-hot soup.  
The lack of proper definition of grounded property constitutes a funda-
mental weakness in their approach.  
Alexiadou & Schäfer (2006: 45) assume that machines are designed for 
a specific task. Therefore, their ability to undergo ISA can be motivated 
by either causal independence or a grounded property. The examples 
they offer are questionable though (Alexiadou & Schäfer 2006: 46): 
(80) a. Sheila extracted the square root of 1369 with the pocket  
  calculator. 
 b. The pocket calculator extracted the root of 1369. 
One might posit that a standard function of pocket calculator is the ex-
traction of roots. However, the function of computer described below is 
not and yet ISA is possible: 
(81) a. Sheila calculated how much time was left with the computer. 
 b. The computer calculated how much time was left. 
From an RRG-perspective, the answer is simple: Pocket calculator and 
computer are causally embedded in both these example sets. Alexiadou & 
Schäfer could, of course, still account for (81b) with the property of 
causal independence. They argue that RRG’s view of an underspecified 
thematic role cannot explain language-variation with respect to ISA, a 
point of criticism I agree with. Alexiadou & Schäfer’s and approach co-
vers a case of ISA that Kamp & Rossdeutscher’s would find difficult to 
explain: Causally dependent instruments that undergo ISA. Language 
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variation with respect to ISA would also be very difficult to handle in 
Kamp & Rossdeutscher’s approach.   
3.7.2.2 Instruments & implements 
RRG recognizes that ISA is a phenomenon that certain instruments can 
undergo. In essence, the first effector in the causal chain is left unspeci-
fied. This is a process described by Van Valin & Wilkins (1996) as meto-
nymic clipping. Due to the fact that the instrument is the highest explicit 
effector in the chain, it takes the actor macrorole. In turn, it is selected as 
the PSA in active sentences. Consider (adapted from Van Valin & Wil-
kins 1996: 318): 
(82) a. The terrorists destroyed the car with the bomb. 
 b. [do´ (terrorists, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (bomb, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME destroyed´ (car)]] 
 c. The bomb destroyed the car. 
 d. [do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (bomb, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME  
  destroyed´ (car)]] 
In (82d), the x-argument of the initial do´ predicate is left unspecified. 
Actor is then assigned to the highest available candidate, in line with 
RRG’s linking algorithm. RRG however recognizes cases where ISA can-
not take place (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 121, Van Valin 2005: 59): 
(83) a. Abdul ate the cereal with a spoon. 
 b. *The spoon ate the cereal. 
 c.  Tanisha looked at the comet with a telescope. 
 d. *The telescope looked at the comet. 
 e.  Chris ate the soup with a spoon. 
 f. *The spoon ate the soup. 
Van Valin & LaPolla assume that this is due to the fact that the instru-
ments used in (83a), (83c) and (83e) are not included in a causal chain. As 
it not part of the causing process leading to a result state, it cannot be a 
part of the causal chain. Cereal and soup can be eaten without a spoon 
and a comet can be seen without a telescope. These events are, at best, 
facilitated by these items rather than being dependent on them. This 
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distinction is captured in RRG by treating the instrument as the y-
argument of an unembedded use´ predicate. Contrary to the full logical 
structures20 for instrument clauses (which embed the use´ predicate as 
the y-argument of the first do’), the use’ predicate here is attached to the 
main logical structure by means of a connective. The y-argument of use’ 
is called an implement. The representations for (83a), (83c) and (83e) are 
given below: 
(84) a. do´ (Abdul, [eat´ (Abdul, cereal) ∧ use´ (Abdul, spoon)]) & 
  INGR consumed´ (cereal) 
 b. do´ (Tanisha, [see´ (Tanisha, comet) ∧ use´ (Tanisha,  
  telescope)]) 
 c. do´ (Chris, [eat´ (Chris, soup) ∧ use´ (Chris, spoon)]) &  
  INGR consumed´ (soup) 
Van Valin & LaPolla (1997: 121) posit that such structures can be identi-
fied by using a gerund-based paraphrase (in English at least): 
(85) a. Abdul ate the cereal, using a spoon. 
 b. Tanisha looked at the comet, using a telescope. 
 c. Chris ate the soup, using a spoon. 
These paraphrases seem to identify a tool that is used in the action. 
However, this paraphrase would also – but wrongly – predict that clear 
examples of instruments ((86a–86d)) are implements: 
(86) a. Mara cut the bread with the knife. 
 b. Mara cut the bread, using the knife. 
 c. Ragnar broke the window with the rock. 
 d. Ragnar broke the window, using the rock. 
One might contend that the example in (86a–86b) does show a difference 
because the using-paraphrase is somewhat of a tautology, whereas in 
(86c–86d) above, genuinely new information is added. However, in  
 
20 Recall that the shorter logical structures are primarily used in this dissertation (and 
in general RRG-literature) for the sake of clarity. 
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(86c–86d), no tautological reading appears, yet rock is an instrument. I 
therefore reject this diagnostic as a tool to identify implements. 
The major diagnostic in RRG to distinguish instruments from imple-
ments is ISA itself. The very occurrence of ISA led Van Valin & LaPolla 
(1997) and Van Valin & Wilkins (1996) to posit the distinction in the first 
place. If one wants to know whether something is an instrument or an 
implement, simply apply ISA to it. If it can undergo ISA, then it is an 
instrument and is embedded in a causal chain. If it cannot, it is an im-
plement and is not embedded in a causal chain. This approach suffers 
from the first and the third problems indicated at the beginning of this 
section: Instruments are not the same as instruments and language-
variation is hard to explain. With respect to the first problem, the refer-
ent’s properties clearly play a role in the grammaticality judgment 
((87a–87d)). 
(87) a. John picked the container with a crane. 
 b. The crane picked up the container. 
 c. John picked up the potato with a fork. 
 d. *The fork picked up the potato. 
It is hard to see how RRG can deal with this in terms of logical struc-
tures. Claiming that fork is an implement in (87c–87d) but crane is an 
instrument in (87a–87b) is an untenable solution, for two reasons: 1) 
Conceptually, the states of affairs expressed are essentially the same. 
This means that it is rather unlikely that there are two separate logical 
structures, just because of a different referent and, 2) if one were to pur-
sue such an explanation, one would have to resort to the referent’s prop-
erties anyway. Grimm would solve this by assigning different positions 
to the two referents in his lattice. I will pursue a similar solution in chap-
ter 4. RRG can, however, provide annotations to logical structure posi-
tions in terms of qualia. Qualia can capture the difference between a fork 
and a crane, for instance. This allows for annotation of a certain argu-
ment position (see Van Valin 2005 & 2013), thereby restricting its filler to 
arguments whose referents meet those exact criteria. This constitutes a 
type of hard constraint. Like Grimm, I propose regions of semantic space 
as soft constraints. An argument’s referent would not exactly need to 
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meet the criteria. Rather, it would need to be in the same general area of 
semantic space. If an argument slot can be filled by several arguments 
with different properties, multiple qualia annotations would be required, 
whereas in the region-approach, a more global area can be defined. Ex-
ceptions to this area could, in turn, be handled in terms of qualia. This 
issue will be explored further in chapter 4. 
Problem three is a very fundamental problem for the logical structure 
approach. Take the Dutch equivalents in (50e) and (50f). This verb ex-
presses the same content as English cut, yet ISA is not possible in Dutch. 
If one were to follow standard RRG, the Dutch logical structure would 
look very different (…∧ use´) from the English one (causal embedding) 
even though the predicates express the same propositional content. This, 
again, is problematic for two reasons: 1) It is an ad hoc solution and 2) it 
calls the fundamental principle of the (near-)universality of the logical 
structures into question.  
Ono (1992) makes a very similar proposal in a Conceptual Semantics 
framework, but diverges noticeably from Jackendoff. Similar to RRG, 
Ono (1992: 202) assumes that intermediary instruments can undergo ISA 
because there is a causal chain with the instrument contained in one of 
the subevents: An initiating cause contains the instrument-subevent and 
this in turn brings about the caused event (Ibid.). Consider the following 
examples of an intermediary and a facilitating instrument, respectively 
(Ono 1992: 202–203): 
(88) a. John opened the door with the key. 
 b. John ate pasta with a fork. 
The sentence in (88a) can undergo ISA, but the one in (88b) cannot. Ono 
assumes that the instrument in (88b) is contained in a modifying subev-
ent clause under the scope of the function USE. As this clause is not part 
of the main causal chain, ISA cannot occur. This is reminiscent of RRG’s 
addition of the use´-predicate. The LCSs for (88a–88b) are given in fig-
ures 32 and 33, respectively. 
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Figure 32: LCS of John opened the door with the key (Ono 1992: 202). 
Figure 33: LCS of John ate pasta with a fork (Ono 1992: 203). 
Ono’s approach suffers from the same issues as standard RRG (see 
above): 1) It is difficult to account for the influence of the referent’s 
properties (see (87)) and 2) as the LCSs are intended to be universal (Ono 
1992: 214), it is hard to capture cross-linguistic variation (see (50e–50f)) 
without canceling the universal validity that is claimed for the LCSs. 
3.7.2.3 Webb’s Causal Force  
In section 3.5.2, I presented Webb’s approach to instruments and themat-
ic relations compared to classical, standard LFG. Webb’s approach can 
account for ISA in a more natural way, using the shortcomings of Alexi-
adou & Schäfer’s account. This shows that Webb’s approach has a clear 
advantage over standard LFG. Webb (2008: 65–66) assumes that ISA in-
volves an operation where the 1st tier proto-agent21 is deleted from a-
structure. Semantically, however, the agent is still implied. This is paral-
lel to RRG’s account of the unspecified instigator. The 2nd tier proto-
agent (the instrument) is promoted to first tier, where it can then access 
the SUBJ-function. This process, together with an example (Webb 2008: 
66–67)22 is given in figure 34. 
 
21  Recall that the first tier proto-agent is located there by virtue of being the initial 
causer in the chain (Webb 2008: 66). 
22 The shading indicates the target for deletion and that which has been deleted, 
respectively. The process is represented from top to bottom. 
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Open 1st  <p-a1   p-p>  
           2nd <p-a2>  
 
Open 1st  <p-a1   p-a2 p-p>  
           2nd <  >  
 
Open 1st  < p-a2 p-p>  
           2nd <  >  
 
The key opened the door. 
 
F-structure   [SUBJ  OBJ] 
         ↑    ↑ 
A-structure    1st tier   <… p-p> 
         ↑ 
  2nd  tier  <p-a> 
Figure 34: ISA in Webb’s LFG-approach. 
Two notes are in order (Webb 2008: 66–67): 1) It is crucial to promote 
the 2nd proto-agent to the 1st tier, because otherwise, it would be optional 
and could be left out. Leaving it out would result in ungrammaticality 
and 2) the 1st proto-agent is deleted and not demoted to 2nd tier. If it were 
only demoted to 2nd tier, sentences like *the key opened the door by Jack 
would be grammatical.  
Because the verb’s semantics encodes a causal relation that is inherit-
ed from the underlying causal chain, a 1st tier proto-agent with the fea-
ture causal force (CF) is required. Causal force is Webb’s translation 
(2008: 34) of one of Dowty’s (1991: 572) proto-agent properties: A partic-
ipant possesses causal force if it brings about another event or a change 
of state in another participant. If a participant possesses this entailment, 
it will be marked with ‘CF’ in the causal chain representation. Only 
those referents with CF satisfy the requirement set by the verb’s seman-
tics (Webb 2008: 39). The referents knife and camomile in (72) possess CF 
and therefore allow ISA. By contrast, spoon in (83a) does not. Webb also 
makes a connection to the type of causation. Webb (2008: 35) combines 
Croft’s causal chain approach with Talmy’s (1988) distinction between 
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onset causation and extended causation. Roughly speaking, onset causa-
tion can be equated to Kamp & Rossdeutscher’s causal independence. To 
account for the observation that causal independence seems to be a good 
indicator of the acceptability of ISA, Webb (2008: 51–52) posits that on-
set causation automatically licenses causal force to the instrument, 
whereas instruments under the scope of extended causation only some-
times get CF licensed. For instance, in the sentence the doctor cured the 
patient with the scalpel the instrument is under scope of extended causa-
tion. As ISA is impossible here, Webb concludes that it does not have the 
CF feature. This implies that the scalpel does not cause a change of state 
in the other participant involved. Yet, this is questionable as it passes a 
causal paraphrase: 
(89) The scalpel acted upon the patient, causing him/her to be healed. 
From an ontological point of view, a scalpel can be the direct cause of 
someone’s healing. This can be the case if the scalpel removes a spot of, 
say, skin cancer. In this respect it would be rather similar to knife in (74).  
Webb (2008: 68) argues that X wrote the letter with the pen, cannot un-
dergo ISA despite the instrument possessing CF. He theorizes that some 
verbs will put highly specific constraints on the SUBJ-function, in this 
case the requirement that the filler of SUBJ be [+animate]. Such con-
straints will override CF, if present. However, the verb write essentially 
has two meanings: 1) The creation of meaningful content and 2) the cre-
ation of symbols on a medium. ISA is impossible with the first meaning, 
but is – depending on the speaker – more acceptable23 with the second 
meaning. Evidence for the ‘two-verb’ theory is found in the fact that 
with the first meaning a wide range of instruments is acceptable, includ-
ing pens and computers.  With the second meaning, only pens and the 
like are generally accepted. In terms of Grimm’s approach, it could be 
stated that the argument positions of both meanings are open to differ-
ent portions of semantic space, the subject slot of the second meaning 
being open to a larger portion of semantic space. 
 
23 Native speakers of English that I have consulted accept ISA with the second mean-
ing, even if it still not as natural as the knife cut the bread. I will assume, following 
Alexiadou & Schäfer (2006: 42), that such judgments are often a matter of gradation. 
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A further problem for Webb’s approach is that it seems hard to handle 
language-variation. The knife-example is said to allow ISA because of 
the CF that can be traced back to the causal chain describing the event 
underlying the utterance. Yet, in Dutch, this alternation is not possible. 
Does this then mean that, contrary to an English-speaker, in a Dutch 
speaker’s causal chain representation the instrument does not possess 
CF? This seems questionable: Event representations (of whatever type) 
are supposed to be (near-)universal. This is a major problem in Webb’s 
approach that also exists in standard RRG’s conception of instruments 
and implements and in Ono’s conception of the two classes. Webb (2008: 
107) himself concedes that analyses of multiple languages are desirable 
and necessary.  
3.7.3 Summary of instruments as subjects 
Schlesinger can be criticized for treating the ‘instruments’ as normal 
agents. In RRG terms, this would be tantamount to treating two different 
structural positions the same. However, there are good reasons to as-
sume that these positions are quite distinct. A more general issue with 
the approaches discussed here is that they do not adequately define the 
degrees of membership or the features they posit: Some use features like 
causing, intentional or grounding without defining them properly or 
without explaining how they relate to each other. Schlesinger’s strength 
is the other approaches’ weakness: Schlesinger gives reasons why one 
would use ISA. If one wishes to focus on the instrument instead of the 
instigator or if one wants to leave the instigator unspecified. RRG, 
Grimm, Ono, Kamp & Rossdeutscher and Alexiadou & Schäfer, however 
provide an account of the limits and the mechanics of ISA but they do 
not go into its communicative purpose. A (simplified) overview of which 
approaches provide an account for which of the three problems is given 
in table 12. 
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Table 12: (Simplified) overview of approaches and ISA-problems. 
Table 13 provides an overview of how the different frameworks and 
approaches that were discussed in this chapter treat the distinction be-
tween intermediary and facilitating instruments. Motivations for distinc-
tions are given as a number in brackets: 
(1) Causal independence 
(2) No causal independence 
(3) Grounding property 
(4) Either causal independence or grounding property 
(5) Neither causal independence nor grounding property 
(6) Close enough to agentive prototype 
(7) Not close enough to agentive prototype 
(8) Causal Force 
(9) No Causal Force 
(10) Causal embedding 
(11) No causal embedding 
 
 
 
 
 
 Instrument 
variation (1) 
Predicate  
variation (2) 
Language  
variation 
(3) 
Schlesinger Yes No No 
Grimm Yes Yes (Yes) 
Kamp &  
Rossdeutscher 
Yes No No 
Alexiadou & 
Schäfer 
Yes No No 
RRG Partially Yes No 
Ono No Yes No 
Webb Yes Yes No 
3.8   Conclusion: properties of thematic relations and instruments 
 
  
 133 
 
 
                    Intermediary  Facilitating 
Fillmore Instrument 
J. Anderson Instrument 
Dowty Instrument 
Conceptual  
semantics 
Instrument 
Croft Instrument 
Standard LFG Instrument 
Kamp &  
Rossdeutscher 
Instrument-causers (1) (Pure) instruments (2) 
Alexiadou & 
Schäfer 
                Intermediary (4) Facilitating (5) 
Causer-like  (1)                  Agent-like (3) 
Schlesinger ISA-instrument (6) Non ISA-instrument (7) 
Grimm ISA-instrument (6) Non ISA-instrument (7) 
Webb (LFG)                  CF-instrument (8) Non CF-instrument (9) 
RRG                   Instrument (10) Implement (11) 
Ono Intermediate (10) Facilitating (11) 
Table 13: Overview of treatment of intermediary and facilitating  
 instruments. 
3.8 Conclusion: properties of thematic 
relations and instruments 
In this chapter, I presented a selection of theories and framework and, 
more specifically, how they capture thematic relations. As instruments 
are an integral part of thematic relations, it was necessary to introduce 
the general approach to thematic relations. To understand the instru-
ment in a given framework, one must understand its general conception 
of thematic relations.  
In general, theories of instruments are faced with several issues: 1) In-
struments are often only treated peripherally (e.g. LFG), 2) ISA is rarely 
captured in a principled way (e.g. Croft), 3) if ISA is captured by the the-
ory, then language variation, predicate variation and referent variation 
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are not captured fully, thereby failing to meet adequacy and 4) many of 
these theories only draw from English data rather than embracing a 
cross-linguistic perspective.  
I have summarized the approaches to thematic relations and instru-
ments discussed in this chapter in table 14.  
 Role Type Inventory Instrument type 
Fillmore 
1968 
Primitive Medium Primitive 
Fillmore 
1977a 
Primitive Medium Displacement 
J. Ander-
son’s CG 
Featural 4 Displacement 
RRG Configurational Irrelevant Reading 
LFG Primitive ± 8 Primitive 
Webb-
LFG 
Featural 2 Featural 
Concep-
tual  
Seman-
tics 
Configurational Irrelevant Combined  
configurational 
Dowty Featural 2 Featural 
Croft Causal Medium Causal participant 
Table 14: Overview of approaches to thematic relations and instruments. 
I distinguish between several types of thematic relations: 1) primitive, 2) 
causal, 3) featural, 4) configurational. The latter two are often termed 
derived thematic relations in the literature.  The reason for recognizing a 
causal type of thematic relations is due to the fact that causality is the 
defining component behind them. As it is unclear whether Croft’s ap-
proach is decompositional or not, I chose not to consider his thematic 
relations as configurational (or featural for that matter). As they depend 
on the type of causation, it would not be adequate to treat them as 
primitives either. The inventory part of table 14 contains the number of 
roles posited by the respective approaches. In many cases though, it is 
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difficult to come up with a fixed number of relations, hence entries like 
medium. It seems intuitive to assume that the type of instrument a theo-
ry has is the same as its general type of thematic relations. Yet, in some 
theories, instruments are not thematic relations of the same order. They 
are, for instance, readings of a patient argument, brought about by a 
syntactic operation (displacement). For Jackendoff, it is a relation of a 
secondary level as well. For him, it is a combination of configurations 
rather than a unique configuration as is the case with, say, agent. I used 
the term reading if the instrument is a reading of a specific position (e.g. 
RRG), rather than a combination of configurations. Granted, some theo-
ries of instrument defy a simple classification.  
In the following chapters, I will present my own approach to instru-
ments and related concepts, using RRG’s theory of thematic relations as 
a basis. I will draw from the work discussed in this chapter, Talmy’s 
Force Dynamics and cross-linguistic data to arrive at an approach that 
captures ISA and ISA-variation with respect to language, referent and 
predicate.  
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4 Semantic range of instruments, 
agents & forces 
In this chapter I will propose solutions to some of the instrument-related 
problems raised in the previous chapter, such as ISA and the restrictions 
that it occurs with.  
The most pressing question is what an instrument really is. It has 
been argued that instruments are a subtype of the more basic effector in 
RRG: Instruments are intermediary effectors (x-argument of do´ (x, Ø)) 
in a causal chain. Instruments that are not causally embedded are im-
plements. In chapter 5, I will formally introduce an alternative way to 
distinguish instruments from implements. Until then, all examples will 
feature instruments unless indicated otherwise. It is important to realize 
that instruments (and implements) are components of the logical struc-
tures. Most (English) examples in this dissertation use the with-PP for-
mat, which is the most common linking strategy for instruments and 
implements. Consider:  
(1) a. Seymour sliced the salami with a knife. (Lakoff 1968: 6–7) 
 b. Adewalé opened the locked box with a key. 
Other linking strategies will be explored in chapter 8. The full LSs for the 
sentences in (1a–1b) are given in (2a–2b). As I pointed out in chapter 3, 
in the ‘usual’ logical structures employed in RRG, the use´ predicate1 is 
often left out because it is clearly implied by the rest of the structure. 
The same is true for the embedded predicate functioning as the second 
argument of intermediate do´. Leaving them out is a matter of clarity. 
The ‘full’ LSs corresponding to (1) are given in (2). 
 
1 The intermediate cut´ predicate is also usually left out, for the very same reasons. 
For the sake of clarity, I prefer to use the reduced LSs in this dissertation. 
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(2) a. [do´ (Seymour, [use´ (Seymour, knife)])] CAUSE [[do´  
  (knife, [cut´ (knife, salami)])] CAUSE [BECOME cut´  
  (salami)]] 
 b. [do´ (Adewalé, [use´ (Adewalé, knife)])] CAUSE [[do´ (key, 
[open´ (key, door)])] CAUSE [BECOME open´ (door)]] 
This full representation is rarely used and this is true for this disserta-
tion as well. The ‘simple’ version of (2b) is given below in (3).  
(3) [do´ (Adewalé, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
 open´ (door)]] 
This chapter focuses on how the semantic space of instruments can be 
characterized. I will also go into concepts that are seemingly related to 
instruments, such as implements and forces including the less canonical 
ones. Consider: 
(4) a. John destroyed the barn with the crane. 
 b. The crane destroyed the barn with a load of cinder blocks. 
 c. The storm destroyed the levee with huge tidal waves. 
The cases above are challenging for standard explanations of instru-
ments for various reasons. For example, in (4a) and (4b) the same inani-
mate referent occurs as an instrument and as a participant taking an 
instrument, and in (4c) the force argument takes an instrument itself. To 
capture the distinctions between such referents, I will argue in favor of a 
revised and expanded animacy hierarchy. 
4.1 Degrees of animacy & autonomy 
In the following sections, I will explore the semantic space that agents, 
forces and instruments occupy, together with several problematic bor-
derline cases. How can that semantic space be characterized? The Van 
Valin-Wilkins hierarchy (1996) was intended to capture if and when ef-
fectors are read as agents. Animacy is a central component of this hier-
archy. Animacy also features prominently in Grimm’s (2005, 2013)  
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approach. As a part of mapping semantic space I will explore the role of 
animacy further and argue in favor of an additional, interrelated concept 
called autonomy. 
4.1.1 Animacy   
Animacy is a category that often stays in the background and is taken 
for granted, despite its pervasive role in grammar and despite substantial 
evidence in favor of including it as a central component in a theory of 
language (Dahl & Fraurud 1996: 47). Animacy manifests itself in lan-
guage mainly in two ways: 1) It influences grammatical rules (case as-
signment and word order, for example) and the choice of expression 
(Aissen 2003) and 2) statistical regularities can be observed (Dahl 2008: 
141). Yamamoto (1999: 41–70) provides evidence for the cross-linguistic 
influence of animacy on case marking, word order, subject selection and 
topicality. Consider the following examples from Malayalam: 
(5) a. Avan kuʈʈi-ye aticcu.  
  3SG.M child-ACC beat.PST  
  ‘He beat the child.’ (Fauconnier 2011: 533–534) 
 b. Avan oru pa∫u-vine vanni. 
  3SG.M INDEF cow-ACC buy.PST 
 
  ‘He bought a cow.’ (de Swart et al. 2008: 132) 
 c. Avan pustakam vaayiccu. 
  3SG.M book read.PST 
  ‘He read the book.’ (Fauconnier 2011: 533–534) 
In Malayalam, the direct object receives accusative case only if the refer-
ent is animate. Fauconnier (2011: 533, 541–542) theorizes that unexpect-
edness plays a crucial role in such an assignment: Statistically, most di-
rect objects are inanimates 2  (89% in Swedish for example; Dahl  
 
2 Grewe et al. (2006) provide psycholinguistic evidence for the importance of anima-
cy. They manipulated the animacy of certain referents, thereby violating the prin-
ciple that animates come before inanimates (‘animates first’). They found that such 
violations activate the same brain areas that are activated when syntactic principles 
are violated. There is also evidence of knowledge pertaining to animates being sep-
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2008: 142). One strategy to deal with this ‘unexpected object’ is to assign 
a different case marker to it (or in the case of Malayalam, a marker). In 
the same vein (and following Silverstein 1976), Fauconnier (2011: 541ff.) 
theorizes that languages generally prefer to avoid inanimate subjects, or, 
if they are allowed, they are treated differently from animate subjects. 
Japanese (Kuno 1973: 31), for example, strongly disprefers inanimate 
subjects, instead requiring (at least) higher animals as subjects. 
(6) a. *Taihuu ga mado o kawasita. 
  Typhoon SUBJ window OBJ break.PST 
  ‘The typhoon broke the window.’ (Kuno 1973: 31) 
 b. Sono otoko ga mado o kawasita. 
  DEF man SUBJ window OBJ break.PST 
  ‘The man broke the window.’ (own data) 
The Australian language Jingulu assigns instrumental marking to inani-
mate subjects, whereas animate subjects receive ergative marking (Pen-
salfini 2003: 178, 189): 
(7) a. Babi-rni ikiya-rnarnu-nu ibilkini. 
  Older brother-ERG wet-3SG>1SG-PST water 
  ‘My brother wet me.’ 
 b. Darrangku-warndi maya-ngarnu-nu. 
  Tree-INS hit-3SG>1SG-PST 
  ‘A tree hit me.’ 
But also in languages with less extensive morphology like English or 
Dutch, animacy can have a profound influence on grammatical rules: 
Rosenbach (2008) theorizes that the animacy of the referents in posses-
sive constructions influences whether an s-genitive or an of-genitive is 
selected in English. Similarly, Bresnan & Hay (2008: 250) argue that Eng-
lish dative shift is partly dependent3 on animacy: Animate recipient  
 
arately stored from knowledge related to inanimates in the brain (cf. Rosenbach 
2008: 157). 
3 Bresnan & Hay (2008: 246) provide evidence that this animacy effect is also depend-
ent on the variety of English. New Zealand English is more sensitive to animacy 
considerations than US English. 
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arguments are likely to be expressed in a double object construction 
whereas inanimate recipients have a preference for the prepositional 
dative. In Dutch, for instance, animates are more likely to be pronomi-
nalized than inanimates (Vogels et al. 2014: 116).  
The examples discussed above illustrate that animacy can have a sub-
stantive influence on the grammar of many languages and should – 
more generally – be included in theories of language (cf. Bresnan et al. 
2001). In what follows, I will argue in favor of a revised animacy scale, 
mainly drawing from Van Valin & Wilkins (1996), Grimm (2005, 2013), 
Schlesinger (1989) and Yamamoto (1999). 
In the previous chapter, I pointed out that it is possible to make the 
logical structures explicit with a matching paraphrase, thereby revealing 
whether there is causal embedding or not. In some cases, the instrument 
is causally embedded, but ISA is nevertheless impossible. In the exam-
ples in (3.50), ISA was shown to be ungrammatical in Dutch but accepta-
ble in English despite the instrument being causally embedded in both 
languages. Furthermore, some instruments allow ISA whereas others do 
not, even if the predicate remains the same. I will argue that animacy is 
directly relevant for instruments, and more specifically, for the accepta-
bility of ISA within and across languages.  Roughly speaking, I will argue 
that the argument positions in a given logical structure are open to a 
specific portion of semantic space (cf. Grimm 2005, 2013). In short, I will 
make a case for animacy as one of the drivers of ISA. This is in line with 
Yamamoto’s claim (1999: 67) that more animate entities will occupy 
more salient positions in clauses and discourse. Zaenen et al. (2004: 118) 
argue that positions on the animacy hierarchy correlate with the acces-
sibility of the referents for the morphosyntax. My approach to ISA can 
be seen as an extension of both these claims. In languages that allow 
ISA, the instrument-referent’s properties relative to the predicate’s re-
quirements will determine whether ISA can take place. The referent 
must be high enough on a revised animacy scale, relative to the re-
quirements of the predicate. One problem, however, is that animacy is 
often used in a somewhat undefined way, similar to many linguists’ use 
of thematic relations. I thus agree with Rosenbach (2008) and Grewe et 
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al. (2006: 1397), amongst others, in treating animacy as an important, 
genuine factor in grammatical behavior, rather than an epiphenomenon. 
Most animacy hierarchies in the literature are roughly based on the 
one proposed by Silverstein (1976, 1981). Silverstein’s original hierarchy 
is a very fine-grained one. However, in the general literature on anima-
cy, it is usually drastically simplified to a coarse three-way distinction, 
between humans, other animates/animals and inanimates. This distinc-
tion is motivated as a hierarchical scale (Dahl 2008: 141, Yamamoto 1999: 
1, 9, Foley & Van Valin 1985: 288). It is ultimately an assumed cognitive 
distinction between animates and non-animates and (by analogy) be-
tween humans and non-humans (Yamamoto 1999: 9).  
(8) human > other animate > inanimate 
Whatever form such a hierarchy may take, I largely follow Dahl (2008), 
Yamamoto (1999) and Comrie (1981: 178) with respect to the general 
properties of animacy: 1) The borders between the different ‘steps’ are 
fuzzy and membership in the categories can be fluid (Yamamoto 1999: 9), 
2) the (human) self is the model for other humans and other animates, 
which are in turn models for lower-ranking entities (cf. a ranking of 
‘sameness’ to one’s self), 3) personhood appears to be a core trait of pro-
totypical animacy (anthropocentric human cognition, see below), 4) 
animacy is cognitively deeply rooted in humans due to it being a central 
component (‘sameness’) in the organization of social life, 5) animacy is a 
property of a referent (Comrie 1981: 56, 179), 6) linguistic animacy is 
distinct from biological animacy (being ‘alive’, cf. Yamamoto 1999: 1ff.) 
and 7) animacy is a universal category that exists independently of its 
language-particular realization (Comrie 1981: 179). Animacy thus refers 
to the cognitive and ontological status of an entity (Yamamoto 1999: 36) 
and the distinction is considered to be fundamental and universal to 
human cognition (Boas 1911: 67). 
The hierarchy in (8) is quite primitive and there is an abundance of 
explicit (and implicit) proposals to be found in the literature to refine it. 
Yamamoto (1999: 2) considers this hierarchy as the core component of 
any animacy hierarchy; it constitutes what she calls the General Anima-
cy Hierarchy (Yamamoto 1999: 2) or animacy per se. Yamamoto (1999: 1) 
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considers the General Animacy Hierarchy as a basic cognitive scale, 
which interacts with several others that further refine the basic scale’s 
echelons. The most important one in this respect is the Hierarchy of 
Persons, which effectively provides an ordering within the human eche-
lon (Yamamoto 1999: 3, 6).  
Van Valin & Wilkins (1996: 316) argue that, for example, 1st person 
pronouns rank higher than 2nd or 3rd person pronouns, because one can 
be sure of one’s own intentions, but not of those of others. Langacker 
(1991: 306–307) arrives at a similar conclusion, focusing on the notion of 
empathy: One shows more empathy for the self than for the individual 
one is speaking to and even more than for a third party. Both these 
points of view lead the respective authors to treating 1st persons as oc-
cupying a higher position on the hierarchy than second persons and so 
on. This does not mean that second persons are considered to be less 
animate than first persons, however. The Hierarchy of Persons simply 
provides a further refinement of the human section of the hierarchy, all 
its members being equally animate. This line of thought reveals that 
animacy hierarchies are both anthropocentric and egocentric (cf. Yama-
moto 1999: 9f., 37). The speaker is at the center of the world and all other 
entities are judged and considered from that perspective (Langacker 
1991: 307). Humans (and particularly the self) are seen as the ‘supreme 
representatives of all animate beings’ (Yamamoto 1999: 9) and imbue 
other entities (even those that are inherently inanimate) with degrees of 
animacy. Due to the speakers investing different degrees of animacy to 
different referents, certain entities will be considered more animate than 
others. For instance, Yamamoto (1999: 2–3) argues that cats will be con-
sidered more animate than amoebae, even though from a biological 
point of view both are equally alive.  
Some linguists also attempt to refine the other echelons. For instance, 
Zaenen et al. (2004: 121) and Øvrelid (2006: 53) propose to further subdi-
vide the ‘other animates’-category by not only recognizing animals as 
subtypes but also organizations, intelligent machines and vehicles. Like-
wise, the inanimate category is enriched with concepts such as concrete 
inanimate, non-concrete inanimate, place and time. The reason to pro-
vide further divisions is to be able to handle the grey, ‘fuzzy’ area that 
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exists between referents. Such borderline cases include machines, espe-
cially those that have human traits like intelligence (Yamamoto 1999: 18) 
or a decision-making ability that is commonly found in various types of 
Artificial Intelligence. Furthermore, Yamamoto points out that machines 
that have an internal power source are often seen as more animate than 
those that receive their power from an external source. 
Often however, such proposed categories are not ranked respective to 
each other, whereas examples in chapter 3 illustrated that more complex 
machines are better ISA-candidates than less complex ones. This means 
that some form of internal ranking should be imposed on the finer cate-
gories.  
I propose the animacy hierarchy in (9). In my proposal, I do not pro-
pose all or nothing parameters for animate beings. I agree with Yamamo-
to (1999) and others that animacy is a gradient, fluid notion. I therefore 
consider the superordinate labels animate and inanimate as vaguely de-
lineated portions of the hierarchy rather than discrete categories.  
(9) Non-entity < abstract entity < concrete entity (immobile) < con-
crete entity < animate entity < (pseudo-)sentient entity < anthro-
pomorphic entity < 3rd person < 2nd person < 1st person 
Animate entity is defined the same way that [+animate] is defined in the 
Van Valin- Wilkins Hierarchy (1996: 314): an entity that feels, responds 
and moves. This does not imply sentience, however. By way of clarifica-
tion, I have repeated the scale’s steps below with types of referents and 
example referents (the three highest echelons are self-explanatory and 
have not been repeated). (Pseudo-)sentient entities are those that are 
assumed to have the ability to judge intentions in others4 and/or the 
ability to make independent decisions. This includes computers and oth-
er forms of Artificial Intelligence. I do not sharply delineate between 
these two features as I assume them to be somewhat interdependent.  
Anthropomorphic refers to the prototypical nature of human beings, 
i.e. the entity talks, walks, has limbs, potentially even has emotions (cf. 
 
4 This was inspired by Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976: 92ff., 100ff.) and Tomasello 
(2003). The concept of intention reading features prominently throughout To-
masello’s work. 
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Zaenen et al. 2004: 121). My proposed category also includes entities that 
are only superficially human in appearance. For instance, in Zaenen et 
al.’s (2004: 122) experiment, the fictitious Vulcan race was consistently 
ranked as human by all participants.  I theorize that this extends to su-
pernatural or fictitious entities like ghosts, vampires and wookies. Bres-
nan & Hay (2008: 249) also argue in favor of grouping such beings under 
human. Because of this, I prefer the label anthropomorphic to human. 
Furthermore, animals are also often anthropomorphized and referred to 
as if they were human (Yamamoto 1999: 13). In this case, they would be 
ranked as anthropomorphic in my approach. 
(10)  a. Non-entity: events, properties (birth, death, tall, short) 
 b. Abstract entity: ideas, notions (federalism, revolution) 
 c. Concrete entity (immobile): places, landmarks (city,  
  island, mountain) 
 d. Concrete entity: objects, artifacts (spear, chainsaw, axe) 
 e. Animate entity: animals (ant, dog, eagle), plants  
 f. (Pseudo-)sentient entity: higher animals, infants,   
  Artificial Intelligence (chimpanzee, Deep Blue) 
 g. Anthropomorphic entity: entities human in appearance  
  and groups thereof (humans, Poseidon) 
4.1.2 Autonomy 
The scales that aim to refine the General Animacy Scale are typically 
lumped together on a single axis, thereby greatly expanding it. This of-
ten leads to problems that require questionable solutions. For example, 
groups of people do not all pattern alike: 
(11) a. ???The mob carefully planned the assault. 
 b. The army brigade carefully planned the assault. 
The example in (11b) is more acceptable than the one in (11a).5 The tra-
ditional approach would be to consider army brigade more animate than 
 
5 I agree with Zaenen et al. (2004: 119) when they point out that as far as animacy 
differences are concerned, acceptability of a sentence is a more apt concept than 
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mob. Therefore, so the argument goes, army brigade is more natural to 
use in conjunction with adverbs like carefully and verbs like plan. I do 
not agree with the idea that mob is less animate. In fact, as argument 
could be made that army brigade is ‘less animate’ because formal organi-
zations can be considered dehumanized (cf. Yamamoto 1999: 20). I reject 
the idea that either of these is less animate than the other. What we have 
here – in both cases – are groups of people that are conceptualized as a 
collective. The crucial difference between them is that mob is inherently 
without internal organization, whereas armies and their constituent 
units are highly organized along formal lines.6 I believe it is more fitting 
to use the level of organization within a collective of people as a feature. 
This is a subsection of a hierarchy I call the Autonomy Hierarchy. It is 
necessary to introduce this hierarchy as an extra axis due to the short-
comings of the Silverstein hierarchy: Fauconnier (2011: 544), for exam-
ple, stresses that the Silverstein hierarchy has difficulties capturing the 
semantic distinction between dependently and independently acting 
inanimates.7 Furthermore, the distinction between groups of animates is 
hard to capture with the hierarchy, as the mob and army brigade exam-
ple illustrates. As far as typology is concerned, Dahl (2008: 142) points 
out that grammatical restrictions are often proposed in terms of cut-off 
points on a hierarchy. However, many phenomena are not reducible to a 
well-behaved hierarchy. Therefore, a system with two axes would allow 
for cut-off regions thereby greatly enhancing the explanatory power of 
animacy (in the broadest sense of the word).  
Essentially, the autonomy hierarchy describes the referent’s ability to 
perform an action independently. The higher a referent is located on the 
autonomy hierarchy, the less external manipulation it requires to per-
form the action in question. For instance, a knife requires more external 
manipulation to cut a loaf of bread to pieces than an electric knife. There-
fore, knife will rank lower on the autonomy hierarchy than its more 
 
grammaticality of sentences. That is to say, instead of categorical Yes vs. No judg-
ments, the acceptability in this domain is very gradient. 
6 A vaguely related distinction (collective voice/purpose) is used by Zaenen et al. 
(2004) as a tagging tool. 
7 This distinction will prove to be crucial to capture the behavior of instruments and 
ISA. 
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sophisticated counterpart. Placing actional independence on an axis of 
its own solves the problem of ranking these referents relative to each 
other in terms of animacy. This equally solves the dilemma of trying to 
distinguish a loose group of humans from a formally organized collective 
in terms of animacy (cf. Bresnan & Hay 2008: 250). In my approach, both 
are equally animate but not equally autonomous.  
Lakoff (1987) advocates an approach of radial categorization, whereby 
humans sit at the center and all other entities are at a distance. The more 
peripheral entities are located further away from the core, more human-
like ones are closer to the center. Unclear, however, is why – for exam-
ple – supernatural beings are considered to be equally distant from the 
center as organizations like corporations. In my approach, a supernatu-
ral being like Poseidon would be considered as animate (i.e. anthropo-
morphic) like a normal human (e.g. Joe), but Poseidon would rank higher 
on the autonomy hierarchy. Important in Lakoff’s (1987) approach, how-
ever, is the recognition of human-like machines. In the previous chapter, 
it was pointed out that more complex machines are better subjects than 
less complex ones. Also recall that internally powered machines are con-
sidered more animate than those with external power (Yamamoto 1999: 
18). Rather than placing the explanation for this entirely on the animacy 
axis, I propose to use the autonomy hierarchy as a central explanatory 
tool. More complex machines or those with an internal power source are 
not more animate, but more autonomous.  
Mechanisms are usually better candidates for ‘agenthood’, to use 
Schlesinger’s (1989: 193) terminology, and, within the class of mecha-
nisms, more complex and self-sufficient ones are ‘better agents’ than less 
complex and less self-sufficient ones (Schlesinger 1989: 197, 206–207). 
This seems to be true across languages (Alexiadou & Schäfer 2006: 43–44 
and own data): 
(12) a. Der Kran hob die Kiste hoch. 
  DEF.NOM crane lift\PST.3G DEF.ACC crate up 
  ‘The crane picked up the crate.’ (German) 
 b. ?Die Gabel hob die Kartoffel hoch. 
  DEF.NOM fork lift\PST.3SG DEF.ACC potato up 
  ‘The fork picked up the potato.’ (own data) 
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 c. O geranos sikose to kivotio. 
  DEF.NOM crane picked up DEF.ACC crate 
  ‘The crane picked up the crate.’ (Modern Greek) 
 d. *To piruni sikose tin patata. 
  DEF.NOM fork picked up DEF.ACC potato 
  ‘The fork picked up the potato.’ (own data) 
 e. De kraan til-de de kist op. 
  DEF crane pick-PST.3SG DEF crate up 
  ‘The crane picked up the crate.’ (Dutch) 
 f. ?De vork til-de de aardappel op. 
  DEF fork pick-PST.3SG DEF potato up 
  ‘The fork picked up the potato.’ 
 g. Sarah disabled Bill’s computer with the hammer/the  
  virus.  
 h. */?The hammer disabled the computer. 
 i. The virus disabled the computer. 
   j. Sarah sneed het brood in stukk-en 
  Sarah cut\PST.3SG DEF bread to piece-PL 
  met het mes. 
  with DEF knife 
  ‘Sarah cut the bread to pieces with the knife.’(Dutch) 
 k. *Het mes sneed het brood in stukk-en. 
  DEF knife cut\PST.3SG DEF bread to piece-PL 
  ‘The knife cut the bread to pieces.’ 
 l. Sarah sneed het brood in stukk-en 
  Sarah cut\PST.3SG DEF bread to piece-PL 
 
  met het elektrisch mes. 
  with DEF electrical knife 
 
  ‘Sarah cut the bread to pieces with the electrical knife.’ 
 m. Het elektrisch mes sneed het brood in  
  DEF electrical knife cut\PST.3SG DEF bread to  
 
  in stukk-en.   
  to piece-PL   
  ‘The electrical knife cut the bread to pieces.’ 
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To put this in line with my proposed approach: More complex mecha-
nisms or appliances (e.g. those with electronic circuitry) rank higher on 
the autonomy hierarchy than simple inanimate objects like sticks or 
knives. Because of this, they are generally more acceptable in ISA. Me-
chanical machines occupy a middle position, as can be seen from the 
degree of acceptability:  
(13) a. Sarah beschadig-de de computer met de 
  Sarah damage-PST.3SG DEF computer with DEF 
 
  drilboor. 
  pneumatic drill 
  ‘Sarah damaged the computer with the pneumatic drill.’ 
  (Dutch) 
 b. ?De drilboor beschadig-de de computer. 
  DEF pneumatic drill damage-PST.3SG DEF computer 
  ‘The pneumatic drill damaged the computer.’ 
 c. Het computervirus beschadig-de de computer. 
  DEF computer virus damage-PST.3SG DEF computer 
 
  ‘The computer virus damaged the computer.’ 
 d. *De hamer beschadig-de de computer. 
  DEF hammer damage-PST.3SG DEF computer 
  ‘The hammer damaged the computer.’ 
 e. The lumberjack cut down the tree with the axe. 
 f. *The axe cut down the tree. 
 g. The lumberjack cut down the tree with the chainsaw. 
 h. ?The chainsaw cut down the tree. 
 i. O ksilokopos ekopse to dentro  
  DEF.NOM lumberjack cut down DEF.ACC tree 
 
  me to tsekuri.  
  with DEF.ACC axe 
  ‘The lumberjack cut down the tree with the axe.’  
  (Modern Greek, own data) 
 j. *To tsekuri ekopse to dentro. 
  DEF.NOM axe cut down DEF.ACC tree 
  ‘The axe cut down the tree.’ 
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 k. O ksilokopos ekopse to dentro 
  DEF.NOM lumberjack cut down DEF.ACC tree 
 
  me to alisopriono. 
  with DEF.ACC chainsaw 
  ‘The lumberjack cut down the tree with the axe.’ 
 l. ?To alisopriono ekopse to dentro. 
  DEF.NOM chainsaw cut down DEF.ACC tree 
  ‘The chainsaw cut down the tree.’ 
Not only mechanisms produce varying levels of acceptability, simpler 
objects do to. The examples in (14) all feature instruments that are not 
mechanical in nature.  
(14)  a. The assassin killed the man with the knife. 
 b. *The knife killed the man. 
 c. The assassin killed the man with the spear. 
 d. The spear killed the man. 
 e. The lumberjack cut down the tree with a saw. 
 f. The lumberjack cut down the tree with an axe. 
 g. ?De houthakker vel-de de boom met 
  DEF lumberjack cut down-PST.3SG DEF boom  with 
 
  een zaag. 
  INDEF saw 
  ‘The lumberjack cut down the tree with a saw.’ (Dutch) 
 h. De houthakker vel-de de boom met 
  DEF lumberjack cut down-PST.3SG DEF tree with 
 
  een bijl. 
  INDEF axe 
  ‘The lumberjack cut down the tree with an axe.’ 
It stands out that spear is a better candidate for ISA than knife. Contrary 
to a knife, a spear is specifically designed to kill. By contrast, knives have 
a wider array of functions such as cutting open boxes, applying butter to 
bread etc. Because of the spear’s specific purpose, it ranks higher on the 
autonomy scale than knife. Likewise, the sentences in (14e) and (14g) are 
more marked than the ones in (14f) and (14h) because the referent axe is 
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more compatible with cut down. This does not mean that (14e) and (14g) 
are ungrammatical, they are simply more marked.  
I have illustrated that referents can intuitively be ranked on the au-
tonomy hierarchy. How can this be formally captured? A gradual in-
crease in autonomy correlates with an equally gradual increase in ac-
ceptability. Ergo, different levels of autonomy have to be distinguished. 
However, it would not suffice to posit mechanical vs. electronic vs. simple 
as dichotomies in the hierarchy. The reason for this is simple: It has been 
illustrated that there are acceptability differences within these categories 
as well, not only between them. 
As far as mechanisms and self-motive entities are concerned, I pro-
pose a bifeatural analysis. The two features I propose are [±independent] 
and [±controllable]. They are defined as follows: 
(15) a. A referent ranks as [+independent] iff the referent is  
  potentially capable of independent action, i.e. action  
  not immediately governed by another entity. 
 b. A referent ranks as [+controllable] iff the referent can  
  be under control of another referent.8 
Referents that are [-independent] are entities not capable of independent 
action. They are therefore always initiated or governed by another entity 
(i.e. [+controllable]). Examples of this category include cranes, printers, 
DVD-players and the like. They typically carry out relatively simple, 
direct orders given by a governing entity (such as a crane operator). 
Orders typically look like: “Move mechanical arm in direction of joy-
stick’s motion”, “Print page 1”, or “Play movie”. The manipulation in-
volved is less direct than with simple artifacts. For example, a chainsaw 
needs to be activated and held by a wielder, but the cutting motion is 
carried out by the machine itself. I will label this feature combination 
and referents fitting the description as semi-autonomous. I not only rec-
ognize mechanisms as being semi-autonomous or higher, but also chem-
icals or medication. These have to be administered or deployed by a  
 
8 What is controllable is judged from the perspective of humans (i.e. anthropocen-
tric). 
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manipulator, but then function according to the purpose they were de-
signed for (curing a headache, for instance). Consider: 
(16) a. The acid ate away at the lock. 
 b. The aspirin cured his headache. 
Referents that are [+independent] and [+controllable] are entities that 
can act on their own, but within the framework of carrying out instruc-
tions. These instructions are typically more complex and require (at 
some stages in the process) independent decision making on the part of 
the governed entity. An excellent example here is any object that has 
some degree of AI. A computer virus is intended and initiated by a gov-
erning entity to wreak havoc on a target. In the process of wreaking 
havoc (of whatever nature), the program will have to make independent 
decisions on how to progress without the governing entity being able to 
intervene. I will call this combination of features autonomous. It is clear 
to me that there are huge differences within the field of AI as far as the 
degrees of autonomy are concerned. Yet, I do not think these are rele-
vant to the average speaker’s conceptualization of AI. In fact, AI’s deci-
sion making abilities often cause it to pattern with humans, despite 
clearly being inanimate. Dabrowska (1998: 124) points out that nouns 
from this domain tend to be assigned more human traits than typical 
inanimate tools. They are considered to be capable of malice, amongst 
others (Rosenbach 2008: 155). Consider the following sentences that 
have been uttered to me in the context of videogames: 
(17) a. De AI deed dat met opzet!9 
  DEF AI do\PST.3SG DEM.OBJ on purpose 
‘The Artificial Intelligence unit did that on purpose!’  
(Dutch) 
 b. De AI heef-t blijkbaar een plan. 
  DEF AI have-PRS.3SG apparently INDEF.OBJ plan. 
  ‘Apparently, the AI unit has a plan.’ 
 
9 In Dutch, in contrast to English, AI can refer to a single unit of artificial intelli-
gence. To make the English translation more sensical, I have opted to translate AI 
as AI unit. 
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Both sentences in (17) attribute human or quasi-human traits to an inan-
imate but intelligent program. Doing something on purpose is certainly 
the product of intention (and in this case also malice) and having a plan 
is a sign of decision making abilities. Despite the inanimate nature of the 
referents, both examples are grammatical and acceptable. Humans are 
also considered to be autonomous. They do rank higher than instances 
of AI because humans are more mobile due to their having limbs that 
can interact with the real world. By contrast, most entities endowed with 
a form of artificial intelligence are confined to storage facilities of some 
sort.  
A referent that is [+independent] and [-controllable] is a typical force-
effector, such as a storm or a meteor shower. These referents act inde-
pendently and cannot be controlled by another entity. This is evidenced 
by the unacceptability of the sentences in (18). 
(18) a. *John wrecked his neighbor’s yard with a meteor   
   shower.  
 b. *Eric used the storm to cut down the tree. 
I propose to label this combination of features as para-autonomous. De-
spite what the terminological background might suggest, referents that 
are [-independent] and [-controllable] do exist. They cannot act inde-
pendently, but cannot be controlled either. These are usually parts of an 
interconnected system beyond conscious human control, such as organs. 
They are, as it were, interdependent. As such referents cannot be con-
sciously controlled, they can never be instruments and are therefore not 
relevant for the current discussion (they are marked accordingly in the 
table). I have summarized this in table 15: 
 [+controllable] [-controllable] 
[+independent] Autonomous Para-autonomous 
[-independent]  Semi-autonomous Irrelevant 
Table 15: Feature matrix for the principal levels of autonomy. 
More importantly, it is possible to visualize these distinctions in a scalar 
way: para-autonomous ranks highest, semi-autonomous ranks lowest 
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and autonomous ranks in the middle. This fits the intuition that entities 
that sometimes need control rank lowest, referents that do not have be 
to controlled rank above those, and entities that cannot be controlled 
rank highest.  
The distinctions above do not apply to those referents that must be 
controlled directly or continuously by a wielder due to their inherent 
properties. Simple artifacts like knife and axe do not carry out instruc-
tions like semi-autonomous referents. Rather, they are continuously and 
directly manipulated by the wielder. In other words, they do not fall into 
this schema. It would be erroneous to assume that knife also ranks as 
[+controllable]. [+controllable] means that a referent can be controlled, 
but does not have to continuously or directly. With simple artifacts, 
however, a manipulator must exercise a form of control directly and 
continuously. For example, the difference between a knife and an electri-
cal knife is that the latter does the cutting action by itself as the blade 
moves by itself. The manipulator guides it in the process. By contrast, a 
simple knife requires the user to move it and make the cutting motion in 
order for it to cut. I consider such referents as ranking beneath semi-
autonomous. I term all referents below semi-autonomous as non-
autonomous.  
It is possible to make a distinction within this class. Here my account 
is vaguely inspired by Alexiadou & Schäfer’s (2006) concept of ‘grounded 
property’. They do not define this feature, nor do they treat it consistent-
ly (see chapter 3). I do believe, however, that there is some relevance to 
it. Consider: 
(19) a. John unlocked the door with the key. 
 b. John unlocked the door with the stick. 
 c. Pierre spliced open the boulder with a knife. 
 d. Pierre spliced open the boulder with a pick-axe. 
Even though all sentences are grammatical, (19a) and (19d) are more 
acceptable and more natural. This is because in those two examples the 
instrument is specifically designed for the action described by the verb. I 
therefore propose to rank specifically tailored referents above plain arti-
facts. This also fits the idea of manipulation as the inverse of autonomy. 
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Cutting a cake with a stick will require more lengthy manipulation on 
the part of the instigator than with a knife, as the latter was specifically 
designed for the cutting activity, requiring less total effort. 
The borders between the echelons of the autonomy axis are not al-
ways clear. Similarly to animacy (cf. Yamamoto 1999), I propose to treat 
these categories as fluid and gradient. For example, knives are very mul-
tifunctional. Therefore, it is not always clear whether they are to be con-
sidered as a higher-level plain artifact or as a specifically tailored object. 
The complete autonomy hierarchy is given below in (20). Autonomy 
can be considered the inverse of manipulation: The lowest levels must be 
manipulated by a manipulator. The higher a referent is located, the less 
manipulation it requires, until a level is raeched where the referent can-
not be manipulated. Echelons (1–2) taken together are considered non-
autonomous and echelons (4–7) are considered to be autonomous.  
(20) plain artifact (1) < specifically tailored (2) < semi-autonomous (3) 
< autonomous (proper) (4) < group (5) < organization (6)  
< hive/individual human (7) < para-autonomous (8) 
In the previous section, levels of organization and groups were discussed 
in relation to the autonomy hierarchy. Since humans and groups of hu-
mans rank as autonomous, I have introduced the relevant distinctions in 
the autonomous class. 
4.1.3 The actionality scale 
Similar to proposals found in the literature, the animacy hierarchy that I 
proposed is egocentric and anthropocentric. The autonomy hierarchy, 
on the other hand, is not anthropocentric (even though the terminology 
might be): Humans are not the highest level. This allows for a very natu-
ral ranking of referents such as meteor shower or storm: They are more 
autonomous than humans but not animate. This 2-dimensional charac-
terization does the inherent features of referents more credit than the 
traditional, one-dimensional animacy hierarchies. 
The combination of the animacy hierarchy and the autonomy hierar-
chy yields an axis-system. An axis-system allows for a cluster-wise iden-
tification of (groups of) referents, rather than forcing them on a  
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one-dimensional line. Forces, for instance, pattern in a very specific por-
tion of the axis system (figure 35). This 2-dimensional clustering pro-
vides the benefit of identifying specific zones, similar to Grimm’s lattice 
system. If the referent is within the portion of semantic space as required 
by the verb (logical structure), it will be able to occupy that LS-position. 
The animacy axis was loosely inspired by Van Valin & Wilkins (1996).10  
Figure 35: The actionality scale with example referents. 
The graph in figure 35 represents the actionality scale with several ex-
amples. Do note that this graph is mainly intended for illustration pur-
poses. Due to limitations on graphical representation, the referents’ posi-
tion should be treated as approximate and not as absolute.  
 
10 For instance, the notion of non-entity was adopted from Van Valin & Wilkins 
(1996). 
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RRG’s AUH-approach illustrates that structurally higher positions tend 
to be occupied by more animate entities (de Swart et al. 2008: 134). The 
actionality scale can be seen as a more elaborate version of this idea: 
Certain regions in the scale tend to correlate with certain argument posi-
tions. 
4.1.4 Pseudo-agents 
In the previous sections, it has become clear that the traditional concepts 
of instrument, force and agent correlate with certain areas on the action-
ality scale. The gradience of the scale suggests that there might be refer-
ents that can be conceptualized as both instruments and instigators in 
their own right. Consider: 
(21) a. John sprayed the fields with the piper plane. (after   
  Schlesinger 1989: 193) 
 b. The piper plane sprayed the fields. (Schlesinger 1989: 193) 
 c. The piper plane sprayed the fields with the wing-mounted 
spray guns.  
 d. John picked up the crate with the crane.  
 e. The crane picked up the crate. (adapted from  
Schlesinger 1989: 193) 
 f. The crane destroyed the house with a big boulder. 
 g. The hacker disabled John’s computer with a computer virus. 
 h. The computer virus disabled John’s computer by means of an 
algorithm.  
 i. Mara destroyed the village with the tank. 
 j. The tank destroyed the village with one artillery shell. 
I assume that referents have to be within the correct portion of space in 
figure 35 for them to be realized as an instigator or an instrument. For 
instance, the referent knife does not occupy the correct area on the scale 
to allow a realization as an instigator. As the referents in question are 
inanimate, an obvious step in a classification is to distinguish forces 
from instruments by testing. To do this, I propose two sets of tests. The 
first involves isolating the referent’s ability to occupy certain LS-
positions: (1) Use the referent as an instigator using another instrument 
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and (2) use the referent as an instrument. These tests correspond to posi-
tions in the logical structure. Hence, ‘use as an instrument’ means that 
the referent is inserted into an intermediate effector position. Consider 
the examples in (22). 
(22) a. John destroyed the barn with the sledgehammer. 
 b. *The sledgehammer destroyed the barn with the boulder.  
 c. The storm destroyed the barn with its strong winds. 
 d. *John destroyed the barn with the storm. 
Sledgehammer fails test (1) but passes test (2), making it an instrument. 
Storm passes test (1) but fails test (2) making it a force. I have summa-
rized the tests proposed by Van Valin & Wilkins (1996) in the table be-
low.11 
 Use as instigator (1) Use as instrument (2) 
Force Yes No 
Instrument No Yes 
Table 16: Tests to distinguish instruments from forces. 
The previous sections have illustrated, however, that animacy and au-
tonomy are gradient notions. This predicts the existence of referents that 
pass both these tests and thus belong to what Yamamoto (1999: 18) calls 
‘borderline cases’. As was pointed out before, typical instances include 
intelligent machines. Consider (23). 
  
 
11 These tests obviously have to be adapted to the fit language under investigation. 
Japanese, for instance, does not allow any inanimates in subject position (Kuno 
1973: 31), thereby making test (1) unusable. 
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(23) a. Mara breached the firewall with the cleverly constructed com-
puter virus. 
 b. Het computer virus doorboor-de de firewall 
  DEF computer virus breach-PST.3SG DEF firewall 
 
  met afvalbestand-en. 
  with junk file-PL 
  ‘The computer virus breached the firewall with junkfiles.’ 
  (Dutch) 
 c. Peter assembled the car by means of the assembly robot. 
 d. The assembly robot assembled the car with a screwdriver. 
In the examples in (23), the referents pass both tests. It follows therefore, 
that these borderline referents can be instruments or instigators. Gener-
ally, there are two subtypes of instigating effectors, forces and agents. 
Forces themselves can be distinguished from agents by the fact that the 
former are inanimate. The second diagnostic is intended to see how a 
referent patterns and to determine what type of instigator they are most 
similar to: a force or an agent. To do this, I propose a test that isolates 
the para-autonomous feature that uniquely defines forces (the control-
test). That is to say, they are conceptually uncontrollable. Humans (the 
most prototypical agents) rank as autonomous because they can be con-
trolled. If a referent tests as controllable, then it is more like an agent. If 
it is uncontrollable, it patterns with forces. Verbs like command or order 
or causative auxiliaries entail a form of control on the part of the con-
troller with respect to the controllee. Consider the following examples 
with their Dutch12, German and French equivalents: 
(24) a. Mara commanded the computer virus to attack the   
  mainframe. 
 b. Mara made the computer virus attack the mainframe. 
 
12 The Dutch examples in (24h) and (24j) use a form of the verb doen. This is typical of 
Belgian Dutch (Heine & Kuteva 2006: 60. Also see Taeldeman (1978: 60), in contrast 
to Netherlandic Dutch, which prefers to use laten (let) to express all types of causa-
tion (also see chapter 5). Belgian Dutch has two causative verbs (doen and laten) ex-
pressing different types of causation. In this respect, Belgian Dutch is more similar 
to French and Netherlandic Dutch is more similar to German. All Dutch examples 
in this thesis are from Belgian Dutch, unless explicitly indicated. 
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 c. Mara commanded Bill to attack Pat. 
 d. Mara made Bill attack Pat. 
 e. ??Mara commanded the storm to back down. 
 f. ??Mara made the storm back down. 
 g. Mara beval de AI de mainframe  
  Mara order\PST.3SG DEF AI DEF mainframe  
 
  
 h. Mara deed de AI de mainframe aanvallen. 
  Mara do\PST.3SG DEF AI DEF mainframe attack.INF  
 i. ??Mara beval de storm te gaan liggen. 
  Mara order\PST.3SG DEF storm to go.INF lie.INF 
 
 j. ??Mara deed de storm gaan liggen. 
  Mara do\PST.3SG DEF storm go.INF lie.INF 
 
 k.   Mara befahl der KI den Mainframe anzugreifen. 
    Mara order\PST.3SG DEF AI DEF mainframe attack  
      (German) 
 l. Mara ließ die KI den Mainframe angreifen. 
  Mara let\PST.3SG DEF AI DEF mainframe attack.INF 
 
 m. ??Mara befahl dem Sturm sich zu legen. 
  Mara order\PST.3SG DEF storm REFL to lie.INF 
 
 n. ??Mara ließ den Sturm sich legen. 
  Mara let\PST.3SG DEF storm REFL lie.INF 
 
 o. Mara a commandé au virus d'attaquer 
  Mara AUX.3SG order.PTCP to.the virus to=attack 
 
  l'unité central. 
  DEF=mainframe (French) 
 
 p. Mara a fait attaquer l'unité central 
  Mara AUX.3SG do.PTCP attack.INF DEF=mainframe 
 
  par le virus. 
  by DEF virus 
 
  
   aan te vallen  
   to attack.INF (Dutch) 
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 q. ??Mara a commandé à la tempête 
  Mara AUX.3SG order.PTCP to DEF storm 
 
  de reculer. 
  to recede.INF 
 r. ??Mara a fait reculer la tempête. 
  Mara AUX.3SG do.PTCP recede.INF DEF storm 
 
The examples in (24a–24f), (24g–24j), (24k–24n) and (24o–24r) show that 
the borderline cases pattern with agents rather than with forces. This 
confirms the provisional ranking of referents in figure 35 where they are 
closer to humans than to forces. 
I will term these borderline referents pseudo-agents because they can 
be conceptualized by speakers as either instigators or instruments. One 
might wonder why I do not simply label them ‘agents’. There is a princi-
pled reason for this: Despite being closer to agents than to forces, there 
are still some differences between pseudo-agents and agents. Pseudo-
agents rank lower in sentience than humans, as is illustrated by the ex-
amples below: 
(25) a. John grudgingly blew up the barn. 
 b. ??The computer virus grudgingly disabled the firewall. 
 c. Jan blies tegen zijn zin de   
  Jan blow up\PST.3SG against POSS wish DEF   
  schuur op. 
  barn VPR 
  ‘Jan blew up the barn against his will.’ (Dutch) 
 d. ??De AI schakel-de tegen zijn zin de   
  DEF AI switch-PST.3SG against POSS wish DEF   
  firewall uit. 
  firewall off 
  ‘The AI switched off the firewall against its will.’ 
Due to their lower sentience, the subject referents in (25b) and (25c) do 
not pattern with adverbs expressing emotional states too well. As ani-
macy is inherently anthropocentric, emotional faculties are associated 
with higher animacy. Conversely, entities incapable of emotion (in the 
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broadest sense of the word) will be ranked lower. Rather than treating 
pseudo-agents as a new effector type, they are a class of referents that 
can be conceptualized as either instruments or instigators. For this rea-
son, the range of pseudo-agents has been indicated with a dashed line in 
figure 37. It is most interesting to find that a power differential manifests 
itself: 
(26) a. The computer virus destroyed the firewall by means of 
  the algorithm. 
 b. The algorithm destroyed the firewall by means of a set 
  of junk files. 
 c. *The algorithm destroyed the firewall with the computer  
   virus. 
 d. De AI leg-de het gegevenscentrum met 
  DEF AI cripple-PST.3SG DEF data center with 
 
  het virus lam. 
  DEF virus VPR 
 
 e. Het virus leg-de het gegevenscentrum 
  DEF virus cripple-PST.3SG DEF data center 
 
  met een reeks junkbestand-en lam. 
  with INDEF series junk file-PL VPR 
 
 f. *Het virus leg-de het gegevenscentrum 
  DEF virus cripple-PST.3SG DEF data center 
 
  met de AI lam. 
  with DEF AI VPR 
In the examples (26a–26c) and (26d–26f), both relevant referents (com-
puter virus & algorithm and AI & virus, respectively) can each be concep-
tualized as an instigator, as the first two sentences of each set show. 
However, the lower-ranking referent cannot be the instigator over a 
higher-ranking one, as the third sentence in each set shows. An algo-
rithm is less sophisticated than a computer virus and a virus is less ad-
vanced than AI. This would place AI highest on the actionality scale, 
virus second highest and algorithm lowest. This principle can be formal-
ized as the Relative Power Principle.  
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(27) Relative Power Principle (preliminary): The instigating 
 referent must be ranked higher on the actionality scale than the 
intermediate effector referent. 
In most situations, however, this is unproblematic, as there is a clear 
scale difference between a human wielder and, say, a hammer. It is po-
tentially difficult in cases where both referents are similarly ranked and 
when both can occupy both positions in the logical structure. A word of 
caution is in order here. It would be erroneous to equate pseudo-agents 
with those instruments that can undergo ISA. Knife, for instance, can 
never occupy the instigator position, but can undergo ISA in English. It 
is likely that all pseudo-agents can undergo ISA, but not all instruments 
that can undergo ISA are pseudo-agents. 
Where are pseudo-agents located in semantic space, then? I contend that 
a referent must rank as autonomous (proper) on the autonomy hierarchy 
but must not exceed level 5 (group) to be a pseudo-agent. The black ar-
row in figure 36 denotes the upward direction of the actionality scale. 
Figure 36: Semantic space of pseudo-agents. 
It is now possible to indicate the portions of semantic space where forc-
es, instruments, agents and causees are prototypically located. Pseudo-
agents have simply been indicated with a dashed line and without a la-
bel, so as to make clear that I do not consider them as an effector type. 
As I have illustrated, there are areas where these concepts overlap (see 
figure 37).  
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The delineation indicated by the oval shapes is not absolute. I have 
stressed throughout this dissertation that animacy and related concepts 
are subject to gradience and fluidity. This holds for the partitioning of 
semantic space in figure 37 as well.  
As a consequence of compounding animacy and autonomy into the 
actionality scale, references to ‘animacy’ no longer suffice to character-
ize the difference between forces, instruments, agent, causees and the 
like. Instead, their positions in semantic space would ideally be indicated 
by way of coordinates in a Cartesian axis system. This is obviously a 
very technical matter and I will go into it in section 4.3.  
Figure 37: Range of instruments, forces, agents, pseudo-agents and  
causees within the actionality scale. 
On a (very) minor note, one colleague pointed out that typical force ar-
guments like storm can sometimes be used as instruments. For example: 
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(28) a. Poseidon sank the fleet with/by means of the storm. 
 b. Poseidon used the storm to sink the fleet. 
Two remarks are in order here: 1) These are very uncommon utterances 
and 2) they are part of a fictitious setting in which storm and similar 
referents are commonly personified ((29a, 29b)). 
(29) a. Poseidon sent the storm to destroy the fleet and it  
  obeyed. 
 b. Poseidon ordered the storm to destroy the fleet and it  
  obeyed. 
Even if one were to accept the sentence in (28) as normal everyday lan-
guage, then acceptability is conditioned by the status differential be-
tween instigator and instrument. Within mythology, Olympic deities are 
considered more powerful than natural phenomena.  
4.1.5 Inherent vs. induced features 
DeLancey (1984: 203ff.) and Levin & Rappaport Hovav (2005: 49), 
amongst others, point out that objects typically functioning as instru-
ments can occur in subject position without actually being manipulated 
by an instigator. The axe in the axe broke the window (DeLancey 1984: 
203) can be construed as falling due to natural circumstances, say, the 
referent falling off a shelf. However, such eventive construals require 
considerable context (Levin & Rappaport Hovav 2005: 49). This observa-
tion usually entails an inanimate object being imbued with some kind of 
kinetic energy (Cruse 1973: 16, 19). For instance, by adding the adjective 
herunterfallend (‘falling down’) to Axt (‘axe’) in German, it becomes 
more acceptable as a subject. Consider: 
(30) a. Die herunterfallende Axt zerbrach  
  DEF.NOM falling-down axe broke  
  die Scheibe. 
  DEF.ACC window pane 
    ‘The falling axe broke the window pane.’ 
    (Alexiadou & Schäfer 2006: 44) 
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 b. *Die Axt zerbrach die Scheibe. 
  DEF.NOM axe broke DEF.ACC window pane 
  ‘The axe broke the window.’ (Alexiadou & Schäfer 2006: 
  44) 
 c. ?De steen heeft de ruit gebroken. 
  DEF rock AUX DEF window break.PTCP 
  ‘The rock broke the window.’ (Alexiadou & Schäfer 
  2006: 44) 
 d. De vliegende steen heeft de ruit gebroken. 
  DEF flying rock AUX DEF window break.PTCP 
  ‘The flying rock broke the window.’ (Alexiadou & Schäfer 
  2006: 44) 
 e. *The gun killed the general. (own data) 
 f.  The bullets killed the general. 
These are clear examples where the referent is imbued with kinetic en-
ergy making it eligible for a position (subject) that it is usually not eligi-
ble for. The properties in question can be considered to be induced, as 
falling is not an inherent property of an axe, nor is it an inherent feature 
of rocks to fly. In (30f) world knowledge will dictate the bullets have 
been fired and were in flight. The introduction of such properties has a 
profound influence on argument linking. In the examples in (31), the 
predicate requires the object to be able to move, yet the induced feature 
(parked) makes the RP incompatible with the verb’s requirements: 
(31) a. William drove away in the car. 
 b. *William drove away in the parked car. 
I believe that adnominal modification, modification by clauses and the 
like can be captured with the actionality scale. Rather than conceding 
such examples as overrides of normal examples or exceptions to the rule, 
I propose to directly include them in the actionality scale-approach.  
I assume that referents have inherent properties. A car, for example, 
has the inherent property that it can move (see Barsalou 1992 for the 
conceptualization of a car in human cognition) amongst others. A key 
has the inherent ability to open a door due to the specific configuration 
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of grooves it was designed to have (provided the target lock has the 
matching configuration). These properties place the referents some-
where on the actionality scale. If a feature or property is induced, the 
new feature matrix of the referent will assign it a new position on the 
scale. This in turn makes it (potentially) eligible to fill argument posi-
tions in the logical structures that it could otherwise not fill. The oppo-
site is also possible: The introduction of a feature may move a referent to 
a location in the hierarchy that is outside of accessible semantic space, as 
the example in (31b) illustrates. If there is no information specifying 
otherwise, only the inherent features of a referent are relevant for link-
ing. The examples above contained phrase-level modification. Whereas 
this is a very straightforward strategy to induce features, others do exist. 
For instance, it is possible to include modifying subordinate clauses. 
Consider: 
(32) a. As a result of the explosion, a stone flew across the road and 
  broke the window. (Cruse 1973: 20) 
 b. */?A stone flew across the road and broke the window.  
The subclause in (32a) changes the feature matrix, thereby raising the 
referent on the scale to a position within the accessible area of fly’s ef-
fector argument. Without the modifying subclause, the sentence would 
not be acceptable as (32b) illustrates.  
This mechanism holds for all referents in relation to the argument po-
sitions of a given verb. Ergo, it is also relevant for instruments and ISA. 
Consider the following Dutch examples: 
(33) a. Jan dood-de de vogel met het mes. 
  Jan kill-PST.3SG DEF bird with DEF knife 
  ‘Jan killed the bird with the knife.’ 
 b. *Het mes dood-de de vogel. 
  DEF knife kill-PST.3SG DEF bird 
  ‘*The knife killed the bird.’ 
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 c. Jan dood-de de vogel met het mes  
  Jan kill-PST.3SG DEF bird with DEF knife 
 
  dat hij gooi-de. 
  REL 3SG throw-PST.3SG 
  ‘Jan killed the bird with the knife that he threw’. 
 d. Het mes dat Jan gooi-de dood-de 
  DEF knife REL Jan throw-PST.3SG kill-PST.3SG 
  de vogel. 
  DEF bird 
  ‘The knife that Jan threw killed the bird.’ 
Normally, the verb kill selects an x-argument from a portion of semantic 
space that knife is not in. However, with the induction of kinetic energy 
in the form of RP-level modification, the referent is ‘moved’ to the por-
tion of semantic space that is accessible to kill’s effector argument. Sen-
tences such as (33c–33d) are the inevitable counter-examples to any the-
ory of instruments and ISA. My approach has the advantage that such 
additional information is handled with the same mechanism. It is often 
pointed out by my informants that typical instruments as subjects are 
perfectly acceptable in fairy-tale like contexts or if the instrument is 
personified. Consider: 
(34) a. ?Nozh razrézal hleb. 
  knife.NOM.SG cut.PERF.PST.3SG.M bread.ACC.SG.M 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ (Russian) 
 b. ?Nož je sekao hleb. 
  knife.NOM AUX.3SG cut.PTCP bread.ACC 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ (Serbian) 
 c. ?Peilis pjov-ė duon-ą. 
  knife.NOM cut-PST.3SG bread-ACC.SG 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ (Lithuanian) 
The sentences in (34) are ungrammatical, except if the knife is personi-
fied. Informants report that in such cases the knife is considered a self-
moving, reasoning entity. The same is true for Dutch. As Rosenbach 
(2008: 155) points out, animacy is not a fixed category but can be 
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tweaked. That is to say, referents can be moved along the hierarchy to a 
different position. In my view, feature induction is just that: Moving the 
referents on the actionality scale by introducing certain features or 
stripping the referents of them. 
In fact, personification of lower animates or inanimates is recognized 
in the literature (cf. Yamamoto 1999: 12–13). In my approach, personifi-
cations or anthropomorphizations can be captured with essentially the 
same mechanics as described above: Features are introduced into the 
feature matrix of the referent, giving it a different position on the scale. I 
propose to treat personifications as an extreme form of feature induc-
tion.  
4.2 The prevalence of instruments and 
implements with respect to verb classes 
In this section, I explore the prevalence of instruments and implements13 
with respect to the verb classes recognized by RRG. To do this, I will 
take canonical examples for each of these classes (adapted from Van 
Valin 2005: 46–47) and determine whether they allow for instruments 
and implements by adding these to the base structure. My prediction is 
that instruments can only be added to causative verb classes, as the very 
notion of instrument is defined over causation. However, implements 
are not dependent on causation and therefore they should be admissible 
in more cases. Implements are necessarily under the scope of a do´-
predicate (Van Valin 2005: 55). Therefore, they should only be able to 
appear in LSs that have a do´-component.  
First, let us explore states. As expected, adding a with-PP is inadmissi-
ble with any kind of instrumental reading. Consider examples from Eng-
lish, Dutch, German and French in (35). 
  
 
13 As implements have not yet been explored in greater detail, all implements men-
tioned in this section follow standard RRG-assumptions. 
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(35) a. ?Pat is a fool with a knife. 
 b. ?Pat is een idioot met een mes. 
  Pat be.PRS.3SG INDEF idiot with INDEF knife 
  (Dutch) 
 c. ?Pat ist ein Idiot mit einem Messer. 
  Pat be.PRS.3SG INDEF idiot with INDEF knife 
  (German) 
 d. ?Pat est un idiot avec un couteau. 
  Pat be.PRS.3SG INDEF idiot with INDEF knife 
  (French) 
These sentences are only acceptable if the with-PP is interpreted as ex-
pressing an attribute of Pat. The attribute reading of with-PPs is explored 
further in chapter 7. Some states do not combine with a with-PP in any 
form, as (36) illustrates. 
(36) a. *The cup is shattered with a rock. 
 b. ???Dana saw the mountain with binoculars. 
       c.  ???Dana zag de berg met 
  -----Dana see\PST.3SG DEF mountain with 
  -----een verrekijker.  
  -----INDEF Binoculars(SG) (Dutch) 
 d. The cup has been shattered with a rock. 
 e. Dana looked at the mountain with binoculars. 
 f. *Dana acted on the binoculars acted causing them to  
  see the mountain.  
 g. do´ (Dana, [see´ (Dana, mountain) ∧ use´ (Dana,   
  binoculars)]) 
The sentence in (36a) is inadmissible. The variant in (36d) is not a coun-
terexample. Rather, it is a causative achievement that has been passiv-
ized. I will go into the passivization of sentences containing an instru-
ment in chapter 8. (36b) and (36c) are equally inadmissible. Note, howev-
er, that look at allows for the with-PP (36e) as it is an activity predicate 
with an implement under the scope of do´. It is not an instrument, be-
cause it fails the paraphrase in (36f). Therefore, (36e) corresponds to the 
LS in (36g).  
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Activities should readily allow for implements, as they have a do´ in 
their LS. The example in (3.84b) is an activity predicate with an imple-
ment. Yet, not every activity predicate allows for an implement: 
(37) a. *The children cried with balloons. 
 b. *De kind-eren ween-de-n met ballonn-en. 
  DEF child-PL cry-PST-3PL with balloon-PL 
  (Dutch) 
 c. *Die Kinder wein-te-n mit Ballon-s. 
  DEF child-PL cry-PST-3PL with balloon-PL 
  (German) 
 -d.  *Les enfants pleuraient avec des ballons. 
   DEF child.PL cry.PST.3PL with INDEF balloon.PL 
  (French) 
This is due to the finer-grained semantics of cry. It is of such a nature 
that there is no tool that can possibly influence the activity. The contrast  
between (3.84b) and (37) shows that implements influence the activity in 
question in a facilitating manner: The activity is made easier for the user 
of the implement.  
Achievements, stative semelfactives and accomplishments do not al-
low for implements or instruments, as their LS would predict. Consider 
the following examples with their Dutch equivalents. 
(38) a. *The window shattered with a rock.  Achievement 
 b. *De ruit verbrijzel-de met een steen. 
  DEF window shatter-PST.3SG with INDEF rock 
 c. ?Dana glimpsed the mountain with binoculars 
    Semelfactive  
 d. ?Dana ving een glimp op van 
  Dana catch\PST.3SG INDEF glimpse VPR of 
 
  de berg met de verrekijker. 
  DEF mountain with INDEF binoculars(SG) 
 
 e. *Dana acted on the binoculars, causing them to glimpse  
   the mountain. 
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 f. *Dana werk-te op de verrekijker in en dat 
  Dana act-PST.3SG on DEF binoculars VPR and CNJ 
 
  veroorzaak-te dat hij glimp een 
  cause-PST.3SG CNJ 3SG glimpse INDEF 
  van de berg opving. 
  of DEF mountain catch\PST.3SG 
 g. SEML see´ (Lauren, mountain) ∧ do´ (Lauren, [use´  
  (Lauren, binoculars)]) 
 h. SEML see´ (Lauren, mountain) ∧ do´ (Lauren, [use´  
  (Lauren, verrekijker)]) 
Semelfactives only peripherally allow for implements ((38c–38d)), as 
evidenced by their marginal acceptability. The failure of the paraphrases 
in (38e–38f) identifies these tools as implements, corresponding with the 
LSs in (38g–38h). 
Active accomplishments readily allow for implements, as is to be ex-
pected ((39a–39b)). 
(39) a. Chris liep naar het park met  
  Chris run\PST.3SG to DEF park with  
  loopschoenen.  
  Running shoes-PL  
  ‘Chris ran to the park with running shoes.’ (Dutch) 
 b. Carl ate the pizza with a fork. 
 c. do´ (Chris, [run´ (Chris) ∧ use´ (Chris, loopschoenen)]) 
  & INGR be-at´ (park, Chris) 
 d. do´ (Carl, [eat´ (Carl, pizza) ∧ use´ (Carl, fork)]) & INGR  
  consumed´ (pizza) 
 e. *Chris werk-te op de loopschoen-en in   
  Chris act-PST.3SG on DEF running shoe-PL VPR   
 
   en dat veroorzaak-te dat ze het park 
   CNJ REL cause-PST.3SG CNJ 3PL DEF park 
   bereik-t-en. 
   reach-PST-3PL 
 f. *Carl acted on the fork, causing it to eat the pizza. 
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The tools in (39a) and (39b) are implements as they fail the causative 
paraphrase that identifies instruments ((39e–39f)). Now we turn to the 
causatives, which, according to RRG-theory, should allow for instru-
ments. Causative states allow for instruments, as (40) illustrates. The 
causative paraphrase is passed, revealing the LSs in (40e) and (40f). 
(40) a. The man scared the dog with the stick.14 
 b. The man acted on the stick, causing it to scare the dog.  
       c. Der Mann verängstig-te den Hund mit 
  DEF man scare-PST.3SG DEF dog with 
  einem Stock.  
  INDEF stick  (German)  
 d. Der Mann wirk-te auf den Stock  
  DEF man act-PST.3SG on DEF stick  
  ein welcher den Hund verängstig-te.  
  VPR REL DEF dog scare-PST.3SG  
 e. [do´ (man, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (stick, Ø)] CAUSE [feel´ 
  (dog, [afraid´])]] 
 f. [do´ (Mann, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Stock, Ø)] CAUSE [feel´  
  (Hund, [afraid´])]] 
The examples in (40) can be interpreted as the man hitting the dog with 
the stick, causing it to be scared. However, it is also possible that there is 
a more indirect causal relation between the stick and the dog’s being 
scared. For instance, the dog can be scared by the man throwing the 
stick in front of it or by man wildly swinging it around. Less direct forms 
of causation are explored in chapter 5. 
Causative activities also allow for instruments: 
(41) a. Felix bounced the ball with the oar. 
 b. Felix acted on the oar, causing it to bounce the ball. 
 
14 The original in Van Valin (2005: 47) has a dog scare a boy. An instrument here 
would be somewhat less acceptable because of the dog’s limited potential to wield 
instruments. In actionality terms, dog would be too low on the scale to occupy the 
instigator position of the expanded LS. 
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 c. [do´ (Felix, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (oar, Ø)] CAUSE [do´ (ball, 
  [bounce´ (ball)])]] 
 d.  Felix deed de bal bots-en met  
   Felix do\PST.3SG DEF bal bounce-INF with  
   de roeispaan.      
   DEF oar      
 
 e. Felix werk-te op de roeispaan in, wat er  
  Felix act-PST.3SG on DEF oar VPR REL MSE  
 
  toe leid-de dat de bal op en neer  
  to lead-PST.3SG REL DEF ball up and down  
  bots-te.15      
  bounce-PST.3SG      
 
 f. [do´ (Felix, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (roeispaan, Ø)] CAUSE 
  [do´ (bal, [bounce´ (bal)])]] 
Causative accomplishments and causative achievements clearly allow 
instruments. In fact, due to the clarity of such examples, many examples 
in this dissertation are causative accomplishments or achievements. Fur-
ther consider (42a) and (42d); they pass the paraphrase and so correlate 
with the LSs in (42c) and (42f), respectively. However, causative accom-
plishments can also feature implements (42g–42i). 
(42) a. Max melted the ice with the hair dryer.   
  Causative accomplishment 
 b. Max acted on the hair dryer causing it to melt the ice.  
 c. [do´ (Max, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (hair dryer, Ø)] CAUSE 
  [BECOME melted´ (ice)]] 
 d. Max smolt het ijs met de haardroger. 
  Max melt\PST.3SG DEF ice with DEF hairdryer  
  (Dutch) 
 
  
 
15 The phrase op en neer (‘up and down’) was included in the Dutch paraphrase, be-
cause without the causative auxiliary doen, botsen translates as collide. 
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 e. Max werk-te op de haardroger in,  
  Max act-PST.3SG on DEF Hair dryer VPR  
 
  wat er-toe leid-de dat die het  
  REL MSE-to lead-PST.3SG REL DEM DEF  
 
  ijs smolt. 
  ice melt\PST.3SG 
 f. [do´ (Max, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (haardroger, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME melted´ (ijs)]] 
 g. The boy put together the bike with a manual. (Farrell 
  2009: 189–190) 
 h. *The boy acted on the manual, causing it to put together the 
 bike. 
 i.  [do´ (boy, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME together´ (bike) ∧ 
   use´ (boy, manual)] (Farrell 2009: 189–190).16 
Causative achievements show a similar pattern: 
(43) a. Lauren popped the balloon with the pen. 
   Causative achievement 
 b. Lauren acted on the pen, causing it to pop the balloon. 
 c. [do´ (Lauren, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (pen, Ø)] CAUSE [INGR  
  popped´ (balloon)]] 
    d.  Lauren deed de ballon spring-en met 
   Lauren do\PST.3SG DEF balloon burst-INF with 
   een Balpen.  
   INDEF pen (Dutch)   
 e. Lauren werk-te op de pen in,  
  Lauren act-PST.3SG on DEF pen VPR  
 
  wat er-toe leid-de dat die de ballon 
  REL MSE-to lead-PST.3SG REL DEM DEF balloon 
 
  deed spring-en. 
  cause.AUX\PST burst-INF 
 
16 This LS is given by Farrell. While I agree that (42g) features an implement, I do not 
agree with the LS he proposes. I return to this issue in chapter 7. 
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 f. [do´ (Lauren, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (balpen, Ø)] CAUSE 
  [INGR popped´ (ballon)]] 
Likewise, causative semelfactives allow for instruments: 
(44) a. Sam flashed the light with a stick.    
  Causative semelfactive 
 b. Sam acted on the stick, causing the light to flash. 
 c. [do´ (Sam, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (stick, Ø)] CAUSE [SEML 
  do´ (light, [flash´ (light)])]] 
 d. Sam deed de lamp flits-en met een  
  Sam do\PST.3SG DEF lamp flash-INF with INDEF  
  stok.        
  stick (Dutch)       
 e. Sam werk-te op  de stok in, 
  Sam act-PST.3SG on DEF stick VPR 
 
  wat er-toe leid-de dat die de lamp 
  REL MSE-to lead-PST.3SG REL DEM DEF lamp 
 
  deed flits-en. 
  cause.AUX\PST flash-INF 
 f. [do´ (Sam, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (stok, Ø)] CAUSE [SEML 
  do´ (lamp, [flash´ (lamp)])]] 
The only way to express (44a) in Dutch is to use a causative auxiliary 
doen ((44d)). 
Causative active accomplishments that feature an instrument are a bit 
more complex. Consider an example with its logical structure: 
(45) a. Mary fed the pizza to the child. 
 b. [do´ (Mary, Ø)] CAUSE [do´ (child, [eat´ (child, pizza)]) 
  & INGR consumed´ (pizza)] 
 c. Mary fed the pizza to the child with a fork. 
What LS would fit (45c)? The paraphrase in (46a) is clearly not accepta-
ble, ruling out the LS in (46b). 
4.2   The prevalence of instruments and implements with respect to verb classes 
 
  
 177 
 
 
(46) a. *Mary acted on the fork, causing to it to force the child to  
   eat. 
 b. *[do´ (Mary, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (fork, Ø)] CAUSE [do´ 
   (child, [eat´ (child, pizza)]) & INGR consumed´ (pizza)]] 
 c.   [do´ (maejto, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (usi, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME         
have´ (yoem, mansana)]] 
 d. U maejto-Ø usi-ta mansana-ta 
  DET teacher-NOM child-ACC apple-ACC 
 
  yoem-ta miik-tua-k. 
  man-ACC give-CAUS-PERF (Yaqui, Uto-Aztecan) 
  ‘The teacher made the child give the man the apple.’ 
  (Guerrero & Van Valin 2004: 312) 
However, the Yaqui sentence in (46d) is acceptable with its correspond-
ing LS in (46c). However, in (46d), event 1 is the teacher causing the child 
to give the apple, and event 2 is the child giving the man the apple. The 
sentence in (45a), however, describes an event 1 where Mary causes the 
child to eat and event 2 is the eating and finishing event. Adding an in-
strument ((45c)), modifies both events taken together, not just one of 
them. By contrast, child in (46d) does not modify the whole event. There-
fore, an appropriate paraphrase of (45c) is given in (47) below. 
(47) Mary caused the child to eat and finish the pizza and used a fork to
 accomplish this. 
To capture the scope that the instrument has, I propose the LS in (48). 
(48) [[do´ (Mary, Ø)] CAUSE [do´ (child, [eat´ (child, pizza)]) & 
 INGR consumed´ (pizza)] ∧ [do´ (Mary, [use´ (Mary, 
 fork)])]] 
It is necessary to repeat the do´ predicate at the end to ensure the right 
scope relations. As the fork is the y-argument of a use´-predicate, it is an 
implement in this example. It cannot be an instrument, because it is not 
an effector-argument (x-argument of do´) anywhere.  
Caused motion verbs do allow for instruments as (49) illustrates. 
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(49) a. Sonia moved the hay bale to the hangar with a crane. 
 b. Sonia acted on the crane causing it to move the hay  
  bale to the hangar. 
 c. [do´ (Sonia, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (crane, Ø)] CAUSE [do´ 
  (hay bale, [move´ (hay bale)]) & INGR be-at´ (hangar, 
  hay bale)]] 
It seems that causative active accomplishments allow for instruments, 
similar to the other causative classes. However, if the tool has scope over 
the entire event, only an implement is possible. It is quite likely that the 
microsemantics of the predicate will be influential in determining 
whether an instrument or an implement is realized.  
This section provided an overview of verb classes and their ability to 
occur with instruments or implements. It was shown that, confirming 
the prediction, implements require the presence of a do´ in the logical 
structure. Instruments, on the other hand, require at least one causal 
operator in the LS. It was shown that causative active accomplishments 
were capable of having both. Causees taking instruments complicate 
matters considerably and this matter will be explored in chapter 7. A 
summary of verb classes and instruments/implements is given in table 
17. 
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Verb class Takes 
State None 
Activity Implement 
Achievement None 
Semelfactive  Implements (peripherally)  
Accomplishment None 
Active Accomplishment Implement 
Casuative state Instrument 
Causative activity Instrument 
Causative achievement Instrument 
Causative accomplishment Instrument and implement 
Causative semelfactive Instrument 
Causative Active Accomplishment Instrument and implement 
Table 17: Verb classes and the prevalence of instruments and 
   implements. 
The mechanics behind the expansion of the base logical structures with 
implements, instruments and the subsequent linking to syntax will be 
the topic of chapter 8. 
4.3 Integrating the actionality scale with 
logical structures 
Generally speaking, RRG recognizes that selectional restrictions can be 
placed on argument positions (Van Valin 2013: 88). RRG has adopted 
Pustejovsky’s Qualia theory as an important mechanism to account for 
selectional restrictions. It allows one to annotate argument positions in 
terms of qualia features: Annotated positions can only be filled by refer-
ents that meet the requirements expressed by the annotation. For in-
stance, if the referent has to be spherical in nature, there will be an an-
notation on the argument position with that information in the formal 
role. This constitutes a type of hard constraint. In order to make soft-
constraint selectional restrictions in RRG more explicit and put them in 
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line with my approach on instruments, I propose to connect the actional-
ity scale with the argument positions in the LS, similar to qualia-
annotations.  
I assume that a number of referents with similar features are accepta-
ble to fill a given argument position. Rather than decomposing the ac-
tionality scale into several features belonging to the qualia roles and 
specifying ranges for each of them, I propose to directly plug in the ac-
tionality scale into the LS. Qualia and the actionality scale are comple-
mentary: Qualia annotations can provide very precise information about 
a referent. For instance, it can specify that a referent filling a given ar-
gument position must be able to create lines on a surface (i.e. write). By 
contrast, the actionality scale can provide a very general range from 
which referents can be drawn, without zeroing in on very precise attrib-
utes. Even though this might seem straightforward on a conceptual level, 
it is important to provide a technical account for it.  
I have proposed the actionality scale explicitly as a Cartesian axis-
system. It is therefore possible to define coordinates in the system. How-
ever, in most cases we cannot simply annotate an argument position 
with a simple set of coordinates because that would constitute a hard 
constraint. We would in effect be coercing the argument position to be 
filled with a very specific referent (or type of referent). This is a possibil-
ity for dealing with verbs with rather specific requirements such as those 
that lexicalize agency. Because most verbs are flexible with respect to 
their slot fillers, we have to devise something more complex. The coor-
dinate approach provides us with a powerful system to do so, however. 
As I have defined the axes explicitly, it is possible to express referent 
requirements in a variety of ways: This approach allows us to specify 
whole regions of semantic space or minimum requirements on one or 
both axes. Consider the requirements17 in (50) with their formulations. 
Recall that the x-axis is the animacy hierarchy and the y-axis is the au-
tonomy hierarchy. 
  
 
17 These coordinates are randomly chosen. They are for illustration purposes only. 
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(50) a. (5, 2)  Filler must be at these exact coordinates. 
 b. (5, Ø)  Filler must have a value of 5 on the x- 
     axis. Y-axis is unspecified. 
 c. (Ø, 5)  Filler must have a value of 5 on the y- 
     axis. X-axis is unspecified. 
 d. (5, 2) ↔ (5, 6) Filler must have a value between the  
     coordinates indicated. 
 e. (5↑, 2↑)  Filler must have an x-value of 5 or 
     higher and a y-value of 2 or higher. 
 f. (5↓, 2↓)  Filler must have an x-value of 5 or 
     lower and a y-value of 2 or lower. 
 g. (5↓, 2↑)  Filler must have an x-value of 5 or 
     lower and a y-value of 2 or higher. 
 h. (Ø, Ø)  Both the x- and the y-axis are   
     unspecified.  
This system allows for an immense range of possible combinations, only 
a subset of which is displayed here. It is very important, however, to 
point out that the actionality scale and its coordinate-based component 
are still parts of human cognition. They are modeled loosely on mathe-
matical concepts yet do not describe a mathematical universe. Determin-
ing whether a referent has an x-value of exactly 5 or is in fact a bit high-
er or lower is difficult and will in all likelihood be different for different 
speakers. Consider then, what an annotated logical structure could look 
like:18 
(51) [do´ (x, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (y, Ø)] CAUSE [INGR pred´ (z)]] 
           (5↑, 2↑)         (4,1) ↔ (5,3)            (Ø, Ø) 
I have opted for a second line of information instead of the usual qualia-
annotation as subscripts for the simple reason of legibility.  
 
18 Here too, the numbers are intended for illustration purposes only. 
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4.4 The three problems revisited 
Three problems with respect to ISA were introduced in chapter 3. The 
first problem relates to variation with respect to instruments: With the 
same predicate, some instruments allow for ISA whereas others do not. 
Consider: 
(52) a. John destroyed the sign with the bomb. 
 b. The bomb destroyed the sign. 
 c. John destroyed the sign with the sword. 
 d. *The sword destroyed the sign. 
The actionality scale can account for this: The acceptability of ISA de-
pends on the position of the instrument’s referent on the scale. The ref-
erents have to be high enough on the actionality scale relative to the 
predicate for ISA to take place. Sword is simply not high enough, but 
bomb is. Both referents rank as concrete entities on the animacy hierar-
chy, but sword ranks lower than bomb on the autonomy hierarchy: The 
former is non-autonomous whereas the latter is semi-autonomous. The 
semantics of the predicate exclude sword because it is not located in the 
correct portion of semantic space. However, it would be too quick to 
conclude that languages will set a general lower limit for ISA in terms of 
the actionality scale. The problem is that – within the same language – 
the same referent can undergo ISA with some predicates but not with 
others, even if both are causally embedded. This can be illustrated by 
keeping the instrument the same, but varying the predicate:  For exam-
ple, ISA is not possible in (53a–53b), (53e–53f) and (53k–53l) whereas it 
is possible in (53c–53d), (53g–53h) and (53i–53j). 
(53) a. John opened the parcel with the knife. 
 b. *The knife opened the parcel. 
 c. Greg shattered the window with the knife. 
 d. The knife shattered the window. 
 e. The assassin murdered the mayor with a spear through 
  the heart. 
 f. *The spear murdered the mayor. 
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 g. The assassin killed the mayor with a spear through the  
  heart.  
 h. The spear killed the mayor. 
 i. The cook cracked open the coconut with the hammer. 
 j. The hammer cracked open the coconut. 
 k. The cook opened the door with the hammer. 
 l. *The hammer opened the door. 
The murder example is analyzed as the predicate lexicalizing agency 
(Van Valin & Wilkins 1996) which is why it is incompatible with a non-
human actor. Traditionally, RRG includes a special operator (‘big’ DO) in 
the logical structure that is said to express lexicalized agency as is the 
case in (53e–53f). But predicates without lexicalized agency also play a 
role, as I have shown in (53a–53d) and (53i–53l). It would be erroneous 
to claim that open lexicalizes agency the same way that murder does, 
because open is compatible with non-human actors. Consider (54a–b): 
(54) a. John opened the container with a crane. 
 b. The crane opened the container. 
 c. John unwillingly opened the parcel with a knife. 
 d. *The assassin unwillingly murdered the mayor. 
Furthermore, open is compatible with agency-canceling adverbs (54c), 
contrary to the example in (54d). However, I believe it is possible to use 
the actionality scale as a single account for all these examples: Each in-
dividual predicate will impose selectional restrictions on the fillers of its 
argument positions. Only if the filler of the instrument slot is similar 
enough to the requirements for the instigator slot can it be assigned 
actorhood. It is not surprising then that a higher-ranking referent like 
crane is a better choice for actor than the lower-ranking knife. By con-
trast, the selectional requirements of shatter are less strict and do allow 
for lower-ranking referents as actors (such as rock, stick and the like). 
Ergo, the actionality scale can also provide a solution to the second prob-
lem. 
The actionality scale can equally provide a solution to the third prob-
lem. By way of the very same system of selectional restrictions, language 
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differences with respect to ISA can be captured. For example, the English 
verb cut imposes looser restrictions on the argument position than any 
of its Dutch equivalents.19 Afrikaans, by contrast, patterns like English: 
(55) a. Tanisha cut the bread with the knife. (English) 
 b. The knife cut the bread. 
 c. Tanisha sneed het brood met het mes. 
  Tanisha cut\PST.3SG DEF bread with DEF knife 
  (Dutch) 
 d. *Het mes sneed het brood. 
  DEF knife cut\PST.3SG DEF bread  
 e. Tanisha sneed het brood met het   
  Tanisha cut\PST.3SG DEF brood with DEF   
  mes door.       
  mes VPR       
 
 f. ???Het mes sneed het brood door. 
  DEF knife cut\PST.3SG DEF bread VPR 
 
 g. Johan het die brood met 'n mes  
  John AUX(PST) DEF bread with INDEF knife  
  ges-ny.  
  PTCP-cut  
  ‘John cut the bread with a knife.’ (Afrikaans) 
 h. Die mes het die brood ge-sny 
  DEF knife AUX.(PST) DEF bread PTCP-cut 
 
  The knife cut the bread.’ 
Similarly, Turkish seems to be less restrictive than Bulgarian (56a–56d) 
and Estonian seems to be more tolerant than Russian (56e–56h): 
(56) a. John ekmeğ-i bıçak-la kes-ti.  
  John.NOM bread-ACC.SG knife-INS cut-PST.3SG  
  ‘John cut the bread with a knife.’ (Turkish) 
  
 
19 Whereas (55d) is completely ungrammatical, (55f) is slightly less bad. 
4.4   The three problems revisited 
 
  
 185 
 
 
 b. ?Bıçak ekmeğ-i kes-ti. 
  knife.NOM bread-ACC.SG cut-PST.3SG. 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ 
 c. Džon narjaza hljaba s nož. 
  John cut.PERF.PRS.3SG bread.DEF with knife 
  ‘John cut the bread with a knife.’ (Bulgarian) 
 d. ???Nožŭt srjaza hljaba. 
  knife.DEF cut.PERF.PRS.3SG bread.DEF 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ 
 e. John lõika-s-Ø leiba noa-ga. 
  John.NOM cut-PST-3SG bread-PART knife-COM 
  ‘John cut the bread with the knife.’ (Estonian) 
 f. Nuga lõika-s-Ø leib-a. 
  knife.NOM cut-PST-3SG bread-PART 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ 
  g. Jon otrezal hleb  
  John cut.PERF.PST.3SG.M bread.ACC.SG.M   
   nozhom. 
   knife.INS.SG.M 
  ‘John cut the bread with the knife.’ (Russian) 
 h. *Nozh razrézal hleb. 
   Knife.NOM.SG cut.PERF.PST.3SG.M bread.ACC.SG.M 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ 
Even within the same language family, there can be substantial differ-
ences. The alternation between (56a) and (56b) is perfectly possible in 
Portuguese, somewhat strange but still grammatical in Spanish and ut-
terly ungrammatical in Romanian (Hugo Cardoso, Thomas Brochhagen 
& Adina Dragomirescu, p.c.). Higher-ranking referents, such as acid, 
seem to be unproblematic in most languages: 
(57) a. Jon-ek ate-a honda-tu 
  John-ERG door-DET(SG.ABS) damage-PTCP 
 
  du azido-a-rekin. 
  AUX acid-DET(SG)-COM 
  ‘John damaged the door with the acid.’ (Basque) 
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 b. Azido-a-k ate-a honda-tu  
  acid-DET(SG)-ERG door-DET(SG.ABS) damage-PTCP  
  du.  
  AUX  
  ‘The acid damaged the door.’ 
 c. John bâ (ân) asid be (ân) dar âsib resând. 
  John with DEM acid to DEM door damage arrive 
  ‘John damaged the door with acid.’ (Persian) 
 d. (Ân) asid be (ân) dar âsib resând. 
  DEM acid to DEM door damage arrive 
  ‘The acid damaged the door.’ 
 e. Ǯon-ma da-a-zian-a k’ar-eb-i  
  John-ERG PR-NV-damage-AOR.S.3SG door-NOM  
  mžav-it.  
  acid-INS  
  ‘John damaged the door with the acid.’ (Georgian) 
 f. Mžava-m da-a-zian-a k’ar-eb-i. 
  acid-ERG PR-NV-damage-PST.AOR.S.3SG door-PL.NOM 
  ‘The acid damaged the door.’ 
 g. Jón skemm-d-i dyr-nar með 
  Jón.NOM.SG damage-PST-3SG door-DEF.ACC.PL with 
 
  sýr-u.  
  acid-DAT 
  ‘John damaged the door with the acid.’(Icelandic)20 
 h. Sýran kemm-d-i dyr-nar. 
  Acid-DEF.NOM.SG damage-PST-3SG door-DEF.ACC.PL 
  ‘The acid damaged the door.’ 
Even though individual languages vary, some generalizations across 
languages present themselves. For instance, not a single Slavic language 
in the sample allowed for the example in (56b). Generally, Slavic seems 
to be fairly restricted with respect to ISA, whereas English and Portu-
guese are the most liberal languages in the sample. 
 
20 Dyr is plural in Icelandic (Felix Knuth, p.c.). 
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All three problems can be accounted for with the same approach based 
on the actionality scale. As I have shown, I propose to follow Grimm in 
assuming that argument positions are open to different sections of se-
mantic space. In RRG-terms, this translates to argument positions in the 
logical structure being open to different sections of the scale. For exam-
ple, the verb kill will have higher requirements than cut and murder will 
have even higher requirements than kill. Higher requirements translate 
to smaller portions of semantic space that referents can be drawn from. 
In other words, the three problems can be accounted for by the same 
system: Accessible regions of semantic space, dependent on the predi-
cate and the language. By plugging the actionality scale into qualia theo-
ry, it can be integrated in a practical system of linking from semantics to 
syntax. 
4.5 A different approach to the semantic 
range 
In this chapter, I proposed an overhaul of the concept of animacy. More 
specifically, I proposed including a second axis, which I dubbed autono-
my, so as to arrive at a Cartesian axis system that allows us to classify 
the referents of arguments more precisely. Furthermore, the use of such 
a system allows us to define regions of semantic space along principled 
lines which are directly compatible with RRG’s linking system. However, 
in the CRC 991, Barsalou’s (1992) frames are recognized as a universal 
format of human cognition (Löbner 2014: 23–24, 2015: 15) and are being 
developed to be applicable across different scientific fields (e.g. Petersen 
2007/2015, Kallmeyer & Osswald 2013). As such, it is possible to provide 
a frame analysis of the concepts explored in this chapter. In this section, 
I will propose a very preliminary modeling of the actionality scale in 
terms of a multiple inheritance hierarchy (Osswald 2002: 12ff.). Osswald 
(p.c.) points out that my actionality scale-approach is useful for captur-
ing some of the properties of referents, especially those concerning in-
struments, causees and the like. However, it is difficult to translate the 
actionality scale into the CRC’s frame approach without an intermediate 
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step, as the architecture of the actionality scale does not allow for a di-
rect translation. That is to say, it first has to be translated into another 
format. This section is intended to explore the intermediate step that is 
necessary for a translation into frames. According to Osswald (2002: 13), 
multiple inheritance hierarchies are an example of a multidimensional 
classification approach. That is, concepts inherit from several superordi-
nate concepts; instead of just one as is the case with the simpler, taxo-
nomic trees. Osswald (2002: 13) points out that with multiple inheritance 
hierarchies, the concepts are not to be considered subconcepts, but ra-
ther as instances of the combination of their superordinates. Such an 
analysis of the actionality scale is given in figure 38. I have taken con-
cepts of the actionality scale’s two axes and used them as concepts in the 
branches of the tree-structure. For the sake of clarity, figure 38 only 
shows the feature values (in terms of connecting lines) that are defining 
characteristics of the concept at hand. For example, human referents are 
defined as [+sentient] and [+animate]. Needless to say, in prototypical 
cases, they are also [+movable]. However, non-defining features have 
not been connected to the concepts to keep the general overview intact. 
The top section of the animacy hierarchy related to reference (1st person, 
2nd person, and 3rd person) has not been included in the tree for the sake 
of simplicity. Example referents are given in italics.  
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Figure 38: Preliminary Multiple Inheritance Hierarchy analysis of the 
  actionality scale. 
Figure 38 reveals that certain features might outrank others. For in-
stance, if a referent is [+sentient], it will automatically be considered 
autonomous (proper). It is indeed difficult to conceptualize an entity that 
is [+sentient] and non-autonomous. The graph in figure 38 can be used 
in future work as a starting point to model the actionality scale with the 
CRC’s frame approach. Doing so here would be beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
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5 Instruments and causation: 
A Force Dynamic view 
In chapter 3, it became apparent that instruments are – in many if not 
most approaches – considered to be causally involved in the state of 
affairs described by the verb. Usually however, the causal role of the 
instrument is not explored systematically. At most, reference is made to 
a feature CAUSE that is connected to the instrument’s referent or argu-
ment. In RRG, for example, instruments are causally embedded. That is 
to say, they are part of a subevent under the scope of a CAUSE-operator 
and the event itself takes scope over another CAUSE-operator. The liter-
ature on causation is vast and spans several disciplines, such as physics, 
linguistics, philosophy and psychology. The CAUSE operator goes back 
to generative semantics with which it intended capture the concept of 
causation. Since then, many approaches have made use of the single 
CAUSE-operator. Generative grammar for instance, has experimented 
with CAUSE as occupying a certain position in the syntactic structure 
(Wechsler 2006: 651). Others have used CAUSE as a purely semantic 
component or operator, such as RRG. This chapter is not intended to 
provide an overview of all of these. Rather, I will explore the Force Dy-
namic (Talmy 1988, 2000) view with respect to instruments. Further-
more, I will propose to integrate Force Dynamics into RRG’s system of 
lexical decomposition thereby accounting for the notion of implement. 
There is an important difference between Force Dynamics’ and RRG’s 
underlying view on causation: Whereas RRG assumes causation is 
events acting on events (Foley & Van Valin 1984: 38), Force Dynamics 
assumes causation consists of participants acting on participants (Talmy 
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1976: 67).1 In the sections that following, I will attempt to bridge this 
divide.  
There are three problems with the CAUSE-operator: First, reducing 
the complex nature of causality to a single operator or deep verb is a 
gross oversimplification. The second issue is related to the first: In a 
system like RRG, there is a fundamental disequilibrium between aspec-
tual operators (BECOME, INGR, SEML) and causative operators 
(CAUSE).2  
Also, treating CAUSE as an ‘isolated primitive’ is problematic. 
Jackendoff (1991: 12) points out that isolated primitives can never be 
justified and that a primitive only makes sense in connection to other 
primitives. However, the use of the single causal operator as a place-
holder allows linguists to make generalizations in other domains (Copley 
& Wolff 2014: 12). In this chapter, I propose to decompose and expand 
CAUSE – using force dynamic concepts – into a network of causal oper-
ators suitable for RRG’s logical structures. Beyond an attempt to trans-
cend the placeholder nature of CAUSE, the refinement I will be propos-
ing in this chapter is necessary to provide a unified theory that can cap-
ture instruments and related concepts, such as causees. From the multi-
tude of frameworks pertaining to causation, I have chosen Force Dynam-
ics (or: FD) for three reasons: 1) FD is a very flexible system that allows 
for many different configurations and combinations of configurations, 2) 
there is strong experimental evidence indicating that humans conceptu-
alize causation along force dynamic lines (Wolff 2007, 2014) and 3) FD 
allows for a natural extension from straightforward physical causation 
to less canonical cases (e.g. psychological or social causation, Wolff 2014: 
100, cf. Talmy 1988).  
Force Dynamics is a production model of causation (Copley & Wolff 
2014: 25, as opposed to dependency models) situated in the field of cogni-
tive linguistics. Production models characterize causation in terms of 
energy, force and/or their transmission. Talmy (2000: 409–410) argues 
 
1 As Croft (2012: 211) points out, Talmy’s diagrams essentially depict participants 
acting on other participants. Talmy’s examples, however, often have events acting 
on events. 
2 RRG (Van Valin 2005: 42) does recognize three types of causation (coercive, non-
coercive and permissive) but these distinctions are seldom used. 
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that the dynamics of force play a fundamental role in human cognition 
and as such FD permeates all aspects of grammar and language. FD not 
only permeates language, it also manifests itself in the conceptualization 
of other domains such as psychology, physics, the social domain and 
others. FD initially developed out of the notion of causation, generalizing 
it to a closed-class grammatical category. That is, Talmy (2000: 411) ar-
gues that FD should be included in the set of more recognized funda-
mental semantic categories like number or mood. As causation is seen as 
the interaction of participants, FD allows for the decomposition of the 
usually primitive notion of causation (as far as linguistics is concerned, 
Copley & Wolff 2014: 11) into more granular primitives. An interesting 
feature of the FD-system is that configurations can be embedded into 
one another (see reason 1) above): Talmy (2000: 435) calls this open-
ended generativity. This concept will play an important role in my pro-
posed integration of RRG and FD.  
Force dynamics can be provisionally characterized as the interaction 
of entities with respect to forces (Talmy 2000: 409). This includes the 
exertion of force on a participant, the reaction of the participant to that 
force, resistance to such a force etc. (Ibid.). In other words, the various 
types of causation are captured as specific configurations of participants. 
As different subtypes of causation are seen as combinations of several 
factors, FD can naturally capture less canonical causative notions such as 
helping and notions that are traditionally not seen as a type of causation 
at all (e.g. prevention). However, standard RRG (Van Valin & LaPolla 
1997: 470ff.) does consider these notions as part of ‘larger’ causation. 
5.1 Fundamentals of Force Dynamics 
Talmy (2000: 413) distinguishes between two primary force entities: One 
that is focused on (the agonist) and the other, non-focused force that 
opposes the agonist (the antagonist). These entities are prototypically 
distinct real-world participants or individuals, but they do not need to 
be. It is entirely conceivable to have two opposing psychological states 
within one and the same individual as force entities.  
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The agonist (or: Ago) is represented by a circle and the antagonist (or: 
Ant) is represented by a concave figure. Each force entity has an intrin-
sic force tendency: either towards action (represented with >) or towards 
rest (represented with ●). In practice, often only the agonist’s force ten-
dency is marked, because the antagonist is assumed to have the opposite 
tendency by definition. One of the two force entities will be the stronger 
and one will be the weaker. The stronger is indicated with a + sign, the 
weaker (if necessary) with a – sign. The resultant is the outcome of the 
interplay between these factors (Talmy 2000: 414–415). The resultant is 
represented as a line beneath the agonist, with either an arrowhead or a 
dot to mark the outcome of the interaction between agonist and antago-
nist. The interaction between agonist and antagonist is termed impinge-
ment. Talmy (2000: 486) proposes the ‘deep morpheme’ ACT ON as an 
expression of impingement. In the previous chapters, I have employed a 
causative paraphrase containing an ‘act on-sequence’ to ascertain 
whether a tool is an instrument or not. This paraphrase not only aims at 
making the LS explicit but also intends to make the impingement be-
tween the different participants explicit. Figure 39 below is a summary 
of a typical FD-configuration. In all graphs, the circle always represents 
the agonist and the concave figure always represents the antagonist. In 
my graphs, these figures will always occupy the same positions (contra-
ry to Talmy’s representations) for the sake of clarity; the crucial differ-
ences between them are the respective values in the figures.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 The terminology that Talmy uses (agonist and antagonist) is potentially confusing 
with respect to the intuitive meaning of these terms. For example, the antagonist 
can act on the agonist, even though a pre-theoretical interpretation would always 
have the agonist as the participant that acts on another. As these terms are stand-
ard in the relevant literature, I have chosen to keep them. 
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Figure 39: An overview of a force dynamic configuration. 
The distinctions introduced thus far allow a formulation of four different 
steady-state scenarios, two of which can be classified as causative. Given 
an agonist with a tendency towards rest, and given a stronger antago-
nist, the agonist is forced or caused to move. The movement is caused 
because the antagonist’s greater strength prevails over the agonist’s 
resistance. In case the agonist is stronger, its tendency would prevail and 
it would remain in rest. Talmy argues that this second scenario belongs 
in the despite-category. It is also possible for the agonist to have the ten-
dency towards action, with the antagonist being the weaker of the two 
entities. In this case the agonist’s tendency becomes the resultant mo-
tion. This too, belongs to ‘despite’. The antagonist can be considered as a 
hindrance. In other words, the agonist can manifest its tendency despite 
the antagonist’s oppositions. For example, in The knight broke through 
the defending lines the referent knight is a stronger agonist that over-
comes the weaker antagonist’s opposition and thus the knight succeeds 
in his endeavor despite the opposition from the defenders. Should, how-
ever, the antagonist be stronger than the agonist, its tendency towards 
movement or action is blocked and the agonist is thus caused to rest. An 
example of this pattern is a sentence such as the dam blocked the gushing 
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water masses. The agonist and antagonist in despite and caused patterns 
are open to both values (that is, not simultaneously), as there is nothing 
in the theory that obliges a participant to always have the same tenden-
cy. The despite and caused patterns thus partition the four arrangements 
of the primary steady-state oppositions. These four possibilities are rep-
resented graphically (adapted from Talmy 2000: 415) in figure 40: 
Figure 40: Primary steady-state oppositions. 
According to Talmy (2000: 417), these patterns can be directly or indi-
rectly expressed by linguistic expressions, usually by certain closed-class 
elements (such as conjunctions). Talmy (2000: 418) considers causation 
as a phenomenon whereby the resultant state of the agonist is the oppo-
site of its intrinsic force tendency. As I pointed out before, linguistic 
expressions can express information or states of affairs from various 
domains: From purely physical events to psychological or social events. 
Yet, despite these widely varying contexts, the fundamental force dy-
namic mechanisms are the same (Talmy 2000: 412–413). Basic physical 
configurations can account for the complex inter- or intrasocial patterns 
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by virtue of metaphoric extension4 (Talmy 2000: 435 & De Mulder 2012: 
4): Such extensions allow the language-user to conceptualize forces in 
other domains with the concepts used to capture the force dynamics of 
participants in the physical realm. In this regard, it is somewhat reminis-
cent of older scientific models and naïve physics (Talmy 2000: 455ff.).  
5.1.1 Further patterns 
Apart from these primary steady-state patterns,5 force dynamic patterns 
can also include change over time. Adding changes over time to the 
steady-state patterns results in change of state patterns (Talmy 2000: 
417). This is a natural consequence of the system, as it allows for the 
factors that have already been discussed to potentially vary: 1) The in-
teraction between agonist and antagonist can change and 2) the strength 
of the participants can vary over time.  
Changing impingement entails that force is not continuously exerted 
on the agonist. Rather, the state of exerting force is stopped or initiated 
at a certain point in time: The antagonist (in the most prototypical cases) 
leaves or enters the state of impingement. A change of impingement is 
indicated graphically with a dashed arrow. If desirable, the resultant can 
consequently be divided by a slash separating the state of the agonist 
before and after. An example configuration is given in figure 41. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Metaphoric extension or metaphoric transfer (De Mulder 2012: 2). 
5 The patterns discussed so far are considered steady-state because there is no change 
in the participants’ values, that is, their tendencies remain the same and maintain 
the same strength over time. 
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Figure 41: Example configuration with disengaging antagonist and  
 two-state resultant. 
Causation proper was defined above as a situation where the resultant is 
contrary to the agonist’s tendency. Including change over time as a pa-
rameter allows for a distinction between onset and extended causation. 
Onset causation can be characterized as follows: At a certain point in 
time, the antagonist exerts a (non-continuous) force on an agonist forc-
ing it into a state contrary to its tendency. There is, thus, onset causation 
of action (e.g. throw or German schubsen) or onset causation of rest (e.g. 
tackle). In cases where the antagonist exerts continuous force (as in fig-
ure 40), causation is considered to be extended causation (e.g. German 
schieben).  
If a stronger antagonist ceases to exert force (i.e. cessation of im-
pingement), the agonist will realize its intrinsic tendency. This is known 
as onset letting. Parallel to onset vs. extended causation, Talmy points 
out that there must be patterns where impingement never takes place. As 
FD is characterized by the interaction (of whatever kind) of the partici-
pants, Talmy (2000: 420–421) considers such patterns as derived from the 
steady-state patterns where impingement does take place. Therefore, he 
calls them secondary steady-state patterns. Any pattern where a stronger 
antagonist never impinges on the agonist, allowing it to realize its in-
trinsic force tendency, constitutes extended letting. 
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Summarizing, causation is a pattern where impingement leads to a re-
sultant that is the opposite of the agonist’s tendency. Letting is the cessa-
tion or absence of impingement, allowing the agonist to realize its intrin-
sic tendency.  
It is important to note that FD recognizes onset and extended versions 
of both causation and letting. Contrary to extended letting, onset letting 
is a situation where the antagonist disengages thereby precipitating a 
performance. It could be argued that even with extended letting, it is the 
antagonist’s non-impingement that is responsible for the resultant. Cau-
sation and letting can thus be considered to be part of causality in the 
broadest sense of the word. 
With both of them, the antagonist’s performance directly determines 
the outcome of the resultant. This performance can be positive (im-
pingement with the agonist) or negative (avoiding or ceasing impinge-
ment with the agonist). In both cases, however, the antagonist does 
something (even if that is the absence of action), which is ultimately re-
sponsible for the outcome. I propose to call this relevant performance. 
With letting, the antagonist could potentially capitalize on its greater 
strength but does not do so. It is the potential power of the antagonist to 
affect the resultant that I consider to be central to its inclusion in broad-
er causation. It should be noted that Talmy (2000: 421) also recognizes 
the importance of the potential for engagement in motivating the exist-
ence of the secondary steady-state patterns.  
In the case of the despite-category, action is taken on the part of an-
tagonist but it is ultimately irrelevant for the outcome as the agonist is 
stronger. I will refer to this irrelevant performance. I propose to include 
causation and letting in the notion of broader causation (cf. Van Valin & 
LaPolla 1997). Table 18 compares Talmy’s key concepts with my pro-
posed matrix. The shaded area indicates causation in the broader sense 
of the word. 
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Performance Relevant Irrelevant 
Positive  Causation Despite 
Negative  Letting While6 
Table 18: Performance matrix. 
The shaded area covers the force dynamic patterns that are relevant for 
my proposal: I will argue that there are four linguistically relevant types 
of causation, two of which correlate to the upper shaded cell and two of 
which correlate to the lower shaded cell. The other cells are not relevant 
for my approach and will not be explored any further.  
5.1.2 Instruments in relation to causation 
Talmy, like many other linguists, treats instruments in terms of partici-
pants in a causative situation. For Talmy, such a causative situation con-
sists of three components: An event 1, an event 2 and a causal relation 
between them. Essentially, a causal relation entails that event 2 only 
takes place as a result of event 1 having taken place (Talmy 2000: 479). If 
event 1 were not to happen, event 2 would likewise not happen. Even 
though counterfactual theories of causation are part of the dependency 
models, counterfactuality can be used as a testing tool (Wolff 2007: 82).  
Consider the crude characterization and an example in (1) (adapted 
from Talmy 2000: 482). The notation in (1d) is a more precise, Da-
vidsonian notation of the same event. 
(1) a. [Event 1] CAUSE [Event 2] 
 b. [The window broke]E2 (as a result of)CAUSE [the ball’s sailing 
  into it]E1. 
 c. [The ball]E1 [broke the window]E2 
 d. Break(e2, window) & Sail into(e1, ball, window) & Cause (e1, 
  e2)   
 
6 Talmy does not readily provide a notion to fill this slot with. I therefore propose 
while as a description of two participants who are involved in completely unrelated 
actions or states. For example: Joan read while Jack played the video game. 
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Contrary to the illustration I used above, Talmy essentially rejects the 
‘deep verb’ CAUSE as it is an oversimplification of a more diverse se-
mantic reality. It is often the case that, in language, only a participant of 
event 1 is made explicit. In sentence (1c), only a participant of E1 (ball) is 
specified, but the participant is conceptually embedded within the event 
specified by E1. Also, the causal relation is implied in (1c) whereas it is 
made explicit in (1b). 
To satisfy the requirements for causality, E1 and E2 must share the 
caused event’s (E2) figure-functioning element (Talmy 2000: 486). This 
element must, at the same time, be the ground of E1 on which another 
figure impinges (see above). Figure and Ground are concepts Talmy 
adopted from Gestalt-psychology and reinterpreted for the domain of 
linguistics (Talmy 2000: 184): 
(2) The Figure is a moving or conceptually movable entity whose 
 site, path, or orientation is conceived as a variable, the particular 
 value of which is the relevant issue. 
(3) The Ground is a reference entity, one that has a stationary setting 
 relative to a reference frame, with respect to which the Figure’s 
 site, path, or orientation is characterized. 
The figure of E1 (the causing event) can be considered the instrument of 
the whole causative situation. In other words, instruments have a double 
role, which Talmy (2000: 487) calls multirelational embedding. A sche-
matic summary of a causative situation with an instrument is given in 
figure 42. 
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Figure 42: Structure of a basic causative event with an instrument. 
F refers to Figure, G to Ground and I to Instrument. A number 1 refers to 
the causing event, number 2 refers to the caused event and 3 refers to 
the entire causative situation. Consider the following example: 
(4) [John] cut [the bread] [with the knife] 
 G1=F2  G2  F1 
    F3   G3  I3 
This view diverges somewhat from RRG’s conception of instruments. In 
Talmy’s approach, the instrument is conceived of as a component of the 
causing event, but not explicitly of the caused event. The illustration 
above can be paraphrased: John acts on the knife (S1) and John cuts the 
bread (S2). Both events share John as the author, but not the knife. Talmy 
elevates the instrument to the level of the whole causative event. From 
an RRG-point of view, this is somewhat odd. In RRG’s logical structures, 
the instrument argument is under the scope of a CAUSE operator, but 
simultaneously has a CAUSE-operator under its own scope. If any ele-
ment should be shared between two events, it should be that which is 
acted on (in S1) and which, in turn acts on another element (in S2). Con-
sider the complete LS for (5). 
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(5) [do´ (John, [use´ (John, knife)])] CAUSE [[do´ (knife, [cut´ (knife, 
 bread)])] CAUSE [BECOME cut´ (bread)]] 
Knife is acted upon by John and in turn acts on the bread, leading to the 
result of the bread being cut. I do agree with Talmy in giving the instru-
ment a prominent place in the state of affairs, but I disagree as to the 
nature of this position. As it is, Talmy’s instrument characterization is 
incompatible with RRG’s logical structures. I will not be using his char-
acterization in my effort to integrate FD with logical structures.  
5.1.3 Integrating Force Dynamics with logical structures 
In the following sections, I will propose an integration of force dynamic 
configurations with RRG’s logical structures. In this section, I will inte-
grate FD with RRG using simple, straightforward examples. That is to 
say, the type of causation is very direct: There is prototypical physical 
manipulation of one entity by another. In section 5.3, I will propose a 
diversification of the single causal operator itself. The FD-patterns can 
thus be considered as a decomposition of the notion of CAUSE (here, in 
its most prototypical sense). Consider the following examples featuring 
an instrument: 
(6) a. The terrorists destroyed the car with a bomb. 
 b. [do´ (terrorists, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (bomb, Ø)] CAUSE [INGR 
  destroyed´ (car)]] 
 c. Mary cut the cake with a knife. 
 d. [do´ (Mary, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (knife, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
  cut´ (cake)]] 
In these examples, an agent impinges upon an instrument, which in turn 
causes the coming about of an event. The instrument impinges upon the 
patient in much the same way. In (6c), this is very clear: The knife makes 
contact with the cake, splicing it into pieces as a result. In (6a), the im-
pingement is essentially the same, even though there is some conceptual 
difference. It is the bomb’s behavior (exploding) that impinges on the 
car, rather than the object itself. In both examples, there are three subev-
ents, linked together in a causal chain. To make the nature of CAUSE 
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more explicit, I propose to use FD-configurations as a model. As both 
CAUSE-operators in each of the examples express a ‘classical’ causative 
situation, they can be described with the same, basic FD-configuration: 
In the first section of the chain, a stronger antagonist with a tendency 
towards action (terrorists and Mary) impinges on an agonist with a ten-
dency towards rest (bomb and knife). Both instruments have a tendency 
towards rest, as bombs and knives are designed to be handled by some-
one. If they are not manipulated, they do not ‘act’. The resultant of the 
first sequence is the antagonist of the second sequence. In this sequence, 
the antagonist is again stronger than the agonist, leading to an action-
resultant. To indicate that the resultant of the first sequence is an ago-
nist that has been caused to move and that this determines the antago-
nist’s force tendency in the second sequence, I have added an arrow 
from the first resultant intersecting with the second arrow from bomb. 
The configuration for (6c–6d) is similar. It is given in figure 44. 
Figure 43: Force dynamic configurations in a standard  
instrument construction. 
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Figure 44: Force dynamic configurations in a  
standard instrument construction (II). 
5.1.4 Force Dynamics: More than causation 
Talmy points out that Force Dynamics is a category that permeates the 
whole of grammar. For instance, it can manifest itself in conjunctions 
(e.g. despite). Even though Force Dynamics was developed to capture 
causation and related concepts, I believe it is crucial to expand FD’s role 
as a category in grammar even further. I propose to treat FD as a catego-
ry that permeates language on several levels and as such, it will be active 
ubiquitously. Consider the examples in (7): 
(7) a. Sarah carried the box. 
 b. John touched the wall.  
Carry and touch are definitely not causative predicates, yet the force 
dynamic configuration is clear. One participant (Sarah or John) impinges 
on another (box or wall), even though the resultant is not made clear 
linguistically. As FD patterns play a basic conceptual structuring role 
(Talmy 2000: 411), I assume they are also active on the micro-level. This  
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micro-level is to be understood as an FD-configuration of participants 
within the same (sub)event.  
This distinction raises an important matter though: If we assume that 
force dynamic configurations operate everywhere (including on the mi-
cro-level), what distinguishes a (linguistically) non-causative configura-
tion from a causative one? I propose to treat force dynamic configura-
tions as linguistically causative, iff the agonist and the antagonist are 
members of separate sub-events. This fits RRG’s logical structures natu-
rally, as was shown in section 5.1.3. Consider the example in (6a). Its LS 
has three subevents: The activity on the part of terrorists, the bomb per-
forming an activity and the ingressive event of the car transitioning 
from an intact to a destroyed state. In my proposal, force dynamic con-
figurations are at play within each of the subevents (i.e. the micro-level). 
These have now been added to the LS.  Each of the three subevents tak-
en in itself is non-causative. However, on the macro-level, the terrorists 
impinge on the bomb and the bomb impinges on the car. These two im-
pingements occur across the individual subevents: The causal operator is 
a specification of the precise type of impingement between the two par-
ticipants in question. I have repeated the (complete) LS from (6a), but 
with the micro-level added. Contrary to terrorists, bomb does not have a 
micro-configuration, as there is no interaction between two participants 
within the subevent. This is illustrated in figure 45. 
In short, under my combined use of FD and RRG, linguistic causation 
is only present if there is impingement on the macro-level, i.e. across 
subevents. Impingement within subevents (i.e. the micro-level) does not 
manifest itself as linguistic causation.  
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Figure 45: Standard instrument construction with  
 micro- and macro-configurations. 
5.1.5 Configurations of volition and Holisky’s principle 
Volition and/or intention plays an important role in many descriptions 
of language and in many frameworks. For instance, RRG ties in intention 
with agency. Agency is thus considered as a property that an effector 
has when it is intentionally performing the action identified by the verb. 
Consider: 
(8) a. John killed the deer. 
 b. John accidentally killed the deer. 
 c. John intentionally killed the deer. 
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In standard RRG-terms, John in (8a) is an agent by virtue of being a hu-
man effector. Human effectors are read, by Holisky’s principle, as agents 
unless there is evidence to the contrary as is the case in (8b). In (8c), John 
is an agent and this is confirmed by intentionally. This is not only rele-
vant for instigators, such as in (8), but also for other human referents. 
Consider the causees below: 
(9) a. Elise made John walk. 
 b. Elise had John walk. 
 c. Elise let John walk. 
In (9a), John is not acting willingly, contrary to (9c), where a non-
volitional reading of the causee is impossible. In (9b), both a volitional 
and a non-volitional reading are possible. This can be tested by adding 
additional information: 
(10) a. *Elise made John walk and he willingly did it. 
 b. Elise made John walk against his will. 
 c.  Elise had John walk and he willingly did it. 
 d. Elise had John walk and he did it against his will. 
 e. Elise let John walk and he willingly did it. 
 f. *Elise let John walk against his will. 
Examples (10a) and (10f) yield contradictions, whereas (10b) and (10e) 
confirm the default reading. Both pieces of information are compatible 
with (10c) and (10d), however, signaling that the English causative auxil-
iary have is compatible with both readings. This is connected to the 
strength of causation, which I will discuss in section 5.3. As far as voli-
tion and intention are concerned, I assume that FD can provide a princi-
pled account. In short, I will argue to treat volition and intention as 
properties of the referents that can come about by context, construc-
tions, pragmatics, adverbs, subclauses and the like. Practically speaking, 
I propose to subject these concepts to an FD-analysis. 
Force Dynamics assumes that FD-configurations do not only hold be-
tween singular individuals but can also apply within the individual self. 
Talmy (2000: 431) calls this concept the divided self. The force dynamic 
participants within the self are elements of the psyche, such as base  
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desires, urges, reservations about a certain topic, self-restraint etc. Talmy 
(2000: 431) points out that the divided self is often made explicit in lan-
guage. Consider: 
(11) a. I held myself back from responding. 
 b. I refrained from responding. 
In the previous section, I proposed to differentiate between two levels of 
FD-configurations: Macro-level configurations and micro-level configura-
tions. In addition to these, I propose to include a third level: Nano-level 
configurations. Nano-level force dynamic configurations are FD-patterns 
within a single participant. Or, put in RRG-terms, within the filler of an 
argument position of the LS. These three levels are related to each other 
via the concept of open-ended generativity: The resultant of a lower-level 
configuration is the agonist (or antagonist) of the higher level. I will 
illustrate this system by means of two examples. The first example con-
tains a base example sentence, whereas the second is characterized by an 
expanded version of the first example. The matching graphs illustrate 
the underlying force dynamic configurations. 
(12) John broke the window.7  
 
7 John is to be identified with the antagonist and window is to be equated with the 
agonist. 
+
>
Macro-
configuration
+
>
Nano-
configuration
Reservations
Will
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Following Holisky’s Principle, John is read as an agent. On the macro-
level, John is the antagonist impinging on an agonist (window). The an-
tagonist has a tendency towards action, whereas the agonist has a ten-
dency towards inaction. The antagonist is stronger, resulting in an ac-
tion resultant, which is, in this case, a breaking of the window. As ago-
nist and antagonist belong to two different subevents in the logical 
structures, this configuration will manifest as linguistically causative. On 
the nano-level, John’s will is the agonist (towards action) and his reser-
vations about the breaking event function as the antagonist (tendency 
towards rest). The agonist is stronger and manifests its force tendency in 
the nano-resultant (towards action). The nano-resultant in turn acts as 
the antagonist on the macro-level (i.e. the macro-resultant). In the sen-
tence in (13), the macro-configuration is the same as in (12), evidenced 
by the fact that the event took place very much the same way. The main 
difference is that John performed the action but this was not concordant 
with his will. This can be captured by assuming a different nano-
configuration: John’s will is again the agonist, but has a tendency to-
wards rest. The antagonist is some pressure on John to break the win-
dow. This ‘pressure’ can be a contextually relevant individual ordering 
John to perform the action, but it could also be John’s clumsiness that 
overrides his will. The nano-resultant is the same as in (12), manifesting 
itself in the very same way in the macro-configuration. Despite a differ-
ent nano-configuration, the same macro-configuration comes about. 
Holisky’ principle will set the nano-configuration to the one in (12) by 
default. By adding extra information, it can be altered. 
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(13) John broke the window, but he didn’t really want to. 
The behavior of causees can be captured in much the same way. I will 
illustrate this with English causative auxiliaries. These are given in (14) 
through (16). In the b- and c-versions, I have added elements aimed at 
fleshing out their causees’ volition. The d-versions contain a subclause 
to illustrate that there is no counterfactuality: The event described actu-
ally took place. In English, make and have are implicatively causal, 
meaning that the event necessarily took place (Van Valin 2005: 42). Let, 
on the other hand, is not implicative. That is to say, the result could have 
taken place, but this is not necessary. This is shown in (15d–15e). To 
avoid unnecessary complication, I will use the implicative reading of let 
for the present discussion.  
(14) a. John made Bill run. 
 b. John made Bill run against his will. 
 c. *John made Bill run and he willingly did.  
 d. *John made Bill run, but Bill didn’t run. 
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(15) a. John let Bill run. 
 b. *John let Bill run against his [Bill’s] will. 
 c. John let Bill run and he willingly did. 
 d. John let Bill run, but Bill didn’t run. 
 e. John let Bill run and he ran. 
(16) a. John had Bill run.  
 b. John had Bill run against his will. 
 c. John had Bill run and he willingly did. 
 d. *John had Bill run, but Bill didn’t run. 
 (17) John made Bill run. 
In (17), similar mechanics are at work as with the example in (12): On 
the macro-level, John is the antagonist (with a tendency towards action) 
and Bill is the agonist (with a tendency towards rest). As the antagonist 
is stronger, its tendency prevails and the result is action, in this case a 
running event. On the nano-level, there is a configuration for each of the 
participants as both are human. John’s configuration is the same as in 
(12). Bill’s configuration, on the other hand, looks somewhat different: 
Bill’s will is the agonist with a tendency towards rest. The antagonist 
can be his reservations concerning his own inaction, for example. As the 
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agonist is stronger, the result is rest, which translates to an agonist with 
a tendency towards rest on the macro-level. In the end, this tendency is 
overcome by a stronger macro-antagonist. 
(18) John let Bill run. 
In (18) the situation is the reverse: Bill’s nano-configuration is one where 
his will (the nano-agonist with a tendency towards action) overcomes a 
weaker nano-antagonist (again, the referent’s reservations or psycholog-
ical pressure), leading to a resultant in action. The nano-resultant trans-
lates to a macro-agonist with a tendency towards action. John’s nano-
configuration equally has an action-resultant: John’s will is an agonist 
towards motion and the antagonist is John’s reservations. As the agonist 
is stronger, the resultant is towards action which translates to a macro-
antagonist. Here, however, we find a different macro-pattern: let ex-
presses the cessation of impingement. The antagonist originally had a 
tendency towards inaction, blocking the realization of Bill’s macro-force 
tendency. John’s nano-resultant (action) thus translates to the removal of 
a blockage (i.e. the cessation of impingement). This is represented with a 
dashed, upward arrow (to the left of the macro-antagonist in (18)). 
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(19) John had Bill run.  
The pattern in (19) allows for a complex configuration, or rather, a set of 
configurations. On the macro-level, the same basic causative pattern 
occurs: Bill is an agonist in rest, and the stronger macro-antagonist 
(John) impinges on Bill, leading to a resultant in action. If Bill is acting 
non-volitionally in (19) – as in the make-construction – the matching 
nano-pattern is the same. However, if the causee is acting volitionally, a 
different nano-pattern exists. It cannot be the same nano-pattern as in 
the let-construction, because the force dynamic configuration is funda-
mentally different: In the let-construction, a blockage is removed allow-
ing the agonist to realize its force tendency. From a conceptual point of 
view, the nature of volition is also different with let and had: had ex-
presses an agonist that is acting counter its tendency. If the agonist were 
realizing its force tendency toward action, then there would be no need 
for coercion on the part of the antagonist. In other words, if Bill were 
genuinely acting volitionally, there would be no need for John to urge 
him into doing so. This is fundamentally different from let where a re-
moval of pressure enables Bill to pursue what he really wants to do. 
Bill’s ‘volition’ in had could better be characterized as the absence of 
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unwillingness: Bill is not against the action described by the verb, but 
without intervention by John, he would not perform the action. By way 
of illustration, imagine the following scenario: Bill would like to go for a 
run, but cannot bring himself to doing that, because of job-related pres-
sure (e.g. grading exams). John (Bill’s boss) urges Bill to go for a run. In 
other words, John overrides Bill’s nano-antagonist, allowing Bill’s nano-
agonist to realize its tendency. The difference with true volition is that in 
a case of true volition, the participant’s nano-agonist is strong enough to 
manifest itself directly. In the case of pseudo-volition, the causee’s will 
can only manifest itself through the agent’s intervention. Therefore, as 
far as the second FD-configuration is concerned, the nano-agonist has a 
tendency towards action, but the nano-antagonist is stronger and thus 
the resultant is towards rest. The nano-resultant has the same value as in 
the non-volitional reading. The volitional nano-configuration for the 
causee is given in (20). 
(20) 
The precise nano-configuration and, thus, the precise reading are deter-
mined by Holisky’s principle: In absence of information to the contrary, 
the pseudo-volitional reading is selected. Languages have multiple  
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marking possibilities to mark causees differentially, thereby conditioning 
pragmatic and semantic differences. This will be explored further in 
chapter 8. Certain languages have marking on the causee to disambigu-
ate the type of causation or supply information regarding the causee’s 
volition (see section 5.3.2). 
Summarizing, the same macro-pattern is shared by all three causative 
auxiliary constructions: An entity in rest is impinged upon, leading to an 
action macro-resultant. The had-construction is special in that it allows 
for two readings of the causee: It may be volitionally acting or non-
volitionally acting. The make-construction only allows for one nano-
configuration (non-volitional) whereas the let-construction only allows 
for the other (volition). The main difference between the make- and 
have-constructions is the strength of causation. This is an element that is 
not given a lot of prominence in Talmy’s account. There is no means to 
indicate degrees of ‘stronger antagonist’. In section 5.3, I will propose to 
enrich causation in the logical structures by introducing the concept of 
strength of causation. 
In the previous sections, I have shown that Force Dynamics is a pow-
erful explanatory tool. I have proposed a distinction between three levels 
of configurations: 1) The nano-level, 2) the micro-level and 3) the macro-
level. The first two levels do not contribute to linguistic causation, but 
are levels of representation that can be relevant for notions like volition, 
intention and fine-grained semantic or pragmatic interpretation. The 
macro-level is a level that is primarily relevant to account for the causal 
relations that affect instrument and causees. These three levels are de-
fined over levels in the logical structure: The macro-level concerns con-
figurations across subevents, the micro-level concerns configurations 
within subevents, and the nano-level concerns configurations within the 
fillers of argument-positions. I have also shown that through force dy-
namic configurations, a principled difference between volition and pseu-
do-volition arises.  
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5.2 Implements as facilitating instruments 
In this chapter, I have presented an analysis of causality with respect to 
instruments by integrating FD with RRG’s logical structures. However, 
implements are not causally embedded. Nevertheless, I argue in favor of 
analyzing implements with FD as well. At present, implements are char-
acterized by the use´ (x, y) predicate preceded by a connective (∧). I be-
lieve RRG’s conception of implements could stand to gain a lot by mak-
ing the nature of this connective more explicit. In RRG’s current concep-
tion, the connective simply means and simultaneously. There is no com-
pelling reason why the use-predicate should be in any way conceptually 
linked with the first subevent. It could in effect be describing completely 
unrelated actions (Sebastian Löbner, p.c.): There is no clear reason why 
(21a) could not link back to (21b). 
(21) a. Abdul ate cereal and he used a pencil.  
 b. do´ (Abdul, [eat´ (Abdul, cereal) ∧ use´ (Abdul, pencil)]) 
I believe it is therefore crucial to explore the nature of the relation that 
implements bear to the rest of the event. To do this, I will use my modi-
fied FD-proposal including micro- and macro-configurations. Assigning 
a specific FD-configuration to implements provides a strong cognitive 
basis for treating them as fundamentally distinct from the causally em-
bedded instrument relation. 
5.2.1 Helping as weaker causality 
In a large-scale study on the micro-semantics of English verb classes, 
Koenig et al. (2008) argue in favor of a weaker causal relation called 
helping between certain participants in the sentence. 
From a force dynamic perspective, helping (Wolff 2014: 108) is a very 
specific force configuration where one participant has a tendency to-
wards the end-state and the other participant has the same tendency. 
This essentially means that a given event is made easier or facilitated by 
the occurrence of another: Due to the presence of the second event, the 
first event is made easier to perform on the part of the author of the 
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event. As I have illustrated in previous sections, Force Dynamics allows 
for the composing of the resultants of configurations into larger configu-
rations. That is to say, a resultant of configuration 1 can be the agonist 
(or antagonist) of configuration 2. How does this relate to RRG-style 
implements and the use´ predicate? Consider a prototypical instance of 
a sentence with an implement: 
(22) John ate soup with a spoon. 
Rather than assuming that there is a causal chain, there is a very specific 
FD-configuration: helping. With my distinction between levels of FD-
configurations, it is possible analyze the two subevents separately on the 
micro-level.  
Figure 46: Micro-FD configurations for an implement construction. 
The two force dynamic configurations above are, by themselves not the 
helping configuration. They both describe similar events: An antagonist 
(John in both) impinges on a weaker agonist with a tendency towards 
rest (soup and spoon, respectively). The result is an agonist in action. 
Recall that this does not constitute causation in a linguistic sense. A 
helping relation is essentially a configuration where the agonist has a 
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tendency and the antagonist has the same tendency (Wolff 2014: 108). 
Following Koenig, helping is essentially making a certain effect or event 
easier, not causing it. In terms of logical structures, the subevent that the 
use-predicate describes makes the other subevent easier. This stands to 
reason conceptually: Eating soup is easier with a spoon than without 
one. This can be captured naturally with FD-configurations. The whole 
first micro-configuration functions as a stronger agonist with a tendency 
towards action on the macro-level. The whole second micro-
configuration functions as the macro-antagonist that equally has a ten-
dency towards action. The tendencies of the two macro-participants do 
not oppose each other, rather they compound each other, making the 
resultant tendency stronger.8 This configuration constitutes a typical 
helping relation inforce dynamic terms. The entire configuration for (22) 
is given in figure 47. This FD-configuration shows the interaction be-
tween the two subevents in a principled way. The occurrence of the 
connective does not mean that there is no interaction between the two 
subevents. Rather, the simultaneous occurrence of the second subevent 
with the first facilitates the occurrence of the first subevent. The connec-
tive may not show this, but the FD-based decomposition of the sequence 
∧ use´ does.  
  
 
8 The increased tendency in the macro-resultant is not indicated graphically as it is 
implied by the rest of the macro-configuration. 
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Figure 47: Micro- and macro-configurations  
for an implement construction. 
5.2.2 Identifying implements and instruments: a new 
diagnostic 
In chapter 3, I argued against ISA as the motivation for the instrument-
implement distinction. If ISA is no longer an adequate tool to distinguish 
implements from instruments, then a new way of detecting them is re-
quired. 
In previous chapters, I have tacitly been using a paraphrase to identify 
instruments. As instruments are defined over causal embedding, any 
paraphrase should 1) make the logical structure explicit and 2) should 
also correctly identify instruments that would be ranked as implements 
when ISA is used as a diagnostic. I propose the diagnostic in (23). 
(23) X acted on Y, causing it to V. 
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This diagnostic is aimed at making the logical structure as explicit as 
possible. If the test fails, then the tool is an implement and not an in-
strument. This is illustrated by the examples below: 
(24) a. Mary cut the cake with the knife. 
 b. Mary acted on the knife, causing it to cut the cake. 
 c. The knife acted on the cake, causing it to become cut. 
 d. [do´ (Mary, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (knife, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
  cut´ (cake)]] 
It is important to provide validation for each causal operator in the 
chain. The test in (24b) validates the first operator in (24d) and the test in 
(24c) validates the second causal operator. The paraphrase test fails in 
(25b), showing that there cannot be a causal operator. The failure of 
(25b) and (25c) means that (25d) is incorrect as the LS of (25a). The cor-
rect LS is given in (25e). 
(25) a. Mary ate soup with a spoon. 
 b. *Mary acted on the spoon, causing it to eat soup. 
 c. *The spoon acted on soup, causing it to become consumed. 
 d. *[do´ (Mary, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (spoon, Ø)] CAUSE   
    [BECOME consumed´ (soup)]] 
 e.   do´ (Mary, [eat´ (Mary, soup) ∧ use´ (Mary, spoon)]) 
The paraphrase in (23) can identify instrument positively and imple-
ments negatively. Is there a test that identifies implements positively and 
instruments negatively? In sentences containing causation, there is a 
relation between – at least – two entities (or events) or between an enti-
ty and an event (Talmy 2000: 476–477). This relation must, at the very 
least, be one of entity A affecting entity (or event) B. If A and B are unre-
lated, then there is no causation. Consider (adapted from Talmy 2000: 
476–477): 
(26) a. Joan emptied the tank. 
 b. Joan read a book and the tank emptied. 
 c. Joan pulled the plug and the tank emptied. 
 d. Joan emptied the tank by pulling the plug. 
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In (26c), entity A (Joan) performs an action which is directly related to 
the event where the tank (entity B) loses its contents. Therefore, it is 
truth-conditionally equivalent to (26a) and (26d) but not to (26b).  
Talmy points out that an alteration of B’s characteristics constitutes a 
facilitating relation. This relation cannot be paraphrased with usual 
causative forms, but rather with verbs like help. As I explained in the 
previous section, the macro-agonist’s tendency (figure 47) is compound-
ed and reinforced. With such reinforcement, the agonist’s identity is not 
altered but its characteristics are: The eating event takes place as it 
would without the ‘helper’, but its characteristics are altered in that the 
mode of eating is changed (and more efficient). Consider the following 
supposed paraphrases of (26a) that Talmy (2000: 477) proposes, in a 
slightly adapted form:  
(27) a. *Joan emptied the tank by enlarging the hole. 
 b.  Joan helped the tank empty by enlarging the hole. 
 c. *Joan caused the tank to empty by enlarging the hole. 
 d. ?Joan made the tank become empty by enlarging the hole. 
In (27b), Talmy argues that the characteristics of B are changed, but not 
the identity. The formulations in the other sentences are expressions of 
causation, i.e. they change the identity of B. The activity of enlarging an 
already existing hole only changes characteristics (i.e. size) but not the 
identity (i.e. the hole already exists). Therefore, the expressions of a 
characteristics’ change in (27a), (27c) and (27d) are incompatible with 
(26a) as it expresses an identity change. Notice that the examples become 
acceptable when they are paired with an expression of change in identi-
ty rather than with the expression of a change in characteristics: 
(28) a. Joan emptied the tank by pulling the plug. 
 b. Joan caused the tank to empty by pulling the plug. 
 c. Joan made the tank become empty by pulling the plug. 
In (29), two different potential test-formats using help are given.  
(29) a. Using a knife helped Mary to cut a cake.  Instrument 
 b. Using a spoon helped Abdul eat the soup. Implement 
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 c. The knife helped Mary to cut the cake. Instrument 
 d. The spoon helped Abdul eat the soup. Implement 
These formats are problematic, however, as both instruments and im-
plements would pass. A test aimed at positively identifying implements 
must target the change in characteristics rather than using the verb help. 
Recall that my treatment of implements assumes that the other subevent 
is made easier and that this constitutes a change in characteristics. The 
causal paraphrase tests for a specific relation that is decomposed in 
terms of an FD-configuration. By way of parallel, an implement-test 
should test for the most salient feature of the helping-configuration. 
However, adding the sequence made easier by using does not produce 
any significant results because, again, both instruments and implements 
pass. Consider: 
(30) a. Mary cut the cake with the knife.  Instrument 
 b. Mary’s activity of cutting the cake was made easier by using 
  the knife. 
 c. Abdul ate soup with a spoon.  Implement 
 d. Abdul’s activity of eating the soup was made easier by using 
  a spoon. 
 e. Joan watched the birds with binoculars. Implement 
 f. Joan’s activity of watching birds was made easier by using  
  the binoculars. 
 g. Ragnar broke the window with a rock. Instrument 
 h. Ragnar’s activity of breaking the window was made easier  
  by using the rock. 
I assume that the examples in (30) are not useable for a similar reason 
that the help-test does not work: The micro-semantics of the verb or 
construction used in the test are wider than the semantics one wishes to 
aim for, which means that instruments and implements cannot be dis-
tinguished. I propose two formats for positively identifying implements. 
One follows the same logic of making the LS explicit. In this case, the 
nature of the connective is made explicit by adding α [and simultaneous-
ly] β. The second test is the use of the verb facilitate. Contrary to the 
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verb help or the sequence made easier by, the results are acceptable when 
applied to a sentence containing an implement but are very odd when 
applied to sentences containing an instrument. These are given in (31). 
(31) a. Mary cut the cake with the knife.  Instrument 
 b. ??Mary cut the cake and simultaneously used the knife. 
 c. ??The knife facilitated the cutting of the cake. 
 d. Abdul ate soup with a spoon.  Implement 
 e. Abdul ate the soup and simultaneously used the spoon. 
 f. The spoon facilitated the eating of the soup. 
 g. Joan watched the birds with binoculars. Implement 
 h. Joan watched the birds and simultaneously used the   
  binoculars. 
 i. The binoculars facilitated the bird watching. 
 j. Ragnar broke the window with a rock. Instrument 
 k. ??Ragnar broke the window and simultaneously used the  
  rock. 
 i. ??The rock facilitated the breaking of the window. 
The tests produce very strange results for the examples containing in-
struments for two reasons: The first test separates the use of the instru-
ment from the main subevent. As the use of the instrument is a precon-
dition for the result state to come about (expressed by the embedding in 
a causal chain), separating the instrument subevent from the other(s) 
yields very strange results. Sentences containing implements are perfect-
ly acceptable because the second subevent is not a precondition for the 
main subevent to occur. The second test uses a very specific verb whose 
semantics are much closer to the semantics of the helping-relation than 
those of the verb help. In other words, both tests make the force dynamic 
logic behind the α ∧ use´ relation explicit. The schematic format for the 
first test is given in (32a) and that of the second is given in (32b). De-
pending on the language, the format of these tests might have to be 
adapted somewhat. For instance, the verb facilitate might not have a 
direct equivalent in every language. 
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(32) a. X V-ed and simultaneously used Y. 
 b. Y facilitated the V-ing. 
If a tool passes the causal paraphrase but not the two implement tests, 
then it is an instrument. If it passes the two implement tests but not the 
causal paraphrase, it is an implement. A summary of these tests is given 
in table 19. 
 Instrument (CAUSE do´ (x, Ø)) Implement (∧ use´ 
(x, y)) 
Causal paraphrase Yes No 
and simultaneous-
ly-test 
No Yes 
Facilitate-test No Yes 
Table 19: Summary of diagnostics for instruments and implements. 
5.3 A proposal for enriched causation 
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have argued for the direct rele-
vance of different configurations with respect to instruments, imple-
ments, causees and the like.  
In standard RRG, causation is represented with the single causal oper-
ator CAUSE. However, the causal component in the logical structures is 
still very much an oversimplification, as Van Valin (2005: 42) points out 
himself. Drawing on insights from the study of instruments and inter-
mediate effectors, this section is intended as a first proposal for expand-
ing the notion of causation in the logical structures.  
Van Valin (2005: 42) recognizes three types of causation: direct (or co-
ercive), indirect (or non-coercive) and permissive causation. Despite this, 
RRG largely only uses a single causal operator in the logical structures.9  
Consider the examples in (33). 
  
 
9 The three subtypes are not used productively in the RRG-literature. 
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(33) a. Eric made Bill call a taxi.  (Direct causation) 
 b. Eric had Bill call a taxi.  (Indirect causation) 
 c. Eric let Bill call a taxi.  (Permissive causation) 
The first two types are amalgamated into CAUSE and the letter is to be 
represented by LET. However, in practice, all three are reduced to the 
single CAUSE-operator. Up to now, it was tacitly assumed that the dif-
ferent types of causation bore little relevance to the linking of semantics 
to syntax. In the following section, I will explore my conception of direct 
and indirect causation, as they are different from standard RRG.10 This 
proposal entails neutralizing causative relations to arrive at four general-
ized causative relations (or GCRs). I argue that Talmy’s notion of im-
pingement is central to causation and to the approach I am proposing 
here. 
5.3.1 Relevant dimensions for neutralization 
I propose a model for GCRs based on the nature of the interaction be-
tween the agonist and antagonist.  I contend that the interaction of the 
antagonist and the agonist can be defined in terms of two features: 
[±impingement] and [±direct]. [±direct] refers to the type of interaction: 
[+direct] is any type of physical interaction between agonist and antag-
onist, whereas [-direct] is any other type. These two features yield a 
matrix with four cells, each one corresponding to one of the GCRs. Note 
that I define [±direct] different from similar concepts in other approach-
es. Kemmer and Verhagen (1994: 121–122), for instance, define indirect 
causation as causation where an ‘intermediary transmitter’ is present. 
Direct causation, by contrast, is defined as causation that holds between 
two participants directly. Van Valin (2005: 42) roughly equates direct 
causation with a coercive form of causation. In my proposal [±direct] 
refers to the strength of the interaction. I treat prototypical direct causa-
tion as a case where direct physical manipulation (full-contact impinge-
ment) is present between the agonist and the antagonist. Typical in-
stances of full-contact impingement are instrument constructions: An 
 
10 In the relevant literature, there is an abundance of differing definitions of direct and 
indirect causation (see Martin & Schäfer 2014: 241ff.). 
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instigator directly physically handles the instrument to arrive at a cer-
tain result. Most causees, on the other hand, will only be ‘handled’ non-
physically. In a sentence like John had Mary cut the cake, the default 
reading will be one where Mary acts volitionally (see section 5.1.5). The 
most likely interpretation of this sentence is one where John asked Mary 
to perform the action. This is similar to Van Valin’s conception of non-
coercive causation. However, direct causation in my proposal is primari-
ly connected to instruments. This does not mean that I treat examples 
like John made Mary cut the cake as indirect. In this case, it is not a re-
quest but a command or some form of coercion. There is no direct physi-
cal manipulation in this case, yet the type of causation is also direct. I 
propose to treat such cases as semi-contact impingement. I assume that 
the full-contact type of impingement is cognitively the more basic of the 
two. Semi-contact impingement is conceptually derived from the former 
through the process of metaphoric extension, the same process that al-
lows for the inclusion of non-physical agonists and antagonists in FD-
configurations. Consider the example in (34). 
(34) a. The soldier made John enter his password at gunpoint.  
 b. John broke the window by pushing Todd into it. 
In (34b), an animate is directly physically manipulated: John pushes Todd 
into the window, thereby breaking it. In (34a), the soldier does not use 
John as a tool to type in a password. Rather, there is a very high degree 
of coercion (expressed by at gunpoint) that conceptually lowers the cau-
see’s autonomy to that of Todd in (34b) or to that of a typical instrument. 
This process is part of the metaphorical extension from full-contact im-
pingement to semi-contact impingement. Therefore, both sentences in 
(34) contain [+direct] impingement and are cases of direct causation. 
The feature [±impingement] is fairly straightforward. [±impingement] 
refers to the standard concept of impingement in Force Dynamics as it 
was presented in the previous sections: Impingement is the coming in 
contact of an antagonist with an agonist. This feature is a neutralization 
as well: [+impingement] thus refers to any situation where an antagonist 
and an agonist are in a state of impingement, be it of the onset-type or 
the extended type. Consider (35). 
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(35) a. The doctor cured the patient with the drug. 
 b. The lumberjack cut down the tree with a chainsaw. 
In (35a), the doctor cures the patient by administering a drug. As the doc-
tor only physically manipulates the drug in the beginning phase of the 
event, this sentence illustrates the onset-type. By contrast, in (35b), the 
lumberjack physically handles the chainsaw throughout the event. (35b) 
is an example of the extended impingement type. In chapter 3, I argued 
against Kamp & Rossdeutscher’s (1994) and Alexiadou & Schäfer’s (2006) 
idea that the distinction between onset causation and continuous causa-
tion is relevant for the discussion of instruments. I have therefore 
lumped these two concepts together under [+impingement]. The value [-
impingement] is slightly different. [-impingement] is primarily defined 
by the cessation of impingement. Consider: 
(36) a. John let the pen fall. 
 b. Sarah allowed her daughter to go to the movies. 
In (36), stronger antagonists (John and Sarah) cease impinging on the 
agonist (pen and her daughter), allowing the latter to realize their force 
tendencies. The main difference between (36a) and (36b) is the directness 
of impingement: (36a) is an expression of [+direct] and (36b) expresses [-
direct]. The pen has the innate tendency to fall as it is pulled on by gravi-
ty11 John holds the pen, thereby physically manipulating it. The im-
pingement ceases and the pen is allowed to manifest its force tendency. 
In (36b), there is psycho-mental impingement between Sarah and her 
daughter. This impingement also ceases, allowing her daughter to realize 
her tendency.  
With respect to [-impingement], there is an added difficulty. The ex-
tended form of [-impingement] is that which Talmy calls ‘extended let-
ting’: The antagonist could impinge, but does not do so at any point. 
This raises the question of whether extended [-impingement] can really 
 
11 Copley & Harley (2014: 132) call the collection of all innate tendencies of all objects 
and entities the normal field. The pen’s tendency to fall due to gravity is an example 
of a force tendency belonging to the normal field. 
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be considered a type of causation. It is possible to interpret (37a) and 
(37b) as cases of extended letting. Consider: 
(37) a. John saw the pen roll towards the edge of the table but he  
  just let it fall. 
 b. Even though Sarah had her reservations about it, she didn’t  
  say a word and let her daughter go to the movies. 
In both examples in (37), the antagonist stays away during the entire 
event, despite their potential for successful impingement. Answering 
this question, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation as I am 
primarily concerned with direct and indirect causation. I have summa-
rized the features and their underlying neutralizations in figure 48.12 
Figure 48: Feature neutralizations. 
For clarification purposes, I will briefly elaborate on the other features in 
the figure. Sensory impingement refers to the antagonist being sensory 
input. For example: If a driver sees a car accident which prompts them to 
stop and help, then the impingement is of a sensory nature, rather than a 
direct physical one. The same applies to cognizing impingement where it 
is reasoning or communication that causes a participant to act. Examples 
include someone being talked into doing something. Event impingement 
 
12 I do not claim to present an exhaustive list of the base relations. 
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refers to a whole event as antagonist. For example, the military assault in 
the military assault made him take a different road.  
The matrix below summarizes the four proposed types of causation 
that are relevant for linking (proposed LS-operators for each respective 
type are given between brackets): 
 [+direct] [-direct] 
[+impingement] Direct (CAUSE) Indirect (IND) 
[-impingement] Enabling (LET) Permissive  
(ALLOW) 
Table 20: Matrix of proposed types of causation and their operators. 
Direct and indirect causation have the same FD-patterns, the main dif-
ference being strength. The same is true for enabling and permissive 
causation. I propose to add an exclamation mark to mark 
strength/directness.13 Direct and enabling causation are set apart from 
indirect and permissive causation, respectively, by the use of the excla-
mation mark. The difference in directness is also a difference in strength.  
The patterns with direct interaction will be indicated by an exclama-
tion mark marking the antagonist. The FD-configurations for the four 
causal relations are given in figure 49 below. 
  
 
13 As strength is the scalar dimension underlying all four relations, [±direct] can also 
be considered as differences in strength (see figure 51 below). 
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Figure 49: Force dynamic configurations underlying  
       the four principle causal operators. 
5.3.2 Neutralization of causation 
As I showed in chapter 3, RRG treats thematic relations as neutraliza-
tions of lower-level verb-specific relations. In turn, thematic relations are 
neutralized into generalized semantic roles (GSRs) called macroroles. It is 
this level that is relevant for linking purposes. I propose to treat causa-
tion in very much the same way. Talmy (2000: 472–475) presents a list 
with about a dozen different causative relations, each with a separate 
deep verb. Internal ordering is motivated by differences is fore-
grounding,  
continuity and the like. Although Talmy provides a principled account of 
derivations from the deep structure to a surface structure, I do not follow 
his approach for two reasons: 1) A derivational account is fundamentally 
incompatible with the framework used in this dissertation and 2) I do 
not consider such an overly differentiated view of causation to be a plau-
sible basis for linking to morphosyntax. However, I do agree with Talmy 
that each of the causative relations in the list is important for interpreta-
tive purposes in the same way that thematic relations are also interpre-
tationally important. For example, the distinction between plain human 
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effector and agent is relevant for the interpretation of the sentence ut-
tered. I argue that this is also true for causation: The neutralized level of 
causation, akin to the macrorole level, is important for linking, whereas 
lower-level causative distinctions can be relevant for the precise inter-
pretation of the content.  
What Talmy labels autonomous event is not recognized here as causa-
tion. In the sense of phyiscs, there very well might be causation at play, 
but this is not linguistically relevant. Even though Talmy stresses the 
distinction between the physical conception of the world and the hu-
man-mental conception of the world several times, he (2000: 472) re-
markably enough recognizes autonomous events as a subtype of causa-
tion. Including autonomous events as causative opens up the door 
for’implicit causation’ or similar concepts under which almost every-
thing could be accounted for as causative (to some extent). I do not rec-
ognize autonomous events as causative as far as language is concerned, 
because they fail standard causative tests: 
(38) a. The ice melted. 
 b. *Ø caused the ice to melt. 
 c. *Ø is the cause of the ice’s melting. 
 d. *The ice melted because of Ø. 
The lack of a second argument blocks any possibility of semantic causa-
tion. The necessity for a second argument was also pointed out in chap-
ter 2. All subtypes of causation that do not pass these tests have been 
omitted. I have also left out the causative types motivated by a differing 
number of elements in the causal chain. In RRG, a causal chain is simply 
a series of causative operators, whatever their nature. In this view, the 
interpretation of the number of elements in a causal chain is a property 
of the whole chain, not just of a single operator. 
The figure below is a proposal for causative neutralization based on 
Talmy’s (2000: 472–475) subtypes of causation. The subtypes proposed 
by Talmy can be neutralized to one of the four causative relations I pro-
posed in the previous section. The proposal is by no means exhaustive 
and is to be seen as a starting point for the concept of general causative 
relations. The base and intermediate causative relations could and should 
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be investigated further and expanded considerably. This is a topic for 
future research in its own right. As the lowest-level causal relations are 
conceptual in nature, this list could grow quite substantially.  
Figure 50: Neutralization of conceptual causation  
         to generalized causative relations. 
I also propose to rank the four causal operators on a scale according to 
strength: The strength of interaction cross-cuts the dimensions of 
[±impingement] and [±direct]. I assume that [±impingement] is the 
more important feature and I rank it higher than [±direct]. Direct ma-
nipulation is more coercive than indirect. Ordering someone to perform 
an activity is more direct than asking someone to do something. It will 
also require greater strength (either literally or metaphorically): One can 
only order someone if there is a solidified power differential. That is, the 
antagonist has to be inherently more powerful than the agonist.  Ena-
bling and permissive causation are judged to be weaker than direct and 
indirect causation, because in these two types impingement ceases.  
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Internally, the former two types are distinguished from each other over 
the same logic of strength. Enabling causation involves direct interac-
tion, whereas permissive causation involves indirect interaction. The 
first value for each operator is impingement, the second is directness. I 
have summarized the four generalized causative relations in figure 51. It 
also includes helping-causation as it was introduced in section 5.2. I treat 
helping-causation as a weak form of causation (cf. Koenig et al. 2008) and 
distinguish it from strong forms of causation (the four GCR types ex-
plored in this chapter). 
Figure 51: Causal operators ordered according to strength of causation. 
On a final note, languages do not always unambiguously mark the type 
of causation in a given context (also see chapter 7).14 In fact, there can be 
a high degree of uncertainty, which mainly concerns the strength-
principle (even on a micro-level). Consider: 
(39) a. Bill had Eric make him some coffee. 
 b. The supervisor had his employee make him some coffee. 
 c. The general had the sergeant clean the toilet. 
In (39b), the semantic content of the agonist and the antagonist makes 
clear that this is rather a type of weak order (as opposed to made which 
 
14 According to Wolff (2014: 107), people are often uncertain about the magnitude of 
forces (in my approach: strength of causation), which has consequences for how 
causality is described and represented. 
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expresses direct coercion). (39a), by contrast, is quite unclear. It has two 
obvious but different interpretations: 1) the same as in (39b) or 2) a re-
quest between equals (e.g. friends). 
English has three causative auxiliaries: make, have and let. The first 
expresses direct causation, the second expresses indirect causation and 
the third expresses both enabling and permissive causation. Dutch, by 
contrast, has only two auxiliaries: doen expresses direct causation and 
laten expresses everything else. German has an even more restricted set; 
it only has lassen. Despite the fact that the English auxiliaries typically 
express a type of causation, there can be some overlap or unclarity ow-
ing to context. For example, in (39c), the semantic content of the refer-
ents would suggest a direct order on the part of the antagonist, making 
this direct causation. Yet, the indirect auxiliary is chosen. If the antago-
nist is inherently more powerful or more authoritative than the agonist, 
the precise nature of the causation (direct vs. indirect) is often a grey 
area. Some languages (but not English) use differential causee-marking, 
for various purposes. One such purpose is to disambiguate that which I 
have called the strength of causation. Consider Dutch, for example. 
(40) a. Thomas liet Charlotte de brief lezen. 
  Thomas let\PST.3SG Charlotte DEF letter read.INF 
  ‘Thomas let Charlotte read the letter.’ 
 b. Thomas liet de brief door Charlotte lezen. 
  Thomas let\PST.3SG DEF letter PREP Charlotte read.INF 
  ‘Thomas let read the letter by Charlotte.’ 
 c. Thomas liet de brief aan Charlotte lezen. 
  Thomas let\PST.3SG DEF letter PREP Charlotte read.INF 
  ‘Thomas let read the letter to Charlotte.’ 
 d. Thomas deed Charlotte de brief lezen. 
  Thomas do\PST.3SG Charlotte DEF letter read.INF 
  ‘Thomas made Charlotte read the letter.’ 
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 e. *Thomas deed Charlotte de brief lezen 
  Thomas do\PST.3SG Charlotte DEF letter read.INF 
 
  en ze deed dat met plezier. 
  and she do\PST.3SG that with pleasure 
  ‘Thomas made Charlotte read the letter and she did so 
  willingly.’ 
 f. ?Thomas liet de brief door Charlotte lezen 
  Thomas let\PST.3SG DEF letter by Charlotte read.INF 
 
  en ze deed dat met plezier. 
  and she do\PST.3SG that with pleasure 
  ‘Thomas had Charlotte read the letter and she did so 
   willingly.’ 
The auxiliary in (40a) expresses indirect and permissive/enabling causa-
tion.15 As was the case in the FD-analysis containing a causee that can be 
read as volitional and non-volitional, (40a)’s causee is ambiguous with 
respect to Charlotte’s volition. Adding the preposition aan in (40c) trig-
gers a strongly volitional reading, making the type of causation permis-
sive/enabling. By adding door in (40b), the volitional reading of Char-
lotte is made less strong (but not canceled), setting the reading to that of 
indirect causation. Even though it is a stronger form of causation than 
without the marking, it is still weaker than if doen is used (40d–40f).16  
These examples illustrate that volition correlates with the strength of 
causation: Direct causation is incompatible with a volitional causee. 
Therefore, more inanimates will be found under the scope of direct cau-
sation than animates. The weaker the causation is, the more acceptable a 
volitional causee becomes and vice versa. For example, Verhagen & 
Kemmer (1997: 65, 71) show that, in case of an animate causer, 79% of 
causees under the scope of doen are inanimate (where volition is hardly 
relevant) and 21% are animate. With laten, there is a higher degree of 
animate causees (49%) than with doen. I will explore causee-marking 
further in chapter 8. Kemmer & Verhagen (1994: 122) furthermore report 
 
15 In Dutch, just like in English, no morphological distinction is made between per-
missive and enabling causation. 
16 This disambiguation strategy is only open to a subset of Dutch verbs (Verhagen & 
Kemmer 1997: 77). 
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that (in English) a decrease in the causee’s autonomy correlates with 
more direct forms of causation (i.e. make-construction). This ties in with 
my actionality scale-approach proposed in chapter 4: The higher a refer-
ent is located on the actionality scale, the more likely it will be under the 
scope of non-direct forms of causation (IND, LET, ALLOW) and vice 
versa. 
5.3.3 Enriched causation in the logical structures 
I recognize the fact that the placeholder nature of CAUSE can have ad-
vantages in the scientific study of language. Nonetheless, I propose to 
include the four causal operators in RRG’s inventory. By way of illustra-
tion, some examples are given in (41). The examples in (41g–41h) and 
(41i–41j) are a case of enabling and permissive causation, as made clear 
by the information given in the brackets. Bear in mind that languages 
usually do not directly distinguish between enabling and permissive 
causation, even though a cognitive difference exists. 
(41) a. Todd broke the console with a rock. 
 b. [do´ (Todd, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (rock, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
  broken´ (console)]] 
 c. Jean a fait couper le pain à Marie. 
  Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP cut DEF bread to Marie 
  ‘Jean made Marie cut the bread.’ 
 d. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
  cut´ (bread)]] 
 e. Jean a fait couper le pain par Marie. 
  Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP cut DEF bread by Marie 
  ‘Jean had Marie cut the bread.’ 
 f. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] IND [[do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
  cut´ (pain)]] 
 g. Todd heef-t John lat-en lop-en. 
  Todd AUX-3SG John let-INF run-INF 
  ‘Todd let John run.’ (by releasing him from his grip) 
 h. [do´ (Todd, Ø)] LET [do´ (John, [run´ (John)])] 
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 i. Todd heef-t John lat-en lop-en. 
  Todd AUX-3SG John let-INF run-INF 
  ‘Todd let John run.’ (by giving him permission to do so) 
 j. [do´ (Todd, Ø)] ALLOW [do´ (John, [run´ (John)])] 
In many cases, the precise nature of causation will be underspecified. For 
instance, the French nuclear faire-construction can express both direct 
and indirect causation. The difference is signaled by the marking of the 
causee (à for direct, par for indirect causation). Rather than assuming 
there are two faires in the lexicon with a different LS, it is preferable to 
assume an underspecified causal operator. To represent this underspeci-
fication in the LS, I propose to use italicized CAUSE. In Van Valin & 
LaPolla (1997: 121), italicized CAUSE represents the main cause in a 
causal chain. However, this practice was discontinued in subsequent 
work. I therefore propose to reintroduce it, albeit with a different mean-
ing. In the examples above in (41), the causal operators were not kept 
underspecified, which they, strictly speaking, should be. In (41), I used 
the very specific operators for illustration purposes only. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have explored the causative semantics of instruments 
and implements. Furthermore, I have proposed a merger of FD with 
RRG’s logical structures. In the introduction, a philosophical distinction 
between the two frameworks was mentioned: RRG treats causation as 
events acting on events, whereas FD assumes participants act on partici-
pants. Even though this constitutes a deeper philosophical issue that 
surpasses the goals of this dissertation, my approach attempts to bridge 
the gap between these points of view: On the micro-level, participants 
act on participants (within one subevent). As such, it does not constitute 
linguistic causation. On the macro-level, participants act on participants 
across subevents. In other words, a participant acts on another partici-
pant, but it is embedded in a proper subevent rather than being a partic-
ipant in isolation (as is the case on the micro-level). My approach does 
not exclude events acting on events in their entirety.  
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6 The Instrument-Subject 
Alternation and subtypes of in-
struments  
In this chapter, I explore ISA in more detail. In particular, I argue that ISA 
and several similar phenomena are best treated as constructions. Goldberg 
(2003: 222) points out that a wide array of semi-idiomatic expressions ex-
ists in every language and that they can be accounted for in terms of con-
structions, that is, as schematized form-meaning pairings (cf. Goldberg 
2003: 219). Constructions are also recognized by RRG as a means to cap-
ture the language-specific properties of languages while still referring to 
general principles (Van Valin 2005: 132). One reason to capture ISA in 
terms of constructions is that there is a great deal of cross-linguistic vari-
ation with respect to ISA. For instance, English and Portuguese seem to 
be very productive, whereas Dutch is very restrictive. German, on the 
other hand, primarily allows for it with a very specific reading. I will also 
make a claim in favor of a new naturalness condition as a means to govern 
contextual factors. Furthermore, there are a number of expressions that 
superficially resemble ISA, yet show various morphosyntactic differences. 
I agree with Goldberg (1995: 8) that different constructions are associated 
with (slight) differences in meaning. 
6.1 Delineating instruments in subject 
position from other inanimates 
in subject position 
I claim that there is a fundamental distinction between cases of ISA and 
cases where other inanimates occupy the subject position. In the latter 
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case, inanimates such as forces occupy the highest argument position in 
the LS. By the very nature of instrument constructions (i.e. causal embed-
ding), intransitive predicates can never feature an instrument as their only 
argument. Inanimates as the only argument of an intransitive predication 
(e.g. Snow in The snow melted) are of no concern to the current study. In 
other words, only transitive predications with an inanimate subject are 
relevant and many of those are force-effectors. In chapter 4 (table 16), sev-
eral tests were proposed to distinguish these from instruments in subject 
position. Only those transitive predictions where the inanimate cannot 
conceivably be a force are relevant. Consider: 
(1) a. The bomb destroyed the car. 
 b. The grenade killed the civilian. 
 c. The terrorists destroyed the car with the bomb. 
 d. The soldier killed the civilian with the grenade. 
In (1a–1b), bomb and grenade can be considered instruments undergoing 
ISA, as the corresponding sentences in (1c–1d) are plausible correlates. If 
a plausible instigator is not readily available, it can become difficult to 
distinguish (2a) from (2b): 
(2) a. [do´ (terrorists, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (bomb, Ø)] CAUSE  
 [BECOME destroyed´ (car)]] 
 b. [do´ (bomb, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME destroyed´ (car)] 
 c. The bomb went off by itself and destroyed the car. 
 d. *The bomb destroyed the car with its shrapnel. 
In (2b), the bomb is interpreted as having gone off by itself as is illustrated 
by the acceptability of (2c). The example in (2c) shows that bomb can be 
the highest-ranking x-argument. However, it cannot be a force or a 
pseudo-agent because it cannot take an instrument itself ((2d)). The ques-
tion is then, whether there is a plausible instigator or not. If not, then LSs 
like the one in (2b) have to be assumed. If yes, then typical ISA-LSs have 
to be assumed (see section 6.2). The plausibility of the instigator will be 
explored further in section 6.3. 
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6.2 Mechanics & purpose 
ISA involves a process (metonymic clipping, Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 
301) whereby the initial effector is left unspecified. As a consequence of 
leaving the instigator unspecified, it can no longer receive the actor 
macrorole. Instead, it is assigned to the highest available effector, the in-
strument. This is illustrated in (3b) and (3c).  
(3) a. Jack cut the bread with a knife. 
b. [do´ (Jack, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (knife, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME  
           A       NMR   
 cut´ (bread)]] 
             U  
c. [do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (knife, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME cut´ 
(bread)]]          A 
       U 
Provided ISA is possible in the language under investigation, why do lan-
guages use this construction? In this matter, I believe Schlesinger’s (1989: 
191) naturalness condition 2 should be reanalyzed as the driver of the con-
struction called ISA. The condition is repeated in (4). 
(4) Naturalness Condition 2: To the extent that attention is drawn 
to the instrument by means of which an action is performed and 
away from the instigator of the action, the former will be naturally 
expressed as the sentence subject. 
Naturalness condition 2 does not capture when ISA is natural but rather 
why speakers would choose to express an instrument as a subject. In the 
examples in (1a–1b) focus is put on the instrument by leaving out the in-
stigator. This is quite similar to the motivation behind the passive: By as-
signing PSA-hood to the undergoer-argument, it becomes more topical as 
PSAs are the topic by default. Contrary to actor selection, undergoer se-
lection can be variable and this is RRG’s strategy to capture phenomena 
like dative shift. In a sentence like Pat gave Chris the gift the undergoer is 
assigned to the argument that is neither highest nor lowest on the AUH. 
In other words, variable undergoer selection allows for the modulation of 
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topicality. There is evidence in favor of the more topical of two potential 
undergoers being chosen as undergoer in case of variable undergoer se-
lection (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 423). As actor selection is not variable, 
it cannot be modulated for pragmatic effect. Phenomena like ISA are 
therefore not unexpected: By leaving the highest-ranking argument un-
specified, the actor role is assigned by default to the highest specified ar-
gument. In turn, this argument is selected as the PSA (in an active sen-
tence), making the instrument the topic. Rather than treating (4) as a con-
dition for ISA to take place, I treat it as a reason for ISA to take place. I 
propose to label it as the ‘Instrument-effector as Actor-construction’ as 
the notion of subject is not directly relevant in RRG (see chapter 2). A 
preliminary constructional schema for ISA is given in table 21. 
Construction: English Instrument as Actor-construction  
Syntax: template: default (see principle in (2.13)) 
PSA: Standard rules for accusative systems 
Morphology: PSA: no explicit morphology 
Verb agreement: Default 
Semantics: (1) x-argument of initial do´ is unspecified 
(2) Actor-macrorole is assigned to highest specified  
x-argument of do´ 
(3) highest specified x-argument of do´ must have  
minimum actional status as defined by argument  
position 
Pragmatics: Instrument-effector is default topic 
Table 21: Constructional schema for the instrument-subject alternation 
 (preliminary).1 
In chapter 4, it was also established that the acceptability of an instru-
ment-effector bearing the actor macrorole is dependent on its referent’s 
position on the actionality scale: The referent must rank above a certain 
 
1  Standard rules for accusative systems in the schema is a reference to the principles 
governing PSA-assignment in accusative constructions (Van Valin 2005: 100): The 
highest ranking direct core argument in terms of the PSA-selection hierarchy be-
comes the PSA. I have adopted this notation here for the sake of simplicity. 
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cut-off point relative to the predicate’s requirements before ISA is possi-
ble. This is represented in the section semantics as point (3). I will revisit 
this in section 6.4.  
6.3 A new naturalness condition as a 
prerequisite for ISA 
In chapter 3, I pointed out that ISA is a construction that seems to be con-
strained by the requirement of an event link. All subevents described by 
the sentence have to be in a meaningful relation to each other. That is to 
say, before ISA can be applied, all components of the event represented in 
the ‘unshifted’ sentence must be immediately causally linked.  I propose 
to capture this with a condition relating to the subevents in the logical 
structure: 
(5) Natural Event Condition: A complex event E is a natural event 
iff subevent E1 immediately causes (or can immediately cause) 
subevent E3 if subevent E2 were removed from the structure of the 
matrix event E.  
Why is such a condition needed? As the instigator position in an ISA-
construction is not lexically filled but contextually supplied, it becomes 
necessary to decide what can and what cannot be a realistic instigator. If 
there is no realistic instigator (from a linguistic point of view), then there 
is no ISA. Rather, the participant under investigation actually occupies the 
initial position in an LS, whatever its nature might be.2 Without any prin-
cipled limits on what can count as an instigator, it is possible to argue for 
increasingly outlandish candidates for instigatorhood. For example, it has 
been claimed that grenade is an instrument manipulated by the implicit 
instigator gravity in (6a). The intended situation is one where due to grav-
ity’s effects, a grenade rolls off of a shelf and explodes. Intuitively, gravity 
cannot be held responsible for the destruction of the shed here. Without 
 
2 That is to say, that LS can be very different from any assumed instrument-LS. 
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the natural event condition, there is no way to rule out such a claim, how-
ever. I propose the natural event condition to fulfill precisely this role: It 
rules out gravity as the instigator. Even though the supposed underlying 
logical structure seems admissible ((6b)), it does not hold up to scrutiny. 
Linking the LS to syntax, as in (6c), results in a very peculiar sentence. 
The reason for this is given in (6d). Here, E2 is removed from the LS and 
the resulting structure is linked to syntax ((6e)) with a non-sensical result. 
By contrast, positing terrorists as an instigator is acceptable ((6f–6i)). 
(6) a. The grenade destroyed the shed. 
 b. [do´ (gravity, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (grenade, Ø)] CAUSE  
   E1                         E2 
  [INGR destroyed´(shed)]]      
   E3 
 c.  *Gravity destroyed the shed with the grenade.  
 d. [do´ (gravity, Ø)] CAUSE [INGR destroyed´ (shed)] 
      E1    E3 
 e. *Gravity destroyed the shed. 
f. [do´ (terrorists, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (grenade, Ø)] CAUSE    
  E1           E2 
 [INGR destroyed´ (shed)]]      
  E3 
 g. The terrorists destroyed the shed with the grenade. 
 h. [do´ (terrorists, Ø)] CAUSE [INGR destroyed´ (shed)] 
   E1    E3 
i. The terrorists destroyed the shed. 
These examples show that the natural event condition can distinguish an 
acceptable instigator from a non-acceptable one. This seems straightfor-
ward, but it can also account for less clear examples where there is no 
(linguistically) plausible instigator at all. Consider the example in (7). De-
spite the oddity of the sentence in (7a), its corresponding structure in (7b) 
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seems well-formed. Removing E2 reveals that is not acceptable. The struc-
ture in (7c) would inevitably link into the somewhat strange sentence3 in 
(7d). 
(7) a. *The WW II-soldier killed the modern-day civilian with the  
  landmine. 
 b. [do´ (WW II-soldier, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (landmine, Ø)]  
 CAUSE [BECOME dead´ (modern-day civilian)]] 
 c. [do´ (WW II-soldier, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME dead´ (modern-
 day civilian)] 
 d. *The WW II-soldier killed the modern-day civilian. 
 e. *The WW II-soldier killed the civilian in 2015. 
It would be possible to claim that a WW II-soldier who is still alive today 
can provide an adequate, though unlikely, context for the sentences in (7d) 
and (7e). The qualification WW II-soldier to denote the former soldier in 
this unlikely scenario is strange as it is hardly relevant for the description 
of the killing event. In this respect, replacing WW II-soldier with WW II-
landmine does yield an acceptable sentence as the landmine does not cease 
to be one over time (and its origins are irrevocably WW II), whereas the 
soldier did cease to be a WW II-soldier by the time WW II ended. This is 
especially important linguistically, as sentences where an immediate 
event-link is absent are highly marked. One cannot simply apply transi-
tive reasoning: The WWII-soldier planted the landmine and the landmine 
killed the civilian in 2015. According to typical transitive reasoning, the 
WW II-soldier caused the civilian’s death. Yet, despite the straightfor-
wardness of transitive logic, sentences like the one in (7e) are still marked 
or even ungrammatical. Language seems to require the existence of a 
 
3 Representing information like modern-day as adverbial information of the type in 
2015 would place it in the logical structures as well. Adverbial information is usually 
not represented in the LS for reasons of economy and clarity. The consequences of 
removing E2 would have the same effect though: The result would be a very similar, 
odd sentence ((7e)). Therefore, I will keep the compounds in (7) to make this point 
clear. 
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plausible, immediate link between all subevents for the sentence to be ac-
ceptable. This point can be made clearer by pulling the subevents even 
further apart temporally.  
(8) a. The bomb destroyed the house in 2015. 
 b. John destroyed the house in 2015 with a bomb. 
c. *The Austro-Hungarian general destroyed the house in 2015  
 with the bomb. 
 d. *The Austro-Hungarian general destroyed the house in 2015. 
e. The bomb went off and destroyed the house because it had 
 degraded too much. 
 f. *The degradation process destroyed the house with the  
   bomb. 
The examples in (8c–8d) illustrate that it is not plausible to posit a general 
of state that ceased to exist almost a century ago as the instigator of the 
destruction event in 2015, even though this person would be the instigator 
under transitive reasoning. A contemporary individual (John) is admissi-
ble, as is no instigator at all ((8e)). Positing the degradation process as in-
stigator is not possible linguistically speaking ((8f)). If there is no realistic 
instigator, there cannot be a corresponding unfilled slot in the LS. 
To refute ever more outrageous and potentially infinitely regressing 
claims regarding an ‘implicit’ effector, it is crucial to put a limit on con-
text. The natural event condition provides a principled way to do this: 
Remove E2 from the proposed sentence’s LS and apply the linking algo-
rithm. RRG (Van Valin 2005: 59) considers the section of logical structure 
that is associated with the instrument position as an expansion of a more 
basic LS. If a sentence with an instrument is posited, then it stands to rea-
son that removing the instrument section (i.e. E2) must result in a base LS 
that links into an acceptable sentence. It is now possible to draw up a 
complete constructional schema for ISA. It is given in table 22. 
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Construction: English Instrument as Actor-construction  
Syntax: Template: default 
PSA: Standard rules for accusative systems 
Morphology: PSA: no explicit morphology 
Verb agreement: Default 
Semantics: (1) x-argument of initial do´ is unspecified 
(2) Actor-macrorole is assigned to highest specified x-
argument of do´ 
(3) highest specified x-argument of do´ must have  
minimum actional status as defined by the argument 
position 
Pragmatics: (1) Instrument-effector is default topic 
(2) Natural Event Condition must be met 
Table 22: Constructional schema for the instrument-subject alternation 
(complete). 
6.4 Actionality constraint  
In chapter 4 I proposed that ISA is only possible if the position of the in-
strument on the actionality scale is high enough relative to the predicate’s 
requirements. More specifically, I have claimed that the instrument-refer-
ent has to occupy a position that is within the instigator’s accessible se-
mantic space. The crucial axis here is autonomy: The instrument’s auton-
omy value must crucially be within the range specified for the instigator. 
This can be handled in structural terms: In chapter 4 I introduced a system 
for translating the actionality scale into a type of annotation. I propose to 
formalize my ‘positional’ claim in terms of the actionality constraint (AC) 
which constrains the occurrences of ISA. Without such a constraint, every 
instrument would be able to undergo ISA due to its causally embedded 
nature. 
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(9) Actionality Constraint: Save for other restrictions, an instru-
ment effector can undergo the Instrument-Subject Alternation iff 
its y-value on the actionality scale falls within the instigator’s y-
value range as determined by the predicate. 
I will illustrate this constraint with the simple examples in (10). Consider: 
(10) a. Jack cut down the tree with the axe. 
b. [do´ (Jack, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (axe, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME cut 
down´ (tree)]] Jack: (8, 7) axe: (4, 2) tree: (3, 1) 
 c. [do´ (x, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (y, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME cut 
  down´(z)]] x-position: (7↑, 3↑) y-position: (4, 2) ↔  
  (4↑, 7) z-position: (Ø, Ø) 
à Y-value of instrument-effector is not within instigator’s  
potential range: AC not satisfied, ISA not possible. 
 d. *The axe cut down the tree. 
 e. Jack cut down the tree with the chainsaw. 
 f. [do´ (Jack, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (chainsaw, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME cut down´ (tree)]] Jack: (8, 7) chainsaw: (4, 3) 
  tree: (3, 1)   
 g. [do´ (x, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (y, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME cut  
  down´ (z)]] x-position: (7↑, 3↑) y-position (4, 2) ↔  
  (4↑, 7) z-position: (Ø, Ø) 
à Y-value of instrument-effector is within instigator’s  
potential range: AC satisfied, ISA possible. 
 h. The chainsaw cut down the tree. 
The numbers in the examples in (10) may not intuitively convey the ac-
tionality differences. Bear in mind, however, that the difference between 
autonomy level 2 and level 3 marks the difference between non-autono-
mous entities (e.g. axe) and semi-autonomous entities (e.g. chainsaw). De-
spite the fact that the numbers might suggest otherwise, the conceptual 
difference is quite profound. 
I roughly determined the minimum/maximum values for each position 
by testing: I filled the argument positions with referents from all ranges 
of the actionality scale. The results are given in the bare LSs in (10c) and 
(10g). Should further selectional restrictions be imposed by the language 
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(e.g. shape of a referent), then these are captured with qualia annotations 
rather than with actionality values. The AC is intended to be universal, 
but it follows language-specific preferences. For instance, in Icelandic and 
Lithuanian, chainsaw is not high enough on the autonomy scale. In other 
words, the minimum requirements the Icelandic predicate imposes on its 
instigator position are higher. Consider: 
(11) a. *Keðjusög-in fell-d-i tré-ð. 
  chainsaw-DEF.NOM.SG fell-PST-3SG tree-DEF.ACC.SG 
  ‘The chainsaw cut down the tree.’ (Icelandic) 
 b. *Pjūklas nupjov-ė medį. 
  chainsaw cut-PST.3SG tree.ACC.SG 
  ‘The chainsaw cut down the tree.’ (Lithuanian) 
6.5 Ability readings vs. ISA 
In chapter 3, it was briefly pointed out that some apparent instances of 
ISA are actually primarily interpreted as utterances conveying a meaning 
of the tool possessing a certain ability. Informants of some languages con-
firm that there is a strong preference for this kind of interpretation over 
an ISA-interpretation. Consider the German examples in (12): 
(12) a. Das Messer schneid-et (das) Brot.  
  DEF knife cut-PRS.3SG (DEF) bread  
  ‘The knife cuts the bread.’ 
 b. Der Schlüssel öffn-et die Tür. 
  DEF key open-PRS.3SG DEF door 
  ‘The key opens the door.’ 
 c. Das Tuch mach-t den Tisch sauber. 
  DEF rag make-PRS.3SG DEF table clean 
  ‘The rag cleans the table.’ 
The sentences in (12a–12c) are preferentially interpreted as their tools 
having the ability to cut something, to open something and to clean some-
thing. Typical ISA-readings are dispreferred, although this is also a matter 
of gradation: (12a) and (12b) are more acceptable with an ISA-reading than 
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(12c), whose ISA-reading was unanimously rejected by informants. 
Whereas German generally prefers ability-readings to ISA-readings, in 
some languages it depends on the kind of referent. Consider the examples 
from Serbian in (13). 
(13) a. *Nož je sekao hleb. 
  knife AUX.3SG cut.PTCP bread.ACC 
  ‘The knife cut the bread.’ 
 b. Deterdžent je uklonio masne fleke 
  detergent AUX.3SG remove.PTCP.M fat.ACC stain.ACC 
 
  u rerni. 
  in oven.LOC 
  ‘The detergent removed the fat stain from the oven.’ 
The example in (13a) is not grammatical, save for personifications (see 
section 4.1.5). The example in (13b) is ungrammatical with an ISA-inter-
pretation, but is acceptable with an ablity-reading (in the present tense). 
It seems that Serbian puts limitations on the ability-reading: Detergent 
ranks higher than knife on the autonomy hierarchy. Serbian thus seems 
to allow ability-readings only if the referent is considered to be acting au-
tonomously. 
Even though ISA and ability-readings are superficially difficult to dis-
tinguish, the latter are subject to certain restrictions. These utterances 
convey very general information about a very specific referent: They ex-
press that a specific referent can do something specific. It is therefore 
more natural for them to appear in the present tense, similar to other, 
general statements. In (14), the statements are odd because they contradict 
the supposed general nature of the referent. The more information is 
added that distorts the general nature of the referent, the less acceptable 
the statement becomes.  
(14) a. Das Messer schneid-et das Brot.   
  DEF knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF bread (Present)  
  ‘The knife cuts/can cut the bread.’  
 b. ?Das Messer schnitt das Brot.  
  DEF knife cut\PST.3SG DEF bread (Past) 
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 c. ??Das Messer schnitt das Brot gestern. 
  DEF knife cut\PST.3SG DEF bread yesterday 
  (Past+yesterday)     
 
 d. ???Das Messer hat das 
  DEF knife AUX.3SG DEF 
  Brot gestern ge-schnitt\-en.  
  bread yesterday PTCP-cut\-PTCP  
  (Perfect+yesterday)   
 
 e. Der Schlüssel öffn-et die Tür.  
  DEF key open-PRS.3SG DEF door (Present) 
  ‘The key opens/can open the door.’ 
 f. ?Der Schlüssel öffne-te die Tür.  
  DEF key open-PST.3SG DEF door (Past) 
  ‘The key opened/could open the door.’ 
 g. ??Der Schlüssel öffne-te die Tür gestern. 
  DEF key open-PST.3SG DEF door yesterday 
  ‘The key opened the door yesterday.’ (Past+yesterday) 
 h. ???Der Schlüssel hat gestern die Tür 
  DEF key AUX.3SG yesterday DEF door 
 
  ge-öffn-et.  
  PTCP-open-PTCP (Perfect+yesterday) 
 
 i. ?Der Schlüssel öffn-et für gewöhnlich 
  DEF key open-PRS.3SG usually 
 
  die Tür, heute aber nicht. 
  DEF door, today but not 
  ‘The key usually opens the door, but not today.’ 
 j. The key opened the door today, but failed to do so yesterday. 
The example in (14i) is contradictory: It implies that the key usually has 
the ability to unlock the door, but does not possess this ability today. The 
English equivalent in (14j) is perfectly acceptable with an ISA-reading. 
The key opened the door, but could not do so yesterday (because, for in-
stance, the lock was blocked by another object). 
An ability reading can be isolated by supplying extra information: The 
utterances become more acceptable if 1) demonstratives singling out a 
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specific referent are used, 2) if they are compared to another referent 
((15b)) in terms of ability to do something and 3) when certain ability ad-
verbs are used ((15i)). Applying contrastive stress to the demonstrative 
makes the examples even more acceptable (15c–15d). Furthermore, (15a-
15b) can be paraphrased as (15e–15f) or (15g–15h), which uncontrover-
sially express ability. 
(15) a. Dieses Messer schneid-et das Brot. 
  DEM.PROX knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF bread 
  ‘This knife cuts the bread.’ 
 b. Dieses Messer schneid-et das Brot, 
  DEM.PROX knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF bread 
 
  das andere jedoch nicht. 
  DEF other on the other hand not 
  ‘This knife cuts the bread, the other one does not.’ 
 c. DIESES Messer schneid-et das Brot. 
  DEM.PROX knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF bread 
  ‘THIS knife cuts the bread.’ 
 d. DIESES Messer schneid-et das Brot, 
  DEM.PROX knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF bread 
 
  das andere jedoch nicht. 
  DEF other on the other hand not 
  ‘THIS knife cuts the bread, the other one does not.’ 
 e. Dieses Messer hat die Fähigkeit 
  DEM.PROX knife AUX.3SG DEF ability 
 
  das Brot zu schneid-en. 
  DEF bread to cut-INF 
  ‘This knife has the ability to cut the bread.’ 
 f. Dieses Messer hat die Fähigkeit das Brot 
  DEM.PROX knife AUX.3SG DEF ability DEF bread 
 
  zu schneid-en, das andere jedoch nicht. 
  to cut-INF DEF other on the other hand not 
  ‘This knife has the ability to cut the bread, but the other one 
   does not.’ 
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 g. Dieses Messer kann das Brot schneid-en. 
  DEM.PROX knife can.PRS.3SG DEF bread cut-INF 
  ‘This knife can cut the bread.’ 
 h. Dieses Messer kann das Brot schneid-en, 
  DEM.PROX knife can.PRS.3SG DEF bread cut-INF 
 
  das andere jedoch nicht. 
  DEF other on the other hand not 
  ‘This knife can cut the bread, but the other one cannot.’ 
 i. Das Messer schneid-et das Brot leicht.4 
  DEF knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF bread easily 
  ‘This knife cuts the bread easily.’ 
If a demonstrative is added to the undergoer argument, the sentence be-
comes even more natural, which is also true for the English equivalent in 
(16b). 
(16) a. Dieser Schlüssel öffn-et jene Tür. 
  DEM.PROX key open-PRS.3SG DEM.DIST door 
  b. This key opens that door. (Alexiadou & Schäfer 2006: 44) 
This extra information cannot readily be added to ISA-readings. Consider 
the following examples from English, with the basic sentence in (17a) and 
the basic ability-reading in (17d). (17b) is an ISA version of (17a) and (17e–
17f) are paraphrases of the ability-reading. Adding demonstratives to ISA-
sentences is less acceptable as (17c) shows. By contrast, using demonstra-
tives is preferred with ability-readings in English. 
(17) a. John cut the bread with the knife. 
 b. The knife cut the bread. 
 c. ?This knife cut the bread.  
 d. This knife cuts the bread. 
 e. This knife has the ability to cut the bread.  
 f. This knife can cut the bread.  
 
4 Interestingly, informants rejected the use of einfach, even though it has the same 
meaning as leicht. 
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If demonstratives are not used, it is not always straightforward to distin-
guish between an ability reading and ISA. In (18), the sentence can be in-
terpreted as ISA (say, when the situation is being described as it unfolds) 
or as an ability. A certain degree of ambiguity has to be taken into account. 
(18) The knife cuts the bread. 
As the ability and the ISA reading are fundamentally distinct, I propose 
two different logical structures for them. The ISA-logical structures were 
given in section 6.2.  
There is some similarity between these ability readings and so-called 
middle constructions, such as the Croatian example in (19). Both ability-
readings and middle constructions prefer the present tense (in English and 
Dutch at least), for example. 
(19) Knjig-a se dobro čita-Ø 
 book-F.SG.NOM REFL good read-3SG.PRS 
 ‘The book reads well.’ (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 416) 
Van Valin & LaPolla analyze middle constructions as attributive construc-
tions where the adverb is an obligatory part of the LS. The LS for (19) is 
given in (20) (after Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 417). 
(20) be´ ([do´ (Ø, [read´ (Ø, knjig-)])], [good´]) 
There are also important differences: Stalmaszczyk (1993: 135) points out 
that middle constructions require the presence of a modifier such as an 
adverbial. Such modifiers are absent from ability constructions. Further-
more, middle constructions attribute a property to the logical object of the 
verb (Stalmaszczyk 1993: 134), as is also apparent from the LS in (20). By 
contrast, ability readings attribute a property to the instrument rather 
than to the lowest-ranking argument. From an RRG point of view, posit-
ing a manner adverb in the LS for the ability construction would not be 
admissible, because everything that is specified in the LS must be present 
in the syntax and vice versa (cf. the Completeness Constraint). As the abil-
ity-readings do not have an overt adverb, it is impossible to posit one in 
the LS. Rather, I propose to capture such constructions with RRG’s modal 
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operator ability. I therefore propose the LS in (21). Essentially, it is a basic 
decomposition for cut, but with a modal operator added. The more general 
LS-template is given in (21b). 
(21) a. [do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE <MODABIL<[[do´ (knife, Ø)] CAUSE  
 [BECOME cut´ (bread)]]>> 
 b. [do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE <MODABIL<[[do´ (x, Ø)] CAUSE  
 [BECOME/INGR pred´ (y)]]>> 
The presence of this modal operator is obligatory and can have an influ-
ence on the occurrence of other operators. For instance, event quantifica-
tion is incompatible with this structure, as (22) illustrates. 
(22) *Dieses Messer schneidet das Brot 4 Mal. 
 DEM knife cut.PRS.3SG DEF bread 4 times 
 ‘This knife cuts the bread 4 times.’ 
It is possible to treat the ability reading as a construction, captured in a 
constructional schema, specifying the tense the utterance must be in: The 
facts that demonstratives, present tense and comparisons make these ut-
terances more natural are fairly ad hoc and possibly language-specific 
facts. RRG’s constructional schemas provide an ideal format to represent 
this. The core component of the semantic side of the schema will be the 
LS in (21b). 
What about language variation with respect to this construction? In 
Dutch, for example, the German ability constructions in (14a–14h) are un-
grammatical ((23a–23b)). To express the same content, a modal auxiliary 
(kan) must be used ((23c–23d)). 
(23) a. *Dit mes snijd-t het brood. 
  DEM.PROX knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF bread. 
  ‘This knife cuts the bread.’ 
 b. *Dit mes snijd-t het brood, maar het 
  DEM.PROX knife cut-PRS.3SG DEF bread but DEF 
 
  andere mes niet. 
  other knife not 
  ‘This knife cuts the bread, but other knife does not.’ 
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  c. Dit mes kan het brood snijd-en. 
  DEM.PROX knife can.PRS.3SG DEF bread cut-INF 
  ‘This knife can cut the bread.’ 
 d. Dit mes kan het brood snijd-en, 
  DEM.PROX knife can.PRS.3SG DEF bread cut-INF 
 
  maar het andere mes kan dat niet. 
  but DEF other knife can.PRS.3SG DEM not 
  ‘This knife can cut the bread but the other one cannot.’ 
In Greek, a demonstrative must be used with the instrument to arrive at 
an ability reading, contrary to German where the use of demonstratives 
only makes the utterance more acceptable. In Greek, (24b) is strange be-
cause it neither conveys the ability reading of (24a), nor is there a real 
generic reading as the plural would be required (24c). 
(24) a. Afto to macheri kovi psomi. 
  DEM DET knife cut.PRS.3SG bread.ACC. 
  ‘This knife cuts bread.’ 
 b. ?To macheri kovi psomi.  
  DET knife cut.PRS.3SG bread.ACC  
  ‘The knife cuts bread.’ 
 c. Ta macheria kovun psomi. 
  DET.PL knife.PL cut.3PL bread.ACC 
  ‘Knives cut bread.’ 
A reason for languages like German to restrict tools in subject position to 
an ability reading can be explained with Fauconnier’s notion of unexpect-
edness (2011: 541): As inanimates like knife are poor ‘agents’, their occur-
rence as subject is unexpected. ‘Unexpected subjects’ are cross-linguisti-
cally restricted. The German-specific restriction seems to be that any such 
sentence must be interpreted as an ability-reading. The constructional 
schema for the German ability construction is given in table 23. 
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Construction: German Ability-construction  
Syntax: Template: default 
PSA: Standard rules for accusative systems 
Morphology: PSA: NOM 
Verb agreement: Default 
Verb tense: Present  
PSA-Determiner: Demonstrative 
Semantics: (1) Comment expresses ability of referent realized as 
Topic.  
(2) Normal actionality requirements for x-initial argu-
ment in LS may be overridden.  
(3) ABIL-operator obligatory in LS 
Pragmatics: Predicate focus 
Table 23: The German ability construction. 
6.6 General statements vs. ISA  
Somewhat related to the ability reading are generic statements with tools 
or other inanimates in subject position. Consider: 
(25) a. Guns kill people. 
 b. Capitalism exploits the working class. 
 c. Poverty disrupts society. 
 d. Knives kill people. 
 e. Trucks clog the roads. 
General statements like these express a behavioral property of the x-ar-
gument. Following Geurts (1985: 251), I assume that generic statements 
essentially convey stereotypes about the referent in question. Knives, for 
example, cannot only be used to kill but also to cut up food or to craft 
tools. Similary, trucks often cause traffic congestion on highways, but not 
every occurrence of a truck leads to clogging of the road it is on. Like ISA, 
such statements are subject to several constraints. For example, they be-
come less acceptable in the past tense. 
6   The Instrument-Subject Alternation and subtypes of instruments 
258 
 
 
 
 
(26) a. ?Guns killed people. 
 b. ?Capitalism exploited the working class. 
 c. ?Poverty disrupted society. 
 d. ?Knives killed people. 
 e. ?Trucks clogged the roads. 
All of the versions in (26) would only be valid if the referent no longer 
existed. For instance, (26b) would be perfectly acceptable if capitalism did 
not exist anymore, as evidenced by (27a). Similarly, (26e) is only accepta-
ble if trucks were a vehicle of the past, as evidenced in (27b).  
(27) a. Feudalism exploited the farming class. 
 b. Wheelbarrows clogged the roads. 
Krifka (1995: 255) argues in favor of a generic operator GEN that is de-
pendent on a modal background to account for generic statements. Ge-
nericity and its semantics are highly complex topics and are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, I propose to roughly follow Krifka 
and introduce GEN as an operator in the LS. GEN in my proposal can be 
characterized as a status operator modifying an LS in the sense that the 
LS is usually valid for the state of affairs described by that LS. A provi-
sional characterization of GEN, loosely modeled after Krifka’s (1995: 255) 
proposal and the LS of (25b) are given in (28a) and (28b), respectively. ISA 
is not necessarily incompatible with the GEN-operator, as the example in 
(28c–28d) illustrates. 
(28) a. GEN: An LS α, describing a matrix state of affairs β, is  
 considered generic iff ∃(β) which consists of states of affairs 
 Xa through Xn and iff more states of affairs of matrix (β) are 
 true than false.			 b. <STAGEN<[do´ (capitalism, [exploit´ (capitalism, working  
 class)])]>> 
 c. Keys open doors. 
d. <STAGEN<[do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (keys, Ø)] CAUSE  
 [BECOME open´ (doors)]]>> 
A very basic constructional schema is given in table 24. 
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Construction: English General Property construction  
Syntax: Template: default 
PSA: standard rules for accusative systems 
Morphology: PSA: no explicit morphology 
Verb agreement: default 
Verb tense: present  
Semantics: (1) Comment expresses a stereotypical property or fea-
ture of referent realized as Topic.  
(2) Normal actionality requirements for x-initial argu-
ment in LS overridden.  
(3) GEN-operator obligatory in LS 
Pragmatics: Predicate focus 
Table 24: Constructional schema for English General Property 
 construction. 
6.7 Subtypes of instruments 
Conceptually, both implements and instruments are used by a wielder to 
perform an action, as evidenced by the use´-predicate that both share in 
their LS.5 The instrument-implement distinction constitutes a first split in 
the class of ‘tools’. With the analysis of ISA, it is now possible to distin-
guish two subtypes of instruments: free and blocked instruments. This is 
given in figure 52. 
 
Figure 52: Split between free & blocked instruments and implements. 
 
5 In case of instruments, the predicate is present in the ‘full’ LS. 
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6.7.1 Free instruments & blocked instruments 
Both free and blocked instruments are instruments: They both occupy the 
same LS-position. The main difference is that the former can undergo ISA 
whereas the latter cannot. This distinction is thus clearly of a different 
magnitude than the one between instruments and implements. The most 
crucial property of this distinction is that it is relative: What is a free or a 
blocked instrument depends on 1) the requirements imposed by the pred-
icate on the argument slot fillers and 2) the individual language. There-
fore, free and blocked instruments are not considered subtypes of effector. 
Rather, the distinction is a purely terminological one, which is reflected 
in the dashed lines in figure 52. 
6.7.2 Conjoined instruments & conjoined implements  
So far, the examples in this thesis only feature one referent per instrumen-
tal phrase. Few in the relevant literature explicitly deal with multiple in-
struments per phrase. I propose to term instrument RPs that contain mul-
tiple referents conjoined instruments. This is illustrated in the examples 
below: 
(29) a. Jack opened the door with the key and the swipe card.  
 (adapted from Webb 2008: 19) 
 b. John cut the bread with the knife and the box cutter. 
c. Seymour sliced the salami with a knife and a scalpel.  
(Lakoff 1968: 8) 
These instruments seem fairly straightforward. They pass the causal par-
aphrase both in their conjoined form and when taken individually: 
(30) a. John acted on the knife and the box cutter causing them to  
 cut the bread. 
 b. John acted on the knife causing it to cut the bread. 
 c. John acted on the box cutter causing it to cut the bread. 
 d. John cut the bread with the box cutter and the knife. 
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Furthermore, the phrase-internal order of the referents can be switched 
without a change in meaning ((30d)). Conceptually, the referents are per-
forming the causing action independently from each other. The knife and 
the box cutter essentially perform the same activity but are not dependent 
on each other. One can imagine John holding the knife in his left hand 
and the box cutter in his right hand. For these reasons, I consider them to 
symmetrically conjoined instruments. The entry in the logical structure is 
similar to that of comitatives. The connective symbol expresses that the 
order of the two referents is essentially irrelevant. The logical structures 
of (31a) and (31b) are given in (31d) and (31e), respectively. 
(31) a. John cut the bread with the box cutter and the knife. 
b. John destroyed the sign with the chainsaw and the machine 
 gun. 
c. John destroyed the sign with the machine gun and the 
 chainsaw. 
d. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (box cutter ∧ knife, Ø)] CAUSE 
[BECOME cut´ (bread)]] 
e. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (chainsaw ∧ machine gun, Ø)] 
 CAUSE [BECOME destroyed´ (sign)]] 
What are the implications for ISA, then? As I have shown, there are ref-
erents that are clearly causally embedded (i.e. they pass the causal para-
phrase) but still cannot undergo ISA. It was argued that this is due to a 
language-specific constraint related to the actionality scale. With respect 
to symmetrically conjoined instruments, ISA with the conjoined phrase is 
only possible if each referent individually can undergo ISA. Consider, for 
example, example (32b) with sword instead of machine gun. The referent 
sword is causally embedded, yet cannot undergo ISA because it is too low 
on the actionality scale: 
(32) a. John destroyed the sign with the sword. 
 b. John acted on the sword causing it to destroy the sign. 
 c. *The sword destroyed the sign. 
 d. *The sword and the machine gun destroyed the sign. 
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The ISA-acceptability of conjoined instruments thus depends on the ISA-
acceptability of its ‘weakest’ component. 
Instruments can also be conjoined asymmetrically. Consider, for in-
stance, the examples (after Schlesinger 1989: 199) in (33). 
(33) a. Jennifer made a hole in the wall with a hammer and a chisel. 
 b. Jeffrey wounded the president with a rifle and two bullets. 
 c. *A hammer made a hole in the wall. 
 d. A chisel made a hole in the wall. 
 e. Two bullets wounded the president. 
 f. *A rifle wounded the president. 
Similarly to the symmetrically conjoined instruments, there are two in-
strument-referents in one with-PP. Schlesinger argues that ISA can only 
take place with the latter of the two referents, as (33c–33d) and (33e–33f) 
illustrate, at least when referring to the situation in the unshifted sen-
tences. Note that if the instrumental phrases only contain the first referent 
((34a)), ISA becomes possible (34b)): 
(34) a. Jennifer made a hole in the wall with the hammer. 
 b. The hammer made a hole in the wall. 
There is a straightforward reason why the sentences in (33c) and (33f) are 
not grammatical. There is a sequential order between the two referents in 
(33a) and (33b). In the scenario described in (33a), the hammer acts on the 
chisel which in turn acts on the wall, causing it to be breached. The ham-
mer thus does not directly act on the wall. This is similar in (33b), where 
the rifle (more accurately, its internal mechanics) acts upon the bullets in 
the chamber, which in turn act on the referent president, causing him to 
be wounded. This can be captured quite naturally with Croft’s causal 
chains. Consider the partial causal chain for the hammer and chisel exam-
ple. 
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Figure 53: Partial causal chain.  
The hammer transfers ‘force’ to the chisel, which brings about the result 
state. This ordering is conceptually determined, as world knowledge dic-
tates that a hammer acts on a chisel to breach something, not vice versa. 
That this ordering is linguistically relevant is also illustrated by the re-
duced acceptability of the sentence when switching the referents.  
(35) a. ?Jennifer made a hole in the wall with a chisel and a  
  hammer. 
 b. ??Jennifer made a hole in the wall with chisel and hammer. 
I contend that the information regarding the conceptual interaction be-
tween hammer and chisel is reflected in the semantics. In English, this 
manifests itself in a preferred order of referents. The question remains 
how to represent this information in RRG. Introducing an extra CAUSE-
operator in the logical structure does not adequately capture the nature of 
conjoined instruments. Consider: 
(36) a. Jennifer acted on the chisel, causing it to make a hole in the  
 wall. 
 b. Jennifer acted on the hammer, causing it to act on the chisel, 
 causing it to make a hole in the wall. 
 c. Jennifer made Bill destroy the barn with a cannon. 
 d. Jennifer acted on Bill, causing him to destroy the barn. 
 e. *Jennifer acted on the cannon, causing it to destroy the barn. 
The example in (36e) is not acceptable because Jennifer does not directly 
act on the cannon. Rather, she acts on Bill who in turn acts on the cannon. 
In cases such as these, it is felicitous to assume that there is an extra causal 
sequence (also see chapter 7). This is different for (33a): Jennifer acts on 
both instruments simultaneously and one of the instruments acts on the 
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other. Because Jennifer directly manipulates both instruments, including 
an additional CAUSE-operator is not an option. This is illustrated by the 
acceptability of (36a–36b). Conjoined instruments also usually occur as 
one argument, as evidenced by the single occurrence of with. Qualia the-
ory is able to capture this information. The formal quale contains infor-
mation that distinguishes the object in a larger domain. In this case, the 
typical position as anterior to and used in conjunction with a chisel can 
be captured. The telic quale stores information pertaining to the function 
of the object, in this case, the transmission of force from one to the other. 
An example of such a qualia-based notation for hammer and chisel is given 
in (37). Consider (37). 
(37) hammer (x) 
 a. Const: impact tool´ (x) 
 b. Form: tool´ (x) ∧ tool´ (y) 
 c. Telic: do´ (x, [hit´ (x, y)]) 
d. Agentive: artifact´ (x), [do´ (a, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (x ∧ y)] 
 CAUSE […]] 
 chisel (y) 
 a. Const: tool´ (y) 
 b. Form: tool´ (x) ∧ tool´ (y) 
 c. Telic: do´ (x, [hit´ (x, y)]) 
d. Agentive: artifact´ (y), [do´ (a, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (x ∧ y)] 
 CAUSE […]] 
A further argument in favor of such a notation and against introducing an 
extra causal operator is that ISA is possible with the conjoined instrument 
in its entirety: 
(38) The hammer and chisel made a hole in the wall. 
Such an alternation is hard to account for if there were an extra CAUSE-
operator in the logical structure. Consider: 
(39) a. Bill made John cut down the tree with a chainsaw. 
 b. *John and the chainsaw cut down the tree. 
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Instead, using asymmetric conjunction allows for linking in ISA in a nat-
ural way. The actor macrorole is assigned to the instrument argument, 
irrespective of whether it is conjoined or simple.6 
Schlesinger pointed out that only the second referent of a conjoined 
instrument (my wording) can undergo ISA. This can now be explained: 
Due to the asymmetric nature of the conjoined instrument, only the ref-
erent that directly causes the change of state in the affected participant 
can undergo ISA. The qualia-based notation captures this. The conse-
quences are that 1) either the whole phrase undergoes ISA with the fixed 
ordering as imposed by the qualia notation or 2) the referent that directly 
causes a change of state undergoes ISA. The first referent cannot be se-
lected to undergo ISA. 
So far, I have discussed conjoined instruments. However, it is also pos-
sible to conjoin implements. Consider: 
(40) a. Mary ate the soup with the spoon and the cup. 
 b. Pat looked at the birds with the binoculars and the telescope. 
The referents in these examples fail the causal paraphrase, both when con-
joined and individually: 
(41) a. *Mary acted on the spoon and the cup causing them to eat  
  the soup. 
 b. *Mary acted on the spoon causing it to eat the soup. 
 c. *Mary acted on the cup causing it to eat the soup. 
d. *Pat acted on the binoculars and the telescope causing them  
 to see the birds. 
 e. *Pat acted on the binoculars causing it to see the birds. 
 f. *Pat acted on the telescope causing it to see the birds. 
 
6  It is possible to read hammer and chisel as a symmetrically conjoined instrument. For 
instance; Jennifer makes a hole in the wall, holding the hammer in her left hand and 
the chisel in her right hand. Even though this is possible, it is an unlikely reading. 
World knowledge dictates that both tools are used sequentially and not parallel to 
each other. 
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The causal paraphrase shows that these referents are not causally embed-
ded and are thus implements. These referents are symmetrically con-
joined, as one can switch them around without any semantic difference: 
(42) a. Mary ate the soup with the cup and the spoon. 
 b. Pat looked at the birds with the telescope and the binoculars. 
I propose to represent conjoined implements in the logical structure the 
same way I represent symmetrically conjoined instruments: 
(43) a. … ∧ use´ (Mary, spoon ∧ cup) 
 b. … ∧ use´ (Pat, binoculars ∧ telescope) 
Contrary to instruments, however, implements can only be conjoined 
symmetrically. The fixed ordering of asymmetrically conjoined instru-
ments encodes a form of ‘internal causation’. This is incompatible with 
the lack of causal embedding that is inherent to implements.  
One word of caution is warranted here though. It is possible to posit 
counterexamples that feature referents that typically occur as instruments 
(e.g. knife). Consider: 
(44) a. Mary ate the food with the knife and the spoon. 
b. *Mary acted on the knife and the spoon causing them to eat  
  the food. 
 c. *Mary acted on the spoon causing it to eat the food. 
 d. *Mary acted on the knife causing it to eat the food. 
 e.  Mary ate the food with the knife. 
However, as the paraphrases show, knife is not causally embedded. It is 
perfectly possible to eat food with a knife ((44e)), despite it being a rather 
inefficient method to do so. Just because the referent knife usually occurs 
as an instrument, it does not entail that it can never occur as an imple-
ment. 
I have illustrated that it is possible to conjoin instruments with instru-
ments and implements with implements. For implements, it is only possi-
ble to conjoin symmetrically, as asymmetric conjoining is incompatible in 
absence of a causal chain. Instruments can be conjoined symmetrically 
6.8   Conclusion 
 
  
 267 
 
 
and asymmetrically. In the latter case, conceptual information is linguis-
tically relevant and represented in the logical structure. ISA is (obviously) 
only possible with conjoined instruments, as only these pass the causal 
paraphrase. There are several restrictions with respect to ISA: 1) Both in-
struments must be able to undergo ISA individually and 2) (in case of 
asymmetric conjoining) only the referent directly causing the change of 
state can undergo ISA or the conjoined phrase as a whole. 
6.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I illustrated that ISA is a construction that can be used to 
obscure the instigator of a causal chain by leaving the corresponding ar-
gument slot unspecified. This assigns the actor macrorole to the instru-
ment-effector, as actorhood has to be assigned to the highest overt argu-
ment in the LS. I also explored the restrictions that accompany ISA. ISA 
can only take place if 1) there is a causal chain, 2) the instrument’s referent 
is high enough on the actionality scale relative to the predicate’s require-
ments and 3) if there is a plausible instigator recoverable from context. To 
capture 3) I proposed the Natural Event Condition. By positing a certain 
referent as instigator and removing the subevent containing the instru-
ment, the naturalness of a causal chain is tested for. If the remaining 
causal chain is inadmissible, there is no natural event and if this is the 
case, the inanimate referent is not an instrument undergoing ISA but it 
rather occupies the highest argument position in the LS in its own right. 
The mechanics and all of the restrictions concerning ISA are captured in 
a constructional schema (table 22). 
Furthermore, I explored two phenomena superficially similar to ISA: 
The ability-reading and the generic reading. Rather than describing a state 
of affairs as it unfolds as is the case with ISA, the ability-reading attributes 
a certain ability to perform an action to a referent, which is, in this case, 
an inanimate usually encountered as an instrument-effector. The generic 
reading attributes a certain fact or state of affairs to an inanimate usually 
used as an instrument. Both the generic reading and the ability reading 
are captured by positing an operator in the LS: GEN and ABIL, respec-
tively. 
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7 Delimiting instruments from 
instrument-like participants  
In the introduction, it was explained that in many languages the marking 
typically employed for instruments has a wide range of other functions. 
Some of these functions are clearly adverbial in nature and are not an ob-
ject of the present study. So far, I have explored the prototypical cases of 
instruments and the related concept of implements. However, there are 
several cases where a certain constituent superficially resembles an in-
strument, such as in (1). 
(1) a. John ran to the store with the hammer. 
 b. The woman with the book left the room. 
  c. Jan ren-de naar de winkel met de 
  Jan run-PST.3SG to DEF store with DEF 
 
  hamer.  
  hammer (Dutch) 
 
 d. De vrouw met het boek verliet de kamer. 
  DEF woman with DEF book leave\PST.3SG DEF room 
The status of such constituents is far from clear. This chapter is intended 
to explore their properties and how they can be captured in RRG. Refer-
ence is also sometimes made to human instruments. I treat these as cau-
sees and I will explore their status in relation to instruments. By delineat-
ing such concepts from instruments and implements, I aim at providing a 
sharper definition of the instrument notion.  
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7.1 Causees 
The intermediate effector position is not restricted to inanimates (or lesser 
animates) only. In fact, causees can be considered as a kind of human in-
strument and there appear to be great parallels between them: The causee 
is acted upon to perform an activity similar to an instrument. Neither cau-
sees nor instruments are ‘primary causers’, to use Schlesinger’s (1989: 194) 
terms, but entities caused to do something. It then stands to reason that 
examples with causees and instruments should pass the same causal par-
aphrase testing that I have been applying thus far. Consider (3a–3c) com-
pared to (3d–3f): 
(3) a. Jean a fait couper le pain à Marie. 
  Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP cut DEF bread to Marie 
 ‘Jean made Marie cut the bread.’ (French) 
 b. Jean a agit sur Marie, ce qui a 
  Jean AUX.3SG act.PTCP on Marie REL AUX.3SG 
 
  causé qu’elle coupe le pain. 
  cause.PTCP that=3SG.F cut.3SG DEF bread 
 ‘Jean acted on Mary, causing her to cut the bread.’ 
 c. Marie a agit sur le pain, ce qui  
  Marie AUX.3SG act.PTCP on DEF bread REL  
 
  a causé qu’il est coupé. 
  AUX.3SG cause.PTCP that=3SG.M AUX.3SG cut.PTCP 
 ‘Mary acted on the bread, causing it to be cut.’ 
 d. Jean a coupé le pain avec un couteau. 
  Jean AUX.3SG cut.PTCP DEF bread with INDEF knife. 
 ‘Jean cut the bread with a knife.’ 
 e. Jean a agit sur le couteau, ce qui  
  Jean AUX.3SG act.PTCP on DEF knife REL  
 
  a causé qu’il coupe le pain. 
  AUX.3SG cause.PTCP that=3SG.M cut.3SG DEF bread. 
 ‘Jean acted on the knife, causing it to cut the bread.’   
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 f. Le couteau a agit sur le pain, ce qui 
  DEF knife AUX.3SG act.PTCP on DEF bread REL 
 
  a causé qu’il est coupé. 
  AUX.3SG cause.PTCP that=3SG.M AUX.3SG cut.PTCP 
 ‘The knife acted on the bread, causing it to be cut.’ 
The logical structures for (3a) and (3d) will look very similar. They are 
given in (4). 
(4) a. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
cut´ (pain)]] 
 b [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (couteau, Ø)] CAUSE   
  [BECOME cut´ (pain)]] 
If causees and instruments arguably occupy the same position in the log-
ical structure, why and how do we distinguish between them? If they oc-
cupy the same position and pass the same tests, then would it not be sim-
pler to treat them as the same category? One argument in favor of keeping 
these notions separate is that languages usually have different preferred 
linking strategies for them. In French, causees (under the scope of direct 
causation) prefer the dative marker à combined with a nuclear juncture, 
whereas instruments prefer the preposition avec.  In English, instruments 
prefer the linking strategy with a with-PP, whereas causees prefer a (com-
plex) construction with a causative verb. The example in (5d) is inadmis-
sible because rock is too low on the actionality scale to be a realistic cau-
see. As an instrument, it is incompatible with a typical expression of cau-
sees (make-construction). Consider English, German ((5e–5h)) and Dutch 
((5i–5l)): 
(5) a. I had Bill break the window. 
 b. ?I broke the window with Bill.1 
 c. I broke the window with the rock. 
 
1 This sentence is perfectly acceptable if it is interpreted as a comitative construction. 
As a causee construction, however, it is of questionable acceptability. The same holds 
for the German and Dutch equivalents in (5). 
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 d. *I made the rock break the window. 
  e. Ich ließ Erich das Fenster einschlag-en.  
  1SG let\PST.1SG Erich DEF window bash in-INF  
 
 f. ?Ich schlug das Fenster mit Erich ein. 
  1SG bash in\PST.1SG DEF window with Erich VPR 
 
 g. Ich schlug das Fenster mit einem  
  1SG bash in\PST.1SG DEF window with INDEF  
  Stein ein.      
  rock VPR      
 
 h. *Ich ließ einen Stein das Fenster  
  1SG let\PST.1SG INDEF rock DEF window  
  einschlag-en.       
  bash in-INF       
 
 i. Ik deed Erik het raam 
  1SG make\PST.1SG Erik DEF window 
 
  ingooi-en.  
  throw in-INF  
 
 j. ?Ik gooi-de het raam in met Erik.2 
  1SG throw-PST.1SG DEF window VPR with Erik 
 
 k. Ik gooi-de het raam in met een 
  1SG throw-PST.1SG DEF window VPR with INDEF 
 
  steen. 
  rock 
 
 l. *Ik deed de steen het raam  
  1SG make\PST.1SG DEF rock DEF window  
  ingooi-en.       
  throw in-INF       
 
There are some arguments that can be realized with typical instrument-
marking, despite being a causee. Consider the following examples: (6c) is 
an LS corresponding to (6a). A paraphrase of (6a) is given in (6b). 
 
2 The Dutch verb ingooien (literally: throw in) is the most direct equivalent of English 
break in this context. 
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(6) a. The general captured the city with only a handful of  
  soldiers.3 
 b. The general made the soldiers capture the city. 
 c. [do´ (general, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (soldiers, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME captured´ (city)]] 
 d. The soldiers captured the city. 
In (6a) typical instrumental marking is employed for the causee. There is 
a good reason not to treat soldiers as an instrument, but as a real causee: 
If ISA were applied as in (6d), Holisky’s principle would link it back to an 
LS with the argument as an agentive instigator. It is given in (7a). Further 
compare (7a) to (7b–7c). 
(7) a. [do´ (soldiers, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
  destroyed´ (city)]] 
 b. The soldiers destroyed the city with a catapult. 
 c. [do´ (soldiers, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (catapult, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME destroyed´ (city)]] 
The default interpretation of (6d) is one where the soldiers themselves act 
as the instigator. The same applies to (5a) if one were to attempt ISA: 
(8) a. Bill broke the window. 
 b. [do´ (Bill, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME broken´ (window)] 
It was illustrated by the examples in (5) that human referents are not com-
patible with instrument-marking (in this function, see footnote 80) and 
inanimates are not compatible with causee-marking. However, the refer-
ent of soldiers is a group of humans. Groups and organizations are usually 
considered less animate than individual humans in most approaches to 
animacy. In my actionality scale, they rank as anthropomorphic entities 
on the animacy hierarchy (just like Bill, for instance), but they are lower 
in autonomy than individuals. In short, their position on the actionality 
scale is lower than that of Bill. This has a reflex in linking preferences in 
English. Soldiers allows for both the made-strategy and the with-strategy. 
 
3 This sentence can also have a comitative reading. However, world knowledge of how 
military organizations operate makes this reading somewhat unlikely. 
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Most referents are only compatible with one strategy but lower-ranking 
causees will typically allow for both. This is equally true for Dutch and 
German:  
(9) a. De generaal vernietig-de de stad met  
  DEF general destroy-PST.3SG DEF city with   
 
  de soldaten. 
  DEF soldiers (Dutch) 
 
 b. De generaal deed de soldaten de stad 
  DEF general make\PST.3SG DEF soldaten DEF city 
 
  vernietig-en. 
  destroy-INF 
 
 c. Der General zerstör-te die Stadt mit  
  DEF general destroy-PST.3SG DEF city with  
 
  den Soldaten.  
  DEF Soldiers (German)  
 
 d. Der General ließ die Soldaten die  
  DEF general let\PST.3SG DEF soldiers DEF  
 
  Stadt zerstör-en. 
  city destroy-INF 
 
It is clear from the examples discussed thus far that a typical causee occu-
pies a higher position on the actionality scale than a typical instrument. 
However, it would be too simple to assume that the differences in action-
ality can provide a complete answer. There are cases where referents can 
be either an instrument or a causee (or be ambiguous). 
(10) a. John broke the window with the dog. (by throwing the  
  dog) 
 b. John had the dog break the window. (by ordering the dog) 
 c. The dog broke the window with a stick. 
Again, dog can be a real causee, as applying ISA to (10b) would rather link 
back to an LS with dog as instigator as evidenced by its instrument-taking 
potential ((10c)). The referent dog changes actionality status between (10a) 
and (10b). In (10a), dog refers to the dog’s body as a physical object, rather 
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than to the dog as a whole. In terms of actionality status, dog in (10a) is 
much lower on the scale than it is in (10b). Therefore, in (10a), it is an 
instrument as it is too low to be a realistic candidate for causeehood. This 
is parallel to more commonplace instruments and causees: Instruments 
like rock have to be manipulated more directly than referents like soldiers 
or Bill. The former requires physical handling on the part of the manipu-
lator, whereas the latter do not due to their position on the actionality 
scale. Typical causees are much higher on the scale than typical instru-
ments with only very few referents that can be conceptualized as both. 
This difference in actionality has repercussions for the type of causation 
that each is under the scope of (or can be).  In chapter 5, I explored an 
expanded system of causal operators in RRG’s logical structures and I sug-
gested representing indirect causation with a different causal operator. 
Causees can be under the scope of direct or indirect causation, whereas 
instruments can only be under the scope of direct causation. To illustrate 
this difference, consider the French examples in (11). The LS in (11e) un-
derlies both (11a) and (11c) and has the underspecified causal operator as 
introduced in chapter 5. 
(11) a. Jean a fait couper le pain à Marie. 
  Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP cut DEF bread to Marie 
 ‘Jean made Marie cut the bread.’ 
 b. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
 cut´ (pain)]] 
 c. Jean a fait couper le pain par Marie. 
  Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP cut DEF bread by Marie 
 ‘Jean had Marie cut the bread.’ 
 d. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] IND [[do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
 cut´ (pain)]] 
 e. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE  
[BECOME cut´ (pain)]] 
 f. Jean a coupé le pain avec un  
  Jean AUX.3SG cut.PTCP DEF bread with INDEF  
  couteau.        
  knife        
 ‘Jean cut the bread with a knife.’ 
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 g. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (couteau, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME cut´ (pain)]] 
 h. *Jean a fait couper le pain à  
    Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP cut DEF bread to  
 
   le couteau. 
   DEF knife 
 ‘*Jean made the knife cut the bread.’ 
 i. *[do´ (Jean, Ø)] IND [[do´ (couteau, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
   cut´ (pain)]] 
The examples in (11f–11i) illustrate that the instrument can only be under 
the scope of direct causation. Using the causee construction is not admis-
sible and thus the type of causation cannot be indirect, as illustrated in 
(11i). Even though there is a tendency for causees to be under the scope 
of indirect causation, they can also be under the scope of direct causation. 
This is illustrated by the examples in (11a–11e). Even though there is no 
physical manipulation in (11a) as with instruments, I assume that the di-
rectness of impingement in that example is the product of metaphoric ex-
tension of prototypical physical manipulation to socio-psychological pres-
sure (cf. Talmy 2000: 409). In terms of the system I proposed in chapter 5, 
this kind of causation would count as semi-physical.4 That does not mean, 
however, that the precise type of causation with causees is always clear. 
Consider for example the conversation in (12), where the second speaker 
asks for clarification by stressing the assumed direct nature of causation. 
(12) Speaker 1: My boss made me tidy up my office. 
 Speaker 2: He MADE you? 
 Speaker 1: Well, he asked me to. 
Contrary to causees, typical instruments can never be under the scope of 
indirect causation or any kind of causation weaker than that as evidenced 
by the English examples in (13). 
 
4  Causees can also be under permissive and enabling causation, as was shown in chap-
ter 5. This is irrelevant for the present discussion, however. The LSs in (11d) and (11i) 
have IND for illustration purposes only. I assume the underspecified CAUSE, how-
ever. 
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(13) a. *John had the sword destroy the sign. 
 b. *John let the sword destroy the sign. 
 c. *Abdul had the knife cut the cake. 
 d. *Abdul let the knife cut the cake. 
In chapter 4, it was established that pseudo-agents have special properties: 
They can be conceptualized as instruments or as instigators. Similar to 
causees operating under direct causation, some pseudo-agents can also op-
erate under indirect causation ((14)). 
(14) Evie liet de AI Michael-s computer 
 Evie let\PST.3SG DEF AI Michael-POSS computer 
 
 lamlegg-en.  
 cripple-INF (Dutch) 
 ‘Evie had the AI-unit cripple Michael’s computer.’ 
As pseudo-agents can be instigators in their own right, I propose to treat 
AI in the Dutch example above as a causee and not as an instrument. The 
potential for causeehood on the part of pseudo-agents is also indicated in 
the graph in figure 37 by means of the overlapping areas. In other words, 
pseudo-agents can be conceptualized as instigators, instruments and cau-
sees. 
In chapter 5, it was argued that causees can act either volitionally or 
non-volitionally and these concepts were decomposed using FD. If the 
auxiliary or other causal morphology does not entail any information re-
garding intention, Holisky’s principle applies. For example, in Quechua 
(15), causees can be marked with accusative, in which case they are read 
as acting non-volitionally (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 588, Van Valin & 
Wilkins 1996: 311–312, examples from Bills et al. 1969). If the causee is 
marked with the instrumental, it can be interpreted as either volitionally 
or non-volitionally acting, whereas accusative marking only allows for 
the non-volitional reading. In the former case, Holisky’s principle applies. 
(15) a. Nuqa Fan-ta rumi-ta apa-ci-ni. 
  1SG Juan-ACC rock-ACC carry-CAUSE-1SG 
 ‘I made Juan carry the rock.’   
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 b. Nuqa Fan-wan rumi-ta apa-ci-ni. 
  1SG Juan-INS rock-ACC carry-CAUSE-1SG 
 ‘I had Juan carry the rock.’ 
A similar situation exists in French (Van Valin & Wilkins 1996: 311–312, 
examples from Hyman and Zimmer 1976). In (16a), any volitional reading 
on the part of the causee is blocked by the use of à. The use of par allows 
for both a volitional and a non-volitional reading. I will return to this issue 
in chapter 8. 
(16) a. J’ai fait nettoyer les toilettes au  
  1SG=AUX do.PTCP clean.INF DEF toilets to.DEF  
  général.       
  general       
 ‘I made the general clean the toilets.’ 
 b. J’ai fait nettoyer les toilettes par  
  1SG=AUX do.PTCP clean.INF DEF toilets by  
 
  le général. 
  DEF general 
 ‘I had the general clean the toilets.’ 
Dutch has an auxiliary that precludes any voluntary reading of the causee 
(doen) and it has a second auxiliary (laten) that does not entail any infor-
mation concerning volition on the part of the causee. Consider (17): 
(17) a. Lara liet Tim het afval buiten zett-en, 
  Lara let\PST Tim DEF trash outside put-INF 
 
  maar deed dat tegen zijn zin. 
  but do\PST.3SG DEM against POSS preference 
 ‘Lara made Tim take out the trash, but he only did so against 
 his will.’ 
 b. Lara liet Tim het afval buiten zett-en 
  Lara let\PST.3SG Tim DEF trash outside put-INF 
 
  en hij deed dat met plezier. 
  and 3SG do\PST.3SG DEM with pleasure 
 ‘Lara had/let Tim take out the trash and he did so willingly.’ 
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 c. *Lara deed Tim het afval buiten zett-en 
   Lara do\PST.3SG Tim DEF trash outside put-INF 
 
   en hij deed dat met plezier. 
   and 3SG do\PST.3SG DEM with pleasure 
 ‘*Lara made Tim take out the trash and he did so willingly.’ 
If one were to use laten without any further information, the causee would 
be interpreted as acting intentionally. By contrast, the causee in (17c) is 
always interpreted as acting non-intentionally. In the Dutch examples in 
(5.40), use of door fixes the reading of causation to IND5, whereas the use 
of aan sets it to permissive/enabling. If no preposition is used, the type of 
causation is underspecified and the reading of the causee is determined by 
Holisky’s principle.6 In French too, the use of a certain preposition is in-
dicative of the type of causation: à fixes the type of causation to direct 
causation, leaving no room for interpretation. The use of à constitutes ‘in-
formation to the contrary’ in terms of Holisky’s principle. If par is used, 
causation is set to indirect and Holisky’s principle determines the precise 
reading of causee: Adding information signaling willingness, yields a con-
tradiction for (18a) but not for (18b).  
(18) a. *J’ai fait nettoyer les toilettes  
  1SG=AUX make.PTCP clean.INF DEF toilet.PL  
 
  au général et il l’a voulu. 
  to.DEF general and 3SG OBJ=AUX.3SG want.PTCP 
 ‘I made the general clean the toilets and he wanted to.’   
 
5  Recall that the use of door makes the volitional reading less likely but does not rule 
it out (see chapter 5). 
6 Verhagen and Kemmer (1997: 79) argue that if no preposition is used, the default 
reading is that of a non-volitional causee. My own native speaker intuitions are at 
odds with this and they confirm Holisky’s principle. Verhagen and Kemmer argue 
that including and she did a fine job in sentences with laten (without a preposition) is 
not appropriate. There are two problems with this: 1) Such an addition is no real test 
for volition and 2) in my variety of Dutch it would be appropriate to add the sequence. 
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 b. J’ai fait nettoyer les toilettes par  
  1SG=AUX make.PTCP clean.INF DEF toilet.PL by  
 
  le général et il l’a voulu. 
  DEF general and 3SG OBJ=AUX.3SG want.PTCP 
 ‘I had the general clean the toilets and he wanted to.’ 
In German, there is only one causative auxiliary, lassen ((19)). Here, too, 
Holisky’s principle determines whether the causee is understood as inten-
tional or non-intentional. Contrary to French and Quechua, there is no 
morphological means to explicitly express a non-volitional reading. The 
preposition von is used for the purposes of disambiguation with animates, 
but has no further implication for the volitionality of the causee. In (19d), 
the argument marked by von indicates that it is the causee and not the 
person kissed. Without von, the sentence is ambiguous with respect to 
who is kissed. 
(19) a. Lara ließ Tim den Müll wegbring-en. 
  Lara let\PST.3SG Tim DEF trash take away-INF 
 ‘Lara had/made/let Tim take out the trash.’ 
 b. Lara ließ Tim den Müll wegbring-en 
  Lara let\PST.3SG Tim DEF trash take away-INF 
 
  und er tat es sogar freiwillig. 
  and 3SG do\PST.3SG 3SG.O even voluntarily 
 ‘Lara had Tim take out the trash and he even did so 
 voluntarily.’ 
 c. Lara ließ Tim den Müll wegbring-en, 
  Lara let\PST.3SG Tim DEF trash take away-INF 
 
  aber er tat es nur unfreiwillig. 
  but 3SG do\PST.3SG 3SG.O only involuntarily 
 ‘Lara had Tim take out the trash, but he only did so 
 involuntarily.’ 
 d. Lara ließ Tim von Maria küss-en. 
  Lara let\PST.3SG Tim by Maria kiss-INF. 
 ‘Lara had Maria kiss Tim.’ 
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I will return to causee-marking in chapter 8. To summarize the properties 
of all classes of referents that can be intermediate effectors, I have pro-
vided table 25. The values in the table are valid for prototypical instru-
ments and causees. For the sake of clarity, I have also included pseudo-
agents. Bear in mind, however, that these are referents that can be con-
ceptualized as either instruments or causees. Type of causation refers to 
the type they are typically found under the scope of. Actionality refers to 
the position on the actionality scale. If more than one type of causation is 
listed, the first one mentioned is the most usual one. 
 Type of causation Actionality 
Instrument Direct Mid-range 
Causee Indirect/Direct Very high 
Pseudo-agent Direct/Indirect High 
Table 25: Summary of intermediate effector classes. 
7.1.1 Causees taking instruments 
Since I posit that causees and instruments typically occupy the same po-
sition in the LS (at least in French), some sentences with both could po-
tentially pose a problem. Consider:  
(20) Jean a fait couper le pain 
 Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP cut.INF DEF bread 
 
 à Marie avec un couteau. 
 to Marie with INDEF knife 
 ‘Jean made Mary cut the bread with a knife.’ 
Assuming that the instrument and the causee occupy the same argument 
position in the LS, how do we account for examples like (20)? The most 
natural reading of (20) is that Jean had Marie cut the bread and Marie used 
a knife to arrive at this result. Before any LS can be proposed, it has to be 
ascertained whether both Marie and couteau are causally embedded. This 
can be done by testing every individual segment of the causal chain with 
the causal paraphrase. Applying the test reveals that the two arguments 
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are, in fact, causally embedded ((21a–21b)) and that couteau is not under 
the direct scope of Jean ((21c)). 
(21) a. Jean a agit sur Marie, ce qui  
  Jean AUX.3SG act.PTCP on Marie REL  
 
    a causé qu’elle coupe le pain  
    AUX.3SG cause.PTCP that=3SG.F cut.3SG DEF bread  
 
  avec un couteau.  
  with INDEF knife  
  ‘Jean acted on Mary, causing her to cut the bread with a 
   knife.’ 
 b. Marie a agit sur le couteau, ce qui  
  Marie AUX.3SG act.PTCP on DEF knife REL  
 
  a causé qu’il coupe le  
  AUX.3SG cause.PTCP that=3SG.M cut.3SG DEF  
  pain.      
  bread      
 ‘Mary acted on the knife, causing it to cut the bread.’ 
 c. *Jean a agit sur le couteau, ce qui 
    Jean AUX.3SG act.PTCP on DEF knife REL 
 
  a causé qu’il coupe le pain. 
  AUX.3SG cause.PTCP that=3SG.M cut.3SG DEF bread 
 ‘*Jean acted on the knife, causing it to cut the bread.’ 
To adequately capture what the paraphrases in (21) revealed, adding  
another causal sequence to the LS is the most straightforward solution. 
The LS of (21a) is given in (22). 
(22) [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (couteau, 
 Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME cut´ (pain)]]] 
There is a marginal reading of (20), where Jean uses the knife to make 
Marie do something and that something is to cut the bread. This reading 
of (21a) also passes the causal paraphrase. Jean acts on the knife, which in 
turn acts on Marie which causes her perform an activity. Bear in mind that 
such an interpretation is very marked and not a single informant indicated 
it as the default interpretation. 
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So far, causees so far have been intermediate effectors, i.e. as effectors fol-
lowed by at least one causal operator. However, contrary to instruments, 
causees do not have to be intermediate. It is more apt to define them as 
non-initial effectors. Consider the following examples from French and 
Dutch: 
(23) a. Jean a fait manger Marie avec  
  Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP eat.INF Marie with  
 
  une fourchette. 
  INDEF fork 
 ‘Jean made Marie eat with a fork.’ (French) 
 b. Jean heef-t Marie met een vork doe-n  
  Jean AUX-3SG Marie with INDEF fork do-INF  
  et-en.        
  eat-INF        
 ‘Jean made Marie eat with a fork.’ (Dutch) 
 c. Marie a mangé avec une fourchette. 
  Marie AUX.3SG eat.PTCP with INDEF fork 
 ‘Marie ate with a fork.’ (French) 
 d. Marie at met een vork. 
  Marie eat\PST.3SG  with INDEF fork 
 ‘Marie ate with a fork.’ (Dutch) 
The sentence in (23a) has two relevant interpretations: 1) Jean makes Ma-
rie do something, and that something is eating with a fork and 2) Jean 
makes Marie eat, poking her with a fork to achieve this. The LS of the first 
interpretation is given in (24a) and the LS of the second one is given in 
(24b). 
(24) a. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [do´ (Marie, [eat´ (Marie, Ø) ∧ use´  
  (Marie, fourchette)])] 
 b. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (fourchette, Ø)] CAUSE [do´  
  (Marie, [eat´ (Marie, Ø)])]] 
 c. do´ (Marie, [eat´ (Marie, Ø) ∧ use´ (Marie, fourchette)]) 
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Fork in (23a) under interpretation 1) is an implement as it would fail the 
causative paraphrase. Furthermore, it would unambiguously be an imple-
ment in the more basic example in (23c). Its LS is given in (24c). 
There is an important principle behind the phenomenon where causees 
take instruments: The instrument has to be lower in the LS (i.e. more to 
the right) than the causee governing it. In other words, there is a relative 
ordering: Causees normally precede instruments. Consider the examples 
in (25) where this principle is violated. 
(25) a. *John made the cannon make Bill destroy the barn. 
 b. *John made/had/let the cannon make Bill destroy the barn. 
  c.  *John deed het kanon Bill de schuur 
    John do\PST.3SG DEF cannon Bill DEF barn 
 
  vernietig-en. 
  destroy-INF 
 ‘*John made the cannon make Bill destroy the barn.’ (Dutch) 
 d. *John deed het kanon de schuur met Bill 
   John do\PST.3SG DEF cannon DEF barn  with Bill 
 
   vernietig-en. 
   destroy-INF 
 ‘*John made the cannon destroy the barn with Bill.’ 
In chapter 4, the Relative Power Principle was introduced to govern the 
relative ordering of pseudo-agents and instruments. The examples in (25) 
illustrate that this principle, or rather an extension thereof, also governs 
the occurrence of instruments and causees in the same sentence. An up-
dated version of the principle is given in (26). 
(26) Relative Power Principle (final): Save for other considerations, 
the referent filling an effector slot (α) in the logical structure must 
be ranked higher on the actionality scale than the referents of ef-
fector arguments that are embedded deeper in the logical structure 
than α. 
This new formulation of the principle covers all cases that were covered 
by the provisional principle in chapter 4. In addition, it covers the  
distribution of causees, instruments and agents. Typical causees are just 
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as human as typical agents, yet are tacitly assumed to be less powerful. In 
causee constructions the instigator is considered to be in a position of 
(more) power: 
(27) a. John made Bill cut down the tree. 
 b. The general had the sergeant make the call. 
 c. ?The sergeant had the general make the call. 
In (27a), John is interpreted as having some power over Bill. If both were 
reversed, Bill would be considered as having power over John. This  
variable actionality is of the induced kind and depends (in this case) on 
contextual knowledge. I therefore regard human causees as slightly less 
actional than human agents. In (27b) on the other hand, this power differ-
ential is lexicalized. Switching both arguments yields a less acceptable 
sentence (27c). 
The revised principle in (26) contains the wording save for other consid-
erations. This refers to examples such as (23a) under the second interpre-
tation. Here, the instrument ranks higher than the causee in the LS. How-
ever, as I pointed out before, such interpretations are very marked and 
never constitute the default interpretation. It seems that the principle in 
(26) is not absolute in the sense that a violation results in ungrammatical-
ity. Deviating from (26) does, however, result in a very marked structure. 
7.1.2 Expanding the effector role 
In Van Valin & Wilkins (1996), the anatomy of the effector role was inves-
tigated. Three main readings of effector were distinguished: 1) agent, 2) 
instrument and 3) force. The authors defined the readings of the effector 
role according to mainly two properties, namely the position of the effec-
tor (intermediate vs. instigating) and the nature of the referent (human vs. 
inanimate). In the previous chapters, I have investigated forces, instru-
ments and causees. For example, it was established that forces typically 
occupy a very specific section of semantic space, centered around the con-
cept of para-autonomous. I believe it would be advantageous to refine the 
existing 1996 classification and to include two new subtypes: the causee 
and the executor. The executor is simply a label for non-agentive human 
instigators, i.e., human instigators whose default agency is canceled. Van 
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Valin and Wilkins (1996) do recognize non-agentive human effectors, but 
they do not include them in the list of effector subtypes. If a subclassifica-
tion of effector is not useful, it suffices to use the term effector or plain 
effector. For instance, if there is only single argument, such as with intran-
sitives (e.g. The ball is rolling), it does not seem necessary to provide a 
classification beyond plain effector. I have not included free and blocked 
instruments or pseudo-agents. Pseudo-agents are not so much an effector 
subtype rather than a specific class of referents that can be conceptualized 
as both instruments and instigators. Free and blocked instruments do not 
constitute a subtype either, as they are both simply instruments. Recall 
that this distinction is purely terminological in nature: A free instrument 
is an instrument that can undergo ISA with a given predicate and in a 
certain language. Mes in examples (3.50e–3.50f) is a blocked instrument in 
Dutch but would be a free instrument in the English equivalent. Free and 
blocked are nothing more than labels to describe the behavior of referents; 
they do not imply any deeper theoretical distinction. 
Feature Effector subtypes 
 Agen
t 
Executor Force Causee Instrument 
Instigator Yes Yes Yes No No 
Causation 
type 
N/A N/A N/A (In)direct Direct 
Metonymic 
clipping 
N/A N/A N/A No Yes/No 
Actionality High High Para-au-
tonomous 
High Mid 
HP rele-
vant 
Yes  Yes  No Yes No 
Volitional Yes No N/A Yes/No N/A 
Table 26: Summary of proposed effector subtypes. 
7.2   Comitatives 
 
  
 287 
 
 
Causees are listed as being under (in)direct causation: They can be under 
the scope of indirect causation, but can also be licensed under direct cau-
sation. Instruments are given the value Yes/No with respect to metonymic 
clipping. This refers to the fact that some instruments allow for ISA but 
others do not. The actionality row refers to the portion of semantic space 
that the subtype’s referents are typically located in. HP relevant refers to 
whether Holisky’s principle is relevant. It is only relevant for agents, ex-
ecutors and causees because the principle primarily affects human refer-
ents. Lexical agents or agenthood imposed by a construction are not cov-
ered. This field only concerns HP-derived agents. Volitional refers to 
whether the referent is inherently acting volitionally or not. 
7.2 Comitatives 
In RRG, comitatives are essentially conjoined arguments where one is 
coded with a with-PP (but need not be). As I pointed out in the introduc-
tion of this chapter, there is a superficial similarity in many languages 
between comitatives and instruments. Even though more languages make 
a morphosyntactic distinction between the two, most languages spoken 
natively in Europe do not make such a distinction (Stolz et al. 2013: WALS 
entry), Finnish being a notable exception. Comitatives are said to express 
the notion of accompaniment of two entities (Ibid.). Yet, there also appears 
to be a criterion of co-authorhood for the most prototypical comitatives, 
as shown in (28a). 
(28) a.  John ran to the store with Mary. 
 b.  John ran to the store with his goldfish. 
 c.  John ran to the store with his hammer. 
In (28b), goldfish is not a co-author, as the animal is confined to water and 
cannot run parallel to John. Similarly, in (28c), hammer, being quite low 
on the actionality scale, cannot be co-autor of the action described by the 
predicate. In this section, I will explore the RRG-approach to comitatives 
and attempt to provide an account of examples such as (28b) and (28c). 
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7.2.1 True comitatives 
Normal (or ‘true’) comitatives are treated as a linking option in RRG (Van 
Valin & LaPolla 1997: 379, Van Valin 2013: 73ff., cf. Jolly 1993). Essentially, 
these prototypical comitatives are tied in to the actor macrorole: One of 
the arguments will function as the actor. As far as logical structures are 
concerned, comitatives are treated as conjoined arguments of the form (X 
∧ Y) where one of the arguments is alternatively coded in a with-PP. The 
necessary characteristic for comitatives is so-called co-authorhood. Co-
authorhood is a preliminary term to denote that both arguments in ques-
tion are considered to be authors of the state or activity. This is evidenced 
by two alternations that can be used as tests: 1) The ability to occur with-
out PP-coding and 2) the interchangeability of the arguments. Regarding 
1), Koenig et al. (2008: 181) suggest paraphrasing the sentence under in-
vestigation as X and Y V-ed. This is illustrated in (29b) and (29d), and al-
ternation 2) is illustrated in (29b–29d). I propose to treat arguments that 
pass both tests as co-authors. Instruments, contrary to comitatives, does 
not pass Koenig’s proposed paraphrase ((29f–29i)). The logical structure 
underlying (29a–29d) is given in (29e). I choose to use co-authorhood while 
rejecting the notion of co-agency because comitatives can be non-agen-
tive, as shown by the acceptability of (29j–29k).  
(29) a. John walked with Sonia. 
 b. John and Sonia walked. 
 c. Sonia walked with John. 
 d. Sonia and John walked. 
 e. do´ (John ∧ Sonia, [walk´ (John ∧ Sonia)]) 
 f. John broke the cup with the hammer. 
 g. *John and the hammer broke the cup. 
 h. Sonia cut off the leaf with a knife. 
 i. *Sonia and the knife cut off the leaf. 
 j. Sonia and John drank all the wine together, but they did  
  not intend to. 
 k. Sonia drank the wine with John, but they did not intend  
  to. 
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Comitatives are primarily a morphosyntactic phenomenon, where alter-
native coding is used for pragmatic purposes. Both arguments can be se-
lected as actor, or one argument can receive with-coding. In case of the 
latter, the alternatively coded argument is not selected as actor but be-
comes an oblique core argument and is marked by with following the 
standard linking rules for non-macrorole arguments. It is for this reason 
that I equally reject the alternative terminology of co-actorhood (instead 
of co-authorhood), because this would be confusing from a linking per-
spective. In the examples below (adapted from Van Valin 2013: 91), all 
three realizations again have the same underlying LS (given in (30d)), ir-
respective of voice-oppositions. 
(30) a. The gangster robbed the bank (together) with the corrupt  
  policeman. 
 b. The bank was robbed by the gangster (together) with the  
  corrupt policeman. 
 c. The bank was robbed by the corrupt policeman (together)  
  with the gangster. 
 d. [do´ (gangster ∧ corrupt policeman)] CAUSE [BECOME  
  NOT have´ (bank, Ø)] 
Van Valin (2013: 103) points out that the qualia-properties of the referents 
are crucial for the comitative interpretation of with. In other words, the 
object of with in (30a–30b) is interpreted as being in a comitative relation-
ship with gangster because its qualia-properties describe it as a human, 
capable of doing a certain activity. These properties are stored on the telic 
qualia layer (or: quale). Van Valin (2013: 100) represents these properties 
for a referent such as Kim as in (31). 
(31) a. Kim (a) 
 b. Telic: do´ (a, […]) 
This information is the reason why the sentence in (30a–30b) is inter-
preted as comitative rather than, say, instrumental. The arguments pass 
both tests for co-authorhood ((32)), because the qualia-properties of gang-
ster and corrupt policeman are essentially the same (i.e. human, capable of 
performing certain activities).  
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(32) a. The gangster and the corrupt policeman robbed the bank. 
 b. The corrupt policeman and the gangster robbed the bank. 
 c. The corrupt policeman robbed the bank with the gangster. 
7.2.2 Undergoer & NMR comitatives 
Jolly (1993: 300–301) explores a phenomenon that is said to use the same 
mechanics as the true comitatives and can be considered the undergoer-
version of the comitative. Consider the example in (33a) and the LS Jolly 
proposes for it in (33b). 
(33) a. John served the entree with the soup to his guests.   
 (adapted from Jolly 1993: 300) 
 b. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME have´ (guests, entree ∧  
  soup)] 
Jolly assumes that the RP entree ∧ soup functions along the same lines as 
far as argument marking is concerned: Entree is selected as undergoer, 
leaving soup as an NMR marked by with. As is the case with the more 
typical comitatives, the order of the nouns can be switched and the with-
coding is not obligatory but optional: 
(34) a. John served the entree with the soup to his guests. 
 b. John served the soup with the entree to his guests. 
 c. John served his guests the entree and the soup. 
 d. John served his guests the soup and the entree. 
As serve behaves like a dative shift verb, it is possible to assign the under-
goer macrorole to guests, leaving entree ∧ soup as the NMR. This is given 
in (34c–34d). Yet, even with this alternative undergoer assignment pat-
tern, it is possible to mark one of the arguments by with (35a). Here, too, 
the order can be switched ((35c)). The LS for (35a) is given in (35b). 
(35) a. John served his guests the entree with the soup. 
 b. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME have´ (guests, entree ∧  
  soup)] A              U NMR1 
  NMR2       
 c. John served his guests the soup with the entree. 
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In case of two NMRs, it appears that the one that is least pragmatically 
salient is marked by with, paralleling the pragmatic assumptions sur-
rounding variable undergoer selection. In case of variable undergoer se-
lection, the lowest-ranking argument is selected as NMR and is marked by 
with. Compare: John presented the pad to Eliza vs. John presented Eliza with 
the pad. The example given in section 6.2 is one of dative shift. Dative shift 
verbs, contrary to transfer verbs, are exempt from marking the non-de-
fault NMR by with (Van Valin 2005: 114). However, the logic of pragmatic 
modulation in both these types of variable undergoer selection is the 
same. I assume that the reason for alternatively coding one of the two 
argument in (33a) and (35b) is driven by the same motivation: The most 
topical of the two arguments is left unmarked. The least topical one is 
marked by with. In the case of (33a), one is selected as undergoer and the 
other becomes an NMR. In (35b), one NMR is split into two. NMR-splitting 
seems to follow the same logic of pragmatic modulation by extension. It 
appears that the term comitative is much broader than co-authorhood and 
also includes (at least) a form of co-undergoerhood. As comitatives are 
essentially a linking-option, I will return to them in chapter 8. 
7.2.3 Comitatives with inanimate components 
Most comitative examples contain human referents and co-authorhood is 
a useful criterion. As pointed out by Schlesinger (1989: 201), sentences like 
John and the key opened the door are ungrammatical. In terms of the ap-
proach in the previous sections, the two arguments cannot be conjoined 
because their referents’ qualia-properties do not match. Using the two 
paraphrases proposed above, the more basic example in (36a) is identified 
as an instrument construction and not as a comitative. 
(36) a. John opened the door with the key. 
 b. *John and the key opened the door. 
 c. *The key and John opened the door. 
 d. *The key opened the door with John. 
However, it would be dubious to explain the acceptability of the sentences 
in (37) (adapted from Schlesinger 1989: 201f.) with matching qualia-struc-
tures. 
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(37) a. Floods and guerilla forces ravaged the area. 
 b. The battleship and the Admiral bombarded the coast. 
It is clear that the referents in these sentences are not directly similar in 
nature. A battleship is an inanimate that does not have a will of its own 
and is in all likelihood commanded by the other referent, Admiral. Yet, 
despite this difference, such sentences are still grammatical, contrary to 
the ones in (38). 
(38) a. *The general and the sword cut open the suit of armor. 
 b. *The farmer and the plow plowed the field. 
I propose that the conjunction of arguments is constrained by the position 
of their referents on the actionality scale: Only if each of the referents 
could function as the sole x-argument of the relevant LS can such con-
junction successfully occur.  The sentence *John and the key opened the 
door is not admissible because it fails this requirement: John and key can-
not occupy the same position (or a similar one) in the logical structure. 
The ability to function in the same slot depends on the referents being 
(rather) close in terms of the actionality scale. Consider: 
(39) a. John opened the door. 
 b. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME open´ (door)] 
 c. John opened the door with a key. 
 d. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME  
  open´ (door)]] 
 e. The key opened the door. 
 f. [do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME  
  open´ (door)]] 
 g. *[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (levers, Ø)] CAUSE   
   [BECOME open´ (door)]] 
 h. *The key opened the door with the levers. 
In (39a–39d), John and key respectively occupy the instigator and instru-
ment position in the logical structures. As I have shown, an instrument 
undergoing ISA is still in its intermediary position. It cannot be an  
instigator, as evidenced by (39e–39h), where an attempt to move key to 
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instigator position with an additional instrument results in ungrammati-
cality. In (40) below, the LS is the same, because both referents could be 
instigators in their own right.  The LS for (40a) is given in (40g). 
(40) a. John and the computer virus disabled Mary’s computer. 
 b. John disabled Mary’s computer. 
 c. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME disabled´ (Mary’s  
  computer)] 
 d. The computer virus disabled Mary’s computer. 
 e. [do´ (computer virus, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME disabled´  
  (Mary’s computer)] 
 f. The computer virus disabled Mary’s computer with spam. 
 g. [do´ (John ∧ computer virus, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME  
  disabled´ (Mary’s computer)] 
One could argue that co-authorhood should be ‘broadened’ to include in-
animates that are high enough on the actionality scale and that comita-
tives with inanimate components should be considered as ordinary, typi-
cal comitatives. As soon as there is co-authorhood, alternative coding is 
possible. This would be false, as the sentences in (40) do not allow for 
alternative coding like normal comitatives, despite being conjoined. John 
and computer virus are both co-authors, as evidenced by (40), yet alterna-
tive coding is not possible: 
(41) *John disabled Mary’s computer with the computer virus. 
The sentence in (41) is not an admissible alternatively coded version of 
the one in (40a). It can only have the classic instrument reading and would 
always link back to the logical structure in (42). 
(42) [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (computer virus, Ø)] CAUSE 
 [BECOME disabled´ (Mary’s computer)]] 
It thus seems that co-authorhood is not a sufficient criterion. Even if co-
authorhood is present, alternative coding is only allowed if the actionality 
level of the conjoined arguments is as good as identical. Prototypically, 
this involves two instances of the same species, class or type. The second 
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sentence in each of the pairs below receives the standard comitative in-
terpretation, even if the referents are inanimates. 
(43) a. The tornado and the hurricane destroyed the barn. 
 b. The tornado destroyed the barn (together) with the hurricane. 
 c. The first and the second assembly robot assembled the car. 
 d. The first assembly robot assembled the car (together) with  
  the second assembly robot. 
There are of course instances where the structural criterion I proposed 
earlier is seemingly met, yet the sentence is still not admissible ((44a)). 
The logical structure of (44b) is given in (44c). Schlesinger believes that 
(44b) and (44d) describe the same state of affairs. He therefore believes 
that the difference in membership is what makes (44a) inadmissible. Even 
though I attribute some explanatory power to degrees of membership (in 
my proper terminology actionality status), I believe there is a structural 
explanation here. It seems strange to posit stick as an effector and, fur-
thermore, it cannot take an instrument itself. Therefore, it cannot be an 
initial effector. Apart from a potential ISA-reading, contexts can be con-
jured up to account for (44d) where there is no instigator and the stick 
falls because of natural causes. Even though gravity (or other natural 
causes) might be an instigator in the purely physical realm, it is hardly 
ever constructed as an instigator linguistically. Yet, a non-ISA interpreta-
tion is quite plausible from a language user’s point of view. A non-ISA 
interpretation would mean that the stick is a force, which it cannot be 
according to the actionality scale. Rather than assuming an exception cap-
tured by a construction or making an exception to the actionality scale, 
there is a much simpler solution. I propose to treat Carol in (44b) as a 
normal effector, subject to the actionality hierarchy. Example (44d), how-
ever, is to be analyzed as a predicate of location, making stick a mover. 
The requirement for predicates of motion are generally lower and the ref-
erent stick – by virtue of being mobile – meets the requirements for that 
LS’s x-argument. This might seem ad hoc, but the meanings of (44b) and 
(44d) are actually quite distinct. The former captures a state of affairs 
where an individual inflicts pain on another entity. The latter denotes an 
7.2   Comitatives 
 
  
 295 
 
 
object impacting another. Aktionsart-testing is difficult as hit is very pol-
ysemous. The Dutch and German equivalents are clearer because they use 
different verbs. Both raken and treffen test as achievements. Evidence for 
the analysis of (44d) as a motion predicate comes from Dutch and German 
(for example), where two different verbs are employed ((44f–44k)). 
(44) a. *Carol and the stick hit the horse. (adapted from   
   Schlesinger 1989: 201) 
 b. Carol hit the horse. 
 c. do´ (Carol, [hit´ (Carol, horse)]) 
 d. The stick hit the horse. 
 e. INGR be-at´ (stick, horse)  
    f.  Carol sloeg het paard.  
   Carol hit\PST.3SG DEF horse (Dutch) 
 
 g. De stok raak-te het paard. 
  DEF stick hit-PST.3SG DEF horse 
 
 h. *De stok sloeg het paard. 
    DEF stick hit\PST.3SG DEF horse 
 
 i. Carol schlug das Pferd. 
  Carol hit\PST.3SG DEF horse (German) 
 
 j. Der Stock traf das Pferd. 
  DEF stick hit\PST.3SG DEF horse 
 
 k. *Der Stock schlug das Pferd. 
   DEF stick hit\PST.3SG DEF horse 
Thus, despite the fact that both states of affairs are coded with the same 
verb, they relate to different logical structures, which are expressed by 
different verbs in Dutch and German. Stick cannot occupy the position 
that Carol occupies in (44c) and therefore conjunction is impossible. 
Therefore, the structural criterion I proposed holds: Only one can fill the 
argument position in the LS but the other cannot. 
In this section I illustrated that inanimates can be conjoined with ani-
mates. Essentially, such cases can be treated like normal comitatives, i.e. 
conjoined arguments. There is a crucial condition for this to be possible: 
Each of the conjoinees must be able to independently function in the same 
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position in the same logical structure.7 I propose to use this criterion as a 
refinement of co-authorhood as the prerequisite for conjoined arguments 
for a given argument position. A referent’s ability to function as such de-
pends on its position on the actionality scale to a large degree (i.e. it must 
be in the correct portion of semantic space).  
Alternative coding, however, is an option that is reserved to two co-
authors that have the same actional status. Schlesinger (1989: 202) refers 
to this as the necessity for the degree of membership to be similar. Normal 
comitatives feature human referents which occupy the same position on 
the actionality scale. Because of this, they are not only co-authors, but the 
similarity in actionality also allows for the alternative linking with a with-
PP. As soon as one of the referents is significantly lower than the other, 
the alternative linking option disappears because of preferred linking back 
to an instrument-LS. If there is no co-authorhood, the conjunction of ar-
guments becomes impossible. As has become clear in this section and the 
previous one, comitatives are a much wider phenomenon than human co-
authors, even though the latter constitute the prototypical instance of the 
class. 
It is easier to generalize with my proposal than it is to generalize with 
statements of the type “only forces and forces or forces and agents may 
be conjoined”. Given the fact that there is a class of referents that can be 
both instruments and instigators (pseudo-agents, see chapter 4), the dis-
crete nature of such statements would pose challenges. 
The three types of comitatives explored so far all share a crucial char-
acteristic, which I call positional equivalence. Whether with the ‘actor’-
version, the ‘undergoer’-version or the ‘NMR’-version, the arguments in 
question have to be positionally equivalent. That is, they have to be able 
to occupy the relevant position in the LS individually and when conjoined. 
If there is positional equivalence, the comitative operation can take place: 
One of the two arguments is alternatively coded. With ‘actor’-comitatives, 
 
7 Needless to say, initial x-argument positions of logical structures will require a higher 
actional status from their prospective referents than argument positions lower in the 
logical structure. In a way, Schlesinger (1989: 201) has a point when he states that the 
‘instrument’ that is conjoined must have a similar degree of membership to the 
‘agent’. 
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there is an added complexity in that the actionality status of the argu-
ments’ referents must be similar enough. The driver behind alternative 
linking (if it is possible) is pragmatic in nature. Actors are default topics. 
By selecting only one of the arguments as the actor, it alone becomes the 
topic. Likewise, undergoers are more topical than NMRs. Therefore, se-
lecting only one argument as undergoer is a strategy to modulate the 
pragmatics. The same logic can be extended to the NMR-version of the 
comitative. 
7.2.4 Inanimate comitatives 
There is also a second phenomenon where an inanimate component oc-
curs in a seemingly comitative construction. I propose to call this subtype 
inanimate comitatives.8 Consider: 
(45) a. John ran to the store with Mary. 
 b. John ran to the store with his hammer. 
 c. John and Mary ran to the store. 
 d. *John and the hammer ran the store. 
 e. *John acted on the hammer, causing it to run to the store. 
 f. */?John ran to the store and simultaneously used the  
   hammer. 
 g. *The hammer facilitated the running to the store. 
In (45b), the runner moves to the store and his hammer makes the same 
journey. Contrary to the type discussed above, these referents do not meet 
the structural criterion: The referent hammer cannot function in the same 
logical structure as John. This is exemplified in (45c) and (45d). In other 
words, it cannot be a comitative. The hammer is not embedded in a causal 
chain ((45e)) or under the scope of helping causation ((45f–45g)). There-
fore, it cannot be an instrument, a causee or an implement. Then what are 
these? 
 
8  I use this terminology for the sake of simplicity and because in many cases the second 
argument is inanimate. 
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The referents in question cannot be part of a conjoined RP, despite the 
potentially confusing use of the preposition with: Hammer and John can-
not be conjoined, contrary to John and Mary or John and computer virus. 
What is in fact being described is a situation where an individual performs 
an action (e.g. running to a certain location) and the inanimate accompa-
nies the individual as a consequence of being carried or being stuffed in 
the individual’s pocket. The inanimate is simply ‘along for the ride’ but 
otherwise uninvolved. 
I propose to model this in a similar fashion to RRG’s implements: A 
connective followed by a general predicate is added to the main logical 
structure. In case of implements, there is a general predicate of usage. I 
base my approach on Farrell’s (2009) treatment of be-with´. Farrell argues 
in favor of a predicative use of with to account for a wide range of phe-
nomena. Even though I reject much of his analysis, I do adopt the core 
concept of be-with´ (in a modified way). I propose to treat be-with´ as a 
general predicate of accompaniment that occurs in the LS if the arguments 
in question are nothing more than co-occurrents. That is, they are not co-
authors, nor are they under the scope of one another.9 Be-with´ can also 
account for languages with so-called with-possessives (Stassen 2009: 
54ff.). Thus, for sentences such as the one in (45b), I propose the structure 
below: 
(46) [[do´ (John, [run´ (John)]) & INGR be-at´ (store, John)] ∧ 
 be-with´ (hammer, John)] 
The arguments of the accompaniment predicate can be considered co-oc-
currents. Such a predicate can also account for a wide range of sentences 
expressing some form of accompaniment, both literal and figurative. Con-
sider the sentences in (47) and their corresponding logical structures. 
(47) a. John is with Mary. 
 b. be-with´ (Mary, John) 
 c. He’s with us. (In the sense of He belongs to our group/unit) 
 d. be-with´ (1PL, 3SG) 
 
9 This is in contrast to Farrell (2009), who, in my view, greatly exaggerates the rele-
vance of predicative with. Also see below. 
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 e. I’m with you. (In the sense of I am on your side, I share  
  your opinion. Van Valin, p.c.) 
 f. be-with´ (2SG, 1SG) 
 g. I put the CDs with the DVDs. (Farrell 2009: 181) 
 h. [do´ (1SG, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME be-with´ (DVDs, CDs)] 
The sentences in (47c–47f) are figurative in nature, yet clearly metaphor-
ically derived from the more primitive, basic local reading that (47a) ex-
emplifies. This is similar to be-at´ expressing possession in languages 
without a have predicate: Finnish, for instance, does not have a have-verb 
and thus, one cannot posit a have´ predicate in its logical structures. RRG 
can solve this by positing (in the case of Finnish) be-at´ with the posses-
sive reading being a metaphorical extension (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980a 
& b). I follow this principle to capture the figurative uses of be-with´ in 
English. Interestingly, in closely related languages like Dutch and Ger-
man, be-with´ has the literal local reading only. For instance, in Dutch, 
(47c) would have to be expressed with the phrasal verb horen bij (belong 
to) and (47e) would have to be expressed with the equivalent of agree with 
(akkoord gaan/zijn met). 
This approach can also capture a perfectly possible reading of Francis ran 
to the hospital with Mary where Mary is not co-author, but rather is un-
conscious and being transported by Francis. This reading is made explicit 
in (48). 
(48) a. Francis ran to the hospital with his unconscious dog. 
 b. [[do´ (Francis, [run´ (Francis)]) & INGR be-at´ (hospital,  
  Francis)] ∧ be-with´ (his unconscious dog, Francis)] 
 c. Marco ran to the hospital with his unconscious daughter.  
 d. [[do´ (Marco, [run´ (Marco)]) & INGR be-at´ (hospital,  
  Marco)] ∧ be-with´ (his unconscious daughter, Marco)] 
 e. *Marco and his unconscious daughter ran to the hospital. 
It would be difficult to account for (48c) with the standard RRG-approach 
to comitatives. On the telic quale, daughter would essentially have the 
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same properties as Marco. This would predict that example (48e) is gram-
matical, whereas it is clearly not. The use of be-with´ renders this prob-
lem moot. It would also be tricky to account for (49) with standard RRG. 
(49) *The unconscious construction worker ran to the hospital. 
Standard RRG captures selectional restrictions primarily in terms of qua-
lia. The unconscious nature of the referent is what makes this sentence 
unacceptable. Yet, it would be very difficult to account for this induced 
feature with qualia. My actionality approach, however, allows for induced 
features. Introducing unconscious would lower the referent’s autonomy to 
a level that is no longer compatible with the requirements of the argument 
position in the relevant LS. 
The general nature of be-with´ does not entail any specific information 
on the mode of transportation: The dog and the daughter can be carried, 
drawn in a cart, dragged etc. The only thing the predicate conveys is that 
during the action described by the first section of the LS, another entity 
occupies a point in space and time that is almost identical with that of the 
other. Farrell (2009: 193) points out that not only English has a linguistic 
expression similar to be with. Portuguese does too, as can be seen in ((50)). 
(50) Os omens estão com as mulheres. 
 DEF men be.PRS.3PL with DEF women 
 ‘The men are with the women.’ (Farrell 2009: 193, glossing mine) 
It can be objected that be-with´ only expresses a vague meaning. Yet, lan-
guages are full of mechanisms to express the vague and unspecific: Pas-
sives can be used as a strategy to make the actor unspecific, partitive con-
structions are cross-linguistically used to express unspecific amounts of 
something, ISA can be used to leave the instigator unspecified etc. 
Farrell (2009: 196) argues in favor of treating (29a–29b, repeated in 
(51a–51b)) as involving different LSs. The latter would feature conjoined 
arguments, the former would add a be-with´ predicate to include Sonia in 
the with-PP. Even though I also make a case for be-with´, I reject Farrell’s 
assumptions regarding the difference between (51a) and (51b), due to the 
fact that the two referents are co-authors. The simple sentence  
alternations in (51) would require very different LSs, making it difficult to 
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account for the co-authorhood of the two referents. I argue in favor of 
using be-with´ more restrictively: It specifically codes cases where the 
two referents are not co-authors. In all of my examples of this phenome-
non (e.g. (48)), the second referent is only passively involved in the event 
and cannot be considered co-author.  
(51) a. John walked with Sonia. 
 b. John and Sonia walked. 
 c. Sonia walked with John. 
 d. Sonia and John walked. 
The be-with´ predicate is not yet included in contemporary RRG. Includ-
ing it does not only explain the phenomenon above, but also complements 
the already existing be-in´, be-on´ and be-at´ predicates in a natural fash-
ion. Furthermore, it is a natural instantiation of the underspecified be-
LOC´ (Farrell 2009: 193). Following Farrell (2009: 201), I propose to define 
the be-with´ predicate as a predicate expressing a general spatio-tem-
poral co-occurrence. This is distinct from location proper. Contrary to Far-
rell, I restrict the use of be-with´ to cases where there is no co-autho-
rhood. This includes potential comitatives ((52)). 
(52) a. Jack went to the store without Jill. (Farrell 2009: 196) 
 b. …∧ NOT be-with´ (Jill, Jack) 
Even though I agree with Farrell’s treatment of (52), there is still no reason 
to assume be-with´ for all comitatives. If an entity is not present, there 
cannot be co-authorhood and a representation in terms of conjoined ar-
guments becomes moot. Therefore, recognizing (52b) does not contradict 
standard RRG’s conception of comitatives. By way of conclusion to this 
section, I recognize a predicative with, contrary to standard RRG (Van Va-
lin 2013: 102). 
7.2.5 False inanimate comitatives 
If with-phrases in inanimate comitatives are not extraposed, a reading of 
identity becomes possible and even likely, as illustrated in (53). 
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(53) a. The woman ran into the store with the book. 
 b. The woman with the book ran into the store. 
 c. John ran into the store with the hammer. 
 d.  Jan met de hamer liep de winkel 
   Jan with DEF hammer run\PST.3SG DEF store 
 
   binnen.  
   into (Dutch) 
The book in (53b) is read as a defining feature of the woman. In Dutch, the 
with-PP can occur in adjacency to proper nouns, yielding an identity read-
ing ((53d)). Jan met de hamer would attribute the hammer to Jan in that 
he often has a hammer with him. I propose to analyze such cases as an 
underlying possessive RP that obligatorily makes the possessor the head 
(at least in Dutch and English) to attain the attribute reading. Consider the 
analysis below (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 189–192, Van Valin 2005: 52). 
(54) a. The woman’s book 
 b. have´ (woman, book) 
 c. The woman with the book 
 d. have´ (woman, book) 
 e. The man with the beard (Farrell 2009: 194) 
 f. have-as-part´ (man, beard) 
(54a–54b) represent the case where the possessed referent is selected as 
the head of the phrase, which is expressed by the underlining of book. If 
the possessor is chosen as head (as in (54d)), the corresponding result is 
(54c). The attribute reading is only possible with the possessor as the head: 
(55) *The woman’s book ran into the store. 
Extraposition, such as in the hammer example in (45b), is not possible be-
cause it is one single, complex RP. Put differently, extraposition is only a 
possible strategy if 1) there are conjoined RPs (in the case of comitatives) 
or 2) if there is an underlying be-with´ predicate. With the latter, extra-
position is obligatory. Otherwise, the attributive reading is triggered as 
(53b) showed. Bear in mind that this holds for common nouns as the actor 
in English. Proper nouns tend to complicate matters further. Following 
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Farrell (2009: 196), the absence of a property can be accounted for by in-
cluding NOT. 
(56) a. The man without a beard 
 b. NOT have-as-part´ (man, beard) 
7.3 Proper parts as instruments  
Apart from the typical instrument referents such as knife, cannon, brush 
and the like, proper parts of an entity (such as body parts) can also be used 
as instruments. Luraghi (1995: 265) points out that humans can and will 
carry out activities with tools, including their own body parts. Some case 
grammarians have entertained the idea of a so-called ‘body part instru-
ment’ as a case for almost every occurrence of a body part in an utterance 
(Bibović 1976: 313). From an RRG point of view, proper parts functioning 
as instruments must meet the very same criteria that more prototypical 
instruments meet. That is to say, the proper part in question must be caus-
ally embedded. A sentence like the one in (57a) does not feature a body 
part instrument but a simple undergoer that happens to be a body part. 
This verb patterns like a semelfactive and therefore correlates to the LS in 
(57b). 
(57) a. Ernesto nodded his head. (adapted from Bibović 1976: 314) 
 b. SEML do´ (Ernesto, [nod´ (Ernesto, his head)]) 
However, consider sentences like (58) with their Dutch equivalents. 
(58) a. He untied the knot with his teeth. (Nilsen 1973: 130) 
 b. I bit him with my false teeth. (Lyons 1968: 422) 
  c. Hij deed de knoop los met zijn 
  3SG do\PST.3SG DEF knot loose with POSS.3SG 
 
  tand-en. 
  tooth-PL 
 
 d. Ik beet hem met mijn valse tand-en. 
  1SG bite\PST.1SG him with POSS.1SG false tooth-PL 
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Superficially, the relevant arguments seem to be instruments. This has to 
be put to the test using the appropriate paraphrase. 
(59) a. ??He acted on his teeth, causing them to untie the knot. 
 b. ??I acted on my false teeth, causing them to bite him. 
The paraphrase test identifies teeth/tanden as something other than an  
instrument. The test shows that there is no causal embedding. This is not 
only the case for human body parts as instruments but also for proper 
parts of other referents. Consider: 
(60) a. The digger dug a hole with its scoop. 
 b. ??The digger acted on the scoop, causing it to dig a hole. 
 c. The algorithm crippled the mainframe with its coding. 
 d. ??The algorithm acted on the coding, causing it to the  
  cripple the mainframe.  
 e. The computer virus crippled the server with spam-mails. 
 f. The computer virus acted on the spam-mails, causing them  
  to cripple the server. 
The paraphrase test reveals that proper parts of entities do not have the 
same status that ‘normal’ instruments have. Conceptually, this makes 
sense: A person does not act on the teeth, causing them to do something. 
Rather, body parts and proper parts are seen as extensions of the instiga-
tor rather than as separate entities. In (60c) and (60d), coding is what 
makes up an algorithm, rather than a separate entity that is impinged 
upon. Note that sentences like (60e–60f) are much more acceptable: A 
computer virus can use independent entities (such as files on the hard 
drive or spam-mails) to wreak havoc. Likewise, the digger does not really 
impinge on the scoop. Even though (60a) and (60c) can be expressed with 
a with-PP, they become more acceptable if by means of is used instead. 
Normal instruments normally disprefer such a linking, even though it is 
not entirely ruled out. Consider (61c–61d) and their Dutch and German 
equivalents in (61e–61f) and (61g–61h), respectively. The choice of by 
means of as marker primarily holds for inanimate proper parts ((61a–61b)), 
but much less for body parts of animates ((61i–61j)). 
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(61) a. The digger dug a hole by means of its scoop. 
 b. The algorithm crippled the mainframe by means of its  
  coding. 
 c. ?The lumberjack cut down the tree by means of an axe. 
 d. ?John cut the cake by means of a knife. 
    e. ?De houthakker vel-de de boom 
  DEF lumberjack cut down-PST.3SG DEF tree 
 
  door middel van een bijl.  
  through means of INDEF axe (Dutch) 
 
 f. ?Jan sneed de cake in stukk-en 
  Jan cut\PST.3SG DEF cake in piece-PL 
 
  door middel van een mes. 
  through means of INDEF knife 
 
 g. ?Der Holzfäller fäll-te den Baum 
  DEF lumberjack cut down-PST.3SG DEF tree 
 
  mittels eine-r Axt.  
  by means of INDEF-GEN axe (German) 
      
- 
 h. ?Jan schnitt den Kuchen in Stück-e  
  Jan cut\PST.3SG DEF cake in piece-PL  
 
  mittels eine-s Messer-s. 
  by means of INDEF-GEN knife-GEN 
 i. ?/*He untied the knot by means of his teeth. 
 j. ?/*The lion killed the gazelle by means of its teeth. 
Parallel to English, door middel van and mittels are the more marked link-
ing options. In addition, German mittels was rated by an informant as 
written language as opposed to spoken language. However, even within 
written language, mittels was rated as better with proper parts than with 
true instruments. It seems then that there is a cross-linguistic preference 
for a different marker if proper parts of inanimates are concerned. In case 
of independent entities and proper parts of animates, with/mit/met are 
preferred. Note that these are only preferences rather than absolute rules. 
Having established this, the question remains what proper parts are, se-
mantically speaking. As they fail the causal paraphrase, I propose to treat 
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them as implements, as entities that help to cause something (cf. Koenig 
et al. 2008), but not cause something. The teeth arguably increase the 
chances of untying the knot, but they are not a causer. The larger entity 
that they are a part of is the true causer, as it passes the causal paraphrase. 
Therefore, I propose to incorporate proper parts as normal implements. 
The verbs untie and bite test as a causative accomplishment and an activ-
ity, respectively. As teeth is not an effector in the untie example, it has to 
be represented as an implement. The LSs in (62a–62d) correlate with the 
examples above: 
(62) a. [[do´ (3SG, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME untied´ (knot)] ∧ [do´  
  (3SG, [use´ (3SG, teeth)])]] 
 b. [do´ (1SG, [bite´ (1SG, 3SG) ∧ use´ (1SG, my false teeth)])] 
 c. [[do´ (3SG, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME untied´ (knoop)] ∧ [do´ 
  (3SG, [use´ (3SG, tanden)])]] 
 d. [do´ (1SG, [bite´ (1SG, 3SG) ∧ use´ (1SG, mijn valse  
  tanden)])] 
The main difference to normal implements is conceptual in nature: Proper 
parts are somewhat different than concrete objects like stick or knife, be-
cause the latter are independent entities. 
7.4 Potential instruments, implements 
& comitatives 
Farrell (2009) argues in favor of using be-with´ to account for all comita-
tives (amongst others). Although this completely ignores co-authorhood, 
I do believe a similar approach can account for potential instances of in-
struments, implements and comitatives.  Potential refers to the absence of 
a referent from a certain state of affairs and the fact that the referent could 
potentially be used or involved in the action. This absence is largely con-
ceptual, however, as the referents are still expressed in the morphosyntax. 
Following RRG’s Completeness Constraint, these referents must be pre-
sent in the LS. Comitatives are primarily defined over positional equiva-
lence. If there is no positional equivalence, then positing co-authorhood 
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and an LS with conjoined arguments would be paradoxical ((63c)). The 
typical comitative alternation in (63b) is inadmissible because it is not 
truth-conditionally equivalent to (63a). An LS where the second argument 
is left unspecified ((63d)) is problematic for two reasons: 1) it is unclear 
what it would link to and 2) it does not account for the occurrence of Elena 
thereby violating the completeness constraint. Following Farrell (2009: 
196), I propose to capture without as NOT be-with´. This LS is given in 
(63e). 
(63) a. Caroline ran to the store without Elena. 
 b. *Elena ran to the store without Caroline. 
 c. ?/*[[do´ (Caroline ∧ ¬Elena, [run´ (Caroline ∧ ¬Elena)]) &  
       INGR be-at´ (store, Caroline ∧ ¬Elena)] 
 d. *[[do´ (Caroline ∧ Ø, [run´ (Caroline ∧ Ø)]) & INGR  
   be-at´ (store, Caroline ∧ Ø)] 
 e. [[do´ (Caroline, [run´ (Caroline)]) & INGR be-at´ (store,  
  Caroline)] ∧ NOT be-with´ (Elena, Caroline)] 
Apart from potential comitatives, potential instruments and implements 
also exist. McKercher (2003: 173) gives an example of an implement where 
it is in fact, absent ((64a)). 
(64)  a. Kim ate pizza without a fork. 
 b. Kim at pizza zonder vork.  
  Kim eat\PST.3SG pizza without fork (Dutch, own data) 
 
  c. Abdul ate soup without a spoon. 
 d. Abdul at soep zonder lepel. 
  Abdul eat\PST.3SG soup without spoon 
To satisfy the completeness constraint, spoon must somehow be present 
in the LS. Similar to NOT be-with´, I propose to use a negated use-predi-
cate. The LSs for (64a–64d) are given in (65). 
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(65) a. do´ (Kim, [eat´ (Kim, pizza) ∧ NOT use´ (Kim, fork)]) 
 b. do´ (Kim, [eat´ (Kim, pizza) ∧ NOT use´ (Kim, vork)]) 
 c. do´ (Abdul, [eat´ (Abdul, soup) ∧ NOT use´ (Abdul,  
  spoon)]) 
 d. do´ (Abdul, [eat´ (Abdul, soep) ∧ NOT use´ (Abdul,  
  lepel)]) 
Not only comitatives and implements, but also instruments can be ‘poten-
tial’. Consider the examples below: 
(66) a. Mara destroyed the barn with a wrecking ball. 
 b. Mara destroyed the barn without a wrecking ball. 
 c. Sonia melted the ice with a hair dryer. 
 d. Sonia melted the ice without a hair dryer. 
 e. The lumberjack cut down the tree with a chainsaw. 
 f. The lumberjack cut down the tree without a chainsaw. 
Here, too, the potential instruments need to be accounted for in the LS. 
Simply adding a ¬ sign or including NOT results in a paradox again. Con-
sider such LSs in (67). 
(67) a. *[do´ (Mara, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (¬wrecking ball, Ø)]  
    CAUSE [BECOME destroyed´ (barn)]] 
 b. *[do´ (Sonia, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (¬hair dryer, Ø)] CAUSE  
    [BECOME melted´ (ice)]] 
 c. *[do´ (lumberjack, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (¬chainsaw, Ø)]  
     CAUSE [BECOME cut down´ (tree)]] 
 d. *[do´ (Mara, Ø)] CAUSE [[NOT do´ (wrecking ball, Ø)]  
    CAUSE [BECOME destroyed´ (barn)]] 
 e. *[do´ (Sonia, Ø)] CAUSE NOT [[do´ (hair dryer, Ø)]  
    CAUSE [BECOME melted´ (ice)]] 
 f. *[do´ (Sonia, Ø)] NOT CAUSE [[do´ (hair dryer, Ø)]  
    CAUSE [BECOME melted´ (ice)]] 
 g. *Mara did not act on the wrecking ball, causing it to   
   destroy the barn. 
 h. *Mara acted on nothing, causing it to destroy the barn. 
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 i. *Sonia did not act on the hair dryer, causing it to melt the  
    ice. 
 g. *Sonia acted on nothing, causing it to melt the ice. 
 j. *The lumberjack did not act on the chainsaw causing it cut  
    down the tree. 
 k. *The lumberjack acted on nothing, causing it to cut down  
    the tree. 
The LSs in (67a–67f) cannot be correct, as the causal paraphrases in (67g–
67k) produce utterly bizarre results. The paraphrases above show that 
there can be no causal embedding. Yet, the potential instrument must be 
accounted for in the LS in order to satisfy the completeness constraint. 
Recall that instruments are only instruments if an implement is causally 
embedded. The examples in (65) illustrated that negating an implement is 
unproblematic. I propose to use the same approach for potential instru-
ments. If an implement is not causally embedded, it is not an instrument. 
If the implement is not even manipulated at all, there certainly cannot be 
any kind of causal embedding. I therefore propose the LSs in (68): 
(68) a. [[do´ (Mara, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME destroyed´ (barn)] ∧  
   [do´ (3SG, [NOT use´ (Mara, wrecking ball)])]] 
 b. [[do´ (Sonia, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME melted´ (ice)] ∧ [do´  
   (3SG, [NOT use´ (Sonia, hairdryer)])]] 
 c. [[do´ (lumberjack, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME cut down´  
   (tree)] ∧ [do´ (3SG, [NOT use´ (lumberjack, chainsaw)])]] 
In this section, I have adopted Farrell’s be-with´ approach to a modest 
degree. While I also treat potential comitatives with the predicate’s ne-
gated version, I reject Farrell’s proposal to use be-with´ for all comita-
tives. Contrary to Farrell, I only use be-with´ for strictly co-occurrent ref-
erents.  
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7.5 Problematic cases of instruments 
A ‘problematic case’ I wish to address was introduced earlier in this chap-
ter. Farrell (2009: 189–190) provides an example of a causative accomplish-
ment that features an implement. This example, together with Farrell’s 
proposed LS are given in (69a) and (69b), respectively. 
(69) a. The boy put together the bike with a manual.  
 b. [do´ (boy, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME together´ (bike) ∧ use´  
  (boy, manual)]  
 c. *The boy acted on the manual, causing it to put together  
   the bike. 
 d. *The boy caused the manual to be used. 
 e.  The boy caused the bike to be put together/assembled. 
Using the causative paraphrase in (69c) shows that the with-PP is an im-
plement and not an instrument. Farrell’s proposed LS, however, is prob-
lematic. The way the LS in (69b) is written, the use of the manual is part 
of the caused event. This is wrong, as the contrast in acceptability of par-
aphrases in (69d) and (69e) shows. Rather, the manual is a tool that modi-
fies the whole LS: The most likely interpretation for (69a) is that the boy 
assembled the bike while continuously using a manual. Therefore, it can 
only relate to the LS in (70a). The LS in (70b) implies that the boy’s use of 
the manual caused the coming about of the event. If the context in (70c) is 
present, then the LS in (70b) is possible. The distinction between the two 
readings relates to the placement of the use-predicate in the LS. 
(70) a. [[[do´ (boy, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME together´ (bike)]] ∧  
  [do´ (boy, [use´ (boy, manual)]]] 
 b. [do´ (boy, [use´ (boy, manual)])] CAUSE [BECOME  
  together´ (bike)] 
 c. After having read the manual, the boy put together the  
  bike. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored the semantics of several concepts or phenomena 
that are superficially related to the typical instruments. Several varieties 
of comitative were discussed, revealing that the phenomenon is much 
wider than it is often assumed in the literature. Even though the most 
prototypical comitative is of the ‘actor’-variety, undergoer and NMR-va-
rieties also exist. Although there are some differences between them, they 
all share a crucial feature which I have called positional equivalence. That 
is, the two arguments in question must be able to occupy the same posi-
tions in the LS. For the actor-comitatives, the actionality levels of the ar-
gument’s referents must be similar. Each of the arguments must be able 
to function in the relevant argument position in the LS and this depends 
on whether the actionality requirements of the slot are met. Whether or 
not it is possible to alternatively code one of the arguments varies. In the 
case of actor-comitatives, both arguments require a level of actionality 
that is almost identical. If the levels are too distinct, then alternatively 
coding the lower-ranking argument (in terms of the actionality level) 
would result in an instrument reading and thus link back to an instru-
ment-LS.  
Apart from comitatives, human referents in the typical instrument-ef-
fector position were also explored. I argued in favor of treating these as 
causees and proposed to include them as a distinct effector subtype. By 
contrast, pseudo-agents are not recognized as an effector subtype as they 
constitute a specific class of referent rather than a distinct reading of the 
effector role. That is, they can be conceptualized as instruments or insti-
gators. It is also possible for causees to take instruments themselves. In 
this case, there is a very strong tendency for the causee to be higher in the 
LS, even though there are exceptions to this. I have formalized this strong 
tendency as the Relative Power Principle, which can be seen as a governing 
principle for causees and instruments when they occur in the same LS.  
I also provided an updated version of predicative with (be-with´) to 
account for the expression of general spatio-temporal co-occurrence of 
two referents. This approach can account for sentences where a referent 
is not wielded by another and those where it cannot be co-author of a state 
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of affairs. Typically, this includes cases where one referent is passively 
spatio-temporally present throughout the event as is hammer in John ran 
to the store with his hammer. Be-with´ can also be used for figurative be-
longing to a group or unit. Potential instruments and implements were 
introduced as the expression of a non-use. Stating that an action was per-
formed without a tool expresses that it was not used. However, as poten-
tials occur in the morphosyntax, they must be present in the semantic 
representation so as not to violate the completeness constraint. To ac-
count for such cases, I proposed treating them as the negated versions of 
implements (i.e. NOT use´). Potential comitatives refer to non-accompa-
niment. It was illustrated that negating a normal comitative is overly sim-
plistic and untenable. I therefore argued in favor of a predicative without 
(i.e. NOT be-with´).  
Properties of individuals are often expressed with the preposition with, 
as in, for example, the woman with the book. To capture these, I adopted 
RRG’s approach to the structure of RPs. 
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8 Linking semantics to syntax 
In this chapter, I go into 1) linking the LS to the morphosyntax and the 
coding strategies, 2) the expansion of base logical structures to accom-
modate instruments, causees, comitatives and implements and 3) several 
constructions containing instruments. With respect to 3), recall from the 
introduction that instruments occur in a wide variety of morphosyntac-
tic configurations. Consider: 
(1) a. Todd shattered the window with the rock. 
 b. The rock shattered the window. (ISA, see chapter 6) 
 c. The window was shattered by Todd with the rock. 
 d. The window was shattered by the rock.  
 e. The window shattered with the rock.1 
 f. The window shatters easily with a rock. 
I refer to the typical examples featuring instruments that I have em-
ployed throughout this dissertation as the standard instrument example. 
It includes examples like the ones in (2). 
(2) a. John cut down the tree with an axe. 
 b. Sarah opened the box with the knife. 
Parallel to the standard occurrence of instruments, there is a standard 
implement example. To date, no language has been found that morpho-
logically distinguishes between implements and instruments. Both clas-
ses of tools do show syntactic differences in different languages, howev-
er. Implements can never undergo ISA and in languages where it is very 
productive, like English, this becomes immediately visible. The linking of 
 
1 This sentence is rejected by many native speakers and it does not fit naturally in 
RRG. Because it occurs in the relevant literature, sentences of this type have been 
included in this chapter. 
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both standard implements and standard instruments will be explored in 
the general linking sections (8.1 and 8.2). Special constructions featuring 
instruments and/or implements will be discussed in sections 8.3 on-
wards. 
8.1 Three classes of prepositions 
RRG makes a distinction between predicative and non-predicative prep-
ositions (Van Valin 2005: 21ff.). In contrast to the former, the latter mark 
arguments in the core and have a flat syntactic structure. Predicative 
prepositions introduce new semantic content and license an argument. 
Jolly (1993: 286) argues in favor of recognizing a category in between, 
the semi-predicative prepositions (class two-prepositions). These preposi-
tions are said to introduce a new argument to the larger LS. A crucial 
feature of class two-prepositions is argument-sharing: The added section 
of LS has to share an argument with the base LS. Van Valin & LaPolla 
1997: 159–160) call these argument-adjunct prepositions. Syntactically, 
these PPs take the form of predicative PPs, but they occur in the core. 
Prime examples of this kind are PPs involved in the alternation between 
activities and active accomplishments. Consider (adapted from Van Valin 
& LaPolla 1997: 160): 
(3) a. Paul ran. 
 b. do´ (Paul, [run´ (Paul)]) 
 c. Paul ran to the store. 
 d. do´ (Paul, [run´ (Paul)]) & INGR be-at´ (store, Paul)2 
 e. do´ (x, [run´ (x)]) à do´ (x, [run´ (x)]) & INGR be-LOC´  
  (y, x) 
In the examples above, to has its own logical structure that is added to 
the base LS by means of a lexical rule (Van Valin 2013: 85) given in (3e). 
 
2  The analysis of active accomplishments has changed over time due to updates in 
theory. In Van Valin & LaPolla (1997) BECOME is used in the LS, whereas in Van 
Valin (2005), INGR is used instead. The notation in (3) follows the theory as out-
lined in Van Valin (2005). 
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As this example involves argument sharing, it can be considered an ar-
gument-adjunct preposition. 
Whenever a preposition is considered to be non-predicative, the cor-
responding PP in the syntax has the typical flat structure. If the preposi-
tion is considered to be class 2, then the PP will be predicative but occur 
in the core. 
8.2 Argument linking in Role and Reference 
Grammar 
Linking the logical structures to their morphosyntactic expression is 
handled in terms of the linking algorithm (see section 2.5.3) in RRG. In 
the following sections, I will primarily explore argument linking and 
marking in English, French, Dutch and German. The notions of macro-
roles are crucial in this regard as RRG does not use traditional notions 
like subject, object and indirect object to this end. The rules for assigning 
the macroroles to components of the LS were given in (2.5.1). Of these 
four languages, only German has a case system. The other three use 
prepositional marking to a large extent.3 I use English as a preliminary 
reference point for the coming sections. In English, prepositions are used 
to mark some core arguments. The preposition with is particularly inter-
esting for two reasons: 1) It is the main marker for instruments, and thus 
of the utmost importance for this study and 2) it has a wide array of 
functions beyond instrument marking (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 376ff., 
Jolly 1993). This last point is illustrated by the occurrence of multiple 
with-PPs in a sentence. Consider the English example in (5a) (Van Valin 
& LaPolla 1997: 377) and its direct Dutch equivalent in (5b). 
(4) a. The woman with strong arms loaded the truck with hay  
  with a pitchfork with Bill with enthusiasm. 
 b. De vrouw met sterke armen belaadde de vrachtwagen 
  met hooi met een hooivork met Bill met enthousiasme. 
 
3 It is important to point out that PP-internal cases, assigned by governing preposi-
tions are not covered by these rules (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 359). 
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RRG assumes that most uses of with can be captured with a single rule 
(Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 381, 382), given in (5). There is a more  
recent version (Van Valin 2005: 113–114) version of the rule in (5), but it 
covers fewer cases than the 1997-version. I will therefore only use the 
version in (5) in this chapter. 
(5) Rule for assigning with in English 
 Given two arguments, x and y, in a logical structure, with x
 lower than or equal to y on the Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy,
 and a specific grammatical status (macrorole, head of NP),
 assign with to the y-argument iff it is not selected for that
 status.  
Essentially, this rule states that the non-selected y-argument of two can-
didates, x and y, is marked by with. They can also capture the attribute 
reading of with, explored in chapter 7. Attributive readings constitute a 
non-default realization of the RP and as such, the preposition with comes 
into play. In other words, with marks the default choice of two candi-
dates for a specific status when the non-default choice is selected for it. 
As I will explore in the next section, this is how instrument marking is 
captured.  
The status and the marking of causees are more complicated, as Eng-
lish causative constructions consist of multiple cores. Bolivian Quechua 
(see (7.15)), by contrast, has causative constructions that consist of a 
single core (nuclear-level juncture). As the examples in (7.15) showed, 
the causee can be marked by either the instrumental or the accusative. 
Thus for Bolivian Quechua, it would not suffice to draw up a single rule 
for causees as they do not only have accusative but also instrumental as a 
marking option. Furthermore, instruments and causees occupy the same 
position in the LS and are both core arguments in Bolivian Quechua, but 
are marked differently, meaning that a single rule does not suffice to 
account for their marking. A similar situation exists in Kannada  
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(Dravidian) with dative and instrumental4 as marking options (Van Valin 
& LaPolla 1997: 588).  
Even in English not all uses of with are captured by the rule in (5). In 
chapter 7, a predicative use of with was discussed (be-with´ (z, x)). Fur-
thermore, potential instruments, implements and comitatives are ex-
pressed by NOT use´ (x, y) or NOT be-with´ (x, y), meaning that the 
preposition is linked to a specific LS-configuration. This is contrasted by 
RRG’s treatment of with, which is tied in with the linking process (Van 
Valin & LaPolla 1997: 380). In the following sections, I will explore the 
linking for the different notions with the rule in (5) as a starting point 
and go into the syntactic status of each. 
8.2.1 Instrument and implement marking 
Instruments are assigned on the basis of the with-rule in (5) and are 
linked to arguments in the core. In the LS in (6b), the instrument is out-
ranked for actorhood as the instigator is to the left of it. Because actor 
selection is absolute, there is no direct way around this principle.5 The 
instrument is also outranked for undergoerhood, leaving it as the NMR. 
Per rule (5), it is marked by with. A constituent projection of (6), together 
with its linking is given in figure 54. 
(6) a. Jacob broke the window with the rock. 
 b. [do´ (Jacob, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (rock, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME broken´ (window)]] 
 
4 In both Bolivian Quechua and Kannada, instrumental marking favors an agentive 
implicature on the causee, whereas the other marker disfavors the implicature (Van 
Valin & LaPolla 1997: 588). 
5 ISA is a strategy to assign actorhood to the instrument, by virtue of leaving the 
instigator position empty. This does not constitute a violation of actor assignment, 
however, as the highest overt argument is still assigned actorhood. 
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Figure 54: Linking to syntax of a clause containing an instrument. 
In terms of valence in the LS, an instrument-slot is dependent on the 
presence of a causal chain. Causal chains can be considered to have a 
lexically unfilled instrument-slot by default. The causal structure of 
causative verbs can be ‘expanded’ in order to provide more specific in-
formation. By its very nature, a causal chain can accommodate addition-
al arguments that such an expansion adds. Syntactic valence is language-
dependent.  
I generally follow standard RRG as far as the rule in (5) is concerned 
in accounting for implements. Van Valin (2013) argues that the telic qua-
le of the implement-referent is what licenses the use-predicate. The in-
formation in the telic quale for spoon specifies that it can be used to facil-
itate eating. This information licenses the use-predicate, introducing a 
new argument. Implement arguments are, as it were, optional. As it is 
licensed by a quale, it is appended to the base LS and falls under the 
scope of the rule in (5). Consider the examples in (7). 
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(7) a. Evie ate the soup with a spoon. 
 b. do´ (Evie, [eat´ (Evie, soup) ∧ use´ (Evie, spoon)]) & 
  INGR consumed´ (soup) 
 c. Evie ate soup with a spoon. 
 d. do´ (Evie, [eat´ (Evie, soup) ∧ use´ (Evie, spoon)]) 
In (7a–7b), Evie is selected as actor and soup is selected as undergoer as it 
is the lowest-ranking argument. Spoon is outranked for actorhood be-
cause there is a ‘better’ candidate (Evie). Furthermore, spoon is a very 
unlikely candidate for actorhood, as it the y-argument of a predicate 
instead of the x-argument. In (7c), spoon is outranked for actorhood by 
the same logic. However, it could be argued that spoon is as good a can-
didate for undergoer as soup: Both are y-arguments of a predicate under 
the scope of do´, that is, both are of equal rank. The left-most argument 
(soup) is selected as undergoer, leaving spoon to be marked by with, in 
accordance with the rule in (5). Syntactically, the implement is realized 
as an argument in the core. Contrary to LSs with instruments, those 
with implements do not have an argument slot available for the ‘tool’. 
The telic quale creates an extra slot. Qualia are the driver behind the 
creation of an extra slot and the process can be captured with a lexical 
rule (Van Valin 2013: 90): 
(8) do´ (x, [pred´ (x, (y))… à do´ (x, [pred´ (x, (y)) ∧ use´ (x, 
 z)])… 
In other words, the implement-PP is not the argument of a preposition, 
but rather the argument of a lexically augmented LS. This is the reason 
why it can be under the scope of the rule in (5). If it were the argument 
of a predicative with, then marking would follow from the preposition 
itself. In case of the full LS of instruments, it is clear then, why the in-
strument does not occur twice. If with were predicative here, it would 
occur twice. Once as a result of the rule in (5) and once as the result of 
the predicative preposition. Because it is part of a (derived) LS, it is an 
argument and not an argument-adjunct, as that would presuppose a 
predicative with. 
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Contrary to standard RRG, Jolly (1993: 298) proposes to treat the imple-
ment-with as a predicative preposition that has the semantic content of 
the use-predicate. This is problematic for several reasons. First, in chap-
ter 7, I presented evidence in favor of a predicative with in the LS-form 
of be-with´. Recognizing use´ as another predicative with would split 
the uses of with, ultimately leading to a treatment of all uses of with as 
separate entries. This is rejected by Van Valin & LaPolla (1997: 377) as a 
non-analysis. Second, the rule in (5) is a unified, simple rule that works 
without exception. There is no reason, then, to assume that it does not 
correctly explain implement-with. Third, assuming two predicative withs 
with very different corresponding LSs (use´ vs. be-with´) is problematic 
from the point of view that predicative prepositions are more basic and 
historically precede non-predicative ones (Jolly 1993: 275–276). If this is 
so, then which predicative with is the basic, ‘older’ one and why do two 
predicative withs exist at the same time in language? How did one 
evolve from the other? Furthermore, why do their LSs take on such dif-
ferent forms? A representation of the linking to syntax of (7a) is given in 
figure 55.   
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Figure 55: Linking to syntax of a clause containing an implement. 
8.2.2 Causee marking 
In chapter 7, a phenomenon where causees take instruments was ex-
plored. This dissertation is concerned with instruments, implements and 
their marking in simple cores. Because English causee constructions 
involve more than simple cores, I will use French as a language of illus-
tration. In French, causatives expressing more direct causation involve 
nuclear junctures (for an overview of the complete theory of juncture-
nexus relations in RRG, see Van Valin 2005, chapter 6), whereas weaker 
causation involves multiple cores. The coordination of cores means that 
both cores have their own set of arguments and one argument is shared. 
Consider the example from French in (9). In the example in (9), the ar-
gument Jean is semantically shared by the verbs. Syntactically, it is part 
of the first core. 
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(9) Je laisserai Jean manger les gateaux 
 1SG let.FUT.1SG Jean eat.INF DEF cake.PL 
 ‘I will let Jean eat the cakes.’ (Van Valin 2005: 189) 
The example in (9) features permissive/enabling causation. More direct 
forms of causation are expressed (in French) as a combination of nuclei. 
An example of this is given in (10). The difference between the coordina-
tion of cores and the coordination of nuclei is visible (in French at least) 
in that with the former type the shared argument in (9) occurs in be-
tween the two verbs (cf. Van Valin 2005: 191). With nuclear cosubordina-
tion ((10a)), the two verbs occur directly next to each other. This situa-
tion also exists in Dutch and German ((10b–10c)). English, by contrast, 
expresses (10a) in terms of core coordination ((10d)).  
(10) a. Jean a fait courir Simon. 
  Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP run Simon 
  ‘Jean made Simon run.’ (French) 
 b. Jean heef-t Simon doe-n lop-en. 
  Jean AUX-3SG Simon do-INF run-INF 
  ‘Jean made Simon run.’ (Dutch) 
 c. Jean hat Simon lauf-en lass-en. 
  Jean AUX.3SG Simon run-INF let-INF 
  ‘Jean made Simon run.’ (German) 
 d. Jean made Simon run. 
The syntactic difference between (9) and (10a) is given in figures 56 
(adapted from Van Valin 2005: 189) and 57, respectively.  
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Figure 56: Syntactic structure of a French sentence expressing  
permissive causation. 
 
Figure 57: Syntactic structure of a French sentence expressing  
 direct causation. 
As far as linking is concerned, nuclear junctures behave the same way as 
simple, lexical verbs. In other words, the linking algorithm applies as it 
would with simple sentences. To ascertain the marking of causees taking 
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instruments, I will explore several key examples, starting with the sim-
plest structure.  
(11) a. Jean a fait manger Marie. 
  Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP eat Marie 
  ‘Jean made Marie eat.’  
 b. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [do´ (Marie, [eat´ (Marie, Ø)])] 
          A        U 
  c. Jean a fait manger la soupe à  
  Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP eat DEF soup to  
  Marie.  
  Marie  
  ‘Jean made Marie eat the soup.’ 
 d. [[do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [do´ (Marie, [eat´ (Marie,  
        A         NMR    
  soupe)])] & INGR consumed´ (soupe)] 
                                      U 
The difference between (11a–11b) and (11c–11d) in terms of marking 
follows from general principles and their application in French. In (11a–
11b), Jean is the actor as it is the highest-ranking argument in the LS. 
Similarly, Marie is the undergoer as it is the lowest-ranking argument. 
French does not mark undergoers morphologically but positionally: It 
immediately follows the nucleus. In (11c–11d), the same principle is at 
work. The undergoer in (11c–11d) is soupe and is assigned the post-
nuclear position. Marie is NMR and is assigned the dative preposition à 
as it is the standard marker for NMRs, parallel to the rule governing 
English to. Parallel to the with-rule in English, there is the avec-rule 
marking instruments. In (12a–12b), this rule applies as couteau is a non-
selected candidate for actorhood. 
(12) a. Marie a coupé le pain avec le couteau. 
  Marie AUX.3SG cut.PTCP DEF bread with DEF knife 
  ‘Marie cut the bread with the knife.’ 
 b. [do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (couteau, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME cut´(bread)]] 
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If causees take instruments, there are two NMRs. An example is given in 
(13a–13b). The first NMR is the causee and the second one is the instru-
ment. The standard rule assigning avec would be problematic. For in-
stance, Marie is a potential actor herself and, as Marie is not selected as 
actor, avec should be assigned. Yet, assigning avec would result in un-
grammaticality. Furthermore, would the avec-rule be applied twice? 
Therefore, a rule capable of handling two NMRs and their relative order-
ing has to be established. If the instigator of (13a–13b) is left out, the 
result is the more basic structure in (13c). In (13c), Marie would be as-
signed actorhood and the instrument would be assigned avec. If the 
chain is expanded in such a way that an instigator is added, Marie loses 
its instigator status, leaving two intermediate effectors with both as po-
tential actors. Marie is a better candidate for actorhood than couteau, as 
its referent ranks higher on the actionality scale. One could posit then, 
that the lower of the two arguments in terms of actionality is assigned 
avec and the higher is assigned à. It would not be correct to assume that 
the higher position in the LS correlates with à-marking and the lower 
LS-position correlates with avec-marking. In chapter 7, I explored a 
French example ((7.23a)) with two relevant interpretations. These inter-
pretations are also available for (13a). The first is a typical causee-
interpretation (LS in (13b)): Jean makes Marie do something and that is 
cutting the bread, using a knife to do this. The second is an interpreta-
tion where Jean uses a knife to make Marie do something and that is 
cutting bread. Parallel to the LS I proposed in (7.24b), the second reading 
has the instrument occupying a higher LS-slot than the causee (LS in 
(13d)). This LS shows that the LS-positions alone cannot account for the 
marking. If they did, then the instrument would be marked by à and the 
causee would be marked by avec. However, such marking is ungrammat-
ical. It is therefore necessary – in case of two NMRs – to tie in the as-
signment rules with the referents’ actionality status. Couteau ranks low-
er and is assigned avec and Marie ranks higher in terms of actionality 
and is assigned à. The rule I propose for this is given in (13e). Following 
the Paninian principle (cf. Kiparsky 1993) that more specific rules take 
priority over more general ones, the more specific rule in (13e) takes 
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precedence over the more general rules assigning avec and à, respective-
ly. 
(13) a. Jean a fait couper le pain 
  Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP cut.INF DEF bread 
 
  à Marie avec un couteau. 
  to Marie with INDEF knife 
  b. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´  
              NMR1 
  (couteau, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME cut´ (pain)]]]  
           NMR2  
 c. [do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (couteau, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME cut´ (pain)]]   
 d. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (couteau, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [[do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME cut´ (pain)]]]  
 e.  Rule for assigning avec and à in LS with two NMRs 
Given a logical structure with two non-macrorole  
arguments, α and β, with both as potential actors in 
terms of the AUH, assign avec to NMR α if its referent’s 
actionality is lower than NMR β’s referent’s actionality.  
Assign à to NMR β. 
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Figure 58: Causee under the scope of direct causation taking an  
  instrument. 
The example above is an example of direct causation. French has two 
causative auxiliaries (faire and laisser) whereas English has three (make, 
have, let). To express the difference between direct and indirect causa-
tion, for which English uses two different auxiliaries (make vs. have), 
French cannot use laissser because it expresses permissive and enabling 
causation. Rather than leaving the structure ambiguous like Dutch6 or 
German, French has a linking option where the second, embedded LS-
segment also takes two macroroles (Van Valin 2005: 236). This creates a 
problem as the compound LS would have three macroroles: An undergo-
er (contributed by the embedded LS), an actor (contributed by the first 
section of the LS) and a second actor (contributed by the embedded LS). 
This would create three macroroles for one core, which is not allowed.  
Because of this restriction, the actor of the matrix-level LS is selected as 
 
6  As I pointed out in chapter 5, Dutch has a disambiguation strategy but it is not 
open to all verbs. The French linking option is fairly productive, by contrast. Also 
recall that Netherlandic Dutch only has one causative auxiliary (laten). 
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PSA and the second actor is realized in the periphery, marked as a pas-
sive agent so as not to violate the restriction. The main piece of evidence 
in favor of analyzing the second actor as being realized in the periphery 
is that it is optional. Contrary to the causee in (13a), it can be left out. 
The instrument-effector in (14) is an NMR, just as in (13a) and its mark-
ing is accounted for by the avec-rule. An example of this is given in 
(14a–14b) and the linking is given in figure 59.  
(14) a. Jean a fait couper le pain par  
  Jean AUX.3SG make.PTCP cut.INF DEF bread by  
 
  Marie avec un couteau. 
  Marie with INDEF knife 
  ‘Jean had Marie cut the cake with a knife.’ 
 b. [do´ (Jean, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Marie, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´  
        AM               A2 
  (couteau, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME cut´ (pain)]]] 
     NMR1              U 
 
Figure 59: Causee under the scope of indirect causation taking an  
  instrument. 
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As far as causation is concerned, the main difference is the strength of 
causation (direct and indirect causation, respectively). The initial causal 
operator is italicized (CAUSE) to indicate its underspecified nature. As I 
pointed out in chapter 7, the precise interpretation (CAUSE vs. IND) is 
supplied by Holisky’s principle. In case of (13a), the à-marker serves as 
information to the contrary and the causee is interpreted as being under 
the scope of direct causation. Par allows for a volitional reading of the 
causee and the type of causation is considered to be indirect. In other 
words, I do not wish to posit two different versions of faire in the lexi-
con, but rather an underspecified one. This ties in to the discussion of 
the different types of causation: Languages allow for a degree of vague-
ness when it comes to expressing the strength of causation. French is no 
different here. The construction in (13) unambiguously expresses direct 
causation. The default interpretation for (14) is one of indirect causation, 
yet it can be interpreted as expressing direct causation given the right 
context (Simon Petitjean, p.c.). In this thesis, I assume the default reading 
for the sake of clarity. Both constructions can be summarized in terms of 
a unified constructional schema.7 It is given in table 27. 
Construction: French causative construction with instrument  
Syntax: Juncture: Nuclear 
Nexus: Cosubordination 
Construction type: Serial verb 
[CL [CORE RP [NUC [NUC…] [NUC…]] RP PP PP]…] 
PSA: ActorM 
Linking: (1) Default (Direct causation) 
               (2) Two Actors (ActorM and Actor2) in case of 
indirect causation and transitive NUC2. 
Link Actor2 to COREPERIPHERY 
Template: Default Syntactic Template Selection      
Principle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 AM stands for actor on the matrix level. 
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Morphology: Verb: NUC1: Default finite 
          NUC2: Non-finite 
Argument marking: Default (linking (1)) 
                                 Par (linking (2)) 
Semantics: [PREDNUC1] CAUSE [PREDNUC2] 
Pragmatics: IF: unspecified 
Focus structure: unspecified 
Table 27: Constructional schema for French causee construction with an  
 instrument. 
8.2.3 Comitative marking 
As pointed out in chapter 7, comitatives are essentially conjoined argu-
ments where only one is selected as actor or undergoer. The other is 
linked as an oblique core argument (in a with-PP). In terms of linking, 
comitative marking can be accounted for by the rule for NMRs in (5), as 
the object of with is still an argument of the main LS. This makes the 
comitative PP similar in status to an instrumental PP; both are non-
predicative PPs functioning as arguments in the core. Consider: 
(15) a. Todd and Michael destroyed the ship. 
 b. Todd destroyed the ship with Michael. 
In (15a), the conjoined RP Todd and Michael is selected as actor and be-
comes the PSA. In (15b) only Todd is selected as actor and PSA while 
ship is the undergoer. This leaves Michael as an intermediate argument. 
To use Jolly’s (1993) terms, Michael is a potential macrorole candidate 
but not selected for a specific macrorole, leaving it as an NMR. The rule 
for non-predicative with applies and Michael is realized in a PP. The con-
stituent projection for (15b) is given in figure 60. 
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Figure 60: Linking to syntax for Todd destroyed the ship with Michael. 
The NMR-marking rule is usually considered in the context of argu-
ments that are not selected as actor, like instruments. Yet, it also applies 
to the lower section of the AUH. As undergoer selection is variable, the 
potential undergoer argument that is not selected as undergoer is (in 
English) canonically marked by with. In chapter 7, undergoer- and NMR-
comitatives were discussed. Their marking is also accounted for by the 
rule in (5). In the example in (16b), only one argument is selected as un-
dergoer, leaving the other as a non-macrorole argument. Because it is a 
potential candidate for a specific status (in this case undergoerhood) but 
not selected as such, it is marked by with. The other NMR, Sam is 
marked according to the default NMR-rule. The LS for (16a–16b) is given 
in (16c). 
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(16) a. Jack served [cheese and wine] to Sam. 
         A    U       NMR 
 b. Jack served cheese [with wine] [to Sam]. 
         A       U    NMR2           NMR1 
 c. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME have´ (Sam, cheese 
  ∧ wine)] 
The marking of the NMR-comitative follows the same principles. The 
example from chapter 7 is repeated in (17). In (17a) the lowest-ranking 
argument is chosen as NMR and the intermediate argument is selected as 
undergoer. Similar to (16b), one of the arguments is not selected for a 
certain status (here: NMR) and is marked by with as a result ((17b–17c)). 
In chapter 7, I called this phenomenon NMR-splitting, as one NMR is split 
into two NMRs and the most topical one is unmarked. 
(17) a. John served his guests [the entree and the soup]. 
         A         U   NMR 
 b. John served his guests the entree with the soup. 
 c. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME have´ (guests, 
         A        U 
  entree ∧ soup)] 
         NMR1        NMR2 
There does seem to be a limitation to comitative phenomena. In the ex-
amples in (16) and (17) the verbs allowing variable undergoer selection 
are dative shift verbs. The main difference (in English) between dative 
shift verbs and the other class of verbs that allow variable undergoer 
selection (transfer-verbs) is that the former leave the shifted NMR un-
marked (Van Valin 2005: 114), as is the case in (17a). Consider an exam-
ple of a transfer-verb in (18). 
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(18) a. Nicholas presented the notebook and the pad  
                  A            U 
  [to Everett]. 
     NMR 
 b. Nicholas presented Everett [with the notebook and the  
                  A     U      NMR 
  pad]. 
In (18a), the default MR-assignment rules apply. In (18b), the intermedi-
ate argument is assigned the undergoer macrorole and the lowest-
ranking argument is assigned NMR-hood. It is possible to apply comita-
tive linking to (18a) but not to (18b): 
(19) a. Nicholas presented the notebook with the pad to   
  Everett. 
 b. *Nicholas presented Everett [with the notebook] 
   A           U  NMR1 
  [with the pad].   
      NMR2 
With comitative marking and marked undergoer selection the arguments 
in question are eligible for a certain status but not selected as such. In 
the inadmissible (19b), the with-rule applies twice, once for the marked 
undergoer selection and once to split the NMR in two NMRs. Both link-
ing procedures can individually apply, as illustrated by (18b) and (19a), 
but not together. It seems that the marked undergoer-with takes priority 
over comitative with. This is not a linking problem in itself, as applying 
marked undergoer selection and comitative linking together is possible 
in dative shift verbs ((20)). Rather, there is a constraint that prohibits two 
withs with essentially the same function and gives marked undergoer-
with priority. 
(20) Jack served Sam [cheese] [with wine]. 
             A              U     NMR1        NMR2 
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8.2.4 Inanimate comitatives  
In chapter 7, a type of ‘comitative’ was explored where no co-
authorhood exists: 
(21) a. Edward ran to the hospital with the hammer. 
 b. Joan ran to the store with the goldfish. 
It was argued that in such cases, the LS-sequence be-with´ (z, x) is ap-
pended to the main LS. This constitutes the prime predicative use of 
with. The sequence be-with´ (z, x) introduces a new argument that can-
not be licensed by the base LS and it crucially shares an argument with 
that same base LS, making this use of with an argument-adjunct preposi-
tion. Consider the LSs for (21a–21b): 
(22) a. [[do´ (Edward, [run´ (Edward)]) & INGR be-at´ (hospital, 
 Edward)] ∧ be-with´ (hammer, Edward)] 
 b. [[do´ (Joan, [run´ (Joan)]) & INGR be-at´ (store, Joan)] 
 ∧ be-with´ (goldfish, Joan)] 
The sentences in (21) contain two argument-adjuncts: The with-PPs and 
the goal PPs. The constituent projection and the linking for (21a) is given 
in figure 61. 
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Figure 61: Linking to syntax for Edward ran to the hospital with the 
 hammer. 
8.2.5 Marking of proper part-implements 
In chapter 7, it was pointed out that proper parts used as implements 
have a preference for a different marker. Consider the following exam-
ples with their LSs: 
(23) a. The digger dug a hole by means of its scoop. 
 b. The computer virus crippled the mainframe by means of
 its coding. 
 c. The digger dug a hole with its scoop. 
 d. The computer virus crippled the mainframe with its  
coding. 
 e. [[do´ (digger, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME dug´ (hole)] ∧ [do´  
  (digger, [use´ (digger, its scoop)])]] 
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 f. [[do´ (computer virus, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME crippled´  
  (mainframe)] ∧ [do´ (computer virus, [use´ (computer 
  virus, its coding)])]] 
The sentences in (23c–23d) are grammatical but less acceptable than 
their counterparts in (23a–23b). This means that as far as (23c) and (23d) 
are concerned, the normal with-rule that covers standard implements 
applies. The implement is eligible for undergoerhood but is not selected 
as such, leaving it to be marked by with. However, how can the linking 
with by means of be accounted for? The key feature here is that the im-
plements in question are a proper-part relation to the effector. This in-
formation can be captured in terms of qualia. In qualia theory, the rela-
tion between parts of an entity and the whole are handled in terms of 
the constitutive quale. I propose the following (partial) qualia-annotation 
for coding and computer virus: 
(24) a. Coding (a) 
  Constitutive: programming subcomponent´ (b) 
  Formal: digital sequence´ (a) 
 b. Computer virus (b) 
  Constitutive: superordinate´ (a) 
  Formal: Digital algorithm´ (b) 
  Telic: [do´ (b, […])] CAUSE [BECOME pred´ (y)] 
The crucial information here is located in in the constitutive quale and it 
can be integrated with a prepositional assignment rule.  
(25) Assign by means of to non-MR argument y in LS segment 
 use´ (x, yC). 
The subscript with the y-argument refers to the constitutive quale in the 
sense that the slot filler must be listed in the lexicon as a proper part of 
the slot filler of the x-argument. The rule in (25) is a much more specific 
rule than the one in (5). Therefore, the Paninian principle regarding the 
order of rules applies here as well: The specific rule outranks the more 
general one. It is important to point out, however, that the rule in (25) 
applies primarily to inanimates and their proper parts. This is evidenced 
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by examples (7.58a–b), repeated here in (26). In (26a–26b), the rule in (25) 
does not apply. Applying (25) to animates and their proper parts produc-
es very odd, and to most informants, ungrammatical results ((26c–26d) 
and (7.61i–7.61j)). The preference surrounding by means of is very simi-
lar in Dutch ((26e–26f)). 
(26) a. He untied the knot with his teeth. (Nilsen 1973: 130) 
 b. I bit him with my false teeth. (Lyons 1968: 422) 
 c. *He untied the knot by means of his teeth. 
 d. *I bit him by means of my false teeth. 
 e. Het computer virus leg-de de computer 
  DEF computer virus cripple-PST.3SG DEF computer  
 
   lam met zijn code. 
  VPR with POSS.3SG code 
  f. Het computer virus leg-de de computer 
  DEF computer virus cripple-PST.3SG DEF computer  
  lam met door middel van code. 
  VPR with through means of code 
8.2.6 Marking of potential instruments, implements and 
comitatives 
It is possible to use Van Valin’s (2013) approach of co-composition to 
account for potential instruments and implements. In chapter 7, I argued 
that potential instruments and implements can be accounted for by in-
cluding NOT in the typical implement LS. The preposition without is 
very specific and is restricted to three cases: NOT have´, NOT be-with´ 
and NOT use´. NOT be-with´ constitutes the predicative version of 
without and will be discussed below. As such, it does not need to be in-
cluded the rule assigning the other cases of without.8 I propose to treat 
the assignment of non-predicative without in terms of the rule in (27a). 
Matching examples are given in (27b–27e). 
 
8 I am aware that there are other uses of without, such as without enthusiasm. These 
uses fall outside the scope of this dissertation and will therefore not be explored 
here. 
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(27) a. Rule assigning without in English 
Assign without to non-macrorole y-argument in the  
logical structure segment:…NOT pred´ (x, y) 
 b. Evie ate the soup without a spoon. 
 c. do´ (Evie, [eat´ (Evie, soup) ∧ NOT use´ (Evie, spoon)]) 
& INGR consumed´ (soup) 
 d. The woman without the book 
 e. NOT have´ (woman, book) 
The assignment of without is predicted by the rule in (27a): Evie and soup 
are selected as actor and undergoer, respectively leaving spoon as NMR. 
As the correct LS-segment is present, the NMR is marked by without. 
There is a close resemblance to the rule governing from in English (Van 
Valin & LaPolla 1997: 377). The crucial difference, however, is that the 
rule governing from includes either the BECOME or the INGR operator 
in the relevant LS-segment. In other words, despite the similarity, it and 
the rule in (27a) are quite distinct. The example in (27b) has a potential 
implement, but (27a) also captures potential instruments. Consider the 
example in (28a) below. 
(28) a. Jacob broke the window without a rock. 
 b. [do´ (Jacob, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME broken´ (window)]  
  ∧ [do´ (Jacob, [NOT use´ (Jacob, rock)])] 
Here, too, a similar linking presents itself: Jacob is the actor and window 
is the undergoer. Rock is outranked for both and becomes the NMR. As 
the segment NOT pred´ (x, y) is present, both conditions of the rule are 
met and the argument is marked by without. Potential instruments have 
to be represented as in (28b), as any other configuration (e.g. negating 
the instrument in the causal chain) yields paradoxical results for the 
larger LS (see the examples in (7.67)). Essentially, I treat potential im-
plements and instruments as the potential version of implements rather 
than of instruments. This has the consequence that the question of the 
source of the argument is raised once more. Van Valin (2013) assumes 
that implements are licensed by the telic quale of the referent. I propose 
to treat potential implements/instruments in virtually the same way. By 
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explicitly stating that one is not using a certain tool, the assumption is 
that it is usually used in the state of affairs. This is illustrated by the 
lower acceptability of the second in each of the sentence pairs: 
(29) a. Abdul ate the soup without a spoon. 
 b. ?Abdul ate the soup without a telescope. 
 c. Evie watched the birds without binoculars. 
 d. ?Evie watched the birds without a hammer. 
Telescopes and hammers are not readily used in eating or watching 
events and as a consequence, the examples in (29b) and (29d) sound odd. 
The telic quales of spoon and binoculars contain the information that 
they are used for eating and observing, respectively. Consider a partial 
qualia-entry for spoon and binoculars: 
(30) a. spoon (a) 
 Telic: do´ (b, [eat´ (b, c) ∧ use´ (b, a)])... 
 Agentive: artifact´ (a) 
 b. binoculars (a) 
 Telic: do´ (b, [watch´ (b, c) ∧ use´ (b, a)])... 
 Agentive: artifact´ (a) 
This information creates the argument slot in the base LS, as explored in 
Van Valin (2013). Contextually supplied information then provides the 
NOT part of the LS-segment. Then, the rule in (27a) applies.9 This can be 
captured with a lexical rule for negated instruments and implements: 
(31) do´ (x, [pred´ (x, (y))… à do´ (x, [pred´ (x, (y)) ∧ NOT use´
 (x,  z)])… 
The constituent projection for (27b) is given in figure 62. 
 
9 It might be confusing that English with has some superficial similarity to without. 
However, in languages like Dutch (met vs. zonder), German (mit vs. ohne), French 
(avec vs. sans) and Bulgarian (s vs. bez) they are quite distinct. 
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Figure 62: Linking to syntax for Evie ate the soup without a spoon. 
As is the case with many prepositions, there is also a predicative version 
of without. This use was introduced in section 7.4 as the potential ver-
sion of comitatives. It might seem counterintuitive to treat potential 
comitatives as involving a predicative preposition when normal comita-
tives are the result of argument marking options. Yet, as I explored in 
section 7.4, treating potential comitatives as a kind of linking option is 
implausible. Parallel to predicative with (be-with´), I propose NOT be-
with´. I assume that predicative without is, similar to predicative with, a 
class 2-preposition (cf. Jolly 1993). That is to say, it introduces a new 
argument and shares an argument with the main LS. Consider: 
(32) a. Caroline ran to the store without Elena. 
 b. [[do´ (Caroline, [run´ (Caroline)]) & INGR be-at´ (store, 
   Caroline)] ∧ NOT be-with´ (Elena, Caroline)] 
In (32a), without is predicative, meaning that the preposition takes an 
argument, rather being the result of argument marking rules. This  
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approach can also account for a variation to (17), as given in (33d). The 
PP with the soup in (17) is essentially the result of a linking option. As I 
have illustrated before, marking an argument negatively in the LS pro-
duces implausible results. As I argue for a difference in status, some be-
havioral difference must present itself. The examples in (33) show that 
the non-predicative with-PP and the non-predicative without-PP are 
positionally constrained: There is a clear preference for them to occur in 
direct adjacency to the RP the soup and after the undergoer-argument, 
respectively. The predicative without-PP does not show this tendency; it 
is positionally less constrained. This is illustrated in (33a–33b) and (33c–
33d), respectively. 
(33) a. John served the entree with the soup to his guests. 
 b. ?John served the entree to his guests with the soup. 
 c. John served the entree without the soup to his guests. 
 d. John served the entree to his guests without the soup. 
As the predicative use of without introduces an argument to the LS and 
another is shared with that LS, syntactically, these PPs are argument-
adjuncts. The linking for (32) is given in figure 63. 
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Figure 63: Linking to syntax for Caroline ran to the store without Elena. 
8.2.7 Extending predicative with and without 
Following Jolly, I assume that predicative uses of prepositions are more 
basic than non-predicative uses. Heine et al. (1991: 159) observed that 
there is a cross-linguistic pattern of grammaticalization where (for in-
stance), the location case function serves a starting point with the ex-
pression of companion and instrument being often derived from it. Heine 
treats instrument as being more grammaticalized than companion but the 
essential insight is that both ‘case functions’ are derivative of the more 
basic location case function.  What does this imply for my treatment of 
with?  
In the previous sections, I argued in favor of recognizing a predicative 
with alongside its already recognized non-predicative version. Jolly’s 
claim that the former function precedes the latter and are thus historical-
ly more basic, fits Heine’s grammaticalization scale. The increasing 
grammaticalization in markers found by Heine has a direct reflection in 
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the semantics (in terms of LS). These two claims can be combined with 
my treatment of with. This is schematized as in (34) below. The direction 
of the arrow indicates increasing grammaticalization, whereas the 
dashed line indicates the shift in corresponding LS-configuration.  
(34)              Instrument/implement 
 Spatio-temporal           CAUSE [do´ (x, Ø)]…/∧ use´(x, y) 
 co-occurrence         Companion 
           (x ∧ z) 
 
 be-with´ (z, x)           Non-predicative with   
As far as without is concerned, I equally assume that the predicative use 
of without is more basic and that it can be modelled according to the 
same logic. This is given in (35).  
(35)      ¬ Instrument/implement 
¬ Spatio-temporal   ∧ NOT use´ (x, y) 
   co-occurrence     
  ¬ Companion 
    
       NOT be-with´ (z, x)   Non-predicative without   
The driver of these grammaticalization clines can be argued to be rough-
ly of the same type of metaphoric extension I referred to earlier (cf. Lu-
raghi 2014, Lakoff & Johnson 1980a & b, Stolz 1996): Being together with 
someone in the same location (more precisely: spatio-temporal co-
occurrence) is considered as a prototypical prerequisite to doing some-
thing together. Prototypical instrumentality can be seen a wielder and a 
tool being together in the same location and doing something together 
(in a more general sense). This line of reasoning can be traced to Lakoff 
& Johnson’s work on metaphors and more particularly on the metaphor 
where instruments are essentially treated as companions (Lakoff & John-
son 1980b: 135ff.). In the European languages, the historical shift from 
comitative to instrument is commonplace and well-documented (Narrog 
2014: 76) and the extension from location to comitative is also a well-
established fact (Ibid.: 74). Stolz (1996) provides evidence in favor of lan-
guages extending instrumental morphology to include comitative  
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functions rather than the other way around. This presents many prob-
lems for the claimed universality of Lakoff & Johnson’s instrument-as-
companion metaphor. Yet, Heine (1991), amongst others, has found evi-
dence in favor of grammaticalization clines from many different source 
domains extending to instrumentality. Be that as it may, the extension 
from companionship to instrumentality is well established for the Indo-
European languages and especially for the SAE-languages (Stolz 1996: 
120) which are the core of this dissertation.  
8.3 Passive construction with an instrument 
Instrument constructions can also be passivized. Consider the examples 
in (36). 
(36) a. Jack cut down the tree with the axe. 
 b. The tree was cut down by Jack with the axe. 
 c. The tree was cut down with the axe.  
The passive construction in (36b) is fairly straightforward from an RRG 
point of view. Passivization is treated in terms of PSA-modulation and 
argument modulation (Van Valin 2005: 116). That is to say, the PSA as-
signment is marked in that the lowest-ranking argument rather than the 
highest-ranking one is selected (in accusative systems). Argument modu-
lation concerns the non-canonical realization of a macrorole argument. 
For English, this includes omitting it ((36c)), or realizing it in a by-PP as 
in (36b). In both (36b) and (36c), the actor (Jack) is modulated. Semanti-
cally, however, Jack, is still the instigator in the LS, meaning that the 
instrument does not change semantically or syntactically. Essentially, 
the same constructional schema can be posited as for ordinary passives, 
proposed by Van Valin (2005: 132). No reference is made to the instru-
ment, resulting in the standard application of the linking algorithm. In 
other words, the occurrence of the instrument follows from general 
principles and does not need to be specified in any way. The schema for 
a plain English passive (in an adapted form) is given in table 28. 
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Construction: English passive construction  
Syntax: template: -1 core slots  
PSA: Undergoer arg. in terms of AUH 
Linking: (1) PSA modulation (voice) 
                (2) Arg. modulation: Actor arg. omitted or in      
peripheral by-PP 
Morphology: Verb: Past participle 
AUX: be 
Semantics: PSA is not instigator of state of affairs but affected by it 
Pragmatics: IF: unspecified 
Focus structure: no restrictions; PSA = topic (default) 
Table 28: English passive construction. 
Sentences including implements can also be passivized: 
(37) a. Abdul ate soup with a spoon. 
 b. Soup was eaten by Abdul with a spoon. 
 c. do´ (Abdul, [eat´ (Abdul, soup) ∧ use´ (Abdul, spoon)]) 
             A               U         NMR 
Similar to instruments, the implement is not affected by any element in 
the constructional schema. As both instruments and implements are 
unaffected by passivization, the plain constructional schema suffices. 
Even though it bears a slightly different name, the schema in table 28 is 
the basic one for English. In Dutch, passivizing the sentence with an 
instrument is only really acceptable if the passive agent is not omitted 
((38b)). This information can be stored in a schema, detailing that the 
passive agent must (or should) be present. The sentences in (38) are the 
Dutch versions of those in (36). 
(38) a. Jan vel-de de boom met   
  Jan cut down-PST.3SG DEF tree with   
  een bijl.      
  INDEF axe      
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   b. De boom werd ge-vel-d  
  DEF tree AUX\PST.3SG PTCP-cut down-PTCP  
 
  door Jan met een bijl. 
  through Jan with INDEF axe 
 
  c. */?De boom werd ge-vel-d 
  DEF tree AUX\PST.3SG PTCP-cut down-PTCP 
 
  met een bijl. 
  with INDEF axe 
8.4 Passive ISA construction 
In chapter 6, an approach to ISA as a construction was explored. Follow-
ing general construction grammar practice, I assume that constructions 
can be combined into more complex constructions that compound the 
characteristics of their components. A typical ISA example from chapter 
6 has been repeated in (39). 
(39) a. Jack cut the bread with the knife. 
 b. [do´ (Jack, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (knife, Ø)] CAUSE  
          A+PSA         NMR 
   [BECOME cut´ (bread)]] 
                U  
 c. The knife cut the bread. 
 d. [do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (knife, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
  cut´ (bread)]]  A+PSA 
              U   
The passivized version of ISA is just that: It is essentially an ISA-
construction (see table 22) combined with the passive construction as it 
was given in table 28. Rather than selecting the actor-argument, the un-
dergoer is selected as the PSA. This is given in (40). 
(40) a. The bread was cut by the knife. 
 b.  [do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (knife, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME 
   cut´ (bread)]]    A 
      U+PSA  
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My informants are divided with respect to the acceptability of the pas-
sive ISA construction. Only slightly more than half the native speakers 
accept it. Assuming that the construction is possible, its constructional 
schema is given in table 29. 
Construction: English passive instrument as actor construction  
Syntax: template: -1 core slots 
PSA:  Undergoer arg. in terms of AUH 
Linking: (1) PSA modulation (voice) 
              (2) Arg. modulation: Actor arg. omitted or in        
peripheral by-PP 
Morphology: PSA: no explicit morphology 
Verb: Past participle 
           AUX: be 
Semantics: (1) x-argument of initial do´ is unspecified 
(2) Actor-macrorole is assigned to highest specified x-
argument of do´ 
(3) highest specified x-argument of do´ must have min-
imum actional status as defined by the argument posi-
tion 
(4) PSA is not instigator of state of affairs but affected 
by it 
Pragmatics: (1) Undergoer is topic, instrument-effector is back-
grounded 
(2) Natural Event Condition must be met 
Table 29: English passive instrument as actor construction. 
8.5 Instrument unaccusative construction 
Webb (2008: 71ff.) explores an instrument-like construction which he 
calls the instrument unaccusative construction, which has hardly been 
discussed in the literature at all. An example is given in (41a). It is neces-
sary to point out that, by a large margin, more than half of the native 
speakers I consulted unambiguously reject this construction. This could 
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account for the sporadic attention in the literature for it. Furthermore, it 
does not fit naturally with the theory of instruments in general and with 
RRG. Nevertheless, as the construction is discussed in the literature and 
considered grammatical by a not insignificant number of people, I will 
follow Webb’s own native speaker judgments and provide an RRG-based 
account. As the name implies, it is essentially an unaccusative construc-
tion with an instrument. Consider: 
(41) a. The door opened with the key. (Webb 2008: 71) 
 b. The door opened. 
 c. BECOME open´ (door) 
 d. John opened the door with the key. 
 e. John acted on the key, causing it to open the door. 
 f. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE  
 [BECOME open´ (door)]] 
I assume that the more basic (41b) is an intransitive accomplishment as it 
passes the relevant aktionsart-tests. The corresponding LS is given in 
(41c). In the sentence in (41d), key is clearly an instrument as it passes 
the relevant paraphrase ((41e)). The corresponding LS is given in (41f). 
The occurrence of an instrument in (41a) is somewhat confusing when 
contrasting it to (41e) and (41f). As RRG does not posit deletions or simi-
lar devices, the LSs and the linkings in (42) are inadmissible for (41a). 
(42) a. [do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME  
 open´ (door)]]              A+PSA 
            U 
 b. [do´ (John, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE  
         A         NMR 
 [BECOME open´ (door)]] 
                               U+PSA 
 c. [do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME  
  open´ (door)]]      A 
              U + PSA      
 d. The key opened the door. 
 e. The door was opened with the key by John.  
 f. The door was opened by the key. 
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 g. *[do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME  
    open´ (door)]]    NMR  
               A  
The LS in (42a) links to the ISA-sentence in (42d), (42b) links to the pas-
sive instrument construction in (42e) and the LS in (42c) links to the 
passive version of ISA in (42f). The LS in (42g) is incorrect because it 
violates the AUH. A reasonable solution for (41a) is to posit the base LS 
in (41c), but with key included. The only plausible way to do this is to 
include an implement, as the causal paraphrase cannot even be applied 
due to verb’s intransitivity. Consider the LS for (41a) in (43a) and a sec-
ond example and its LS ((43b–43c)). 
(43) a. BECOME open´ (door) ∧ do´ (Ø, [use´ (Ø, key)]) 
 b. The window broke with a hammer. (Chomsky 1972: 170) 
 c. BECOME broken´ (window) ∧ do´ (Ø, [use´ (Ø,  
  hammer)]) 
The implement-section of the LS has to include an activity-component as 
implements can only be added to activity predicates. The x-argument of 
do´ and use´ is unspecified. The marking of the implement is captured 
by the rule in (5): In (43c), hammer cannot be assigned actorhood. From 
the point of view of the whole LS, that would violate the AUH as the 
‘actor’ ranks lower than the undergoer. If one were to argue that the 
second do´ is sufficient to produce a ‘new’ actor, then the linking would 
assign it the PSA and link it to a plain transitive sentence with a causal 
chain. I assume, following the practice of the previous sections that MR-
assignment concerns the whole chain including the use-predicate. In this 
case, the intransitive nature of (43b) prohibits an actor, leaving the x-
argument of do´ unspecified. There are two potential candidates for 
undergoerhood (window and hammer). As window is selected, hammer is 
marked by with as the rule in (5) would predict. At this point, I wish to 
reiterate that many native speakers of English do not accept this con-
struction. In Dutch ((44a–44b)) and German ((44c–44d)), this construc-
tion is utterly ungrammatical. 
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(44) a. *De deur open-de zich met de sleutel. 
    DEF key open-PST.3SG REFL with DEF key 
   ‘The door opened with the key.’ 
 b. *Het raam brak met de hamer. 
    DEF window break\PST.3SG with DEF hammer 
    ‘The window broke with the hammer.’ 
 c. *Die Tür öffne-te (sich) mit dem  
   DEF door open-PST.3SG (REFL) with DEF  
   Schlüssel.       
   key       
  ‘The door opened with the key.’ 
 d. *Das Fenster zerbrach mit dem Hammer. 
   DEF window break\PST.3SG with DEF hammer. 
   ‘The window broke with the hammer.’ 
8.6 Middle construction with an instrument 
In chapter 6, the difference between ability-readings and middle con-
structions was addressed. The middle construction I explored did not 
feature an instrument, yet it is sometimes possible to include one. I have 
given a more basic middle construction in (45a) with its LS in (45b). Due 
to RRG’s inherent flexibility, including an instrument is unproblematic 
as the example in (45c) and its LS in (45d) illustrate. 
(45) a. This glass breaks easily. 
 b. be´ ([[do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME broken´ (glass)]],  
  [easy´]) 
 c. This glass breaks easily with a hammer.    
  (Schäfer 2008: 2) 
d. be´ ([[do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (hammer, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME broken´ (glass)]]], [easy´]) 
The x-argument of be´ has been expanded into a full causal chain, albeit 
with an unspecified instigator. Why do I posit a causal chain here but 
not in the LS for (41a)? There are two reasons for this: First, the  
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‘unaccusative’ construction does not imply an instigator, whereas the 
middle construction, by its very nature, does (Stalmaszczyk 1993: 135). 
This is also evidenced by Van Valin & LaPolla’s (1997: 417) proposal to 
include an unspecified x-argument of the initial do´. Second, the aktion-
sart tests clearly identify the ‘unaccusative’ open as an accomplishment, 
whereas the transitive break tests as a causative accomplishment.   
Middle constructions with implements are not as prevalent. Consider: 
(46) a. ?This book reads easily with glasses. 
 b. ?This soup eats easily with a spoon. 
 c. ?These birds are easily watched with binoculars. 
One reason for this is that base LSs of the verbs do not have the full 
causal structure that the ones in (45) have. As was explored in section 
8.2.1, implements are licensed by the telic quale of the referent. It ap-
pears that this quale-based licensing is not readily compatible with mid-
dle constructions. It can be theorized that LSs functioning as arguments 
of middle constructions cannot take non-causal LS expansions like use´ 
or be-with´. Attempts to include the latter also produces questionable 
results: 
(47) a. *This glass breaks easily with the goldfish. 
 b. ??be´ ([[do’ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME broken´  
  (glass)]], [easy´]) ∧ be-with´ (goldfish, glass) 
 c. ??be´ ([[do´ (Ø, Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME broken´  
  (glass)]], [easy´]) ∧ be-with´ (goldfish, [[do´ (Ø, Ø)] 
  CAUSE [BECOME broken´ (glass)]]) 
Typical comitatives are obviously incompatible with middle construc-
tions, as they are by definition without an instigator. Middle construc-
tions are much less common (and acceptable) in Dutch than in English 
and the inclusion of an instrument is quite ungrammatical: 
(48) a. Dit glas breek-t makkelijk. 
  DEM glass break-PRS.3SG easily 
  ‘This glass breaks easily.’   
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 b. *Dit glas breek-t makkelijk met   
  DEM glass break-PRS.3SG easily with   
  een hamer.      
  INDEF hammer      
  ‘This glass breaks easily with a hammer.’ 
 c. ??Dit boek lees-t makkelijk. 
  DEM book read-PRS.3SG easily 
  ‘This book reads easily.’ 
 d. *Dit boek lees-t makkelijk met   
  DEM book read-PRS.3SG easily with   
  een bril.      
  INDEF glasses      
  ‘This book reads easily with glasses.’ 
8.7 Impossible structures 
In this section, I briefly discuss two impossible sentences featuring in-
struments. The reason for their impossibility is found in the logical 
structures, and more precisely, in violations of linking principles. Con-
sider: 
(49) a. *The key opened the door by Jack. (Webb 2008: 67) 
 b. [do´ (Jack, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE  
  [BECOME open´ (door)]] 
 c. The door was opened by Jack with the key.  
In (49a), PSA-assignment is violated. The PSA is assigned to the instru-
ment argument. This is only possible if the highest-ranking argument 
(Jack) is omitted from the LS, which would constitute a case of ISA. By 
keeping the slot lexically filled, either it or the lowest-ranking argument 
can be assigned the PSA. The latter option is given in (49c). As key is 
neither the highest nor the lowest argument in (49a), it cannot be select-
ed as PSA. In other words, English does not allow intermediate effectors 
to be selected as PSA if the instigator is lexically filled. It is true that 
English generally does not allow NMRs as PSA, but there are some  
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varieties of English that do (Hudson 1992: 257). An example of this is 
given in (50e).  
(50) a. Todd gave the pad to Michael. 
  A+PSA    U    NMR 
 b. Todd gave Michael the pad. 
  A + PSA      U   NMR 
 c. The pad was given to Michael by Todd. 
   U+PSA    NMR           A 
 d. Michael was given the pad by Todd. 
       U + PSA     NMR         A 
 e. The pad was given Michael by Todd. 
  NMR + PSA     U       A 
In (50c), the undergoer is assigned PSA-hood as it is the passivized ver-
sion of (50a). The example in (50d) has the added complexity that it has 
undergone dative shift. In other words, (50d) is the passivized version of 
(50b), rather than of (50a). The example in (50e) is also a passivized ver-
sion of (50b), but with the NMR selected as PSA. This is only possible in 
a subset of English varieties (Hudson 1992: 257). 
Examples like the one in (51a) are ungrammatical. There are two pos-
sible (but wrong) LSs for (51a). They are given in (51b–51c). 
(51) a. *The key opened the door with Jack. 
 b. *[do´ (Jack, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE 
        NMR          A 
   [BECOME open´(door)]] 
       U  
 c. *[do´ (key, Ø)] CAUSE [[do´ (Jack, Ø)] CAUSE 
         A                    NMR 
   [BECOME open´ (door)]] 
       U 
The LS in (51b) is inadmissible because the AUH is violated: The inter-
mediate argument is selected as actor, which is not allowed. In (51c), the 
AUH is not violated, but actionality restrictions are violated: Key is 
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simply too low on the actionality scale to occupy the initial x-argument 
position.  
8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the linking of the concepts discussed in previous 
chapters. The central question of this chapter can therefore be stated in 
RRG-terms: How are the components in the LSs related to the constitu-
ent projection? I posited linking rules to account for instruments and 
causees in the same sentence. French was chosen as a language of illus-
tration because 1) the relevant sentences are instances of nuclear cosub-
ordination (i.e. they behave like simple sentences as far as linking is con-
cerned) and 2) French has clear differential causee-marking, driven by 
differences in the strength of causation.  
A proposal was also made to account for non-predicative without, 
which is assumed to be the marker for potential instruments, imple-
ments and the absence of an attribute. The rule governing non-
predicative without is a very specific one and could potentially conflict 
with the more basic with-rule. To account for the ordering of both rules, 
I proposed to follow the Paninian principle which states that the more 
specific of two rules applies in case both are possible. Predicative with 
and without, on the other hand, are unproblematic as the occurrence of 
the prepositions in the morphosyntax is explained by their predicative 
nature.  
Furthermore, I explored some of the less typical occurrences of in-
struments. It was shown that passives containing instruments are cap-
tured with the same constructional schema as a normal passive (at least 
in English) because the instrument-effector is unaffected by the con-
struction. The passive version of ISA, on the other hand, was captured 
by combining the constructional schema for ISA with the basic schema 
for plain passives. Middle constructions with instruments are fairly 
straightforward as they obey the same principles as normal middle con-
structions. However, it was shown that middle constructions with im-
plements are generally disfavored. An account for the instrument unac-
cusative construction was provided, even though this construction is 
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considered by many to be unnatural and ungrammatical. Because it re-
ceives some attention in the literature, it was investigated in this chap-
ter. 
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9 Conclusion: A semantic-syntactic 
landscape for instruments and 
related concepts 
In the introduction, I put forward three goals for this thesis: 1) To ex-
plore the status of instruments in linguistic theory and provide answers 
to problems connected to instruments, 2) to deepen RRG’s approach to 
these concepts and 3) to contribute to the further development of RRG as 
a theory. 
An overview of theories of instruments was presented in chapter 3 
along with several problems that these analyses are confronted with. 
Theories of instruments are usually faced with two major problems: 1) 
The role is poorly defined and understudied, and, 2) ISA is an alternation 
that is difficult to account for in a systematic way.  I have argued in fa-
vor of keeping RRG’s distinction between the causally embedded instru-
ments and the non-causally embedded implements. However, I have ar-
gued against using ISA as a diagnostic tool to distinguish between these 
types, as the universality of the LSs would be called into question. This 
makes ISA untenable as a diagnostic tool. Rather, a paraphrase was pro-
posed (see section 9.3) that aims at making causal embedding (or the 
absence thereof) explicit. The exploration of instruments in chapter 3 
revealed that there are several related concepts. These are either related 
semantically or superficially with causees as an example of the former 
and comitatives of the latter. In particular, the logical structures and 
RRG’s linking algorithm (as explored in chapter 2) were used to capture 
these phenomena. In doing so, I deepened RRG’s account of instruments 
and at the same time contributed to its ongoing development: I intro-
duced the actionality scale as an addition to qualia theory, provided up-
dated versions of predicative with and without (cf. Farrell 2009) and I 
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drew up linking rules for causees taking instruments (in simple cores). In 
addition, variations to established phenomena, such as comitatives, were 
explored. In the introduction, it was established that instruments are 
intimately connected to the concept of causation. To explore the nature 
of causation in relation to instruments, a proposal was made to integrate 
Force Dynamics with RRG’s logical structures. I attempted to merge 
these frameworks by treating the variables in the LSs as participants in a 
force dynamic-configuration. In turn, the subevents in the causal chain 
can feature as the participants in a higher-level configuration. This latter 
approach played a crucial role in my analysis of the semantics behind 
the non-causally embedded implement. In particular, a very specific type 
of causation called helping (cf. Wolff 2014, Talmy 2000) was posited. 
The actionality scale was introduced primarily to analyze the behavior 
of instruments and implements in terms of a revised form of animacy, 
combined with autonomy.  Simply put, autonomy refers to the degree of 
control a referent requires to perform an action. The actionality scale is 
an axis-system that uses the animacy and autonomy hierarchies as axes. 
This allows one to situate referents in regions of semantic space and al-
lows for a characterization of the portions of semantic space that argu-
ment slots in the LS have access to. For instance, instigator argument 
slots in the causal chain typically require referents that rank higher on 
the actionality scale. 
Actionality is central in the explanation of the instrument-subject al-
ternation. In addition to causal embedding, ISA can only take place if the 
argument’s referent is high enough on the actionality scale relative to 
the predicate’s requirements. The occurrence of ISA is also contextually 
governed. I argued in favor of a new type of naturalness condition to 
rule out implausible instigators. If there is no plausible instigator, then 
the referent in question occupies the initial position in the LS and it is 
not under the scope of some kind of implicit instigator. It was also illus-
trated that ISA is strongly language-specific. Some languages disallow 
the construction completely (e.g. Japanese) whereas some allow for it 
fairly productively (e.g. English). Still others (e.g. German) allow for a 
phenomenon that is superficially similar to ISA, but in fact expresses the 
ability of a referent to perform an action. In addition to an account for 
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ISA in terms of a constructional schema, I proposed an ability-operator 
and a generic operator in the LS to capture phenomena superficially 
similar to ISA.  
The nature of the argument’s causal relationship with the other com-
ponents of the LS plays an important role with respect to the distinction 
between instruments and implements. In addition to maintaining RRG’s 
distinction between implements and instruments, I have argued that 
implements are arguments whose embedding subevent has a very specif-
ic causal relationship with another subevent. This relationship has been 
called helping and a very specific force dynamic configuration was pro-
posed for it (figure 47). In addition, four generalized causative relations 
were posited as neutralizations of more basic causation types as pro-
posed by Talmy (2000). These relations were introduced to replace the 
single causal operator CAUSE with four more specific operators, thereby 
providing a more detailed, practical account of causation that can direct-
ly be used in the logical structures. For example, instruments are always 
under the scope of the strongest type of causation, direct causation. Cau-
sees, by contrast, can be under the scope of both direct and indirect cau-
sation. A reason for this is the semantic status of their referents: Causees 
are typically human and anthropomorphic entities rank near the top of 
the actionality scale. Instruments, on the other hand, rank much lower 
on the actionality scale. Thus, certain portions of semantic space seem to 
correlate with the type of causation that such arguments are found un-
der the scope of. Roughly speaking, higher-ranking referents will be 
under the scope of direct causation less often than lower-ranking ones. 
9.1 Summary of instrument-like concepts 
I have explored several related concepts: instruments, implements, cau-
sees, forces, pseudo-agents, comitatives, inanimate comitatives, false 
inanimate comitatives and potentials. These concepts were explored 
either because 1) they are semantically related or 2) their expressions 
consistently share marking cross-linguistically with each other. A sum-
mary of the concepts explored in this dissertation is given in table 30. It 
lists the concepts with a general classification, a typical actionality level 
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(if applicable) and the canonical LS-configuration the concept occurs in 
or with. Ranges of actionality levels are difficult to indicate precisely. 
Therefore, broad labels have been given.  
 Classification Actionality Canonical LS-
configuration 
Instrument Effector  
subtype 
Low-Mid CAUSE [do´ (x, 
Ø)] … 
Implement y-argument of 
use´ 
Low-Mid ∧ use´ (x, y) 
Causee Effector  
subtype 
High CAUSE/IND [do´ 
(x, Ø)] … 
Force Effector  
subtype 
Para-
autonomous 
[do´ (x, Ø)] 
CAUSE… 
Pseudo-agent Class of  
referent 
Mid-high [do´ (x, Ø)] 
CAUSE…  
CAUSE [do´ (x, 
Ø)] … 
Comitative  Linking  
option 
High (x ∧ y) 
Undergoer 
comitative 
Linking  
option 
Low-Mid (x ∧ y) 
NMR  
comitative 
Linking  
option 
Variable (x ∧ y) 
Inanimate 
comitative 
Spatio-
temporal  
co-occurrence 
Low-Mid ∧ be-with´ (z, x) 
False  
inanimate 
comitative 
Phrasal  
extraposition 
Variable have´ (x, y) 
 
Potential 
comitative 
Non-occurrent Variable ∧ NOT be-with´ 
(z, x) 
Potential  
implement 
Negated y-
argument of 
use´ 
Low-Mid ∧ NOT use´ (x, y) 
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Potential  
instrument 
Negated y-
argument of 
use´ 
Low-Mid ∧ NOT use´ (x, y) 
Potential false 
inanimate 
comitative 
Phrasal  
extraposition 
Variable NOT have´ (x, y) 
 
Conjoined 
instrument 
(symmetrical) 
Double  
effector 
Low-Mid CAUSE [do´ (x ∧ 
y, Ø)] … 
Conjoined 
instrument 
(asymmetrical) 
Double  
effector 
Low-mid CAUSE [do´ (x ∧ 
y, Ø)] … 
+ Qualia annota-
tion 
Conjoined 
implement 
Double y-
argument of 
use´ 
Low-mid ∧ use´ (x, y ∧ z) 
ISA Construction Predicate 
dependent 
Initial x-argument 
unspecified (see 
schema) 
Ability  
reading 
Construction Irrelevant Obligatory ABIL-
operator in LS 
(see schema) 
Generic  
reading 
Construction Irrelevant Obligatory GEN-
operator in LS 
(see schema) 
Table 30: Overview of concepts explored in this dissertation. 
9.2 Summary of expanded causation 
Apart from the concepts summarized in table 30, I have explored causa-
tion from the point of view of Force Dynamics. More specifically, I have 
argued in favor of recognizing four types of causation, represented with 
different operators in the logical structures, defined over two independ-
ent features. A summary of this is given in table 31. 
9   Conclusion: A semantic-syntactic landscape for instruments and related concepts 
362 
 
 
 
 
 [+direct] [-direct] 
[+impingement] Direct (CAUSE) Indirect (IND) 
[-impingement] Enabling (LET) Permissive  
(ALLOW) 
Table 31: Matrix table of causation types. 
Table 31 summarizes the interaction between the two participants rele-
vant in Force Dynamics: the agonist and antagonist. [±direct] refers to 
the nature of the interaction: Is the interaction direct or indirect? A pro-
totypical example of the former would be direct physical manipulation 
of an antagonist with respect to an agonist (say, a lumberjack wielding 
an axe). Indirect forms of causation include verbal commands or psycho-
social pressure. [+impingement] refers to whether the interaction be-
tween the two participants is permanent or begins, whereas  
[-impingement] refers to the absence or cessation of interaction. Each 
type of causation in table 31 has a characteristic, corresponding force 
dynamic configuration. These were given in figure 49. If the nature of 
causation is kept underspecified I proposed to use the italicized operator 
CAUSE. The type of causation called helping is not included in the matrix 
of causation types. Rather, it is considered much weaker than the types 
summarized in table 31. Figure 51 illustrated this graphically: Helping 
occupies one end of the scale whereas direct, indirect, enabling and per-
missive causation occupy the other (stronger) end of the scale. 
9.3 Overview of tests 
Throughout this dissertation, I have proposed and employed a number of 
diagnostics. Many tests (e.g. aktionsart-tests) are commonly used in the 
literature and in RRG. They will not be repeated here. The most promi-
nent diagnostic in this thesis is the one that identifies instruments, set-
ting them apart from implements. It is given in (1a).  I have argued 
against using ISA as a test. Rather, the test in (1a) essentially makes the 
logical structure explicit in that it provides a direct translation of it. The 
assumed causal embedding of the target argument is explicitly tested for. 
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If the argument in question passes the test, then the target is meaning-
fully causally embedded and it is an instrument-effector. If it does not, 
there is no causal embedding and the target argument is an implement. 
That is, it is a y-argument of a use´-predicate and not an effector. The 
test in (1a) positively identifies instruments and negatively identifies 
implements. To positively identify implements, two tests can be used in 
conjunction. They are given in (1b–1c). The test in (1b) separates the use 
of the target argument from the other subevent(s). As the subevent con-
taining instruments cannot be meaningfully separated from the rest, this 
generates bizarre results in the case of instruments, thereby negatively 
identifying them. The use of ‘and simultaneously’ can thus also be con-
sidered as a method to make the relevant section of the LS explicit. The 
test in (1c) isolates the more fundamental helping-type causation. The 
choice of verb is important in this respect as facilitate seems to be a pur-
er reflection of the underlying force dynamic-configuration than, for 
example, help. Instruments fail this test, because they are not involved in 
helping causation. Rather, they are under the scope of direct causation. 
(1) a. X acted on Y, causing it to V. 
 b. X V-ed and simultaneously used Y. 
 c. Y facilitated the V-ing. 
The main tests to identify the prototypical comitatives test for what has 
been termed co-authorhood. Consider: 
(2) a. X and Y V-ed. 
 b. X V-ed with Y. 
 c. Y V-ed with X. 
The test in (2a) tests whether both components can occur as a conjoined 
actor. This is only possible if the actionality of both referents is similar 
enough. The ability to occur with alternative coding is tested for by (2b–
2c), along with the interchangeability of the arguments. If the tests in (2) 
are passed, co-authorhood is present. The ability to occur with alterna-
tive coding ((2b–2c)) is only possible if the actionality status of the refer-
ents is almost identical (cf. chapter 4). In case of undergoer- and NMR-
comitatives, the test in (2a) is irrelevant as it tests for the ability to occur 
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as an actor. However, similar tests can be easily derived that follow the 
same line of thought: The arguments in question must be able to occupy 
the same position in the logical structures. In case of undergoer-
comitatives, for example, both components must be able to receive the 
undergoer macrorole separately and when conjoined. In addition, they 
must be interchangeable without a difference in meaning.  
As is the case with all linguistic tests, these tests have to be adapted to 
the language under investigation. For instance, English has a verb that 
very specifically conveys the helping-relation (facilitate). Dutch, by con-
trast, does not have a direct equivalent.  
9.4 Future research 
The primary goal of this dissertation has been the exploration of a set of 
concepts at the syntax-semantics interface. Throughout this dissertation, 
examples have been drawn from a modest set of languages. A logical 
extension of this work is to perform a comprehensive survey of these 
phenomena in a much larger selection of languages. Because most inves-
tigated languages are Indo-European, exploring the other macro-families 
is an interesting and necessary new perspective. 
In section 4.5, I proposed a very preliminary multiple inheritance hi-
erarchy analysis of the semantic range that the actionality scale cap-
tures. The tree-structure in figure 38 can serve as a starting point to 
translate the actionality scale into the CRC’s frame model. Furthermore, 
the hierarchy is potentially well-suited for an optimality theoretical ap-
proach. Optimality theory could prove to be an invaluable method to 
determine which concepts and features take priority. Using optimality 
theory, it could be determined whether or not argument positions are 
more sensitive to particular features than to others. For example, can one 
feature be sufficient for the referent to fill the slot under investigation? If 
there are several defining features (e.g. [+sentient] and [+organization]), 
is one of them a sufficient criterion for the argument slot or are both 
required? In other words, do some features outrank others? A frame 
approach could then be used to discover why such priority relations 
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exist. Are there further entailment relations? For instance, does 
[+organization] always entail that the referent is [+animate]?  
A third interesting avenue for future research is the integration of the 
force dynamic configurations proposed in this dissertation into the 
frame semantic approach as developed in the CRC 991. As Löbner (2014, 
2015) considers frames to be the universal format of human cognition, 
how can FD-configurations be translated into frames? Is each of the par-
ticipants simply a node in the frame? If yes, how can the concept of 
open-ended generativity be accounted for? How can the features of 
[±impingement] and [±direct] be translated? Furthermore, as instru-
ments and implements are distinguished over different types of causa-
tion and as there is cross-linguistic evidence to support the instrument-
implement distinction, some difference in the frames must present itself. 
The integration of Force Dynamics and RRG proposed in this disserta-
tion is by no means exhaustive or final. It is a useful proposal to capture 
the behavior of instruments and implements but there is still a great deal 
of work to be done before the integration of these frameworks can be 
considered complete. For instance, the notions of permissive and ena-
bling causation were not directly relevant for the topic of this disserta-
tion. Apart from drawing up a configuration for them, they were only 
explored to a limited degree. Likewise, the neutralization of the subtypes 
of causation to the generalized causative relations (figure 50) is only a 
first step and needs to be explored in more detail. Are all the basic causa-
tive types Talmy proposes distinct from one another? Is there overlap 
between them? Furthermore, are there cross-linguistic correlations as far 
as juncture-nexus relations are concerned in connection to the four 
GCRs? For instance, are permissive and enabling causation always ex-
pressed with weaker linkage than direct and indirect causation? Do lan-
guages exhibit major marking differences between direct and indirect 
causation on the one hand and permissive and enabling causation on the 
other? 
This dissertation set out to resolve some of the longstanding, but un-
derstudied issues concerning instruments, especially the instrument-
subject alternation. Using RRG and Force Dynamics, I have provided a 
proposal that captures the behavior of instruments with respect to ISA. 
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Furthermore, the integration of FD and RRG has allowed for an alterna-
tive analysis of the weaker causal relation that the implement has with 
the rest of the logical structure. 
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Appendix: Figures 
This appendix contains three figures that were too cumbersome and 
large to be integrated into the main text. The numbering of the figures 
has been kept in line with that of the others, so as to maintain text-
internal consistency.  
Figure 20 is Van Valin and Wilkins’ (1996: 314–315) representation of 
the relation between agency and the referent’s properties. It employs 
two interrelated, yet distinct hierarchies (Van Valin and Wilkins 1996: 
313 & 316): 1) a saliency hierarchy which ranks entities according to the 
likelihood of them being interpreted as agent when placed in an actional 
event and 2) an animacy hierarchy with various degrees of animate enti-
ties (with prototypical animates near one end of the scale). 
Figure 29 represents one of Grimm’s (2005 & 2013) two proposed lat-
tices. He posits a more basic agency lattice and an agency-animacy lat-
tice, the latter being a combination of the former with a typical animacy 
hierarchy. The agency lattice is compiled from the features instigation, 
motion, sentience, volition and persistence, some of which are inspired by 
Dowty’s proto-role properties (Grimm 2005: 20). The agency lattice is 
given in figure 29. Figure 30 is the combined agency-animacy lattice. For 
the construction of the animacy hierarchy, Grimm proposes a combina-
tion of features, compiled into a lattice-like structure (Grimm 2013: 5–6). 
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Figure 20: Top section of the saliency scale proposed by Van Valin & 
Wilkins (1996: 314-315). 
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 Figure 29: Grimm’s (2013: 4) agency lattice. 
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Figure 30: The combined agency-animacy lattice (Grimm 2013: 6). 
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